ML19246B047
| ML19246B047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/09/1973 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REGGD-03.006, REGGD-3.006, NUDOCS 7907110250 | |
| Download: ML19246B047 (8) | |
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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS 4rn o' REGULATORY GUIDE 3.6 CONTENT OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS
- 1. INTRODUCTION those wahng wah admtmst rat n e cont rols, must be incluJed m the appbcMion but does not become part of in accordan<e w nh : 50 W ot 10 G R Pa r t 5 0. an the te s hmcal s pe cifica tion s.
Techm. al specnications apphcation for a wnstrusnon percut f or a produchon or cannot be changed wahout poor Con: mission approval.
ulill/allon IaCilll) is lequired til11hiude Jn identiti<alion Jild juslllitalnin for tlle sC le t t b n l of ibt)sC b arlah!CL be C r ion 53.35 < >f 10 C Part 50 sets for th conditions, or ottier dems whnh A deternuntd as a dehn; tams and requacments ielat'ng to the categones result of prehnunary saf ety anJy m and eva uanw to be f or winch teshmcal sinificanons for fuel reprocessmg piohable subie c t s ol lesh:n al spec hanons for the plants nw be appropnate (1) safety hmits and linuting plant. Speaal attennon should be men to those nems control senmp, (3 Inninng condnions for operation.
w hnh may siemticantly mlkence the hnal deuen. T he (3) sunediante requirements. (4) desip features and ob ective m selecung probab te<iunal specilianon (5) dnumsnatne con t rols. Thu document provides i
subjects is to idenofy t h.ne denn t hat w ouid requae general emJehnes for the development of technical special at tennon at tln m
stru non per m m to specaicata,ns u nd er each category. tilubit i of this noid the neces,ih lu any ennk at Amx mt.<v pi prese m s a s uggested forma t for technical to suppor t sinal techmcal speciCcane. c f.. p.u ncu;aily spe s canons for Categones I, 2. 3. and 4,.u hsted t hose specifica n on s th c muuJ tu hmcal opera:m above.
hnuts condinons. and kwuc snis unposed upon plant operation m the interest of t1 c h lth and safety of th?
II. CONTENT OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS v
puhhe.
T e ch mcJ spe M ca nons should melude both m unnJ spu.uican ons technical and adnumstratne m at te rs.
Techmeal t he probahlc su bj e o and the wnespmnimg pnnhauon pro p red b:
spec 1hcanons related to tecluncal matters should consist an a pphCJ n l tiU lts plaiH are i slud M m lb-Pic h m:nal) o{ tlp he leatures ( process Vanables, systCms. of Liety A naly sis Repm; i PS -\\ R nd ho JJ he as compmenta of the facihty that are of controllmg complete.n lhe status id the dcwn pcimJ s o>thJ
.mpor t a n c to sale t y. In ad d dion, technical s
f ullesi extent imele numcool s ahn s and wher sgg wns ielated :o techmcal matters should mclude peronent data should be piouded e f flue n i and environmental mo n i t ormg and speut nanom addiessed to the altamment of "as hw as in amudance w uh ; m m oi in ( i R pali s o.
practhaHe jesch of relenes and exposures. lechnical pmdu< non or utiheauon p unconom related to adnumstranve matters should be e.n h operat mg ocense t or a
lauhiy moed by the Amans I-ne:p ( onnabsmn nnN adJ i cssed to t h me orgam/anonal and func nonal contam t a hmcal o;wratmg imut s, co n dmm and requirements that are unportant to the achievement and requuemenh unposed upon punt o;uanon n the mamtenance of safe operanon of the facihty.
uncrest of the hea!th and sately et the put The taluncal speaticanons are pwosed b;, t!m a' @ cant 1.
