ML19249A989

Transcript of 790508 TMI-2 Investigation Interview W/Rl Benner & ML Kuhn

ML19249A989
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/08/1979
From:	Benner R, Kuhn M METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 7908280657
Download: ML19249A989 (50)

Text

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i i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION i

In the Matter of:

2!

IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i

3 of Mr. Richard L. Benner i

Radiation Chemical Technician 2 4'

Mr. Michael L. Kuhn Sj Radiation Chemical Technician Junior 61 i

7l l

8!

l Trailer #203 9

NRC Investigation Site DiI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletown, Pennsylvania 11l l

May 8,1979 12!

(Date or Interview) 13; July 2, 1979 I

(Date Transcript Typea) 14!

l 173 and 174 15i (Tape Numoer(s))

16l 171 18i 19j f

20l 21; NRC PERSONNEL:

~22' Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas 23j Mr. John R. Sinclair 24l 25i l

79or2/0657 a.

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1; SINCLAIR: The following interview is being conducted jointly with Mr.

2j Richard L. Benner. Mr. Benner is a Radiation Chemical Technician 2 at the i

3j Three Mile Island nuclear facility.

Also present is Michael L. Kuhn, 4

That's KUHN.

Mr. Kuhr. is a Radiation Chemical Technician Junior.

Present 5

time is 3:40 p.m. EDT.

Today's date is May 8, 1979. The place of the t

6i interview is Trailer 203 located immediately outside the south gate to the Three Mile Island site.

The individuals present for the interview will be 7

gj interviewer Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas from Region I. The spelling is YUHAS.

My name is John R. Sinclair.

Last name is spelled SINCLAIR.

I am an investi-g i

'0l gator, the Office of Inspecting and Auditor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

• I Prior to the interview being recorded Mr. Benner and Mr. Kuhn were provided

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copies of the document explaining their rights concerning information to be y

obtained regarding the incident at Three Mile Island. In addition Mr.

Benner and Mr. Kuhn were apprised of the purpose of the investigation and the scope and the authority in which Congress authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct the investigation.

On the second page of the advise-ment document Mr. Benner and Mr. Kuhn have answered three ouestions.

17,1 The i

questions and the responses of bot" individuals will be recorded as part of the interview.

Mr. Benner, in response to the first question.

Do you understand the above?

20l 21 BENNER:

Yes.

22l 23 l

SINCLAIR: Do we have your permission to tape the interview.

24 25i bUU j ')

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BENNER:

Yes you do.

l 2!

3l SINCLAIR: Do you want a copy of the tape or transcript?

4l l

BENNER:

Yes I do.

S 6l i

7' SINCLAIR:

Thank you.

Mr. Kuhn, your response to the first question, do y u understand the above?

8l 9f 10l KUHN: Yes.

lli SINCLAIR:

Do we have your permission to tape the interview I

13i KUHN:

Yes, you do.

14:!

15l SINCLAIR:

Do you want a copy of the tape or transcript?

16!

i 17l KUHN:

Yes.

191 SINCLATR:

Fine.

Ok, at this time we'll begin by asking starting with Mr.

Benner asking if you'll provide us some information about your work experience 21:,

at this nuclear facility or in the nuclear industry.

23l 1

BENNER:

I started in September 12, 1977.

I came down to Three Mile Island 24I as a Rad Chem Tech 2 first year. I was given approximately eight weeks of 25!

680 355 6

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health physics school and trained on the job until November of this year...of i

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1978, and I was given two weeks of chemistry training.

I was in the Health I

3j Physics Department since September 12, 1977.

4[

r 5l SINCLAIR:

Ok, thank you.

Mr. Kuhn would you provide some information on I

6l y ur background and experience?

I 7!

l 8i KUHN:

I started May 23, 1977 in Rad Chem Department.

I had approximately g

eight to ten weeks training in heaith physics training by Ralph Jacobs of 10 ces and wo we& of WaWng M NWy.

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chemistry but that doesn't pertain to this and I've been in the corporate approximately two years.

12l l

13j YUHAS:

I'd like to explain to iou how we're going to do this interview.

What I would like to c; is begi. with one of you first, Mr. Benner and have g

you in your own words describe the scenario of how you became aware of the 17l incident where you came to work, what you did for the first three days.

After you've gone through it and I'll come back and ask specific questions 18i about relative events that occurred.

Then we'll go through with you Mr.

Kuhn, and the time that we have gone through the complete three day period.

Then I'll give both or you the oportunity to bring forth any problems or 21!

comments that you might have on your own if we haven't covered it in the i

discussions.

Mr. Benner, go ahead and begin.

23j 25; iC!

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1 BENNER:

The morning of the incident I came to work.

When I entered the 2

security building, I was advised that the alarms were going off in Unit 1 1

3l and Unit 2 Aux Buildings.

I proceeded to go back to Unit 1 HP.

When I 4

entered Unit 1 HP I think it was Tom Mullavey, who was in the HP Department, 5

and hee told me to grab an instrument and head for Unit 2, start surveying 6j and look for people that might be in the building.

So I went over and 7

started going around and I observed a rapid rise in dose rates.

You could 8;

stand in one spot and just watch the needle climb.

In some areas when I g

walked in I would get a reading of maybe fifty or a hundred mR and go back 10i en minutes later and it might be reading three tin.es that much.

e r I

The dose rates were definitely increasing fast.

So I went around on the 305 level in some of the cubicles on 305 and I also went to the 281 level I

through the cubicles and the hallways and there was water on the floor at the time and I wasn't in the building that long.

I guess about twenty 14' 15l minutes.

I came in about between six thirty and twenty to seven.

And I think it was somewhere around seven o' clock that they blew the radiation emergency siren and I got out of the building and went into the HP area.

17j And there technicians, the ones that were there, we did some air samples 18j and also observed that the b.ckground in that area was increasing dramatically and we did air samples and determined that respirators were required.

We 20!

l started moving counting equipment out of the area and just about anything 21l 22;l we thought we might need, respirators, any equipment that we thought would i

be necessary.

The readings at the reactor hatch, which we did take scme, 23 started to climb dramatically.

They went from a couple mR up to a couple 24!

l hundred in a short period of time.

So from there we moved out into the 251

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hallway into the first aid room.

I was contaminated so I had to go back to 2

Unit 1 to shower, and put on coveralls.

Well then we moved to Unit 2 i

3l control room and we were there for a period of time I don't know how long, i

.ij ard they told us to move to the aucitorium.

We moved to the auditorium and 5

then they moved us back into Unit 1 HP.

I think that was the sequence.

I 6i Anyway, from there, I ended up in Unit I control room and I was counting 7

samples and recording information up there.

And that was the first day I 8l think that was it because I stayed in Unit I control room the rest of the day.

The second day I went back into Unit 2 aux building as an escort g

i 10l with...was it second day they laid down the plastic the first night?.. I don't remember...the day after they laid the plastic on the floor..I went back to Unit 2 aux building and the levels, the short tia:e I've been around I've seen some pretty high levels in some areas but these levels, it was

-l unbelieveable what you could run into.

And we went down to the primary 14' f

neutralizer tanks, myself and an operator, and he had to open a valve down loi there.

Anyway, we came along the 281 level in the Aux building..at that tim-it was covered with plastic.

The levels varied from a couple mR to 17l three, four, five R depending on where you were.

But that was the only entry the first three days that I made after the initial accident.

The 19:

rest of the time, I worked at the Observation Center and also in the control 20t rooms themselves.

I did not go back in the Aux building.

The only thing I 21!

did that day other than enter the Aux building was to help retrieve clothing, 22l protective clothing and other equipment, things that we had forcot, help pass them out, and help move things back and forth.

24 25l i

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i SINCLAIR:

What about the 30th?

1 I

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BENNER:

30th?

i aj SINCLAIR:

Right.

5 Si BENNER:

Friday, Gees.

I don't remember, you know, the exact sequence what 7

days...I lost track of time, really I did.

I tell you, I was removed, I think it was Friday, they started putting me on offsite and also up in the 9l control room because I had been extended for the qualter to two R and by 10l l

this time I was over two R, so or I was pretty close to it, anyway, they 11!

removed me from going into the hot areas.

