ML19249B080
| ML19249B080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1979 |
| From: | Donaldson D, Essig T, Marsh R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290579 | |
| Download: ML19249B080 (81) | |
Text
l t
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
In the Matter of:
2:
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3i of Mr. Thomas L. Mulleavy Radiation Protection 4:
Supervisor
\\
I Si 0l 1
7!
8!
Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletcwn, Pennsylvania 11!
April 24, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) r 13!
June 21, 1979 (Date Transcriot Typeo) 14i 73 and 74 15!
(Tape Numcer(s))
16i l
17 181 19j 20!
21i NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Dale E. Donaldson 23; Thomas H. Essig Bob Marsh 2 *. :
ggg' )jg i
l 25' I
i i
1
I i
i
(
Marie i
s l
li i
2{
l 3i i
e 4!
Si 61 I
7 i
8 9l 10i 892 220 11!
t i
12l 131 14' 15:
16!
17!
t 18i 19' 20!
21l 22'h 23l 24I i
i 25!
I I
f
i
-l I
l I
I MARSH:
The date is April 24.
The time is 11:35 p.m.
This is Bob Marsh 1!,
2l speaking.
I am an investigator with the U.S. NRC assigned to Region 3 i
3f office out of Chicago, Illinois.
We are currently at the Three Mile Island 4l site and we are about to commence an interview of Mr. Thorras Mulleavy.
Sj Before we start I would like the other two individuals at the table here to introduce themselves.
If you would, gentlemen, spell your last name, and 6
7l!
give your job title, and then, Tom, I would like you to do the same thing if you w uld.
Then at that point I have got some comments on th-lette-8 then we will begin.
g 10!
{
DONALDSON:
Dale E. Donaldson, Radiation Specialist, U.S. NRC, Region 1 12!
ESSIG:
Thomas H. Essig, Chief in the Environmental and Special Project 131 Section, U.S. NRC, Region 3 141 MULLEAVY:
Thomas L. Mulleavy, Radiation Protection Supervisor with Metro-politan Edison.
17j MARSH:
I thank you.
Tom, if I may, or if you prefer, Mr. Mulleavy, before 1Sl t
we turned the tape on, I have given you a two page memo and asked you to 191 look it over, and there were one or two questions at the end of that memo 20!
i which I do want to put on as a record.
The memo itself addresses, as you 21; i
have read, the purpose of the investigation and some of the ground rules 22l that we have read it into the record, and instead of reading them in I have t
23l asked you to look at the note; and to ease the transcript work, what we are 24 going to do is have this typed directly into transcript at this point.
At j
25!
892 221 l
I i
3 i
i yl MULLEAVY:
No, I understand the question and I have chosen not to have 2
someone present with me.
t 1
3t i
MARSH:
Fine, should you feel at any time that you would rather have someone 4;
come in with you just indicate, so that we will be glad to get someone in 5
I here.
6 7l MULLEAVY:
Yes sir.
8l 9l MARSH:
OK, at that point I would like to turn it over to Dale.
I think if 10!
things go as they have been going, we would like to get a little bit into 111 your background.
12l r
13!
DONALDSON:
First I guess I will start by thanking you for taking your time after your work day to speak with us, and I guess we will get right in to 15; it by having you just give os a little bit of your background and experience 16; in the nuclear field if you would.
17!
i 18f MULLEAVY:
Well, I began back in the early 60's on the NS Savannah project, 19' the first nuclear power merchant ship built at New York Shipbuilding in 20:
l Camde7, New Jersey.
From there, after spending six years with that parti-21l cular project I moved down to the Naval Nuclear Program with New York 22l l
Shipbuilding.
I spent three years in that particular project then moved to 23l Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power spent 8 ye:rs there, and joined this company 241 l
5 years ago.
2c; i
892 222 I
i
- l l
t
{
4 t
t 1l DONALDSON:
Thank you.
In yove current position with Metropolitan Edison 2,
as the radiation protectior. foreman, who is your immediata repervisor?
I 3f MULLEAVY:
Dick Dubiel.
4 Si 6j DONALDSON:
Would you please describe the individuals or organizations wno report to you in the line organization?
si, MULLEAVY:
As we said mentioned Dick Dubiel is my superviso, then I am the g
Radiation Protection Supervisor then I have four foremen mo egort to me.
101 They are radiation protection foremen we primarily had two in Unit 2, two in Unit I and 22 now technicians that we have.
12!
i 13l DONALDSON:
If you would describe any involvement you may have had in any 14,:
of the emergency planning activities or the development of any of the 15i rauiation protection or environmental monitoring programs at the Three Mile Island station.
181 MULLEAVY:
As far as the development in tne environmental monitoring programs, 19i no, that is handled out of the Reading Office and wa: well establishec 20!
before I joined the company.
My involvement is me ely on a ',aekly basis to 21l t
see that the technicians do go out through the foraman.
We send the techni-22!
cians out, we receive the results back from Telerlyne and those are then 23 l
sent by me onto the Reading Office after our revi3w.
Ti:e emergency plan I 241 I
have been involved in through the five years I have been here, in altering 25i 892' 223 L
I 6
l l!
MULLEAVY:
The morning of the 28, I was called at 7:00 a.m., by one of our 2
technicians who stated on the phone that there had been a problem at the 3j Island and that Dick DJbiel Wanted me there right away.
I dressed and got 4;
ready and I guess I arrived at the plant site at 25 or 20 of eight.
I went 5
to the office and there was no one there, so I want directly to the lab.
I f ur.d the ECS had already been established and took over the ECS as it had 6i been directed in training sessions that we do so.
We began to establish 7!
our communications, our communications had already been established with the contro! rooms,.
Unit I and Unit 2.
We had set up the " squawk" box g
between the offsite teams, the one that was going to be used for the offsite teams.
I tried to call over to Unit 2 to Dick Dubiel to see ' hat was going on and I did not receive a pass through the gate tronic system to get over to Unit 2.
So really, right away I did not know what had happened.
It had 131 i
crossed my mind that this was a drill.
I did not know for sure it was real 14:
when I first went into the plant.
But I was... (in driving through the North Gate, they waved me right through), did not see steam coming from Unit 2's towers so I knew that..., it had crossed my mind that it was a 17!
drill when I first came in, because we had jokingly said to Len Landry a ISI couple of days prior to that and he had said we really should have a drill 19:
I unannounced just for practice.
So I thougnt it might possibly have been a 20!
drill.
Hcwever, when I arrived in the HP control point which we had estab-21; lished in the ECS it was already in force and by the tone that was there I 22l l
realized, no, it was not a drill, it was an actual.
something had happened.
23l Although no one there could tell me exactly what had happened.
So going 24t" back I tried to call Dick Dubiel in Unit 2's control room and, no, we could 25i 892 224 l
{
l
{
7 i
flj not reach him, he would not respond or could not at the time I guess.
So i
2 we went ahead and began to establish our different teams and wrote them 3{
down on the board and so forth and got that squared away.
I can't tell you 4l the exact time it was reported that we started to have some problenis at the ECS.
Si The radiation levels were going up; we noted that the monitors, the personnel monitors devices there that we had for contamination control such 6
p as the portal monitor, and the hand and foot monitor, began to to go off so gj we instructed a couple of individuals to take some surveys araund the area gj and there was some confusion as to whether there were radiation levels, where they were coming from, and whether we had an airborne problem.
They started taking some air samples, at our direction to do so and before those ll; air samples were finished it was reported that we had somewhere I believe something like 50 mr per hour from the hallway, coming from the ECS.
I then directed individuais and told them that we would have to get ready for j
an evacuation of the ECS that they were to report to the Unit 2 control lb:
room where we would set un our secondary ECS.
I am not sure of the time 16:
~
when we actually evacuated.
It was due to a radiation level and we just were not sure where it was coming from.
It looked as thougn it was coming 181 from the sample room (which is right benind the wall that runs along the 191 ECS).
We evacuated everybody and told them to report via the turbine hall 20i to Unit 2's control room.
I waited for everybody to leave there.
Bob 21,'
McCar.n was one of the last to leave, and a couple of technicians.
They set 22l up residence at the entrance way from the control tower, Unit l's control 23!
tower to the entrance to the ECS.
Their instructions by me, from me, were 24 i
to prevent anyone from entering that carticular area and monitor that 25:
892 225 i
i
[
8 l
particular doorway to see how, if the levels were to continue to go up and i
i f
trying to determine just what was happening there.
We then went to the 2
3 control room, Unit 2, where I did have visual and verbal contact with Dick Oubiel because he was there.
He began to fill me in on little bits and 4
5 pieces of what he felt Jas happening.
From Unit 2's control room we began to dispense our teams and to start onsite/offsite teams and start into the 7
full scale investigation of on and offsite radiation levels, picking up the kits and so forth frem the processing center.
The teams were ready.
We 8j got cars and trucks and so fc1th ready to go and then they awaited further g
ns c
ns.
% M pacular pont, R was a rouWe.
I will say, 10 i
11.;
although, at the time thct we had practiced these particular drills during our last session and... it was Len Landry's idea to do so.. we had practiced 12!
I evacuation of the ECS and gone to the control room.
That helped this time, 131 I
because in actuality we had to do that, So it was not forei
.1 14:
~ to us to have to set up a residence in Unit 2's control room.
So through drills taking some off beat situations, it looks like an off beat situation did happen.
We were prepared for that particular evacuation from our normal 17' ECS to set up Unit 2's ECS and that was part of the drill session we had IS[
prior to this.
So going up to Unit 2 then we did begin to dispense indivi-19i duals.
It was easier that way because we could communicate direct then, 20!
had visual contact with Unit 2's control room, and could see what was 21!
happening and what their needs were rather than wait for communications to 22!
j happen, because they normally would do this from this set up of our ECS 23!
t from Unit 1.
At that particular time it seemed to go on and on, surprise 24j after surprise, of different areas that had to be monitored.
The wind i
25i 892 226 4
I
.I, l
9 lj seemed to shift back on us, it did not establish a pluma as we had normally 2
thought it would because the wind was so calm.
It seemed to come back on us repeatedly, and it was a long day.
4l DONALDSON:
All right.
Let me back up and ask a few questions regarding your arrival at the ECS, which means the Emergency Control Station, right?
01 7
MULLEAVY:
Correct.
81 9l DONALDSON:
Your arrival time at approximately 07:35, what other individuals
,gI I
were present in the ECS?
11.
12.
MULLEAVY:
Fred Huwe was there, Joe Deman was there.
I believe Mike Benson, 13i Dick Bensil, technicians, I can't tell you exactly right now what all the 14,,
technicians or who all the technicians were that were there.
We had auxiliary operators.
The, I can't remember right off hand right now what we had for emergency rescue team, although I know before we left we did have individuals 17 there who were going to take the emergency rescue team I can't remember the 1Si names at the moment, and wno they were, although the emergency rescue team 19i was established before we left the control station.
I do recall, I believe, 20!
Hiliary Mitchell was there and I can't remember anyone else.
21l 22!
DONALDSON:
I have a copy of an organizational chart out of the emergency 23!
procedures and what I would like to do is try to fill in some of the people 241 who were in these various positions if you can help do that.
Why don't we 25!
892 227
I f
10 i
l!
take a look at the repair party team.
Was that formed by the time you had i
arrived?
2; I
31 MULLEAVY:
I believe there was an individual there, whether it be Hilary Mitchell, I am not'sure, but there was an individual there.
The names had M
not been put on the board as far as the team being a functioning team.
Not m
at that time that I had arrived.
7 8l DONALDSON:
Was it formed subsequently?