Techruca, %t ten 1 A ')
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f to an (Teranng htense A!:et rei:ew by Ik A M, lqg l/Q llegula t ory statT, they are moudied as noemsai> Le: ore betomme p.ut i>t the operatmg ke:< A stak n:er,! of l hi ihnnOcat.on of watrolhng teatures can be t he bases or reasons for ah spwnan m mher tnan accomrMed ny a th u ough safety analysis of the USAEC REGULATORY CUIDEJ Cao.n of peist as em may be nots.n-1 by reque" inrs cota the d vts.o s dawe.1 to i me U1 A to rrx E erg, C am rw ss on. Wash +rston. D.C. 20545 Hegutai.vy G m 'es ar e osued e3 owr.u.
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A rvert.on Drees of R*wetm Stan.wrn. Comments ervi suwatteons hv ie Secretary ing;rovemn s m these pws s<e e%r apd and shoukf be sert to "n.C. ?Os45, reethods acwptd,e to t he AE C R9a,y5 v i O m.p.ea.en. ny 5,w # c p,,, t g c,,
9 w.enut.nu sevof c protoems oe r1f t % C essie US A nim < E ^eg v Comrnas.on, WasNng'on, s he Comrmss.oris r epat e 5 to d eee' e re, # # _, me we n
ev u s e _ te'ed a c e m to v, cwo p.4,, w e to A rt e-t on CNef. Pur e Prweedngs Staf f appt =3n rs Regulat e v Gudes are n<n sw
.t es f w - atus a wi tornpana th them a not required Me% ids and v etens 1 t'e t ' mm t wo se t ou t m The pirrs are essue1 m the foawrq ten twoad divmens h
the pwses vuoi t;e accepiarne if they prcvee a has a f x rw Mr? rg,i reyuve to the emuerww or coct nuence of a perwt or iianse by the C omm.ss.on "1.
Pone, a w on 6 Pm& ds Roscord and T en R asctor1 L Tre wteten 3 Fue.s er.jys t e, n F x + t,es d Orrupst.orel Health Pat >oshed gu. des was be rn ei pe<,od ca, n eu g 4 e r,,,
t o,ma:e 4 E v romrto a u 5 s q 9 Anwrust Review (WQf7Wnts eru110 re' eect new. i 0s mo f agn Or p u ps.r ie x e 5 Mater.ea and Pieni Protes tion
- 10. General 8
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facihty based on current knowledu and i nderstandm in the e"ent of errors m operation or relatively of safety needs and techmques. The sdety analysis mmor malfunctions of equipment, a condition of should determme:
abnormal operation, as d!ustrated by the second block in The mareins of safets dunng normal operations Figure 1, w ut eust. To present further progression of a.
and transient conditions anncipated dunng th. hfe et these circu mst an ces, s y c:al operating procedures, the facihty; and a! arms, or automatic controls are usually provided. Even b.
The adequacy or sauetures, systems, and thouch these procedures and con t ro!s return the components provided for the presention of accidents operating situation to normal, any radioactmty that was and the mingation of the consequentes c! accidents.
rcled to the ceib must not reach the ennronment, He nce, the t ur t he r barners m ust be functioning The perfornunce ut such an analy sis should entail:
ade qua tely.
a.
Detaded eunur.aton of structures, systems, and couponents with respect to their abihty to meet The propess:on ;n Figure I illustrates the need to asgned objectives; develop specificanons which wt:1 ensure that successive pro ess controls, procedures, and b.
Evaluation of their abihty to resist ma!funcnon; barners cust; that s
c.
hstimation of their abihty to funttion rehably equipmen t are f unctioning as necessary to present despite malfunction of related structures, systems, or accidents and dispersal of radioactinty; and that systems com ponen t s; a nd con t ro!hn g the hquid and gaseous effluents, possess d.