So I was pretty much in the i

background until after the first and I stayed up at the Observation Center 131 it might have been Friday and counted TLDs, so I really wasn't onsite the 14i one day.

15i 16:

YUHAS:

Ok, lets go back to some specifics.

You got in between six thirty 17,

and six fourty in the morning.

1Si 19i BENNER:

Yes. Right.

20l 21l YUHAS:

Ok. Tom Mullavey was already there in Unit l?

22l 23l l

BENNER:

I believe it was him, yes.

It wasn't him.

Who was it?

24l 25!

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1l SINCLAIR:

Dick Dubiel.

i 2!

i BENNER:

Oh, it was Dick Dubiel, ok, I wasn't sure.

31 i

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YUHAS:

Make the record clear, it was Dick Dubiel.

I 61 BENNER:

It was Dick Dubiel t!at was there.

7 8

YUHAS: That told you to go over to the Unit 2.

g 104 BENNER:

Right.

11l l

12!

l YUHAS:

To make a tour.

What instrument did you take with you when you 13) went to Unit 2?

14i 15!

BENNER:

I took an R02.

It's a five R instrument.

16' 17l YUHAS:

When you toured the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, what levels did you 18r go on that morning?

19!

20!

BENNER:

What levels did I enter?

Well, I went on the 305 level a,d after 21l I surveyed the 305 level and then there were other techs there with me.

22l, i

Mike was one.

And we went around 305 level and I advised the operators of 23!

areas to stay clear of.

I went down to the 281 level and by then basically 24l t

what I was looking for was people.

Any people that I could find and also 25!

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f just generally get an idea what was going on down there.

I went througn I

2l the 281 level and then that was when I came back up to the 305 level I l

came back up by the aux operator...by the aux elevator.

I heard the 3l[

radiation emergency alarm and I heard them tell everybody to get out of the building.

So I went back through the hallway to the HP area.

That was it 5

for the day.

g 7

YUHAS: How were you dressed when you were touring the 305 and 281?

8 9

BENNER: (Benner) Street clothes.

10,l 11[

YUHAS: (Yuhas) Streets clothes and just hand held survey instruments.

12!

I 13 BENNER: (Benner) Yes.

14:

15:

YUHAS:

I don't suppose you had glasses on since you apparently don't 16!

normally wear glasses?

17) 18i BENNER:

I don't remember whether I did or not...yes, I did as a matter of 19!

fact, because I left them behind.

They got contaminated a s I left them 20l behind.

21' 22 l

YUHAS:

As you walk down the hallway from the 305 do you remember any dose 231 l

rates that you may have measured?

24) 25!

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!lj BENNER:

Yes. I do remember.

The 305 valve alley when I first went ba k 2{

there was reading 100 mR or so in the hallway and I went up to the far door l

3l and it was reading maybe 150, 200.

I went back in later and it pegged it i

on the 5 R scale, so I got out.

I didn't stay.

The makeup tank, I went Si d wn by the makeup tank room at the door I was reading over an R and when 6

pened the door we took a reading with a teletector on the nitrogen line we inside the door and it was reading 10 R.

And that whole area in there was 7

exceptionally high.

I went into the waste gas decay tank rooms and they were climbing.

They were up 10 to 20 mR on some of the lines in there.

91 i

The tanks themselves hadn't reached any proportional level yet.

But when I 10r I

left the building, I don't remember what I got on the 281 level, but when I 11:

left the building when they sounded the alarm as I ran past the makeup tank 12!

room, I had the meter set on the 5 R scale I was ca t.he opposite side of 13l the hallway for the makeup tank room and it pegged the needle.

15 YUHAS:

Gretater than 5 R?

16' 17l BENNER:

Greater than 5 R. Yes.

And this was however wide the hallway 18:

is..10 foot wide and this was around seven o' clock.

19!

20l YUHAS: You had an R02.

Was the window open or closed.

21{

22 BENNER: It was closed.

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10 lj YUHAS:

When you got out din the R02 have a residual reading ?

?

2l I

3l BENNER:

That I coulan't say.

I don' t honestly know because by then t."e l

4; gas level was getting so high in there that it was pretty hard to tell.

I 5l YUHAS:

Did yoJ take any readings by MUR 720? That's the letdown monitor b i.

or otherwise (nown as the failed fuel detector.

7 l

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BENNER:

Nct that I know of, no.

91 i

10[

YUHAS:

Jid you take any readings (.f the rad waste panel?

11, 12!

l BENNER:

I took some reading..there were operators over there.

.I walked 131 over there and I think it was like 25 or 50 mR at the time that I walked 14!

15l over there.

And this was before I went down to 281.

This was shortly after I got into Unit 2 Aux building.

It was coming.

17f YUHAS:

Did you notice anything unusual around the monitor HPR 227?

18i.

191 BENNER:

227.

No, the last time I went past there I was running.

I was in 20l a hurry.

So I didn't really notice.

21:

22l l

YUHAS:

Do you remember the names of any operators that yc-saw?

23!

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-BENNER: Not off hand.

l 2l YUHAS:

Was one of them Terry Dougherty?

3 4!

BENNER:

I'd have ta see them.

I'm not that familiar with their names.

I 5

I 6!

have to connect the n:me to the person.

i 7l YUHAS: What parts of you were crapped up or contaminated after this tour?

8 9l BENNER:

Head to fo inen I came out and I approached the monitors I 10' just set everything off.

I was just crapped up head to foot.

My clothing...we 11:

12l took a reading on the clothing..was reading 30 mR.

I 13l YCHAS:

I assumed you removed it and went over immediately to the shower?

15 BE*NER:

Yes.

16:

17!

YUHAS:

Was it easy for you to de-contaminate yourself.

19!

BENNER:

It wasn' t hard. No, it came right off.

We went over to Unit 1 and 20!

showared and once I went through the shower I washed from head to toe and 21l it came right off.

22lj 23i l

YUHAS:

Did you write down any of the readings that you measured?

24i 25l t

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.2 BENNEF: Nc.

Didn' t take tine tc wr ite then down.

1; I

2:

YUHAS:

I trean after you cane cut?

3 4!

g!

BENNER:

Oh, after we came out.

I dan't remember if anybody was recording d

them or not. We passed them on to the control room. We called up the 6

control room and passed on sone of our findings.

But whether they were recording then or not I don't honestly know.

9i YUHAS:

Do you remember any of the other rad chem techs that you saw in the 10(

auxilliary builuing about that time.

11!

12:

i BENNER:

Yes.

Pat Donnachie, Mike Kuhn, Dave Zeiders, Tom Davis, Carl 13l Meyers.

That's, at the moment, that's a'l I can remember.

14t 15:

YUHAS:

You clearly remember hearing the site radiation?

16i 17!

BENNER:

Yes I heard them sound that.

And they specifically stated to

'.S j evacuate Unit 1 and Unit 2 Aux building.

19!

20!

YUHAS: When you went cack to the Unit 1 ECS station, you said that the 21!

background was increasing.

Do you know why?

I 23!

BENNER:

You mean in the HP area?

24j 25!

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Ilj YUHAS:

Yes.

l 2!

l BENNER: The background was coming up and we weren't sure..I mean we realized 31 i

4j the levels were climbing around us so we took some air samples and it was i

5l air activity and then we decided to don respirators at that time.

I 6i YUHAS:

What sort of respirators did you put on?

7 8

BENNER:

g Just whatever we had at the time, the standard Scott respirator w

a standard carWge on R R wasn' t an iodne car W ge.

10 11; i

YUHAS:

When the word was passed to leave the ECS in the Unit 1 Chem-HP 12l area what did you carry with you over to Unit 2?

131 14i BENNER:

By that time I was...I was in white coveralls.

I didn't even have 15!

street clothes enymore.

And I carried two or three instruments.

I was carrying instruments.

1St YUHAS:

Most were just portable inetruments?

19t 20i BENNER:

Yes.

Hand held survey instruments.

P02, E520 maybe, I'm not sure 21 exactly what I had.

I rememN r I did have some instruments with me.

i 22j 2 31 l

YUHAS:

Could you describe wh was going on in the Unit 2 control room 24i when you arrived about 9:15 oi 25i 681 006

I l

l

[

14 If BENNER:

Up in Unit 2 control room.

I'd said there was a lot of not panic, 2{

you know, they were confused and but they were pretty busy up there.