9l 10l MULLEAVY:
Yes, it was.
2.1 ',
12!
I DONALDSON:
Who headed that team?
1 31, 14!
MULLEAVY:
I believe it was Hilary Mitchell.
151 15i DONALDSON:
Is he normally the supervisor of maintenance or what is his 17!
i normal title?
18i 19i MULLEAVY:
He is electrical supervisor.
20; 21l DONALDSON:
Would he be a normal individual who would head up the repair 22 party team?
23 892 '228 24l 25l l
l
.f
(
s
(
11 MULLEAVY:
Not normally, no.
1!
l 2;
I 3f DONALDSON:
Is he one of the alternates?
4[
5l MULLEAVY:
He could be an alternate, yes, because he is in the maintenance i
crew.
7 ONALDSON:
Dic he have anyone else on the team with him?
8 P
9l MULLEAVY:
When he arrived in the control room, Unit 2, I believe Dan 101 Shovlin.
11!
1 12l DONALDSON:
Looking down, do you recall whether or not--I believe the title 13l chemical supervisor is new a defunct title now, is it not?
14!
15, MULLEAVY:
We do not have a chemical supervisor.
We now have a Chemical Foreman.
17!
181 DONALDSON:
Who according to this organization was filling the position 19i which was formally designated as Chemical Supervisor?
20' 21j MULLEAVY:
Gary Reed.
22l i
23l j
DONALDSON:
Mr. Reed was here and available?
24, 2si 892 229
!I l
I
}
l l
12 1!
MULLEAVY:
He is the chemistry foreman.
i 2!
i 3l DONALDSON:
In relation to the various monitoring teams that are called for I
4!
by the emergency plan, how many onsite monitoring teams did you initially Si dispatch?
i 6i MULLEAVY:
We dispatched one.
si DONALDSON:
Do you recall the individuals who were on that team?
g 10i MULLEAVY:
I am sorry, I can't do that now.
,1j J.
- 12l, I
DONALDSON:
How about, how many offsite teams did you send?
131 14!
MULLEAVY:
Two.
15i 16i DONALDSON:
Do you recall any individuals who were on those teams?
181 MULLEAVY:
No, I can not give you that.
19!
20:
DONALDSON:
Was an assembly area monitor designated?
211 22l MULLEAVY:
Yes, there was an individual sent to the assembly area when we started to see our levels go up.
That was probably about 8:30.
24:
i 25!
892 230 i
I l
13 l
1, DONALDSON:
Do you happen to know who that individual was?
2; 3}
MULLEAVY:
No.
4l 5l DONALDSON:
Were gate monitors dispatched?
Gi MULLEAVY:
Not at the moment, no.
7 8l gl DONALDSON:
How about an ECS monitor?
10j MULLEAVY:
Yes.
g 12!
DONALDSON:
Do you recall who that might have been?
i 14!
MULLEAVY:
No I don't.
16i DONALDSON:
Did you assign a monitor to the repair party?
17;:
18!
MULLEAVY:
No, not at the moment.
20:
l DONALDSON:
How about wash down area monitors?
21!
i 22; I
MULLEAVY:
No, they were not established at that point.
2 31 241 892 231 25!
t
14 i
i 1,
DONALDSON:
Was a liquid release monitor established?
I 2
3 MULLEAVY:
No.
4l 5l 00NALOSON:
I see here now that...
Were any initial in plant surveys 6
conducted at the time you either had arrived, or prior to the time you had 7
arrived at the ECS, or shortly after your arriv'l?
8 MULLEAVY:
We conducted the survey out in the aux bldg and down through the g
fuel handling area, just to see where we began to find that our levels were 10 y[
going up.
We tried out there to see if that was coming from there, then we came down through our own auxiliary building and then down through the fuel Iq.,[
handling area and out into our own ECS.
14!
15lr DONALDSON:
Do you recall who performed that survey?
16i MULLEAVY:
I believe it was Tom--well I am not sure.
I am not sure whether 17l it was Mike Janouski was there--it may have been Mike Janouski, I can't be 1m, sure who it was.
19i 20; DONALDSON:
21l:
We are through the point to where you have relocated the ECS.to 1
the Unit 2 control room.
Characterize the scene in the control room upon 22l l
your arrival to assume your duties at that location.
23l 24{
25!
892 232 I
i
f 15 MULLEAVY:
It was very crowded when we arrived up there.
1:
2!
3{
DONALDSON:
Approximately how many people were in the control room, l
4j 5;
MULLEAVY:
Probably when we arrived with our group, I would say probably 40-50.
Si 7\\
DONALDSON:
From your experience in drills run in the past g
9I i
MULLEAVY:
It was exactly like the same thing when we when up there from 10,;
our last drill.
A crowded situation.
We kept all the auxiliary operators our own team off to one side to the old shift supervisor's office area to 12!
i keep them out of the center portion of the area and away, and then of 131 course the groups kind of migrated together.
We had to keep keeping them 141 apart so that we did not fill the control room with unnecessary personnel.
16i DONALDSON:
Did you have, or could you observe the operator control area in front of the control panels location?
1S; 19!
MULLEAVY:
Yes I could.
20j 21; g1ALDSON:
Approximately how many peop'e were frequenting that area?
22l 23 l
l MULLEAVY:
I would say probably 20.
24l 25; 892 233 i
I P
6 I
l
{
16 1!
DONALDSON:
Whai <uld be the normal complement of operations personnel?
l 2!
3l MULLEAVY:
About four.
t 41 Sf DONALDSON:
Can you from an opinion about whether or not the area was 6
perhaps too crowded, or the necessity for all those people in the operator control room?
7 l
81 MULLEAVY:
I am sure there was not a necessity for all those individuals.
g They were behind the line.
They were just in front of the panel, those 10lg operators that were necessary to be there, I assume.
The area in front of the ship supervisor's office was crowded.
It was difficult to get thr3 ugh i
at times.
I would say it was c meded.
131 14!
1:y Was it apparent who was performing the duty of the cmergency DONALDSON:
director at the time?
16i 17l r
MULLEAVY:
No, I don't believe it was apparent to me.
Of course my relation-18i ship not to the emergency duty officer, but to Dick Dubiel, was foremost in 19i my mind.
20!
21 DONALDSON:
Where were you located in proximity to Mr. Dubiel's station.
22f i
23 MULLEAVY:
Probably about 20-30 feet away.
24l 25!
892 234 i
t
I l
17
{
1!
DONALDSON:
Was he on the other side of the room?
l
?!
i 3l MULLEAVY:
He was in the middle of the room, I was to the left as you face r
4j the panel.
i 5
DONALDSON:
From your work station in the control room, were you able to 6
I 7l see the area radiation monitor panels?
8l I
gj MULLEAVY:
No.
I 10!
DONALDSON:
Did you go to those panels at all and surve the various alarms and readings en those monitors?
l 13l
,m,;
MULLEAVY:
No, I did not.
Because under normal circumstances I would not be in that particular area, so therefore, I would not have those to avail myself.
So, therefore, I did not at that particular time.
My main duty lo, ;i was to get the teams out and to take care of those team.
181 DONALDSON:
From talking to a number of people, I believe at approximately 19!
this time there were a number of areas in plant that began to exhibit 20l increasing radiation levels.
21l 22f MULLEAVY:
Yes, they did.
23 24i 892 235 1
25!
h
t l
{
{
18 g
DONALDSON:
I also note from looking at the emergency organization chart that for all of the teams formed, there is not an in plant survey team that 2
is f rmed.
3 4l M JAVY:
No, not for normal circumstances.
5 6i DONALDSON:
Did you form one?
8l' MULLEAVY:
Did we form one? Yes, we did.
91 10l i
DONALDSON:
Do you feel this is something that should be conc dered in a 4
11:
normal organization?
12l 1 31 MULLEAVY:
Yes, I do.
14i 15i DONALDSON:
So, this sort of fell out as a normal requirement to be placed 16i upon this.
17l 18; MULLEAVY:
That is true.
It happened under these circumstances that an 191 onsite team--when we speak of onsite team I think of an individual as it 20i normally means in our emergency plan, is that that onsite team goes outside 21l the buildings.
There is not a provision made for an inside-the-building 22 team.
Your question was-yes, I believe there should be one formed.
23 24l 2sj 892 236 l
l
I 19 i
lj DONALDSON:
I would like to have you address another aspect, and I think 2
this is perhaps something I have picked up talking to a number of other 3
people also.
Under the conditions that you are operating, there appeared 4l to be a need for the establishment of health physics controls and to re-Sf establish health physics controls almost at the outset, and there also 6
appeared to be a need for continuity of plant chemistry functions.
Is this
[
a correct perception en my part?
8l MULLEAVY:
I am not quite sure I understand what you are saying.
g 101 DONALDSON:
Okay, let me try to rephrase it.
Initially, there were some in plant surveys conducted in order to ascertain the degree of the hazard 12!
in the plant.
13l i
14i MULLEAVY:
Okay.
15i 16i DONALDSON:
As the situation developed did you find that there were additional requests for in plant surveys of various areas?
18i 19t MULLEAVY:
Yes, there were.
20i 21;
(
DONALDSON:
Did you receive any requests for water, liquid, any kind of 22F j
effluent samples, in the first few hours?
23 24l 892 237 25!
t
20 I
MULLEAVY:
No.
y l
2!
i DONALDSON:
RCS letdown samples? Makeup tanks?
3f 4!
MULLEAVY:
No, I did not.
5 6l I
DONALDSON:
After your arrival?
7{
l 8l MULLEAVY:
No.
10 DONALDSON:
Were you aware that any such requests had been made?
11!
12 i
MULLEAVY:
No.
13l 14!
DONALDSON:
All right, why don't you pick up from 8:30, 9: 00 when the next 15i event of significance occurred and take it through the rest of the day.
16i 17 MULLEAVY:
Well, we continued on that way rallying to each different area 181 as it showed up, still wondering what was going on.
I did not ever reelly 191 fully understand the situation and I am not sure many did.
We did as we 20i were directed to do to send teams to various locations.
We had more teams 21!
than we normally would have ever experienced during a drill such as many 22l j
onsite teams formed.
I believe at one point we had four groups of individuals 23 moving around the outside of buildings, scanning back and forth, mostly on 24l l
the West side going from North to South; another group coming around the 2st i
892 238
i 21 i
,f North gate area; another group scanning around the GE locations out on the
- l 2j East side of the fence, Northeast side of the fence; another group going r und South.
We were constantly feeding numbers back and forth.
We had a 3
few instruments that malfunctioned and had to get them replaced.
We were 4
busy with the monitoring team so therefore not many additional requests 9
{
were made to take inside plant samples, to get inside surveys.
The actual 1
survey taken of the aux building inside I was unaware of, and I am not sure
,d, when that was done, and I believe Mr. Huwe and Mike Janouski took that t
al survey.
I was unaware of that particular survey having been taken.
It was g
recorded later on that their survey was done in the auxiliary building.
10!
i 11; i
MARSH:
I think we are at a break point here I want to change tapes.
The 12l time is now 12:05.
April 25, 1978.
I am going to break at this point and 131 turn the tapes over.
14i 15i MARSH:
Time 12:06 2 m,, 4/25/79, this is Bob Marsh.
Same people still present.
We will continue.
181 CONALDSON:
We were talking about continued dispatch.
I guess this is sort 19!
of pretty much what you were doing the rest of the day.
201 21l MULLEAVY: We were doing it most of the day and it was puzzling because the 22!
readings were up in areas, they were back down again.
We would go back to 23 i
resurvey, and they would be up.