De ternunation and unde rstandmg of the sufficient resc rve capacity not needed for routme operation to control the results of any accidents. For conditions or circunntan<cs relatmg to equipment or process va ri able s, under whidi eadi can no longer example, in a fuel reprocessing plant, the scrubbers.
function properly filters. and absorbers u3ed to treat the offgas constitute a barner to release of radioactive contammation to the The focal points f or the ana!> sis shou ld be (1 ) the ennronment. As i prerequNie !or [aCdity operation, it desipi features that assure that radioactne matena:s wd!
is necessary t > specify the condition of operability of not be dispe rsed from the p roce ss equ>pment these sy stems. It is also necesury to specify surveiUance
( accide ntally or ot herwne ) and t M the fdters ami and testing programs for these items to assure their barners that prevent raduuctive matenah f rom reaciang proper functionmg.
the environment. These unous succenne barners to the release of radmactmty form a defense in depth on which No barner is perfect, and therefore sole reliance overall safety depends. "Ik fens m depth" carnes a should not be p; aced on any smgle barrier to protect broader connotation than just that related m 'uccesme nubhc hea!th and safety. However, careful attention to
'he maintenance of miehnty and performance of each of pmtective features to prevent release of radioacnnty.
t For cumple. the pnneiph apphes to control and a: arm the barnen can sabstantu!!y reduce the consequences of m st r u men t at ion ( i.e - redundancy and backupt to a senous accident. Therefore, techmcal an ! engmeeting people. equipment, and pr ocedura! m terac nons; and to matters formmg the subjects for techmcal specifications renew and audit by vaneus gmups at several leseh of should be addressed to reasonable maintenance of each management. This is further diustrated in secuon IV of of the barners.
this guide m which the live categones of techmcal specifications are discussed.
Surve dlmce of the site, by monitoring of the pot en tial pathways of radionuchdes th rough the The relationships of the barners to the operation cf environment to nan, provides added assurance that the a facihty and to the conditions and charactenstics that miegnh and performmce of the bamers has been lead to protection of the barners are shown m Figure 1 adequate to protect public health and safety.
of this guide, which is a sunphtied dueram showmg the course of events wluch could lead to uulatmn of one or 2.
Administratis e Matters more of the barners. Conditions of norrr.11 operanon are represented by the first bh>ck m Figure 1. To mamtam With respect to aJ minist rative contro!s, the these conditwns, two important ut3 of circumstances framework for technical specih
.ons is based on four m ust emt: (I) important process vanahles muy be pnneipa! functions that should be performed:
mamtamed in their normal ranges and (2) compor.ents a.
Operation of the plant equipment; and systems of equipment must be e perat:nu ;, roper!y.
i Maintenance of equ pment; c.
Record keep:ng; and Pr ot e ss vanab!cs are m. untamed in their norrna' d.
Audits, renews, and evaluation of operations ranges by use of standard operating procedures, and in (i.e., performance of both equipment and people).
some instances, by automatic control sys t e n.s.
Equipment which is necessary to operate or control the While rep rocessmg plan ts may vary in sue, process is momtored throughout the op: ration, and character, and co m pic u t y, the safe operation of a some compiments and sy stems are tested and checked facihty depends on an organuatmn that includes people dunng operation to a ssu re that they are operatmg of various talents. For the organization to operate correctly.
successful y, there must be de!egation of responsibdity 14? 1//
3 6-2
a and aut honry. To e nsu re a safe ty consciousness 1.
Safety Limits and Limiting Control Settings throughout the organization, management must provide safety standards and objectives e.s weil as a procedural S pecifica tio ns of tius category apply to system that implements these.
safety.related process variables which are observable and measurable (e.g., pressures, temperatures, How rates, im portant factors in such a system include the concentrations, volumes, and quantities). Control of following:
such variables is directly related to the puformance and a.
An orgamzational structure that provides a integrity of equipment and confinement barriers.
clear de finition of responsibility, authority, and accoun tability; Figure 2 of this guide illustrates in a general way the b.
Personnel with adequate technical ability, concepts of limits and their relation to normal expenence, and training; conditions of plant operation.
Standards and 1;iits within which the fuel c.
reprocessing plant and auxmanes must be operated; The safety limit for a given variable is a value of that d.
Approved wntten procedures for all operations, variable at which one can say with confidence that no includmg procedures for abnormal and emergency serious consequences will occur. If the value of the conditions and procedures for reuew, approval, and variable were to reach this limit, no hazard to the public execution of changes to the process, equipment, or health and safety would exist even if all othe-variables proce d ur e-were at the upper bounds of their operating ran c.
t 1Iorough analysis of all unusualincidents; e.
f.