I i

3j didn't really watch thein too closely.

But they were, a lot of discussion 4

and people were mosing around a goud bit..the operators..the control room g[

coerators.

But they seem to even though there was a lot of confusion and I

6 everything they seem to have...they were pretty cool headed.

They had 7

things under control to a degree..anyway, they weren't...they didn't panic..I didn't see any panic up there.

g 9!

YUMAS:

You didn't stay up there long.

Do you know why?

,0j 1

l 11!

BENNER:

Gees, I think, I think tnat was because the gas level climbed in 12; r

I the control room.

I think they moved us out of there to the auditorium for 13!

I the same reason.

And we stayed in the auditorium, I stayed in the auditorium 141 only a short time because Fred Hoovey, Unit 2 Foreman, told me to go back to the HP area because they wanted to move the people out of the auditorium 17l to offsite.

They wanted to get them offsite to get all the extra people out of here.

They didn't all these catalytic and maintenance people hanging 18!

around.

So they moved the HP personnel )ack to Unit 1 HP Lab, which was ok 191 at the time, you know, to go into, they moved the other people offsite.

20(

That's all I know.

21!

22f YUHAS:

Let's talk a little bit more about your trip into the Auxiliary l

23:

l building on 3/29.

Who decided that you had to go into the Aux building?

24i 25:

i

Il I

l l

{

15 i

i 1{

BENNER:

I really don't reniember who made that decision.

All I remember 2

was they had an operator that had to go in to cycle a valve down by the i

3j primary neutralizer tanks and I don't remember whether I volunteered or 4

whether they told me or asked me, or what the situation was, that I don't remember.

All I remember was I got suited up with a Scott pack and went 5

6i down with this operator to accompany him on his tour to go get this valve.

7f He had a valve to cycle there and I think he had one to cycle right outside 1

the seal injection filter area. If I remember correctly.

g 9

YUHAS:

Do you know who the operator was?

10:;

l 11!

I j

BENNER:

I know him by site, by God, I don't remember his name.

I worked 12, with him for awhile.

13l l

14!

YUHAS: 0F, and the jobs that he had to do were to operate valves and one of Idl them was by the seal injection?

?

17!

BENNER:

Yeah.

And the other one was by the primary neutralizer tanks.

18f Which at the time the levels weren't bad in there, like a 100 mR..in the 19!

neutralizer tank room.

20:

21 YUHAS: Ok, who briefed you on the job before you went down both yourself 22l[

and the operator?

23[

i 24!

25!

nne hii bdU

9 l

16 l

1 BENNER:

I remember they fed me information as, you know, what to expect.

2 I remember they told me by the decay heat walls, that there was about a 2 R 3

field in there, which ther, was.

I don't remember who it was, but they did i

4 feed me information ar,a we did not walk through the 305 level because the 5[

makeup tank.. we went down the stairs directly into 281 level.

And that's 6l the way we went back up.

7 YUHAS:

Was this job on a RWP?

g 9f BENNER:

I believe it was, yes.

10t 11l 1

YUHAS: There was an RWP filled out for this job?

12!

t 131 BENNER:

I'm pretty sure there was, yes.

Because I think I got 85 or 95 mR 14!

off it.. pretty sure it was an RWP.

16 YUHAS:

Could you briefly describe how you dressed and what dosimetry both yourself and the operator wore?

18f 19' BENNER:

Dosimetry, TLD,.. fine low range dosimeter.

I carried a tele-20i tector.

We were dressed in I think two pairs of coveralls, couple pairs of 21t booties, and a wet suit, I remember that wet suit, and Scott pack, and two l

or three pairs of gloves.

When we come out we were not contaminated that 23!

time, so the clothing was sufficient.

24!

25:

t, 1

n n t, (j h k

_i d i

n 17

[

l YUHAS:

Do you know how much the operator pickea up?

2 1

3l BENNER:

Not offhand, no.

4!

YUHAS:

5 Were any air samples taken while yau were there?

6i BENNER:

In the Aux building? Not to my knowledge.

7 8

YUHAS: In the day that followed, do you know which team you were assigned g

y to when you were on enviromental monitoring or onsite monitoring team?

11l I

BENNER:

Yes.

I do.

I was on Delta.

12 6 I

131 YUHAS: Was that onsite or offsite?

14 '.

15 BENNER:

That was onsite.

17l YUHAS:

Do you know who was with you on th3 Delta team?

18!

19!

BENNER: I'm trying to think.

The one was a utility worker, he had a funny 20!

l sounding name, it begins with a C or something, I don't remember...he was 21!

my driver.

Offhand, I don't remember I think I had three different people i

with me at different times.

I don't remember who exactly was there.

For 23!

j awhile I had another rad chem tech and for the life of me I don't even 24!

remember who that was.

But we toured the island.

Yeah I do.

.I do remember 25j

) ; i i

I l

l l

18 llj who it was Harry First.

In the beginning when I first went out on Delta 2

team I was with Harry First.

And then they split us up.

'..e weren't together 3f very long.

They split us and gave me a utility worker and I had him the i

4 rest of that day.

I'm not sure...I don't remember about the following day.

Si HA

, Mr.

uhn why don't you pick it up and tell us how 61 you got involved.

7 8

i KUHN:

This is Kuhn.

On the date of the accident I cam

• to work approxi-g mately I guess a quarter-of seven and I was informed by one of the guards at the PC, that the rt=-tc. building dome alarm was alarming.

And that 11!

they felt we had a problem beginning.

I went to the HP area where I picked up my TLD and my dosimetry and Mr. Dubiel told me to call Fred Hoovey and Tom Mullavey at home and tell them that there was a problem developing and 14-he needed them in right away.

From there he assigned me to go over to Unit 2 with a dose rate instrument, taking readings along the way and to start 16 air sampling.

I proceeded to Unit 2 picked up an air sampler, went to the 17i 305 beside HPR-227 and started air sampling.

I went on taking readings 18 along the 305 and they kept increasing as I traveled.

I had approximately 2%

2 R with an E-520 on the door to the makeup tank room and I proceeded over 20t to Unit I to pickup my respirator... in case of unforeseen difficulties.

On 21; the way back I took my air sampler off, took it into Unit 2 HP lab and Carl 22f' Marris was there at the time counting air samples.

I handed it to him and 23l proceeded to the 328 elevation to take an air sample beside HPR 219.

As I 24!

was at 219 taking my air sample the dose rates started increasing frcm 10 25-

?

(.O 1 i

19 I

6 1:

mR to 50 mR to 75 mR to 175 it kept going up and at that time I heard an 2:

go off but I wasn't sure it was the reactor...any of the evacuation 31 alarms or monitors themselves.

They were all going off at the same time.

I 4l So I finished taking my air sample and went down to Unit 2 HP Lab again and r

5l Mike Janouski came in and informed us there was water in 280 elevation and l

6j was anywhere from ' inch to 3 inches deep and anybody going in that area 7j should have a wet suit on for their protection.

Carl Marris had finished I

8[

counting my air sample and then it was below the limits and he called Unit g

2 control room and notified them and they informed us to evacuate Ai.x building.

While waiting to do that I checked myself out with a frisker and 10 i

11]

I was contaminated.

I took my clothes off and put on PC, wet suit, rJbber boots, and so forth.

And I stood by for further orders.

As we were waiting for further arders, the air activity started increasing and hand and foot y3 and RM-14 started alarming in the HP office.

We informed operations of the situation and told them we Were going to the hall.

Then we..two of u donned, no it was three of us, because Dick Benner was there at the time donned respirators and we stood by in the area to see if they wanted us to 1,/ ;

go and take any more readings of the Aux building.

I called Unit i HP-Lab and asked.

'.c make sure the model room door was closed because of the 19!

situation with the ventilatic' holding drafts frcm Unit 2 to Unit 1 when you lose ventilation.

They informed us to evacuate Unit 2 HP Lab and I did 21!

as requested.

I went out, I took off my protective clothing.

They gave me 22lj new paper coveralls to wear and I headed to Unit 1.

Upon arrival to Unit 1 23!

I was informed that they wanted some air samples to be taken, we started i

taking air samples, the model room door was shut.

When I arrived at Unit 1 25l l

N81 Cll

20 l

l 1!

and they were in the process of getting ready to take the chemistry sample.