The main question was:
What was really 241 happening and what was going on?
25!
892 139 1
a 3
(
22 I
ilj DONALDSON:
By what is happening and what is going on, do you mean what is 2{
the source of the activity? Where is it coming from?
31 4j MULLEAVY:
Was it coming from the stack, was it coming from the auxiliary Si building? Just where is the source?
Gi DONALDSON:
What were some of the ideas that were discussed and evaluated 7
during this period of time?
9 MULLEAVY:
The reasoning to us, the idea to us, was that it was coming from OI the stack and it could have also been coming directly around and out of the buildings.
We did not really know for sure, and then we were told later on i
in the afternoon that it was indeed coming from the stack.
We did not know 13l why it was still coming out of the stack:
Was the source not able to be shut off, was its valves that had to be closed, or just what the d'eal was.
,5 I was unaware that there was a bunch of water in the auxiliary building--
lo,,i that was actually coming from the auxiliary building.
We did r t know if 17l it was a reactor building, auxiliary building--just what the source was.
19i DONALDSON:
You mentioned the water in the auxiliary building.
Would you 20l expand on that a little bit to discuss where this water was located and the 21;l ventilation path that would carry it out the plant's stack.
22l 2 31 l
MULLEAVY:
Well, it would be through the aux. bldg ventilation that the 24l activity was coming out.
I understand the water was, and we were told 25!
892 240 I
i
ii f
23 lj later in the afternoon--I did not go inside the building and at that parti-2 cular time and take any surveys.
We were told later on that, yes, indeed 3f there was water covering the 281 elevation of the auxiliary building.
We 4j were told later on that, yes, indeed there was water covering the 281 5
elev tion of the auxiliary building and that is where we were getting this activity from.
It was believed that this was the source of the activity.
6 It was coming through the auxiliary building ventilation system.
8 DONALDSON:
In the morning between the hours of say 9-11, did you notice g
any increase in the air activity in the Unit 2 control room.
t 11!
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
12' 13l DONALDSON:
Approximately what time did this occur?
14'-
15i MULLEAVY:
Oh, I am trying to think to myself right now, because I did leave the Unit 2 control room and go to Unit one, and direct the activities of the teams from Unit 1, and Dick (Dubiel) would handle Unit 2.
So, 18{
therefore, I believe before I left--and I think it was around noon time--
19i that I was asked to go back over to Unit I and direct the activities of the 2Dj offsite teams and onsite teams from the Unit I control rooms.
21l 22l DONALDSON:
You were ask2d by Dick?
23 24l 092 24}
25i l
i.;
l 24 f
tlj MULLEAVY:
Right.
I 2:
I DONALDSON:
At any time when you were in the Unit 2 control room 3!
4j Sf MULLEAVY:
I did not answer your question, however.
I do believe it was l
6 shortly before that we did experience some monitor increase in the control 7
room monitoring but there was no problem while I was there, in actual gj wearing respirators.
When I went to Unit l's control room, then we did see gj and experience some difficulty in the air.
I 10!
if DONALDSONi Clarify something for me.
During the normal operator actions in response to the situation where you have the general emergency or site emergency, is the control room manually put to recirculation?
1.,21 14!
MULLEf'Y:
Yes, it is.
15i 16:
i DONALDSON:
So the Unit 2 control room at some time earlier in the day 17l should have been put on recirculation?
19!
MULLEAVY:
Manual circulation, I cannot tell you when that was.
21!
DONALDSON:
So, when you saw activity increasing in the Unit 2 control 22l room, was there any conjecture as to where it would have come from?
23 24!
25i 892 242 i
4
l
{
{
25 l
MULLEAVY:
No, no there was not.
It was not at that particular time.
1 2
Although it was cuestioned "Are we on recirc?" and the answer was "Yes, 1
they were."
3 4,
y 00NALOSON:
Over on the Unit 1 side you mentioned also that some increased activity was experienced there also.
6 7
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
8l 9i DONALDSON:
Was it a normal practice for that unit to also go an manual recirculation if you are under conditions of a site or general emergency?
12!
MULLEAVY:
It is not normally done, no.
There would be no reason to normally 131 put it on.
But when we saw an increase in the background levels of the control room I asked them to put in on recir.
It did at that time.
15i 16i DONALDSON:
Did that appear to alleviate the backgrounc?
17i 18!
MULLEAVY:
No.
19i 20!
DONALDSON:
Would you give us a conjecture on what happened there?
21; 22li MULLEAVY:
Well, we started taking air samples.
We did go into masks.
231 l
Again I cannot tell you when we went into respiratory equipment, but it 24!
seems that we were in it for quite a long time.
We repeatedly took air 25{
l 892 243 l
\\
l
l 26 1}
samples.
We tried to have them evaluated but our own Ge(Li) detector was i
2j out of service because we could not get to it.
It was in our ECS in the i
3 counting room off of the ECS, and we were experiencing at that time about 4
100 mr/hr down in the particular area.
We could not do any evaluation of Sj those air samples.
We did some decays and I conferred with Dick and found 6j them to be also in respiratory equipment.
And we were on recirc and we had 7j that re-established by the control room that, yes, we were on recirc.
We felt the only reason that we were seeing some intake was that the plume was 8
coming into Unit l's air intake.
From the direction we were, West, Unit g
l's air intake is on the West side, and we probably were having an air 10 i
intake into the building.
11, i
12l l
DONALDSON:
You mentioned that you were on internal recirculation.
131 1L MULLEAVY:
That is right.
15; 16i DONALDSON:
Does that mean--
17!
18l MULLEAVY:
It should not have been coming in, although it could have been a bypass fan er a bypass vent that was open or something.
They did tell me 20!
l that, no, that was indeed not happening and that we were all set on our 21; recirc.
Yet, we still saw an increase.
Now it could possibly be due to 22l j
the xenon, which was going to rubidium-88 after pass through the filters, 231 j
and we were seeing a particulate and we did do decay of that particular 241 sample which hit us just about 18-19 minute half-life.
We decayed it for 25!
I 892 244 t
i l
{
27 i
1 many half lives and we came out of respiratory equipment seeing that we did i
2t not have any long-lived--- it seemed to be a short half-life, indicative of i
3 Rubidium 88, and so we did come out of respiratory equipment.
4!
5l DONALDSON:
So then the increased activity in the Unit 2 and Unit 1 control i
6; room continued even after confirming that both control rooms were on recirc?
i 7l MULLEAVY:
Yes.
g 9i l
DONALDSON:
10!
Has this situation ever been noted in the past? Has there ever been anything to indicate that there might be cross ties in ventilation systems, or incomplete vent dampering of systems when you go on to recirc?
131 g
MULLEAVY:
Not to my knowledge.
It had not been demonstrated before.
15, DONALDSON:
You mentioned that people went into masks.
Now, when you went into masks were you in the Unit 1 control room?
{
,7, 1
131 MULLEAVY:
Yes.
191 20; DONALDSON:
Approximately how many people were in the Unit 1 control room 21, at that time?
23l l
MULLEAVY:
Probably 20.
29 892 245 25l i
I l
{
j i
(
28 l
lj DONALDSON:
Okay.
In masking, were there sufficient numbers of masks stock 2j piled?
l 3l, 4j MULLEAVY:
Yes.
5l DONALDSON:
Could you describe the type of masks available?
6 i
7 MULLEAVY:
We had two types.
We had particulate masks, and we also had the 8;
MSA iodine / particulate cartridge.
91 i
10j DONALDSON:
11!
Would you have taken any credit?
12!
I MULLEAVY:
I could not.
131 14!
DONALDSON:
Why not?
16i MULLEAVY:
Because I don't have an efficiency for that iodine cartridge.
I 171 don't believe it is NIOSH approved, and we could not take that.
18l 19!
MARSH:
NIOSH, can we m; fine that? Just what are the initials?
201 1
21:
MULLEAVY:
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.
22 231 i
00NALDSON:
Frcm this point on, I guess it was approximately 12-1:00 when 24i l
t:1e masking, you went under mask.
I believe when that took place, yes, and 25j 892 246 i
r.l
[
29 i
l{
we stayed on and off.
We did wear them at one point.
We took them off at i
2{
one point.
Our activity went back up again.
We re-established wearing the 3l masks again, until we were constantly taking air samples and evaluating.
With the Ludlum we had set up a little HP lab in the back of the control 4
5l room and we had some RM14's so that we could see the air activity go up we 6
could also see the air activity go up in the monitor--the control room 7{
monitors--and we reestablished wearing masks again and we found out our i
half-life was again, indeed, looking like the very same thing we had before g
so we then took masks off.
It did go down.
g 10j 00NALD$0N:
Let me back up a minute.
Do p u recall at any time in the I
morning after your arrival after 07:00 that a general emergency was declared 12!
over the page system?
14 '.
MULLEAVY:
That had happened, I believe, before I arrived.
16i DONALDSON:
That a general emergency had been declared?
17!
l 18!
MULLEAVY:
Yes, I think that was prior to my arrival.
If it was not, I do 19i not recall the actual announcement.
20l 21l DONALDSON:
At the time that these activities were going on, were other 22l l
individuals reporting for work? Do you know?
23l 5
2 41 25!
892
.247 l
{
30 lj MULLEAVY:
No, the day shift should have already come in; they come in at 2f seven.
All of the technicians were there.
We had, I believe, a couple of engineers arrived.
Earl Showalter came in later on about 8 o' clock.
I saw 3
him later in Unit 2's control room.
He reported to us because he generally l
comes to the ECS.
51 i
bl 7!
ONALDSON:
Were there any people assembled in the North auditorium area?
8 Si MULLEAVY:
Yes, there were.
10!
11; l
OONALDSON:
How would you characterize these people?
12l l
131 MULLEAVY:
They were concerned people, enough so that I asked an individual 14:
to go and speak to them, and I believe it was Earl Showalter.
I asked him 15; to go up and tell the individuals as much as we knew, and this was I believe 16i 8:30-9:00.
j 17; 18l DONALDSON:
Were these office workers?
i 191 l
20:
}
MULLEAVY:
Yes, they were.
21) 22lI DONALDSON:
Is it a normal procedure when a general emergency has been 23l declared to permit continued access to non essential personnel onto the 24}
site?
892 248 i
I i
{
31 1
MULLEAVY:
No.
It is not.
2l t
3{
DONALDSON:
Wht is the normal procedure for entry onto the sight? Under 4
declaration of a general or site emergency?
S MULLEAVY:
6 They are stopped at the gate and they go to the observation center.
81 DONALDSON:
Did this cross your mind at all? Did you wonder what they were g
"9 "Y 9 10 11!
MULLEAVY:
No, it did not at the moment, at the time.
12!
13l DONALDSON:
I assume you said you had sent someone to the North auditorium to monitor in that area, is that correct?
16' MULLEAVY:
Yes, we did.
I 181 DONALDSON:
Did you receive any survey results on the North auditorium 19i area?
20' 21f MULLEAVY:
Yes, we did.
22 23 DONALDSON:
What were the highest dose readings that you had heard in that 24l r
area?
25' 892 249 O
i
l i
[
32 1,
MULLEAVY:
Only, I think less than 1 mr.
i 2!
l 31 DONALDSON:
Did these people remain there for the day or did..
41 i
Sj MULLEAVY:
No, they were directed at one point in the game they were directed l
6i to leave that particular arec, and the monitoring station was then set up 7j at the North gate, and the individuals did leave via the North gate to the i
observation center.
g 9l DONALDSON:
All right, So I guess normally we would not have expected to 10 j
find those people.
