ML19248D466
| ML19248D466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Zechella A OFFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS (SUBS. OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRI |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908160283 | |
| Download: ML19248D466 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 M ARIETT A ST., N W. SUIT E 3100
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AT L ANT A, GEORGI A 30303
'g In Reply Refer To:
RII:JPO 50-437 Offshore Power Systens ATT!i:
A. P. Zechella, President P. O. Box 8000 Jacksonville, FL 32211 Centlenen:
Bulletin !;o. 79-14 was initially sent to yc.: on July 2, 1979.
Revision 1 to page 2 of 3 was sent to you on July 18, 1979.
Due to an error in transmission and in order to provide continuity to the Bulletin, we are forwarding you pages 1, 2, and 3, which include Revision 1 to page 2 of 3.
Sincerely, f.
tNN N. D V M w '
c-Janes P. O'Reilly Director
Enclosure:
Pages 1, 2, and 3 of IE Bulletin 79-17 7 9 0 816 O L' S U i,90G33
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASifINGTON, D.C.
20555 July 2,1979 IE Eulletin No. 79-14 SEISMIC ANALYSES FOR AS-BUILT SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS Description of Circumstances:
Recently two issues were identified which can cause seismic analysis of safety-related piping systems to yield noncoiservative results.
One issue involved algebraic summation of loads in son e seismic analyses.
This was addressed in show cause orders for Beaver Valley, Fitzpatrick, Maine Yankee and Surry.
It was also addressed in IE Bulletin 79-07 which was sent te all power reactor licensees.
The other issue involves the accuracy of the information input for seismic analyses.
In this regard, several potentially unconservative factors were discovered and subsequently addressed in IE Bulletin 79-02 (pipe supports) and 79-04 (valve weights).
During resolution of these concerns, inspection by IE and by licensees of the as-built configuration of several piping systems revealed a number of nonconformances to design documents which could potentially affect the validity of seismic analyses. Nonconformances are identified in Appendix A to this bulletin.
Because apparently significant noncon f o nna nces to design documents have occurred in a number of plants, this issue is generic.
The staf f has determined, where design specifications and drawings are used to obtain input information for seismic analysis of safety-related piping systems, that it is essential for these documents to reflect as-built configurations.
Where subsequent use, damage or modifications affect the condition or configura-tion of safety-related piping systems as described in documents from which seismic analysis input information was obtained, the licensee must consider the need to re-evaluate the seis aic analyses to consider the as-built configuration.
LS0040
IE Bulletin No. 79-14 July 18, 1979 Revision 1 Page 2 of 3 Action to be taken by Licensees and Permit Holders:
All power reactor facility licensees and construction permit holders are requested to verify, unless verified to an equivalent degree within the last 12 months, that the seismic analysis appiies to the actual configuration of safety-related piping systems. The safety related piping includes Seismic Category I systems as defined by Regulatory Guide 1.21, " Seismic Design Classification" Revision 1, dated August 1, 1973 or as defined in the applicable FSAR. The action items that follow apply to_
all safety related piping 2 -inches in diameter and greater and to seismic Category I piping, regardless of size which was dynamically analyzed by computer.
For older plants, vhere Seismic Category I requirements did not exist at the time of licensing, it nust be shown that the actual configuration of safety-related systems, utilizing piping 22 -inches in diameter and greater, meets design require ments.
Specifically, each licensee is requested to:
1.
Identify inspection elements to be used in verifying that the seismic analysis input information conforms to the actual configuration of safety-related systems.
For each safety-related system, submit a list of design documents, including title, identification number, revision, and date, which sere sources of input information for the seismic analyses.
Also description of the seismic analysis input information which is submit a concained in each document.
Identify systems or portions of systems which are planned to be inspected during each sequential inspection identified in Items 2 and 3. Submit all of this information within 30 days of the date of this bulletin.
2.
For port ons of systems which are normally accessibles, inspect one system in each set of redundant systems and all nonredundant systems for conformance to the seismic analysis input information set forth in design documents.
Include in the inspection: pipe run geometry; support and restraint design, locations, function and clearance (inclnding floor and wall penetration);
embedments (excluding those covered in IE Bulletin 79-02); pipe attachements; and valve and valve operator locations and weights ( e x c.1 -
those covered in IE Bulletin 79-04). Within 60 days of the date of this
.letin, submit a description of the results of this inspection.
Where nonconformances are found which affect operability of any system, the licensee will expedite completion of the inspection described in Item 3.
xNormally accessible refers to those areas of the plant which can be entered during reactor operation.
C330u
'uly 2, 1979 Page 3 of 3 3.
In accordance with Item 2, inspect all other normally accessible safety-related systems and all normally inaccessible safety-related systems.
Within 120 days of the date of this bulletin, submit a description of the results of this inspection.
4.
If nonconformances are identified:
A.
Evaluate the effect of the nonconformance upon system operability under specified earthquake loadings and comply with applicable action statements in your technical specifications including prompt reporting.
B.
Submit an evaluation of identified nonconformances on the validity of piping and support analyses as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or other NRC approved documents.
Where you determine that reanalysis is necessary, submit your schedule for: (i) completing the reanalysis, (ii) comparisons of the results to FSAR or other NRC approved acceptance criteria and (iii) submitting descriptions of the results of reanalysis.
C.
In lieu of B, submit a schedule for correcting nonconforming systems that they conf orm to the design documents. Also submit a descrip-so tion of the work required to establish conf ormance.
D.
Revise documents to reflect the as-built conditions in plant, and describe measures which are in effect which provide assurance that future modifications of piping systems, including their supports, will be reflected in a timely manner in design documents and the seismic analysis.
acilities holding a construction permit shall inspect safety-related systems in F
accordance with Items 2 and 3 and report the results within 120 days.
Reports shall be submitted to the Regional Director with copies to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and the Director of the Division of Operating Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C.
20555.
Approved by GAO (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for generic problems.
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