2 Feeling at the time, it warn't wise to de-con myself I postponed that to a i

3{

later time. While waiting there, Tom Thomp:;on and Mike Janowski were iy informed that they. wanted letdown sample taken of Unit 1... Unit 2, excuse me... reactor letdown system.

So they donned their protective clothing, 6

Scott air packs, and so forth went in and started lines recircing and Mr.

Janowski came out said it was 200 R on the drag valve behind the panel.

/

They took approximataly 50 mi s'mple left it s.. in the primary sampling 8

lab and left the area.

g 10!

Break here we want to change the tape. The time is 4:11 p.m.

l 12!

I SINCLAIR:

The time is 4:12 p.m. we're continuing the interview with Mr.

131 Benner and Mr. Kuhn.

Mr. Kuhn vis describing.

r 15 KUHN:

Before as I was discussing, they were just finishing taking a sample, they had gone and purged 50 ml into a beaker and left it remaining l

in the RadioChem sampling room.

They requested me to don a respirator, 18[

protective clotning and go in and take a one ml sample and put it in one of 19:

our volumetrics to try to be counted which was a

..I'm not sure wnether it 20:

was a 1000 mi or 350 ml.

I donned my protective clothing, with a high 21; range..and low range dosimeter and at the time they had a teletector in t

the room.

I went in I took one ml c,ickly out of the beaker came, out Dave 231 l

Zeiders was there with the plastic v lumetric.

I deposit that, he took it 24l oct to try to count it.

They informed me also that they wanted a quick 25!

b' o I d.

I

/

I

i i

(

21 1l b ron run to see what the boron levels were in Unit 2 letdown. So I proceeded i

2j ver c get my necessary equipment ready to run a baron and t. hey told me to 3l d it as quickly as possible to cut down on my exposure.

So I got a 100 mi i

4j v 1 metric graduated cylinder.

I filled it up with 95 mis of demin water, N[

(demineralized) went in, took the 50 ml beaker poured 5 mis, approximation, into the... graduated cylinder and went in to Radio C.hm. lab and ran my boron, as quickly as possible.

And I came up with the results, I dumped it into the sink.

8 And proceeded out of the door because, I wac inf m ed that g

they were evacuating Unit 1 HP lab because of high airborne activity.

From Of there we went to Unit I control room and they dispersed some of us over to Unit 2 to handle the situation over there that came up, whatever needed to be done.

I went over to Unit 2 to the centrol rica and Dick Dubiel said j

two foreman had to go into the Unit 2 aux building to check on three valves, 13j that they were getting false indications and also to close a breaker on the 328 elevation.

I'm not...I know the two gentlemen when I see them..I know their names..but I cannot think of them right now.

We proceeded downstairs with Scott air packs to outside of Unit 1.

Unit 2 Aux Building and donned protective clothing, it was one pair of paper, on pair of cloth, a wet 18J suit, it was..a hood, and a plastic cap, a high range dosimeter I don't 19; think I had.

I had = low range and a teletector.

Upon.

.we didn't have 20:

any RWP that I knew of.

We went into the Aux Building.

On, my way in 21:

they informed me they needed readings on the seal injection filters because 22!

l they were thinking about sending someone in to check...to change the seal 231 injection filters and asked me on my through if I could check it.

We went 24j into Unit 2 aux building down the stairs to the 280 elevation.

There was 25!

NOI 0 l ![

i 22 gj water on the floor.

I surmised anywhere from maybe two to three inches so 2{

we went wading through that, and two operators...two foreman stood outside 1

3l the shadow wall and I took contact readings as close as I could with a teletector and it was 50 R and 75 R.

We proct.:'ad down the hallway in 4

y roughly 2 R area the whole time to the close.. decay heat close cooling 1

6l coolers.

We went into decay heat valve area and the readings in there were approximately 50 mR, and the floor was still dry in that room.

We stayed 7

there for approximately maybe 10 minutes and they couldn't find the valves g

so we proceeded to the stairway and proceeded up the stairs to the 328 elevation and ' kept watching my teletector and as we reached the 328 elevation at the stair door it was reading approximately 1 R.

As I entert:d 11; the door it went to 5 R as I walked toward the air filter system it went to 12!

100 R and I told them we're getting the hell out of nere.

So we turned 13)'

around and headed down the stairs.

At that time I ran out of air..well, I 14 didn' t run out of air... I should clarify that..my alarm went off on my 15, Scott air pack and we exited the building the quickest way possible.

From 16 there I went upstairs ?nd told them what my readings were, what the situation 17i was and they sent be back to Unit 1.

I went back to Unit 1 and we were 181 back in the Unit 1 HP Lab in respirators and I had paper coveral's on.

So 19i what time it was, I lost all track of time the first day.

We mainly took 20i air samples, took readings in the lab what between the ccotrol room 21i

,f Unit i HP Lab and sometime that evening they told us we could leave and go 22\\

l over to the Observation Center to get a sa Mich they had set up a checking 23!

l station at the 500KVA Sub and that everyone must take their vehicles down 24:

thete and be frisked before proceeding to the Observation Center.

So I 25i t

I

I e

l 23 1,

went from there to the Observation Center...not the Observation Center...to 2l the 500KVA Sub...before I left, I went over and got my clothing when I came i

3{

out of the aux building, took them over to the Unit 1, I took a shower, de-i d

con myself, threw my ciothes in the laundry, de-con them and so I'd have gj something to wear before I left for the 500KVA Sub.

When I got to the l

6i 500KVA Sub I still had a slight residual contamination which was mainly gas 7l because I stood there and it decayed off, it blew off in the air.

And I l

gj can't remember much more of that first day.

Now the second day I was reassigned to the island.

And we went over we were in Unit 2 control tower cl 10l in respirators.

They wanted us to go in and take a gas sample.. gas sample or charcoal I can't remember whic.h it was now or hydrogen sample on HPR 227 and while we were in there we were supposed to take readings, do like a quick routine survey of the general area.

50 Ken Burkholder had done the a

305 elesation, so I was going to do the 328 while my gas sample purged, my le charcoal purged.

I went to..or was it the 280 I can' t remember whether it was 323 or 280.

Must have been the 328.

So I went upstairs and took my 17;l readings and the levels had dropped drastically from the day before.

And then when I went down to finish my HPR 227 sample I was informed that they 18I wanted me to take contact readings on sump t. ink area so I had to leave the new bottle and go back down and as I got the new bottle they informed me they wanted to the seal injection filter area checked for a seal injection

. seal plate for the RC pumps, to take readings on there.

I proceeded bz:k downstairs to the 280 elevation.

I checked the seal injection fil'.ers 23 l

and it was 100 R approximately three feet from the seal injection filters.

24; I proceeded back to the doorway and it was 50 R on contact with the door.

25I t

681 f)I 4

24 l

f I opened up the door braced it with my foot, ran my teletector back in as l

2j far as I could, and I had greater than the 500 R so I prrceeded down the i

3j hallway in ar.ywhere from a 2 to 4 R field to the sump tank area and on 4

contact with the one waste tank was only 250, on contact mR.

I proceeded 5l into the cubicle before the sump tank room and my levels dropped down to like 125 and 175 when I entered the room of the sump..the tank read 2 R on 6

the north end the middle read 3 R in the south reau about 4 R, on contact 7

with the tank.

I proceeded back up took off my sample ar ' left the area.

g I can't remember too much more about that day, and the following day I was g

put on an offsite team where we took air samples and dose rates, all day.

10, l

11!

l YUHAS:

Thank you.

Let's go back are you sure it was Dick Dubiel that was 12!

i there when you came in on the morning of the 28th?

13[

14!

KUHN:

Yes I am.

15 16 YUHAS:

And you called Fred Hoovey.

Did you get in touch with Mr. F.

Hoovery?

IS:

19:

KUHN:

Yes I did.

I got in touch with Mr. Mullavey he said he'd be right 20!

in and I got in touch with Fred Hoovey.

And he said he'd be right in.

21; i

22l YUHAS:

E520, what is the maximum reading that instrument can read?

24!

25!

f '

t O k f y

.) \\ $

r l

l

(

25 1!

KUHN:

5 R, no no, wait a minute.. 2 R.

Yes, 2 R.