Now you did say you were away..
u 12l MULLEAVY:
Many of the people do start at 7:30 in the morning.
13l 14i DONALDSON:
But we have declaration of a site emergency?
16!
l MULLEAVY:
I am not sure what time that happened.
17 i
18(
I DONALDSON:
Let me go back to the time frame of 8:00 a.m. in the morning.
Under the emergency organization.
Let's start over again.
Normally when 21jl the plant trips, that is, the reactor trips, are there any chemistry samples that are routinely pulled?
22l l
23l l
MULLEAVY:
I can't answer that for the chemistry department.
I know that 24!
I we take RM-A-5, which is the condenser off gas monitor, that is our immedi-25!
ate duty.
(
892 250
I
{
33 llj DONALDSON:
OK.
At any time in the morning, where you aware that an RC 2
letdown sample had been requested?
l 3l MULLEAVY:
I was not aware of that.
4 5
DONALDSON:
You were not involved in an operation or any discussions relative Si to the operations performed by Mr. Velez or Mr. Houser to octain an RC 7
letdown sample.
MULLEAVY:
No.
101 11 DONALDSON:
Outside of the letdown sample, were you directing any inplant health physics activities on that first day? Additional surveys, adjustments?.
13) 14I MULLEAVY:
Unrelated to the incident.
15i 167 DONALDSON:
Well they were related.
In ether words, additional corrective 17!
actions that needed to be taken inside tne plant, changing of any filters l
13f of any kind?
19:
201 l
MULLEAVY:
Yes, the RMS system, we did change monitors.
21:
I 22' DONALDSON:
What monitor was changed?
23 24 l
25i 892 251
/
34 1.
MULLEAVY:
In Unit 1, our vent monitors we changed.
In Unit 2, I believe--
2 well I can't be sure in Unit 2, because I think Dick Dubiel was handling l
31 those later on in day.
l 4!
DONALDSON:
Now, you have mentioned before that when Mr. Dubiel sent you to Si 6
the Unit I control room, that you would take care of Unit I and he would 7j take care of Unit 2.
8f MULLEAVY:
No, I would take care of the offsite and onsite teams from the g
Unit 1 control room, and he would handle the control room in Unit 2.
lif DONALDSON:
OK.
Normally would you have to expected to direct or coordinate
, ['
any activities involving the changing of the filters in the plant?
^
i 14i MULLEAVY:
Under their direction, yes.
16i DONALDSON:
Who?
17; 18i MULLEAVY:
At the Unit 2's direction.
The effective unit.
See, we take 19!
our direction from the ECC.
20.'
21 DONALDSON:
From wh(m would you take direction?
In other words, what I am 22!
trying to establish is someone over in Unit 2 side decides they either need 23l a sample, or need a narticular valve line up verified, or a monitor cartridge 24' chcinged out.
Normally who would that request for work come from?
25l 892 252 6
I
f i
i i
{
35 MULLEAVY:
1
.It WOuld have come from Dick Dubiel.
I EI DONALDSON:
At any time, did you receive requests for change out for any 3
I health physics support or corrective actions that did not come from Mr.
Dubiel?
Si Gi MULL.EAVY:
No.
71 i
8!
DONALDSON:
Direct from the operations group.
9!
t 10!
MULLEAVY:
No.
11ll 12' 00NALDSON:
Any one else?
14:
MULLEAVY:
No.
15i 16; DONALDSON:
CK.
Now, did ar.yor.e arrive later in the day to help you with 17!
your duties? Any consultants? Any other foremen relieve you on and off?
18l 191' MULLEAVY:
No, not up in the control com.
2CI 21i DONALDSON:
Were you doing any of the dose assessment functions on your 22l' side?
23l 24!
892 253 25j i
[
s 6
36
)
MULLEAVY:
No, I was not.
1 2!
DONALDSON:
You don't normally back up Mr. Dubiel on the other side as they 3
4!
perform assessment functions independently?
Si i
Gj MULLEAVY:
No.
That was stopped two years ago.
When it was taken from the ECS, and felt that it would be better for the ECC, the Emergency Control 7
Center, to handle that rather than having two different groups doing it.
g So, no, we did r.ot back those up.
g i
10l DONALDSON:
Now, is it safe to say that throughout the period of interest 11!
that we were talking about, 3:28 through 3:30 p.m., that your prime involve-ment was directing the on and offsite survey effort?
131 14i MULLEAVY:
Yes.
Yes.
15; 16:
DONALDSON:
On the first day, at any time, were there any indications of positive iodine samples in the environment?
18l 191 MULLEAVY:
Not of a positive iodine number.
No.
We were asked by Sid 20l Porter to adjust our SAM-2 is off of the xenon peak to give us more of an 21!
indication for the iodine peak, and to my knowledge we did not get a posi-22j l
tive iodine number.
23l 892 254 25i 6
[
(
37 1l 00NALDSON:
You say, you mentioned you were asked to adjust your SAM-2 off 2
f the Xenon peak? Am I to assume that the normal window / threshold adjust-l 3{
ment is broad enough that you were taking in a sum peak?
41 MULLEAVY:
Yes, we were seeing Xenon peaks.
6i DONALDSON: What effect would it have, or let me ask you this:
"Why weren't the threshold and windows set to exclude the Xenon peaks in the first 81 i
place?"
9l 10; MULLEAVY:
This was explained to me by Sid Porter that he had done some 11; additional work and found it to be a little better on this setting that he 12',
gave us, and he directed that this be d:ne.
131 14!
DONALDSON:
You say he directed, under what authority was Mr. Porter acting?
15i 16i MULLEAVY:
As a consultant.
17) 18!
DONALDSON:
Did Mr. Porter, obviously you had some contact with Mr. Porter, 19!
did he appear to be working independently or was he working under the 20!
direction or control of someone in your emergency organization? Was he 21!
working with you? Exactly what was he doing?
221 23 I
MULLEAVY: Well, I assumed at the time that he was working with the emergency 24i org nization under the direc. tion of the ECC.
I did not call them and ask 25:
i r
892 255
i l
I
{
38 l
l ll what he had.
I really had rio cause to question him, because I know he is a 2
consultant and I'm sure that he did not direct anything that would give us 3f adverse effects.
It was only to help.
We had a lot of consultants.
4!
5l 00NALDSON:
Prior to this point in time, had the planning at the Three Mile 1
6[
Island Station ever considered how consultants would ba factored into the 7l emergency organization?
8 gj MULLEAVY:
He is on the emergency call list as an outside outfit, I believe, 10i and would be called--as would RMC and Porter-Gert: in the event that we did have a problem.
g 12l DONALDSON:
13 Under whose direction would consultants operate?
141 MULLEAVY:
I hope it would be under the direction of the ECC.
15i 16i DONALDSON:
Naturally, did it appear that this is the way it fell out? Was it unclear at all?
i 18i 19l MULLEAVY:
Yes, I guess it was unclear.
There was no direction in that,
" Hey!
so and so is coming to give a hand, you do what ever you can to make 21; 22l it easy for you, because he is there to help you."
We didn't have that l
type of direction.
23l i
24 892 256 25!
l t
1
i I
I i
l 39 i
DONALDSON:
1{
At any time, were any of the consultants or outside groups who 2:
were integrated into you' group or emergency organization, make requests or 3{
bypass the normal emergency organization chain of command and either direct i
4j or request that certain actions be performed without knowledge of the 5;
individuals in charge?
I 61 f
MULLEAVY:
On the first two days?
7 8l DONALDSON:
Let's expand and just say at any time for the period of interest?
gj 10f MULLEAVY:
Yes.
Oh, yes.
12l DONALDSON:
Could you detail some of those requests?
131 i
12 MULLEAVY:
Well, Sid (Porter) for one, requesting later on in the week to follow that different monitors be changed because we owed it to the public to find out exactly where and what this was.
Sampling of effluents and so 1_/
forth, trying to get samples from HP-R-219--through the NRC directing me that I could not afford not to do that.
We were getting directions from qJite a few individuals:
from the NRC, from consultants, to do things that 20t just had to be done in order to protect the public.
I can understand that, 21l however, but there was no one individual seeming to direct the efforts.
22{
There were quite a few people directing the efforts.
23i 24!
2s!
892 257 h
r
40 1
DONALDSON:
Under your emergency organization, who would you expect to 2
receive all these requests for information, assign priorities, and direct 3{
that work be accomplished.
4!
MULLEAVY:
Well, that is where I think we fell short.
Because I was asked 5
6 by an NRC man one evening when I was put on 7 to 7 at night two days after this happened.
Dick was taking the front 712 hours0.00824 days <br />0.198 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.70916e-4 months <br />, and I was taking the back 7 to 7 shift.
An NRC man asked me "What phase in your emergency 8
planning are you?"
I answered, "Our drills never lasted this long.
I g
really did not know."
It was--we had deviated from the plan enough so that 10!
I could not stay in the Unit 2 control room forever.
We had not regained Unit l's ECS yet, so we could not go back and reg.oup and continue the plan as we normallv would, and should have left it when we moved from the ECS to 131
~
go up to Unit 2's Control Room.
If we stayed with the plan, I should have 141 stayed in the Unit 2's Control Room.
The ECC should have been maintained in the Unit 2's control room.
And the Unit 1 Control Room, the unaffected 16:
uisit, should have continued on.
We did not.
We deviated a bit from that 17i and then we began to have a lot of people in who are now pushing us to do 13; many other things other than running our drill the way we know how to run 19) it.
20!
21!
DONALDSON:
Despite the change in physical location, that is outlined in 22l
.he emergency plan for locations of the various subelerents of the response 23 organization, do you feel that part and parcel of physically being relocated 241 that the continuity of the command and control throughout the emergency 25!
organization degraded from that point?
t 892 258 i
i l
b i
41 i
1; MULLEAVY:
Yes, it was lost.
i 21 3
DONALDSON:
Do you think that was a manifestation of the physical relocation 4j or a manifestation of increasing demands placed upon the emergency organiza-Sj tion?
Si 7
MULLEAVY:
It was the increasing demands placed on it.
Yet it got much 8
bigger than the organization has allowed us to become.
Many more people g
were added that were not originally in the plan.
When you have a plan set t
10f up and you say, well, we will call when we need them, we will call this g
organization, such as we '. sill notify the NRC.
The NRC never responded in a 1y manner in which they responded to this one.
The token call was made during the drills, and yes we called them--they never responded with 100 bodies coming back to the plant.
I never was involved with an NRC man coming up to me saying what are you doing now, why aren't you doing this? How come you are not doing this type of thing, or just what are you supposed to be doing? See this doesn't take that into a drill.
17!
18i 00NALDSON:
How would you characterize the involvement of the NRC in that context when you are trying to do your job.
20;.
21l MULLEAVY:
It is hard, the same way it is for the consultant to come in and say now I want you to do this.
Or I think you should be doing this.
Why I
aren't you doing this?
24I 25!
892 259
i
-l I
f 42 i
lf DONALDSON:
If you had one recommendation to make to planners in the future, 2!
and considering the development of an emergency org_nization and how to I
3!
handle a similar situation when, let us call them, "the foreigners" arrive, 4
what would that recommendation be?
l Si 6;
MULLEAVY:
Let's call them "outside help." All right? What would I 7j recommend?
I would let them have their plans.
I would let them do what I
g they are supposed to do.
They know.
An individual told me the other day, g
it is a good thing it happened here because this plant knew what to do.
10f Hey, that was kind of heartening to hear.
But let these indiv. duals do 11!
what they know how to do, 12f i
DONALDSON:
The consultants?