2!

i 3{

YUHAS:

That instrument went full scale when you were walking by the i

4l makeup room?

5' KUHN:

Yes...In a lot o* areas it went full scale.

6 7

YUHAS:

8 Do you remember what Mike Janowski and Mr. Thompson were wearing g;

when you were collecting reactor coolant sample?

In terms of respiratory 10l pr tection?

I i

ll!

KUHN:

Scott air packs.

12!

i 13!

YUHAS:

And Jai.owski told you that the drag valve read 200 R per hour on contact?

15:

16-KUHN:

Yes he did.

17!

18; YUHAS:

Ncw when you got dressed to go in and split the sample, you were just wearing a particulate filter?

20i i

2]!

i KUHN:

Yes I did.

22:

23 YUHAS:

Not a charcoal.

24l 25!

i 681 018

[

26 7{

KUHN:

Not a charcoal, no.

2!

YUHAS:

Do you have an instrument with you?

3 I

4l i

5:

KUHN:

A teletector.

Si YUHAS:

Do you know what the bottle read with the 50 mililiters in it?

81 i

KUHN:

I think it was only like 2 R.

I'm not sure.

It wasn't that hot.

9{'

My total exposure for the two trips in was 400.

10f 11; l

YUHAS:

Did you run the boron analysis?

12!

(

131

_K_U_H_N :Yes, I did.

i 15' YUHAS:

What was the results?

16' i

17!

i KUHN:

Approximately 248 PPM boron.

18l 19h YUHAS:

Did you find those results unusual or disturbing?

20:

t 21!

l KUHN:

Yes, I did for th( amount of boron that was normally in the RC 22' I

system, but I was later informed we never took into consideration the 23i

}

sodium injection.

2al 25' I

.i,

I i

l 27 l

1 YUHAS:

Who informed you of that later?

i 2!

l 3;;

KUHN:

A GPU chemist.

4!

Sj YUHAS:

About when?

l i

6i 7l KUHN:

Approximately 4 days ago.

But I feel that our chemist themselves felt that we weren't really that low because Kerry Harner said that he felt 8

that was not a representative number.

g 101 i

YUHAS:

Did you report that number to the control room?

11l l

12l 13l KUHN:

I reported it to Kerry Harner who is Unit 2 chemist supervisor and l

14I he reported to Unit 2.

15 YUHAS:

O k.

Do you remember the time that the sample was taken?

17 KUHN:

No, I don't.

18i 19i YUHAS:

Did you have any extremity monitoring on when you were handling the 20i l

sample?

21; 22!

[

KUHN:

No, I iidn' t.

23!

t 2 41 25i t i tj t ULv

28 l

7{

YUHAS:

Have you every used extremity monitoring before, ever worn it on the job?

2 i

31 4

No, never, other than once when I was doing the seal injection filters.

KUHN:

5{

6)l YUHAS:

When you were doing the seal injection filters what type of extremity i

monitoring would you wear?

7 8

KUHN:

This one TLD on my hand.

That was in the holding the, pulling the 9l; l

seal injection filter out of the case.

10i i

ll!

YUHAS:

So it wasn't a TLD ring it was just a TLD badge strapped to the 12{

i wrist.

13!

14' KUHN:

Yes.

15:

16 YUHAS:

Did you get a whole body count after you had split this sample?

1 17l 18 KLHN:

Yes, the day of the accident.

It was late at night or it was the 19!

following day, no it was the folloiwng day because they asked me to stay 20!

over beyond my regular shift and take over the 500K'/A Sub and it was slow r

21!

at the time and the gentleman from the body counter..

I asked him if he I

\\

22' could do my whole body count and he said yes he was free, so it was approxi-23 mately 8:3J at night and he took me down and gave me a whole body count and 24)

{

it didn't show any appreciable iodine concentration.

25:

r 11 b>

1 l

[

29 ilj YUHAS:

Do you know what time you entered the auxiliary building with the i

2:

two other fellows to close the breakers and operate valves?

l 3!

KUHN:

No, I don't.

4 5

l YUHAS:

6 Relative time afternoon of the 28th, evening?

I 7l KUHN:

I could not truthfully tell you.

8 9l HA 10i e num ers Gat you gave me, the 50 R and the 75 R per hour, i

were those teletector numbers on top of the seal injection filters?

11:

12' 13{;

KUHN:

No, they weren't.

They were approximately a foot in front of the i

seal injection filters.

14!

15:

YUHAS: Do you remember who requested that you get those numbers?

17)

KUHN:

Unit 2 Operations.

181 19t YUHAS:

A specific name.

20l i

21f KUHN:

I can't remember they..they were going to send in anoiner HP do 22,!

that specific job and it was Tom Thompscn and he asked me since I was going 23l by the arc ir I could take them for him and I said it was no use two 241 people going in to the same area and I'd picked them up for him.

And when 25:

i I.

f) p *l dLL

('i i

9

,(

30 i

I g-the readings I called the control room right away, got ahold of Bob 1

2 McCann and told him to tell those guys nnt even to bother to come in.

I 3l YUHAS:

Did you give him Thompson or any of these guys a number of thousand Sj R per hour?

6i KUHN:

No, I...the only one is the two foreman that were with me when I I

was leading the way off the staircase and the 328 we were heading towards 8j 9;;

the pit area and as soon as my teletector pegged on the to 50 I kept clicking i

up and when it it went pegged on the high range I turned around I had it 13l extended, I turned around and headed the other direction and we proceeded 11; out of the aux building.

i 13!

YUHAS:

When did it peg on the 1000 R per hour?

14:

15:

KUHN:

Just as I approached, I'd say I was approximately 8 to 10 feet away 16' from the equipment opening.

I can't remember what they call the opening to 17i the floor elevation that covers all the levels from raising and lowering 2%

equipment.

19t 20l YUHAS:

Ok, just the equipment hatch.

21!

l 22' KUHN:

No, its an opening in the floor where they can lower and bring 23l

[

equipment in from the outside through the culkhead into the aree inside the 24{i Aux building and by booming it over they can lower it to the basement or 25!

take up to the.

7 n 'i,

.t: r. 1 0t 0 4- -

i

31 i

i YUHAS:

Were you on the 305 elevation then?

1:

l 2l KUHN: It goes in all the elevations.

3 4

YUHAS:

5 Ok, but what elevation were you on when the teletector pegged?

i Gi KUHN:

328.

7 8

YUHAS:

Down on bottcm or up on top?

r 91 i

10!

11;!

KUHN:

Up on top. 328.

I'd said I was maybe 10 feet away from the exhaust fans. I think they were exhaust fans for the charcoal banks.

I'm not sura there.

They sit right to the right as you come out of the stairways.

14!

YUHAS:

Did that appear to be the source?

16:

i KUHN:

At the time I thought it was.

17!

18l YUHAS:

Do you remember who these other two foreman that went with you?

19!

20!

i KUHN:

Maybe Dick could help me, wriat's Bubba's name?

Bubba Marshall, 21:

Rubba is his nickname and the other one was..I know one was Bubba Marshall, 22!

l and he might be able to remember better than I am, but it was two foreman 23 and the one foreman he told me later he was he e from eleven to seven 24 shift.

He was here when the incident began so w.,ever was Unit 2 foreman 25!

j at the time.

l I

i.

l l

32 l

If YUHAS:

... foreman?

2i i

3{

KUHN:

Yes. He's a shift supervisor.

i 4l YUHAS:

Fred Scheimann.

g,*l i

6i KUHN:

Fred Scheimann.

7 8

gf YUHAS:

Ok, so its Fred Scheimann and Bubba Marshall.

i 101 i

KUHN:

Yes.

11l t

12' YUHAS: Do you know what breakers they were trying to operate?

14t KUHN:

I think it was the sump, sump.

YUHAS:

Sump pump breakers.

16 i

l'7l KUHN:

Sump pump breakers...or...I'm not sure but they did it I was informed 18{

by some of the guys in HP that they had gone in later that night again and 19t came up through the 328 elevation behind the..from the east and the levele 20; never exceeded 5 R because of the cement wall and that they were later to 21l able to close the breakers by coming that way.

22!

i 23; YUHAS:

During the course of that tour did you..anybody wear lapel air 2 41 l

samples, anything like that?

25l l

4 I

),

I l

32 l

1 If No, the first day other than what we took our original air samplers KUHN:

2 from then on we didn't take any.

We were just going in with the dose rate 3l instruments to do specific jobs and it wasn't till later that we started taking air samples.

4 i

51 6l YUHAS: you came out did you write any of these numbers down?

7l KUHN:

"1, we didn't.

8!

9!

'rUHAS:

Did you volunteer to make this trip in with these two fellas?

10!

11l I

KUHN:

Dick Dubiel volunteered me.

12; r

131 YUHAS: Dubiel told you to do it.

Did Dubiel set an upper limit to the amount of exposure you should have fear?

16 KUHN: He told me to watch my exposure.

Dick Dubiel told me to watch my 17!

exposure and to play it by ear.

So I tried to cover myself as much as 18l possible and whoe'cer I'm with.

19t 20; YUHAS:

Did they tell you don't take more than an R or don't take more than 21; 2 R or can't take more than 10 R?

2 2 ',

23l i

KUHN:

They told me not to take more than 2 R.

24j l

25 i

nn -

bL I

?

i i

(

34 f

p YUHAS:

Then you actually took what 400, you said?

2!

KUHN:

That day I think I got a total of 18. 1800, 1.8 R.

3 4!

gj YUHAS:

Are you aware of Mr. Scheimann or Mr. Marshall took on this trip?

i Si 7f KUHN:

I think each gentleman got approximately 800 mR but I'm not sure, g

I'd have to look into the records to be sure because our low range dosimeters went off scale and we didn't have high range.

g I

10i YUHAS:

On the 29th did you say you went with Mr. Burkhold(

20 collect tiie 11l I

hydrogen samples?

12!

13l 14;,'

KUHN:

No, at the time they had the ventilation system working and we had an HP office set up in the control room in the corner, we had guilding maps of the general areas, had tried to mark down what were the radiation levels at the different spots from the people who had gone in that night and that 17,!

we were requested to take hydrogen samples off of HPR227 to be able to 181 monitor how much hydrogen was in the reactor building, so we wert: taking 191 turns.

Mr. Burkholder was the first to go in and take a sample.

I was the second person to go in, and Jim Dupes was supposed to be the third.

Mr.

21;;

Burkholder went in proceeded to get the monitor purging and to collect the 2 25 sample and he proceeded to take dose rate readings of the building to 23 update what our readings were.

Approximately eleven o' clock I think the 24!

next scheduled sample was to be taken and I went downstairs donned the

<; ^') '/

()

'I

r I

l,

{

35 f

t lf necessary clothing got my vial and went in to take a sample.

The first 2j three to four days are were like a jumble where there instances were a day i'

3[

late late or a day early, it's hard to remember.

1 4I

.y YUHAS:

Burkholder, when he went in to take the contzinme:.t air sample.

• l Was that the morning of the 29th?

i 71 KUHN:

I'm not sure.

That's what I was just sitting here thinking, too.

g I

I think that was at least two to three days later.

g 10[

YUHAS:

I think if I'm not mistaken the first samples of the containment llj air were drawn like night of the 30th.

12j l

13!

{

KUHN:

I think it was the 30th.

I think I'm getting my days mixed up because so many things happened.

.blump, blump, blung right in a row..it's hard to pick out certain instances, but I do remember I made two entries the first day cnd the second day.

17/

I 18l YUHAS:

Do ycu remember any dose rates that you may have taken from the 25 19t cc glass collection chamber, from containment air sarrple?

2.

21; KUHN:

On the ore I took I had 1.5 R on contact with a teletector cn the 22!

glass sample and in the general area of HPR 227 they had installed so it 23 must have been later in the accident because I remember they had installed 24i a vent line t.lat had run through between the monitors so it had to be three 25i l

D\\

nD\\

a

[-

i I

36 i

1 to four days later a vent line from the makeup tanks or somewhere to ve'.t 2

gas back into the reactor building and that was approximately 2 R on contact i

3l and we made note of it, that you get an extremely high exposure to your 4

lower body crossing over the pipe to take the samples.

And they were in Sj the process of installing a remote hydrogen analyzer at the time.

Si YUHAS:

Didn't you have a routine analyzer on it?

I 81 KUHN: No, we don't.

We always take it over to the RadicChem lab and run it 9l l

on our gas partitioner which was by this time in a high radiation area and 10!

I so they were trying to eliminate the problem of transporting the bomb with 11; a glass vial from Unit 1

.. Unit 2 to Unit 1 and cutting down needed 12; i

exposure.

13i 14!

YUHAS:

Very good chronology.

At this time I'd like to give you either one of you the opportunity to bring up any comments you might have to be more 16 familiar of what went on.

17l i

18!

BENNER:

You mean leading up to the accident.

19t 20!

YUHAS:

Just addition to the comments that...

21 22l j

BENNER:

Ok.

Prior to the accident a lot of us had been concerned about 23l exposures.

According to our own administrative procedures we were suppos2d 24i to equalize exposures, we weren't doing this.

Another thing was instru-25!

() o p ? P-U i

l 37 i

1 ments, our instruments were such a state of disrepair that we had very few 2j avai'iable the day of the accident.

Most of them were broken, many of them 3

were torn apart, stripped down from parts to repair other ones, and I don't 4;

know what the problem was but it just we came down to we didn't have the 5

instruments to de the job.

We didn't have as many instruments as we had I

6j techs.

We had very few techs.

i 71 YUHAS:

Let me ask you a question specific to the instruments?

I have 8l reviewed the calibration data sheet inservice out of service sheets and g

that indicate on the date of the accident about sixteen teletectors only 4 10i f

were operable.

12l l

KUHN:

It's very possible, yes.

13!

14' YUHAS: It indicated that like fifteen E120, or E520s excuse me, about six 15:

of them were operable.

16, 17l l

BENNER: Shortly before the accident only a few days before the accident, I 18:

personally, took instruments down to calibrate them of four teletectors 191 that I took down one of them was serviceable, three of them were broken.

I 20!

took down some R02 and some E520s I don't remember the number.

When I came 21!

back up myself and Peg Pelen the one trainee, we carried the instruments down and I know we had over a dozen instruments and I think we ended up 23i j

with like two or three serviceable instruments out of that many instruments.

24!

25!

c' e

l

[

38 1;

YUHAS:

According to the paper work that I have reviewed, less than, 2

significantly less than half of the instruments that you have were available 3l on the day of the accident.

i 4!

KUHN:

This is probably true.

5 6i YUHAS:

Of all the PIC-6, only 4 were operable?

7 8l BENNER:

Well, they're worthless anyway.

I'm sorry but they are.

g; 10!

YUHAS:

Just prior to the accident right after the outage on the tail end of the outage in Unit I we went around, myself I believe Jim Dupes was involved.

There might have been a couple of other techs, we went around and looked for instruments.

We marked the type of instrument and serial number on a sheet of paper and the status.

And we found most of our instru-ments in the repair shop and they weren't in the shop being worked on they were back in the parts cage, sitting because they didn't have the parts to fix them.

That was the status of the instruments very few of them were available when you wanted an instrument you almost had to fight for it.

19:

20!

SINCLAIR:

We're going to have to break hert

'a change on to the second 21; l

tape.

The time is 4:44 p.m.

22l 2l SINCLAIR:

The time is 4:45 p.m. and we are continuing the interview with 24l Mr. Benner and Mr. Kuhn.

3 25 (J'l"i

(; 0 ;!

i i

39 i

1!

YUHAS:

Mr. Benner you were still, we just caught the tail end of discussion 2{

about why there were so few instruments available at the time of the incident.

3 Y u were at the point where you were saying the techs were about ready to 1

4f fight with each other to get an instrument.

5l BENNER: Yes.

Unit 2, we had pulled a lot of the instruments out of Unit 2 6

into Unit 1 for the outage. Like I said most of the instruments in Unit 1 7

were broken. The only good instruments we had and were Unit 2 and we had g

gj some in Unit 1, but the majority of them were Unit 2 instruments, and they were running short, in fact, I remember specifically delivering just a couple R02s and maybe one teletector and an E520 Unit 2 shortly before the accident because they didn't have any servicable instruments.

It was i

really bad' The instrument situation was to the point where if you wanted 13; to go into an area and you didn't know whether you could make an entry 14!

simply because you didn't nave an instrument.