13l 1M j
MULLEAVY:
Let the staff do what they know how to do.
Then, because in talking to individuals that were here, they were confused they did not know g
wt; was directing what, and we had many good ideas, I am not saying they
' sere bad, we had many many good ideas.
There is a lot of talent out there
, 88 that came in to help us.
But too many ideas and everycody just lost track of what really was going on.
21!
DONALDSON:
From the time you arrived onsite through the 30th, had anyone 22!
ever sat down or was the emergency job board ever filled out and placed in t
a location to know who was in charge of what?
24!
2si 892 260 i
e I
I
.g.
{
43 l
1!
MULLEAVY:
No, that was one of the biggest things we really wanted was to 2
take the staff and to tell the individuals what was going on.
31 1
DONALDSON:
I think it was time for us to turn the tape.
4 5I MARSH:
The time is 12:34 April 25.
At this time I will~ terminate this
,l tape.
81 MARSH:
Same people present.
Dale, I think you were posing some questions.
g 10i DONALDSON:
I would like to pursue the line of continue with this emergency organization idea we are talking about.
Again this is during that three-day period of the 28 through the 30.
You have an emergency job board.
131 Would you just describe that board a bit and what it is used for?
15i MULLEAVY:
Well, we are speaking about the--is this what you are.
this one?
(Mr. Mulleavy shows Mr. Donaldson a board schematic) 17!
13l DONALDSON:
I believe you have the ECS.
I know there is a.
19!
201 MULLEAVY:
Yes, the ECS.
There is an assignment board and I guess we do 21:
call it the emergency job board.
It gives spots where individuals can be 22l written down, if there is a spot for the different parties that you du 23!
form.
The status board or job board was not maintained because we did move 246 l
from one ECS to another.
The one at the ECS at the HP (Health Physics) 25 892 261
{
44 l{
control point in Unit 1 is bolted to the wall.
That could not be moved.
2j The data that was recorded there had to be recreated up in the control room i
3f of Unit 2, perhaps a better place, or something that could be moved in the 4j event that we have to move, so that data was actually left on the wall on gj the job board down at the ECS when we did make our move.
To go cack up and i
Sj recreate that then, and to reestablish everybody on their same jobs, it did 7!
w rk.
Indivi~ duals did go up and they assumed the phone communications and so forth.
Then it began to work again.
We had milling around of individuals g
that were unassigned.
We did then have to form more on-site teams, which g
10j we chose auxiliary operators and they functioned very well incidentally.
They were asked to do things, they performed them.
They did come back to the ECS Unit 2 control room, which we had established as our alternate ECS.
12!
We continued on that way until we then had formed all these particular 131 14!
We continued on that way for the rest of the day.
It worked from teams.
there, it was confusing, because individuals were around and about the area.
We had to confine them to one section so they did not wander off.
lo,,r It was a little more difficult up there than it would have been in Unit l's ECS, although it worked.
As far as individuals panicking and not doing what they were asked to do, we did not have that.
We did have individuals, 191 they were responsive, they did what we asked them to do, and they came back 20; expeditiously with the answers that we had asked them to find.
The main 21(
thing that the plume kept coming back on us, it did not go in a specific 22l' pattern as we though it would.
The air just hung around us; it was very 23 difficult to know where to send individuals.
24!
25!
892 262 I
I i
}
l
[
46 i
1l line--from Unit 1 to Unit 2's control room to Unit 1, and Dick (Dubiel) 2f would communicate with me via that hot line.
So therefore we established i
3!
this communication a one on one, Dick Dubiel to myself, myself to the off-4; site teams.
5!
i 61 ESSIG:
So you were then communicating through Dick to and from the off-site ;ew.es?
7!
i 8l gl MULLEAVY:
That is correct, as we normally would do.
Now they are choosing 10!
wind direction, they are choosing what they would like to see; we are trying to anticipate.
12f i
ESSIG:
Wind direction you say they are.
13i 14!
MULLEAVY:
The Unit 2 Control Room.
They are doing the dose calculations, 151 they are using the isoplots, they are looking at the maps, and so forth.
lo,,i We are trying to anticipate their needs, getting the teams where I feel i
17!
they should be, and monitoring up and down, with direction again from the ECC.
19' 20l ESSIG:
Did you both have, after you relocated to the Unit I control Room, did you both have access to when I say both I mean Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control 22; I
Room, both Dick and yourself? Did you have access to wind speed and 23 direction?
24i 2M 1
892 263 i
l
[
45 l
DONALDSON:
1 I would like.to ask Tom (Essig) if he has any questions.
l 2{
ESSIG:
Yes I do.
Tom you indicated that after you got into the Unit 2 3
control room, you and Mulleavy had operated there for a while.
Then later q
q on went over to the Unit 1 control room.
As I understand it, the mission NJ that Dick gave you was essentially to direct the on-site off-site survey bt i
teams.
Was that ic?
7!
8!
MULLEAVY:
That is correct.
9l
[
101 ESSIG:
And in giving you that assignment, did he pretty much give you a 11:
free hand in, say, essentially to do what needs to be done in terms of 12!
l assessing what is happening off-site.
What kinds of instructions did he 131 i
give, what kind of marching orders or instructions, or whatever he wanted 141 to call them, did he give you.
15i 16 MULLEAVY:
Well, there was not much instruction to be given because this 17' was the normal situation as it would have been done in the drill.
I run 1SI the on-site and off-site' team and would be faciliar with that.
It just was 191 easier done that way; that I take the instruction over to Unit 1, less 20i confusing that way, and get out of the Unit 2's control room with everybcdy l
there.
So the normal duties would be to feed the information back to the 22!
ECC in Unit 2's control room after we received it from the off-site and on-23 site teams from Unit 1, where we were directing their activities.
The 241 l
response that we got from the ECC would be via the communication--the hot 25j I
892 264
l' l
{
47 li MULLEAVY:
Yes, both Units have wind speed and direction indications.
I 2l 1
3{
ESSIG:
Do they have a recorder which is set up off the same power, is that 4;
how it is set up.
El MULLEAVY:
That i:, right.
6i 7!
ESSIG:
8 So I gather then from what you are saying that Dick or somebody in gj the Unit 2 centrol room in the ECC, as you called it, would decide where a Oj survey needed to be done, whether it be in Goldsboro, or this side of the river, or where.
It would be up to you to dispatch to make sure the team..
12 MULLEAVY:
That is correct that if I saw the wind speed was such and such, 131 and we were taking one at a certain location, whether it be North Northwest at a mark on the map, I might then choose to send them out in the same direction to the next location further on out.
I would then tell Dick, 17; "This is what I am going to do, do you concur?" and he would say yes, or no, or whatever he felt.
We would communicate back and forth that wa/.
We 18l i
had the maps, we had the isoplots in Unit 1, we had the duplicate set, and 191 we were also doing--I was not, I had an engineer doing those calculations 20!
also, following it on the map.
21!
22!
ESSIG:
You had an engineer?
23l1 892 265 24}
2dj l
i
-l 48 1
MULLEAVY:
We had an engineer also doing that, following the plume and 2
drawing it.
l 3r ESSIG:
Who was with you initially, was this a nuclear engineer?
4 Si MULLEAVY:
Mike Benson.
S 7
ESSIG:
Mike Benson, and do you know who it was with Dick Dubiel?
8l 91 i
MULLEAVY:
I dcn't know who it was.
101 lli ESSIG:
At what point did you feel that you had a reasonably good handle on I
what it is you were monitoring for? You indicated earlier that at first 131 1,[-
you did not know where the releases were coming from?
Did you feel that l
what you were encountering was primarily noble gases? What did you know about what you were monitoring, say early on?
r 17!
MULLEAVY:
What did we know what it was?
18l l
19; MULLEAVY:
That is correct.
20l 21l ESSIG:
Where was the first offsite team sent'.
This has been probably 22{
early--not too long after you got there, I wotid guess you were probably 231 still at that time in the Unit 2 control room with Dubiel.
24i l
l i
7;,
892 266 I
i I
t
i-}
j 49 i
'l y
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
I can't recall exactly where.
I know later on we sent them on the West side.
ESSIG:
On the West side?
Si MULLEAVY:
Yes.
I believe it was on the West side of the island that we el first got some readings.
Then we talked about air lifting a team over to 7) the Goldsboro area.
It seemed to swing from the West to North-Northwest 8t North-Northeast, all in that particular quadrant.
We were back and forth going on to a couple of the islands.
We tried.
Thank goodness we had i
helicopter service, because that was very good.
lli.
12 ESSIG:
This was helicopter service, then, that you chartered?
141 MULLEAVY:
There were all of a sudden, I don't know where they came from, 15i but all of a sudden we had three helicopters available.
I believe they 16i were State police.
I am not sure exactly where tney came from, who we had 171 the service with, but they were very, very helpful.
So if you can ever 131 have helicopter service, you neec it.
191 20)
ESSIG:
Did you in fact go on the West side of the river?
You said you 21 were planning to go there.
Did you send a team over there?
22I l
23(
MULLEAVY:
Yes, indeed.
24l 892 267 25l l
t
l 50 i
- lj ESSIG:
And did they stay over there for some time or just.
2!
MULLEAVY:
3 We had one team stay there for a good length of time.
I am not sure exactly how long, but we had them stationed there and then the wind 4
gf did shift again.
It was a very moving type of wind that was just all over the place, really.
But stayed within those particular areas.
6 71 ESSIG:
Fairiv low wind speed.
9}
t MULLEAVY:
Yes, practically non-existent, as I recall.
Then, it came back 10t on us the plume came back, and seemed to drift out another way.
It never really went too far and that was a source of quite a lot of confusion.
It seemed we would get a team out there, and we would drive to the Olmstead 13i Air Force Base, and all of a sudden they were not needed there, they had to i
14!
go some place else.
It was very difficult in sending your teams out, but 15!
they responded well.
16; 17' ESSIG:
Could you define just for talking purposes, how many people on each 18!
team? When you say team, is that 2 men, 4 men, 6 men?
19 20; MULLEAVY:
Generally, a three man team.
21l 1
22l ESSIG:
Three men would go in the vehicle, then.
23l 24 25j 892 268 l
i l
l
I i
51 MULLEAVY:
That is correct.
1:
i 2l 1
ESSIG:
In a single car.
i 31 i
4l MULLEAVY:
S Except the ones walking on the island.
6i ESSIG:
You had some walking on the island.
7!
I a!
MULLEAVY:
Yes we did.
We had about four teams walking around the buildings, 9f North, South, East, and West on the four quadrants of the island.
10!
I 11!
t ESSIG:
So you had 4 teams on the island.
12!
13{
MULLEAVY:
We established 2 offsite teams right away.
A Bravo and Charlie, 141 as we normally would do.
We then established another one, wnich we had 15i done during drills.
16i 17!
ESSIG:
What was the third one.
181 MULLEAVY:
Delta.
They were dispensed, and we had some difficulty with 20i j
getting them equipment for the 4th team.
Sid Porter had brought an instru-2'^ '
ment witn him, another SAM-2, and we utilized his SAM-2 in going out with 22!
j that particular team.
They began functioning, then ultimately later on it 23' l
was handled at the observation center, and then all of the directing was 24l done over there.
25l 892 269
j l
j 52 i
ESSIG:
When the;e teams went out if there is a three man team, I gather l.'
there is one guy who does the driving.
How is the work split out? Once l
they arrive at the point, I assume they can make some measurements as they 31 4l are going.
Si l
MULLEAVY:
They are' directed to make measurements it is part of the proce-Si dure.