We went into the reactor building looking for instruments, we couldn't find any.

They just seemed to evaporate, and it turned out that they were definitely torn apart and just laying around broken. So and you said about Lapel air samplers, well I'd never even seen one before, when you people came in, that was the first 194 I had seen one.

As far as equipment went, I got the impression when I 20i first came into the department that they bought what they had to, they 21l didn't buy anymore and no less.

They just bought what they had to and what 22' l

they thought would be a bare minimum to get by, and not necessarily did 23!

they go out and buy the best they could get for a dollar.

They went out 20 l

and bought, I don't know how they made the deals, but they just bought.

25i (O1 O7^

ii e t

i j

40 1

(

lj This is my own impression. Even like respirators and Scott packs, when you 2{

can inventory all your Scott packs, when one man can inventory all the 3

Scott packs, in less than a day ycu don't have enough, especially when you 4{

are traveling all over the plant you do it on foot.

There just aren't 5l en ugh Scott packs to go around, there weren' t.

i 61 YUHAS:

About how many Scott packs were there available prior to the incident?

p I

8i BENNER:

g Prior to the incident Unit 1 had thirty, thirty-two something like a

e r

ee in e

re, a ceuple at each 10 11'.

reactcr hatch and the rest were scattered all through the turbine and the i

aux building.

We had six emergency with a little small hand carried air 121 bottles.

Unit 2, I don't remember how many we had over there, we might i

131 have had maybe twenty-five or thirty icott packs over there.

But for the amount of personnel you have tnat's not near enough. They weren't placed in the right places.

They weren't in the right positions.

Because when we evacuated the aux building we left a heck of a lot of Scott packs behind.

18!

YUHAS:

Inside the Auxiliary building.

20:

BENNER:

Yeah inside the Auxiliary building we had four scott packs for each control room.

We had a couple setting on each floor.

There were two 22 in the control tower outside of, other than the HP lab, outside of each 23 level on the landing and one or two at each elevator door in the turbine 24!

building, and then there was like two in Unit l's control building at the 25!

l n ', '

f3 4

(l )l 5r, 4

)

l

\\

i

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41 l

If north wall, in other words they were scattered around a couple up in chlorine 2{

house a couple up at circ water house, but that when you mass them altogether 3!

y u really don't have many.

So we didn't have many to work with.

When we 4l started making entries in the Unit 2 Aux building, we exhausted our scott gj packs in no time. We just didn't have any to work with.

i 6i YUHAS:

Is that why Mr. Kuhn you wore a particulate filter when you went in 8l to take the primary coolant sample.

9l 1gl KuHN:

The main reason was, you know, they were already being used or had been used up and you don't use a partial bottle or sombody eses.

To get back to the incident, since I've been here the HP department has taken a I

second seat in everything, operations seems to me, now this is my opinion, 131 runs the Island.

In the way of repairing instruments like Mr. Benner has 14!

suggested I&C shops repairs our instruments when they have time.

If not they just set up in a disabled stage of events. Our foremen were just in the process of getting an outside concern because of this to do all our repair.

But when it comes to manpower to keep areas clean, even in Unit 1, 18:

before the accident, we were always given the least amount of people to do the job.

It seems to me since the accident its got back to the same way.

20 i

Where everybody else comes first and HP comes second.

I don' t feel that's 21; right when you are locking from the health physics viewpoint.

22i 2 31 l

YUHAS:

Did the operations staff adhere to HP rules and procedures?

24l 25:

"~~

(18 ~

y i

{

42 1{

In those cases the workers themselves tried to, we have some that we KUHN:

2 catch anu tell them about it, breaking our rules and regulations, but some 3j were the shift supervisor and the shift foreman feel like the are above the 4

concensus of the HP department and a number of times our foreto have been 5

dictated to by operations.

6i f

YUHAS:

Dictated to or did the operations people just forget about the HP l

rules and regulations and did what they wanteJ?

9I KUHN:

They were more or less written up by our foreman and informed that

,0(

they were going to see that our foremen were taken care of for causing them to be written up.

And when they had a chance to stick him they would stick 12!

him.

13' 14:

YUHAS:

Is there any other problems aside from these two?

16 KUHN:

I feel Mr. Benner was right in that they weren't as I call budgeting the amounts, with exposures because at one time when Unit 2 was still functioning we were having problems with the neutron shielding.

Mr. Howe that was our Unit 2 Supervisor, was the only one at the time that was 20; really putting up a fuss against operations sending us into Unit 2 reactor

$1; building for needless exposure, and he was always being overridden by his r

22l supervisor and as long as operations wanted it done, operations had their

$3l way.

24' 25!

Y n:c (j h,i dJJ l.

8 i

43 Il!

YUHAS:

You said Mr. Huwe was being overridden by his supervisor which one?

l 2!

l 3j KUHN:

Well Mr. Huwe only has two supervisors Mr. Mulleavy and Mr. Dubiel 1

4j and I'm not sure which one.

Most of the time I feel this is my opinion and 5l Mr. Kuhn's opinion, tha+ Uick Dubiel overrode the decisions.

Gl YUHAS: Did it appear to you that Dick Dubiel was reporting to the operations group?

H,,

9l KUHN:

In my opinion he was swayed by the operations group.

11l l

YUHAS:

Mr. Benner do you have any other comments or criticisms ?

12l

~-

131 l

BENNER:

Yes.

As Mr. Kuhn said about some of the problems, I, my short ex-14!

perience here I haven't known Mr. Dubiel very long and certainly haven't known Mr. Mulleavy too long, but my own observation was Mr. Huwe was more concerned with personnel and the radiological end of the job anm he became 17; concerned last December along with the technicians that we did have a 18!

neutron problem in Unit 2 reactor building; however, our neutron film 19i badges were coming back negative nothing on them.

So Mr. Huwe, I believe 20!

it was his decisior, decided to start using neutron TLDs, which according 21!

to out, the head of our department, they would be more proven yet.

But 22l

[

anyway, myself and Mr. Egenrider went into Unit 2 reactor building to do a 23l weekly survey and we picked up the equivalent of over 600 millirem beta 6

24r t

gamma and when we came out and they accused us of doing tils intensionally.

25j n

)

44 l

l{

We were in there like 45 minutes.

What we found was we found 250 mR neutron 2

in the elevator in the Unit 2 reactor building.

We found on the operating i

3l fl r we f und in a general area of like 25 to 200, inside the D rings on i

4 the in-core area we found greater than 5 R.

That's all the further the rem y

ball goes up to is 5 R. We stayed clear of these areas.

We went up on top

-i f the D ring in order to do a thorough survey, we went on top of the D 6

'ing and we did a neutron survey up there and we found that over the reactor 7

i 8l area, over the pool area and everything, it was reading greater than 5 R i

neutron.

So we reported this and we read our TLDs that day.

Converted it g

10l with, as per the the formula we were given, and it came out to mine 649 milliren beta gamma equivalent.

We reported this and of course like I said 11l I

they accused us of dawdling in there to get this.

Weil I don't know, but 12!

I anyway.

They then questioned the validity Of the findings whether we found 131 neutron in there.

So Joe DeMan and Fred Huwe took a rem ball they also 141 questioned the accuracy of the rem ball, they took a rem ball, they went into the reactor building they measured a field set a TLD in the field and timed it, took it out read the TLD and it compared favorably with the 17, fir. dings that the rem ball gave so they were together. They also, it is my n,

understanding that, Mr. Huwe sent TLDs out to be shot by Hartshaw and they 19!

turned to be very accurate and then we were told by Mr. Plumlee, NRC inspec' r

20i that the film badges that we were using were for 50 MeV neutron and we 21!

i received like 1 to 3 MEV neutron.

In other words they had like 5% or 10%

22!

accuracy in our situation.

The TLDs were a lot more accurate.

But they 23!

ignored this.

24!

25!

68i l

j I

45 Il 1.l YUHnS:

T Who is they?

.s.

l 2t BENNtiR:

Mr. Dubiel, specifically.

I think..r. Mulleavy would like to have f

3 4{

turned on his back on it.

I'm not sure whet.'er he did or not I don't 5l remember. But our department the heads of our department ignored for a 6

while and then when Mr. Plumlee came in and started talking to the techs about this we raised the question to him. All of a sudden Mr. Logan, the 7

Unit 2 Superintendent, and also Mr. Dubiel and Mr. Mulleavy started getting interested in this neutron problem.