As they move along they have a radio talker.
One guy can be doing this.
It can be a two man team, generally one driving and one reading the 81 instrument as they go along on their way to a pre-determined point on the 91 map.
10; 11!
ESSIG:
Okay.
12l i
131 MULLEAVY:
All our maps are indicated in North, North-Northeast, Northeast 14!
and so forth and they are directed to go to a quadrant and to a point 15; within that particular quadrant whether it be 1-1, 2-1, 3-1, so forth and 16i They will go to that particular point, and give us a background reading, on.
17 off their dose rate instrument, and they are directed at that particular 18:
time--or prior to being dispatched to their destination, will be told what l
i 191 i
to do when they are there.
Either get a dose rate and move out of the j
20f i
area; or get a dose rate, phone it back, and take an air sample and read 2'9 it; or they are told to take an air sample, a particulate, and an iodine or 22' charcoal, and then leave that particular area, report to such and such a 23f point, read it, so that they are out of the plume.
These are their instruc-24l tions as we have been giving them.
2st 892 270 l
- =j.
I i
j 53 l
y ESSIG:
What type of survey instruments were generally used?
l 2!
f MULLEAVY:
They are set up with the PIC-6, an Eberline PIC-6.
They subse-3l quently started with the R02 and began--shortly that afternoon-we began to 41 go out with the R0-2, which is an ionization chamber and has the capability
,l to open and close a beta window.
bl 7!
ESSIG:
Okay, so initially...
8I 9I MULLEAVY:
Initially it is the PIC-6.
Which has a lower level of 1 mr per 101-I hour.
11!
12 i
ESSIG:
You can't read anything below l?
It is the bottom of the scale 13!
line.
14; 15i MULLEAVY:
Right.
16i 171 ESSIG:
dhat dose rate do ycu think you can reliably read with an R02?
i 181 19!
MULLEAVY:
What dose rate?
20r 21i ESSIG:
What is the lowest dose rate that you could reliably say that we t
are talking about? We are talking about tenths?
23l l
24!
892 "271 25i a
t
i
- ?
i 54 i
MULLEAVY:
.02,.03, it will give you a background reading.
2.
i ESSIG:
Oh,.02,.03 mr per hour?
31 41 S,'
MULLEAVY:
Yes, because the first range on that is a 5 mr full scale reading.
i i
Gi ESSIG:
Okay.
So the teams then are being directed by you in coorcination 7'
with Dubiel, based on wind direction and speed, and they are making window open, window closed, measurements.
And occasionally they are directed to 9!
take air samples.
10!
l 11:
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
13l ESSIG:
What determines when they--how is it determined when they should be 141 taking an air sample?
15i 16; MULLEAVY:
By the wind speed.
If they are going to arrive before the 17!
plume, they would take a background reading, stay there until they saw an 181 indicated uoscale reading; then they would be directed at that time to take 191 an air sample.
20l 2
~
ESSIG:
These were air samples collected with what type of sampler?
22I 23]
MULLEAVY:
A RADEC0, which is a low volume--well, it is not really a low 24l volume.
It has a variable volume, and they take those.
That sample.
25I l
892 272 i
i
I j
i i
l 55 lj ESSIG:
Approximately what flow rate?
2l MULLEAVY:
Five SCFM.
3:
4!
ESSIG:
In how many minutes?
-I 6i MULLEAVY:
About four to five minute run.
7 81 ESSIG:
Okay.
Let me borrow that procedure for just one second.
There is g
just one point that I wanted to ask you about on one of the procedures on outside monitoring.
It says--I am looking now at procedure 16-70.6, which is the offsite monitoring procedure.
One of the points that it makes was that the ECS may direct the monitoring team to do certain things.
Such as if a continuous air monitor--I presume they really mean air sampler and not air monitor.
You mean one of the regular environmental air sampling stations that are in..
or am I wrong on that?
"If a continuous air monitor i
is located in the designated area, replace the charcoal and particular filters with clean filters and make gross radioactivity determinations frca dirty filters.
Retain dirty filters for a precise laboratcry analysis."
i 20l MULLEAVY:
That is the radiation monitoring environmental stations that we j
21:
are talking about.
22l 23!
ESSIG:
These are routine fixed filtered stations?
24 s
25l 892 273 l
l t
1
i i
\\
i 56 I
1{
MULLEAVY:
That is correct.
i 2!
3f MARSH:
Tom can I ask you to give the citation you are reading on?
Is 4j there a procedure nJmber on that?
Ei l
ESSIG:
Yes, I gave the procedure number.
It is procedure 16-70.6 Revision g,
7j 2, dated January 16, 1978.
I was reading from paragraph 2.1.15 of the i
gj procedure.
I will get to the question I wanted to ask you in a minute here.
g It also says that if a TLD station is nearby, collect the TLD and 10; return to the ECS for evaluation, replacement new TLD; and then it goes on to say place sufficient TLD's at either the continuous air monitor, or a
,l A
convenient representative location in a designated area, to permit reading TLD's every four hours during emergency.
Do know if any time consideration was given that?
15 MULLEAVY:
Consideration was given to changing the enviremental monitors.
I discussed that with Bev Good who is our reading representative for the environmental, and she at that particular time thought it was best that'.ve I
ISr l
leave them on for this duration, not knowing how long it would be at the 19!
time, but not to fuss with those right at this particular mcment.
20!
21\\
ESSIG:
OK, you discussed with Bev Good.
Was she actually there?
22) t 23l I
MULLEAVY:
Yes, she was.
241 l
25 892 274 I
l l
i i
i r
i 57 l!
ESSIG:
So her recommendation was to leave the TLD samples.
To leave them 2:
go for now, this is the recommendation she made on the 28th?
Leave air 3
samples in place and in addition leave the TLD's?
4!
Sj MULLEAVY:
Yes.
Si ESSIG:
Now getting back to this procedure just fcr a second.
I don't want 7j g;
to be labor the point too much.
Going back to that same Paragraph 2.1.15, gj where it speaks to placing TLD's, and I believe it is talking about additional TLD's.
10:
at either the routine monitoring stations or at another representa-
.,l tive location in the area.
To your knowledge was it ever, was that consi-J...
l dered, to put additional ones to be retrieved every three or four hours?
131 MULLEAVY:
Not at that particular time.
Later on--again I am not sure
,4
. 1 about the exact time.
We discussed with Sid Porter, who brought the area monitor and the area TLD's and so forth, and those were changed, and we
.e-l replaced them with the additional set.
I believe that was on the 29th or 17' 30th.
Changing out the normal ones that we do change every month.
,g 19!
ESSIG:
OK.
Let's see.
The interface with the people doing the actual l
20i i
assessment of the offsite impact-you indicated that there was one of the 22; nuclear engineers was in the Unit 1 site, where you were later on in the 3
i morning and the rest of the day, and then there was also one in Unit 2 23; site.
Were they essentially doing the same job?
24j 25i i.
l 8
.1 I
i
(
58 1:
MULLEAVY:
I don"t believe that they were actually communicating with each 2
other.
The engineer that we had was following the plume.
He was taking 3j care of correlating the offsite readings.
He was changing our map to d
reflect these particular readings, and the reports that we were getting in g
from the offsite teams, and taking care of that particular aspect.
A.s far 6j as his communication with Unit 2's dose assesor, I don't believe that the p
two of them were communicating directly, one with the other.
The mere fact gl is that I don't believe that each one was near a particular phone, that they could conveniently converse.
g 101 ESSIG:
Did you have occasion to communication with the one in region.
12l MULLEAVY:
13!'
The only one that I communicated with was Dick (Dubiel) over at Unit 2 control room.
15, ESSIG:
Getting back to the survey teams just fcr a minute.
Do you know if lo,.:
one of the individuals on the survey team would have been given the job to I
1_/ :
}
record the actual survey measurement and/or t. hen radio them in, or did they I
just radio them in as there taking them.
i I
20?
MULLEAVY:
They are to record them on their mac as t.'ey move along.
That 21!
is a suggestion to them, that they record it on the map.
They do have 22!
paper and tablets with which to record this information.
They should 231 record and have it on their envelopes that they draw up the samples from or 24i on, and that data should have been recorded on those envelopes.
25]
892 2/6 j
t h
0
[
59 l
1.'
ESSIG:
I think Dale asked some questions along this line a little bit 2j earlier?
I would just like to come batk to it just briefly.
During the 3
collection of the air samples, I believe that we had established that you had some occasional positive ones, or you had a positive ore early some time that morning, which was taken up to the State for analysis.
What were Si Si y ur feelings about that sample in terms of-was it believable to you? Did j
you have any feeling one way or another, whether or not you had expected the iodine to be there, or did you talk with Dick about this? As I under-S,i
-8 9
stand the level we were talking about on a couple occasions was 10 micro-1
-7 curies per cc, I think as high as 10 11!
MULLEAVY:
We did discuss it and we looked at the dose rates in those 12!
l particular areas.
We did see that we had some lenghthy stay time in those 131 particular areas, in looking it up on the chart.
I was not worried at that particular time because I did not think that those levels were that bad at 151 the moment, if they indeed were iodine levels.
I had no reason to disbelieve 16-them, but having never seen iodine levels go off-site, it was hard to 17' believe that we were actually experiencing this.
I was relieved to hear IS{
i back from the State eventually that they did not see any iodine in those j
samples.
20:
I 21; ESSIG:
Do you happen to know what their minimum detectable activity was?
22; 23)
MULLEAVY:
No, I don't know what that number was.
24i 3
l 892 277 4
l l
l 1
l
i 60 If ESSIG:
Dale, if you have an additional question and would not mind asking 2l it now, I would appreciate it.
We are at a break point.
Fine.
3 4{
MARSH:
Time to roll the tape over. so I have 1:05 a.m., April 25.
I am Sj reading about 470 on the meters so at this time I am going to change. sides 6i on tape.
7l gj MARSH:
Time is 1:06 a.m., April 25.
This is Bob Marsh.
We still have the gj same people present, and Dale, I think you just received the ball from Tom Essig.
O!
11!
DONALDSON:
Ok, Tom.
Let me just briefly address documentation and logs of actions taken.
Is it a normal procedure for the ECS and the ECC to maintain
,,I a log?
15:
MULLEAVY:
Yes, it is.
We do maintain our particular log as far as sampling lo_t goes by the sample sheets that we receive as they come in from the off-site teams.
Those particuclar sample sheets are then given to the man who is maintaining the board, and then put together by this individual.
The engineer who is taking the data from the offsite teams generally is the one 20:
who begins a log.
I 21.
22!
l DONALDSON:
On the morning of the 28th, were you apprised when accountability 23i of individuals had been completed?
24i 25 892 2/8 6
il
.L t
l
[
61 1l MULLEAVY:
Yes.
l 2:
3j DONALDSON:
You received a muster listing?
4!
MULLEAVY:
We received an OK listing from the guards.
There us inde_ed, I g
l 6i believe, two individuals missing at the time, atid they were found without 7{
us going out looking for them.
81 DONALDSON:
The accountability syster' then appeared to work.
g 10l MULLEAVY:
Yes, it did.
12!
DONALDSON:
Were you, during the initial stage, and toward down the ECS, 13l were you authorizing access and egress into the facility?
15:
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
16) 17' CONALDSCN:
How long did that continue, or whec did that stcp?
13i MULLEAVY:
That stopped shortly after I received no more calls, once as hit 20:
Unit 2's control room, but we did receive a few calls at Uni'. 1 when we 21; were still there, to either let or not let individuals into the plant si;e.
23l l
00NALDSON:
In regard to performance of equipment, what was une status of 24:'
equipment on the morning of the 28th?
25!
892 2/9 i
I
l
- g l
i
(
62 il!
MULLEAVY:
We had three operational units.
i 2;
3 DONALDSON:
By units, you mean what kind of units?
I 4j S'
MULLEAVY:
The kits, the emergency kits.
t I
Gi 7l 00NALD50N:
How many are normally available?
I 8!
MULLEAVY:
Four.
g, 10!
DONALDSON:
How long had the one kit been out service?
y 12l Mt[LLEAVY:
About one month.
13 141 15' i
16:
MULLEAVY:
Len Landry was working on it.
There was a board that had to be
,7, replaced in the SAM-2 Kit.
i 19' i
CONALDSON:
Could you characterize the demonstrated reliability of the SAM-21;,'
2 systems, since you have had about a year and a half?
i 22l MULLEAVY:
Well, we had probably 75 percent of the units in operation.
One 23l seemed to go, and then another one on the next inventory, something would P.ai be wrong with it.
I would say the one kit was not functional when we had 25' this incident.
- ,t 892 280 i
l
l
\\
63 l
1l MARSH:
You had previously indicsted you did experience some equipment 2
difficulty during your first start when you settled your teams.
What are l
3l you making reference to there?
l 4l MULLEAVY:
5 That was a technician going for the fourth kit, and it happened 6
to be in the possession of Len !.andry at the time.
He went to get it and of course it was not operational, and that was the difficulty that we gl experienced.
9!
"^
^"Y "9 * "
Lot 11; MULLEAVY:
'le had an air sampler go af ter it was used a couple of times, i
and we had to send to send another out from the ECS, that was to the North gate.
Then we received word that another SAM-2 was not functional, and we i
had to replace with the fourth one that we had gotten from Sid Porter, so 1:,r then we only had three operational again.
So, the on site team, we took lo, ;,
thef" kit. and used that for an ef f-site.
17' 13:
MARSH:
Do your duties involve any of the control of the TLD's and the 191 dosimeters to plant personnel?
20!
21l MULLEAVY:
By the control?
22',
2 31 MARSH:
The issue and the call back of those.
There has been some comment 2ai i
previously about a possible shortage af dosimeters that once these were 25i 892 281 a
l i
{
64 I
1!
'given out they were kind of hard to reclaim, and that there may have been 4
2l some shortage of the dosimeters themselves.
3i MULLEAVY:
At that particular time of the game, no, we didn't have a shortage f dosimeters.
We had plenty in Unit l's control or Unit l's ECS because Si 6
we had just come out of an outage for which we had ordered many low range f
dosimeters.
Si MARSH:
How about during the second and third days of the event?
o'i 101 MULLEAVY:
They began to get in short supply because we were not getting them back from individuals, and as the plant staff grew, we did run short.
l 13l MARSH:
Did this present any severe problems, and how did you counter them 1+,
when you began to run short?
16i MULLEAVY:
We began to recall and put notes out at the processing center that please to return their dosimeters.
We then stopped issuing dosimeters at random to anybody who came into the plant site. We started out by 15' issuing them at the North gate as the bus loads of people came in.
- ihus, 20!
we were not getting a return on them, so we stopped that and drew that back 21i to each control point, the Unit 2's control point and the Unit l's HP 22l l
control plant.
This kept them where they were most needed.
23; I
24j 2si 892 282 i
1 I
l e5 1
DONALDSON:
Did you experience any communication difficulties in the initial gj setup of the ECS?
i 3i 4l MULLEAVY:
No, we did not.
El DONALDSON:
We had--someone else had mentioned that there was a difficulty Si in establishing the tie line between the ntrol rooms.
al i
MULLEAVY:
The tie line between the control rooms is the not line.
g 10!
DONALDSON: One of the
" anes that were talking about settin3
.p, could get
'to Unit 2 but they couldn't they could get the Unit 1 control rcom.
This is a three party hook up.
Is it not?
13!
1L MULLEAVY:
Yes.
15; 16:
DONALDSON:
There is Unit 1, Unit 2 and the ECS all along the same line.
13/
MULLEAVY:
That is correct.
We have got one line that goes directly from
{
the ECS to the Unit l's control room, which we use the gatronic system, so 20!
we have Line 1 and Line 3 and then we have the turbine hail phone system, which we go direct up to the control room.
When I arrived all of those 22!
lines were working.
23!
i 24l 892 283 25!
f I
I
f
.n l
[
66 1!
DONALDSON:
All communications were normal 2;
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
3 4i g'
DONALDSON:
You recall off hand what the SAM-2 minimum detectable activity j
detectable amount is.
I realize it will vary with background.
6 7!
MULLEAVY:
It does vary, I believe it is.
Now with the volume taat we are 8l
~9 taking, I think it is within the range of above 5 x 10
,l 3
10!
00NALDSON:
When these samples were indicated to be positive, hao anyone evaluated the MDA under the existing conditions to determine where or not those samples could be thrown out as unreliable at that point.
13!
14; MULLEAVY:
No.
15 16; DONALDSON:
In retrospect, do you think that would of been a good idea?
IS!
MULLEAVY:
To throw them out.
19' 20' CONALDSON:
No, to look at the MDA'of the systems that were being used.
To give you a better handle on whether or not the results were believable or 22l not believable.
23l 892 284 2e 25; i
l
l 67 lj MULLEAVY:
Well, I think if we had tc bring them back in again, whether 2f they were believable or not, to bring them in and have them evaluated right 3{
away--not to send them off to a hospital somewhere or through the State, i
4J but to have a facility closer to us.
No obviously we didn't anticipate we Si couldn't use our own system, which obviously looks wrong right now.
.I i
6i believe that those samples should have come back and we should have evaluated 7'
right away.
It was a long time from the time we sent them off by helicopter 3;
to the State that we finally got an evaluation back.
91 10l DONALDSON:
Now throughout the course from the 28th through the 30th the levels of radioactivity within the auxiliary building and specifically 12l levels of iodine in the buildings began to build.
Is that correct?
131 MULLEAVY:
That is correct.
15; DONALDSON:
In simple terms I guess throughout this early period and through the period of 28th, could you explain why no fadine was released?
Do you have any feel for that.
19i MULLEAVY:
Why no iodine was released during the first few days?
21f DONALDSON:
Right.
In other words, the trend seems to be that there would be iodine in the environment.
They were neing iodine in the auxiliary f
23!
j building.
Everywhere they looked t v _ was iodine in the IWTS the IWFS.
24j 25' 892 285
I r
.L l
l 68 lj MULLEAVY:
I believe that our filtration system was taking care of it, i
2{
until we probably had a break through.
l 31 OONALDSON:
Let's go to Friday, that would have been the 30th.
Around the 4
5!
m rning f the 30th then into the early afternoon there was an activity in 6
the area of recommendation of protective actions being implemented for
,j selected members of the population in the environment.
Where were you
/
Sl 1 cated when this recommendation to be made public?
i 9i i
MULLEAVY:
I was at home.
11l DONALDSON:
You were at home at the time.
lZ i
13i MULLEAVY:
Yes, I was in the 7:00 in the evening to 7:00 in the morning la:
shift.
15i 16i DONALDSON:
So as of 7:00 you would have knowleage of the situation up until 7:00 in the morning.
When you heard that, what was your initial f
reaction?
20; MULLEAVY:
Are you speaking of the evacuation?
21 22\\
DONALDSON:
Yes, your personal.
23i 892 286 i
24; 25i i
I i
f I
I f
i i
.I,
{
69 1l MULLEAVY:
My personal feeling of it: foolish.
l 2l t
3l DONALDSON:
Could you exoand en that.
I 4l J
MULLEAVY:'
Yes, I think it was.
At the time, I don't think enough informa-9 J
tion was there, and I think the populace was unduly burdened by this parti-01 7j cular evacuation notice. I don't feel that the Governor knew, nor was being told enough, to make that particular evaluation, and if he had known the g
full score, I don't think he would of ever done it.
g 10i 00NALD50N:
Now there are those who will say, and who believe, that such a 11:
recommendation was prudent based upon the potential for the escalation of 12,'
off-site consequences because of potential for melt-down and break-through 131 of filters and on going or continuing releases.
In light of that do you
,4; 1.
still feel that the recommendation was incorrect?
15; 16i MULLEAVY:
Yes.
17 ISt DONALDSON:
Would you care to elaborate on why?
19t 20!
MULLEAVY:
Again I don't feel that the potential was there.
I think that 21l at that particular time, the situation was in hand through our own operations.
22j
[
In looking at the transcript that preceded that evacuation notice, I don't 231 think those people were fully informed either that made those recommendations i
24i to the Governor.
I 892 287 2si i
l
3
..I 70 l
1 DONALDSON:
To your knowledge had any of the levels in the environment, any 2{
of the projected doses, exceeded any of the lower limits of the protective d
action guides adopted by the State of Pennsylvania.
4I 5f MULLEAVY:
I don't believe so, no.
6:
DONALDSON:
Can you pin point a time, maybe on during 30th if it did occur 7;
(I don't know if it did or didn't) when the emergency organization sort of 8
g, began to evolve to one of a recovery operation?
10j MULLEAVY:
Ouring our particular shift at the begining of the 30th, we on my shift were told and advised that we should begin to--I will take that l
back, it was on the 29th as a matter of fact--that word came out that if we 13i did not begin to recover and get back to some normality, that we would 15.
answer to the Commission for not making this particular move.
It was received by individuals on our particular shift as, of sort of feather ruffling, but in looking back now I am glad that it happened that way.
.7 However it evolved I dont know.
Stories and rumors were flying about; I
however, it did make us take a look at our actions.
It helpec us to get back to reality, to show us what we were doing and to begin to pull the i
reigns back in again, and say yes I guess you are right maybe we ought to 21!
start reestablishing our particular areas taking a firm footing, establishing 22l l
a ground, and looking to a goal to get back to our HP control point, look 23 to see where we were, and we then began to try that particular rule.
24l t
f i
25 892 288 l
I l.
71 Ilj DONALDSON:
You think that, as early as the 29th, it was a good decision to 2
D*9i" VI"9-i 3l g
MULLEAVY:
I think so.
5' DCNALDSON:
Gi Did this organization evolve smoothly or were there some diffi-culties encountered?
7 sl MULLEAVY:
Oh, there were difficulties encountered.
g 10:
l DONALDSON:
To what do you tribute the major cause of the difficulty?
11; l
12l f
MULLEAVY:
Total upset of our particular little world that we were living 131 in.
It is very difficult to reestablish when we began to see our own establishment being what we thought was taken over by some other group or another outfit, as people began to come in and throw ideas our way.
We saw I
16:
our own control diminishing and we saw others trying and many times succeeding in forming ideas in our minds on what should be done.
Some were gooc I i
felt, and I do believe that that one particular little shot into, " Hey 191 i
boys, start establishing your ground and get back to something that is 20l 1
normal." That is when it began.
l 21:
1 22 l
DONALDSON:
Do you know of any time at all during the 28th through the 30th 23l when the trains happened to have blocked either one or both of the entrances l
24 I
to the Island.
2s 892 289 i
I i
1 I
i i
f 72 i
1 1l MULLEAVY:
Yes, I believe the North gate was blocked for a period of time.
2j I had-heard that.
I did not know that to be a fact other than somebody 3l said, "Yes, we were blocked on the island for a ;hort while."
41 5l 00NALDSON:
There are provisions, are there not, for contacting Con-Rail to i
gj ensure that these this kind of blockage does not occur.