Well then they discovered that the g

shields around Unit 2 reactor were empty.

They were supposed to be full with water.

They neglected to do something or other, anyway, the water evaporated and they never filled out of 12 shields, or cubicles, I think 12!

there was only one or two of them that had any water in it.

So they brought the reactor down and they filled them back up.

This dir.n't cure the problem 14' but it lowered it tremendously.

But I found that this is what we run into all the time, they don't listen to us enough.

We tell them scmething, we're in there working all the time.

We see these things.

We see a problem 17!

coming we can tell them about it.

They ignore us.

191 YUHAS:

Again they, was that ycur supervisf orit 20l 21l BENNER:

This is our supervisors, in our department and I get the impression 22 it goes all the way up, you know, the people at the top, our supervisors 23!

j all the way up, just really aren't that interested as long as everything 24!'

runs nice and there are no big problems or anything, that's it. It's fine 25!

and dandy.

i fs " ~

(181

i i

{

46 i

1{

SINCLAIR:

We are going to take a break here for a minute.

The time is 2

4:58 p.m. We are going to continue with the tape, the time is still 4:58 p.m.

I 4!

g!

YUHAS:

Do you know of whether the same condition existed, for instance, el among the auxiliary operators. Did they find things that were wrong ar.d try to take it up to their supervisors and not get anything done?

l 81 1

BENNER:

Yes, ! can't name any specific items but with talking to the euxiliary operators I think that they had the same problem that we did.

It t

101 just seemed to be a division.

We were on one side, the technicians and the 11l 1

operators, and management was on the other side the fence and as long as we 12t I

13{

listened to what they told us everything was fine.

Sometimes you'd find somebody that would refuse to do what they specifically outlined, but not 1

too often.

15 3

16 YUHAS:

Were any of these recommendations documented?

17i 15l SENNER:

To my knowledge I don't honestly know.

I never dccumented any 19i myself.

We don't have a suggestion system or anything around here.

I 20 don't think they want to hear from us.

But in fact I suggested last year 21:

that they put one in and they said it was a waste of time.

But there are, 22l l

I mean if you go to a supervisor I've always been taught you go to a supervisor 231 and you tell him you have a problem, he should look into it.

There were 24' some that would.

The majority of them would ignore you.

2 l

681 039 I

f 47 t

1 YUHAS: Do either of you have any reason to believe that an individual 2f deliberately made a defect in the system that either precipitated or aggravatec 3

the incident that occurred on the 28th?

4j 5[

KUHN:

Other than though cleanup of Unit 2 we found a lot of garbage in different strainers.

When the plant initially, before it started up, they 6i 7j run the.ystems through strainers if there is any tools, equipment, rags gf and so forth there cleaned out before they get to the pumps.

They found a g

lot of 2 X 4s, hammers, wrenches and so forth in the screens, but sirce that time there was some minor things broken but to say that some individual 0l did it because of hate towards the company I can't honestly say I know.

y 12!

BENNER:

I don't know of anyone who had enough hatred or despised the 131 company or nuclear power or what have you, enough to sabotage the plant.

Offhand I don't know of anybody.

I can say this, going back te the plant itself, that plant from the beginning, when it was under constructicn, it's really a very poor designed as far as the layout.

It's the layout of the 17,!

plant.

I not talking about the design equipment inside, but the layout of the plant itself is very poor for a nuclear plant, because there are too 19' many lines running at knee level, ankle level, too many rooms you can't really get into.

They block you off, they take and build a doorway and 21; 22!

then they put pipes in front of it so that you couldn't get in and out.

They take and build a doonvay and forget to build the wall, you know, and 23l l

thisandyougodownstairsyou'llfinditaroomthathasnopurposewhatsoeveh.

24i It's just there. It was never designed for anything, in fact, it was just 68i 0?0 3

l 1

t l

48 I

1{

as if it landed there by accident.

This is was my impression when I first 2

went through there and I though well they will correct this later'but they didn't.

Some of it, they corrected a little bit of it, but they didn't 3

Correct much.

5!

YUHAS:

6 Do you fellows have any other comments?

71 8l KUHN:

Mr. Kuhn does.

This is Kuhn.

Just before the accident, GPU had sent two representatives from NUS to talk to us, look over the situation to g

see where they could alleviate problems that were developing, that other companies were getting citations from the NRC about, and to maybe be able y

to upgrade our equipment, if needed, upgrade our personnel, give GPU what im l

training that might help us to achieve, me as an HP myself, I feel like we 13; should be trained more often.

We work a six week rotation, we have a week of training, and other than the eight weeks of training we had before we had before we started, anything I picked up I picked up from my own reading procedures, talking with people, I feel we have some good people, NUC navy ceople (nuclear) who ware on submarines that were trained by the government they know what they are doing.

I was lucky I was put on a good cM ft and I lo; had good training.

I mean, I can't kick at it, but whether the company 20:

would have listened to these people they told us that they recommended that 21i we have more people that we did not have enough equipment and that our 22 supervisors were a little lax in some of their practices, but before they 23l j

could ever turn it over to GPU which I feel GPU was trying, the accident 24!

occurred and it was all in vain. This is Kuhn.

My opinion is, still, if at 25l n'I

(; u 'l u

U

O

l i

t

[

49 l

r II NUC plants, if they have a training program they should implement it and...well 2

trafn people.

I mean it should refresh your courses and keep it upper most 3

in y u: mind, not let you know it but it takes you a couple minutes to i

think about it.

4!

i 51 BENNER:

6 I go along with Mr. Kuhn on what he said and also I want to bring 7

out the point that we were running this show down here, two units, a total e a ra ries W a four man s M.

Sometimes R was only a W ee 8

man shi f t.

When you are trying to run two complete nuclear units with only g

e ur men, especially on a backsM, or on a weekeM, aM H 10 anything does happen like it did, you are bound to be short handed anyway you look at it.

Plus the fact that we have on a shift normally you have l

two senior techs and two junior techs.

Now the senior techs are trained to 13i i

do a little bit more than the junior techs but they are also trained they 14!

are also authorized to sign certain paperwork.

The juniors are not allowed to do this.

They could alleviate some of their problems simply by putting in like a made of progression or something to get all the techs on the same 17!

technical level instead of having two grades of techs except maybe a training 18; grade, you knew, to bring it up. They could alleviate some of these problems 19' wnere all the techs would be authorized to do the same thing.

Instead of 20' having say, a man come to you and say of well I can't do this because my 21; man is in the reactor building and you will have to wait an hour till he 22j comes out.

This slows down work and just makes things more difficult. But 23l the manpower problem definitely is a sore spot and they were going to hire 1

20 more techs, we were promised more techs, and somebody killed it.

25!

(I P ;

C42

6 50 i

KUHN:

I would like to make a comment about that.

At the beginning of the 1:

2 year Gary Miller came in and we were startir.g to have weekly discussions of i

3l the problems and mutual grievances.

He informed us that at the beginning i

of the year there were six jobs for six new technicians or juniors in the Si.

w rks, and that had our foremen maybe Mr. Mulleavy, Mr. Dubiel, never l

61 f 11 wed through and they were eliminated from the budget.

So in my estimation y

they did not feel that there was any more need for techs.

i 8!

YUHAS:

Gentlemen, I certainly thank you for coming in and spending this g

time with us and giving us your input as to what you're involved in an i

10j your comments on the program in general.

Should you have any additional 11l comments feel free to contact us, we will be happy to talk with you. I l

think for now we'll cuit.

13t I want to make one other point.

Prior to start of this interview the gentlemen Mr. Kuhn and Mr. Benner informed me that the management of the utility Metropolitan Edison has requested to hear their copies of the tapes.

Both individuals have been informed that a copy 16 tape they will be provided is there own personal property and it is their responsibility to do with it as they see fit.

Is that correct gentlemen?

18i 19i BENNER & KUHN:

Yes.

20:

i 21l SINCLAIR:

The time is 5:08 p.m.,

May 8, 1979 and this will conclude the l

22!

interview with Mr. Benner and Mr. Kuhn.,

23i l

21:

25

/Oi (n 1 7 ti o I

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