7 8l MULLEAVY:
Yes, we have their number, and we could have called them to have g
that train moved.
10l DONALDSON:
Do you know if they were or were not contacted?
11';
I 12l MULLEAVY:
I do not know that, no, 13 14 DONALDSON:
OK.
Tom, do you have any other questions before we?
15i 16i ESSIG:
Yes, I think I have just a couple more.
Do you recall who the technican was that you sent? There was the one that essentially made the y4 first outside survey over at Goldsboro.
l 20:
MULLEAVY:
I don't know the group.
We did send one of the offsite teams 21l there,and I don't recall who that team was, or who was on that particular
{
22!
i I
team.
23!
892 290 24j i
25l I
i e
I
l l
73 i
i 1!
ESSIG:
I think you mentioned when earlier when we were talking about the 2
helicopters being made available, and if I remember what you said correctly 3l y u indicated that there were surveys on a couple of islands.
4!
Sj MULLEAVY:
Yes there was an island over Northeast of us.
We had hope _d to I
$i send a helicopter over thera, and then there was some concern of whether it could land on that particular island or not.
We, I don't believe we did 7
send a helicopter there, because the wind shifted before we dispatched it, g
and we went to Olmstead.
I think there was some trees in the way.
We g
I discussed that at the time.
10l t
11l ESSIG:
Why were you interested in surveying on this island? Are they I
inhabited?
13!
14:
MULLEAVY:
No.
That happened to be the closest point off-site in that 15!
particular wind direction at the time.
17l ESSIG:
I guess there are some homes on some of the islands, are there not?
18r 19I MULLEAVY:
Yes, there are.
There is some habitants.
20; 21i ESSIG:
Were you aware of any people that were there at the time?
22l 23l j
MULLEAVY:
No, I believe they are inhabited but not in the winter time.
24l l
Mostly in the summer.
They are mostly summer cottages.
j 25!
l 892 291 i
I t
l e
74 ilj ESSIG:
Let me just ask one more question.
I think we started to get to it i
2{
earlier bt,.
Your involvement, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday-would you I
3!
char eterize it as being pretty much the same; that is, you were directing y
the on-site and off-site survey teams through approximately Friday?
Si MULLEAVY:
I would say, Friday, the involvement diminished somewhat because 6
7j it began to be taken over by another group, which was off site, which was at the observation center.
They were busy establishing something..hich we g
were not aware of, and beginning to direct the activities from the observa-g tion center.
There was another rad group being established of which I was
, 0,
.i unaware of at that particular time.
12!,
i ESSIG:
Ok, but this would have been composed of some of Dubiel's other 131 people or?
15, MULLEAVY:
No, I don't believe it was Dubiel's--other people, it was another le,,
group.
I believe it was another group, the EB group (Electric Boat) was in 171 l
and they began to establish HP controls and directives and so forth.
I i
18i l
gradually was taken away.
19, t
20:
i ESSIG:
Without your knowledge, and I gather from what you are saying that 21:
l pretty soon EB was directing the off-site surveys and you just sort of l
22l l
phased out.
23[
24!
892 292 25i l
l l
s
i
[
75 i
Ilj MULLEAVY:
We just phased out, and then we went over to the Unit 2's control 2j room, and this was later on.
We went to over Unit 2's control room and we 3
began our involvement totally then with Unit 2 and directing HP activities in the auxiliary buildings.
i Si i
ESSIG:
You were working at that time, 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
So that g
7j Friday evening when you came in some time during that particular shift then gj you were...
9i MULLEAVY:
I was slowly being phased out.
10[
11; ESSIG:
And then at some point you decided, well, it appears like I have 12!.
I been phased out of directing the off-site surveys and so I will get witn 13l Dubiel and.
14:
15 MULLEAVY:
That is right, and we began our efforts in other directions.
In fact, I was called by this particular individual ever there to.
He wanted to talk to me.
IS!
19f I
ESSIG:
Who was that?
20l 21l MULLEAVY:
Mr. Graber.
I didn't know who he was, and he asked me to come 22; after 7:00 in the morning.
Over there he talked to me for two days, and 23l l
finally one 7:00 o' clock in the morning I received a call from him and he i
24i said I am still waiting for you.
2s; 8 9 <.,
z,9 3 i
I i
4
il ln 76 i
f lj ESSIG:
This would of been saturday morning?
21 1
MULLEAVY:
Yes.
So I went over and talked to him, and he told me--he 3l
.;j showed me an organizational chart which I had not seen before, and he said Si you realize you are now working for me.
"Oh,"
said I.
(Laughter) fie said Gi does that cause you any problems, and I said no it didn't.
However, I had 7j wished that Met-Ed had told me this.
8 ESSIG:
Did Dubiel have no knowledge of this?
g, 10; MULLEAVY:
No.
Well Dubiel had also been asked to report to Graber, and 11 72j Graber told me that he had had trouble in getting with Dick.
He thought Dick was avoiding him, and I said well I didn't really think he was but he i
has been pretty busy.
Dick didn't know at that particolar time, I don't believe, of this new structure.
So that happened.
I don't know why.
The Si structure is still there; however, in asking about it through Met-Ed we lo,.t were. told that that didn't exist, and don't worry about it.
g 18; ESSIG:
OK.
I think that's about all the questions I have, unless you have some additional ones Dale (Donaldson).
t 2 11 00NALD50N:
No, I don't.
Tom, you have been through it.
You are one of the handful of experts in the world right now, from the School of Hard 23!
Knocks, in the area of response to incidents of this magnitude.
What I 24l would like you to do is.
I am going to give you the floor for the rest of 892 294 l
I L
77 1!
the tape and I want you to discuss some things.
I want you to discuss the 2f effectiveness of your emergency plan in general.
I prefer to have you 3l discuss the strengths as well as the weaknesses.
Any recommendations you 4
have for anyone else who may be in your position, either in the planning Si end or the response end.
Recommendations for us, the Commission, in. terms 6
of additional rulemaking, if you think that's necesssary.
In conclusion, 7
gripes, complaints anything at all--let it hang out.
I 8!
MULLEAVY:
The plan itself basically is good as far as it goes.
I will gj tell you why I say that in a minute.
The equipment that we had to use did 10l 11!
indeed malfunction, as most equipment will do on occasion, and always seems ig to when you need it most.
Perhaps we should have had more to select from, say six or seven kits, so that needing maybe four or five you would of had that equipment.
Statistically, maybe it would of all worked better that rg nization and so forth I have no problem with the organization way.
e.
15:
of it.
Communications as far as offsite teams leaves a little bit to be lo, i desired.
The walky-talkies offsite, and so forth.
Getting them is a chore.
Making them work--in some areas, we had lost communication with some individuals.
They had the foresight as we had directed them to do, to go to public telephones and call us back.-
The incoming communications, then, to the plant under those circumstances I think should be individual, 2 11.
where an individual can call back to us on an own separate line or on a 22l couple of lines in.
We are deficient in the incoming call lines, which I 2 31 i
believe we only have three trunk lines coming in.
So, I may be incorrect 21 in that, but there are not that many phone lines coming into the plant that 25; j
892 295 l
[
I i
e a
l
{
78 1!
an individual n an offsite team could select a line knowing that he would 2
get through right away to a party such as the ECS.
A little deficient on 3
that.
If his walky-talky doesn't function, then we know there are some 4;
areas in which they dont.
We lost them for periods of time in the outside Si w rld, which was difficult and delayed in getting results back.
6i 7j Getting results back, and so forth, if we could have analyzed it quicker, gj rather than sending it off to the State would have been a help for use.
We i
g{
could have determined.whether we did or did not have iodine right off the bat, and whether it alleviated a lot of fears and so forth that we did 10 have.
12:
The structure again of our particular thing. I have no problem with the g
structure of it.
The communications in plant was good as it could be.
It was exciting, it was a lot of excitement, a lot of concerns, a lot of
,5 1
people get involved.
We had always said that the structure would fall apart because there would be so many people involved that those who were 17,:
supposed to be making the decisions wouldn't be allowed to.
For the first couple of days that did not hold true.
We did make scme decisions.
We had 19!
communications in plant and so forth.
Later on too many people got involved.
20:
(
It was very difficult to know who to follow, who was making the decisions, 21!
who was doing what.
I think that in discussing that aspect with many 22;l different outfits who were here, they also felt some confusion on who to 23; i
follow, who was really running this show.
Very dif ficult to fina that out.
20 I dont know if that could be corrected or not, because in an incident cr 25!
892 296 i
i l
t l
]
I I,I 79 If disaster type of situation it is very hard for one individual to become 2!
predominant and actually have that individual calling the shots.
There is i
3 too many people involved.
That made it hard.
We didn't know who to follow.
[
We didn't know who was running the show.
As I mentioried before, I found gj that I was working for somebody else who thought that they were direc. ting Gi the HP activities.
It was very difficult.
The instrumentation and so 7j forth-- fine, we don' t have any problem with that,..
mention maybe we 8l should have more to select from.
Outside concerns ar.d offsita consultants and so forth were beneficial.
They had ideas.
We followed some of them, g
10j and thought we should follow some individuals' suggestions.
They were good ones.
Some had poor suggestions.
We balked at them and we didn't follow g
those.
That's it.
,2 But all and all it is hard in a particular scenario to
]
direct day after day activities in the drill.
As I said before, the drills never lasted that long.
During the fourth and fifth day, how can you possibly know how to react, because you are out of the imm?diate situation, you are starting to recover.
You recover the operation.
It should oe taken into more detail in emergency planning.
17:,
131 CONALDSON:
Just one final comment or question in the area of drills.
Do l
you feel.
I guess this one was an intuitively obvious kind of statement.
Drill programs--do you feel they are necessary?
21!
22l MULLEAVY:
Oh, yes.
231 i
2w 892 297 25' t
{
i i
i I
l
(
80 l
1!
DONALDSON:
Do you feel the fact that the NRC observes the drills causes a i
2 program to be upgraded and a little more attention given to it?
3l 4
MULLEAVY:
Oh, sure, I do.
5l 6
00NALDSON:
Do you have any recommendations for the Commission in its 7
inspection and enforcement functions or in future guidance or assisting in g
the area of emergency olanning.
9I MULLEAVY:
10!
I think that more effort should be put on the State.
I thought that the State could have been better.
They could have helped us a little more.
We did communicate with the State on day one, day two, and so I
forth, and I don't think that their direction helped us an awful lot.
I
,3l 1
think that just looking at the State's emergency plans is a valid concern 15:
for all of us.
16; ESSIG:
Tom, I appreciate your comments and your candor, and thank you for 1.
/;
taking time off work to help us out.
I know everybody in the future will be interested in these tapes, and take to heart what you said.
I know we i
19i i
will.
Thank you.
201 i
21f i
MARSH:
The time is now 1:36.
Tom, just because we are coming to the end 22l l
of the tape, doesn't mean we have to quit.
If you've got more to say, 23i 24l!
please, I will put more tape on here.
If you feel you have covered it.
i 25!
l 892 298 i
I
t l
e
.j i
l I
81 i
lj MULLEAVY:
I think we have covered just about everything.
I think anything i
2l further would just be rambling on.
i 3l 4
MARSH:
OK, at this point then at 1:36 reading 932 on the meter, I am going 5
to terminate the tapes.
Let us all say thank you for your time recognizing 6i you are coming on for full work shift.
OK, the time now is 1:36.
71 l
8l 892 299 gi i
10j 11!
i 12!
13 1
14:
15; 16i 17' 13; r
19' 20 21l i
i 23!
24!
25l l
l l