Sche ju!ed penodic review of the operation by Beyond the safety limit, and separated from it by a com pe ten t independent staff with a high level of finite margm, is a danger zone in which unacceptable authority; and consequences may occur or for which a safety analysis g.
Prompt corrective aenon en deficiencies found has not been performed. Somewhere in this zone is a real during audits.
limit which divides va'ues that are certain to result in unacceptable consequences from those ' hat will not.
Ill. BASES FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Usually, this lumt cannot be precisely louated because of uncertainties both in the acceptabdity enteria and in When a technical specincation has been selected, the technical knowledge of the process, and because this ba.ses for its selection and its signideance to safety of limit is interdependent with the values of other variables.
operation shou'd be defined. This can be done by the Therefore, the safety limit for a given vanable is chosen provision of a summary statement, in wnting, of the after consideration of expenence, expenmental results, tecimical and operational considerations which justify interaction between variables, and all other pertinent the selection. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR)should plant characteristics, and is located conservatively withm fully develop, thiough analysis and evaluation, the the bounds of knowledge. The margm noted as details of these bases. The physical format for technical
" Allowance for Uncertainty. " in Figure 2 is intended specificatmns therefore assumes importance, since the to take into account the factors mentioned above. For collection of speciGcations and their written bases form example. consider the variables pressure, temperature, a document which delineates fatdity features that are and acid concentration m a dissolver. Pressure may be important to safety of opention, the reasons for their limited so that the dissolver offgas system does not importance, and their relations one to the other.
become overloaded. Temperature and acid concentration may be limited at a certain stage of the process to Fur thermore, as experience in operation and control reaction rate.
technical knowledge accrue, changes in technical s;rcifications become desirable from time to time, and The practical result of this approach is that the the wntren basis for a specincation provides for orderly transgression of a safety limit by a sma!! amount would analysis and evaluation of such changes. Only the not produce unacceptable consequences. Ilowever, this speciGcations are bindmg upon the licensee. Bases are action would represent a signiGeant and undesirable suppor t mg information.
departure from proper operation. To transgress a safety brait, sigmficant equipment malfunction or failure or one or more signiGeant deviations from operating IV, DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL procedures, or both, would have tolodult ]/h SPECIFICATIONS irL At a level on the safe side of the safety limit, a The Gve categories for which technical speciGca.
limitmg control setting is selected. The region between tmns are deGned in y 5036 cf 10 CFR Part 50 have this settmg and the safety limit should be suf0cient to been derned from a consideration of factors that bear al!ow for alarms and for subsequent corrective action by on the use and mamtenance of physical banxts in the automatic protective action con t rols or procedure Teration of a facihty. Additional categories may be systems to rerum :he situation to normel or to shut the designated by the applicant The fu!!owing discussion process down before the sa fety limit is reached.
will examine and outline the avelopment of technical Selection of the hmiting control settings must take into speciGeations that must be covered.
a c c ount response times, transient characte nstics, 3.6-3
cahbration uncertatnties, and instrument reliabilities and readmess to assure contmued safe operation and to maccuracies.
prevent a malfunction trom deve!oping mto a severe accident situation. Examples of this type are emergency Some examples of situations that should be powar, emergency air, emergency steam, spare on.line considered are excess pressure or vacuum in a cell or ventilation fans, backup coohng water supphes, and fire glove box, high concentration of fissile material in an prevention systems.
extraction t:mt, high temperature of solvent systems, loss of coolant in a high. heat-genera mg system, and A third type of equipment that requires abnormal hydrogen concentration in an offgas system-performance and inte6;ity speciGcations are the filters and baniers that must perform well routinely but must On thq safe side of the hmitmg control setting hes also have some minimum reserve capacity to contam the /one of normal operations. A!!owance must be made large accidents. Examples of this equipment type. with for the possibility that the value of the vanable may typical appropriate specifications, are iodme absorbers transgress the normal zone occasion ally due to the and their mmimum efficiency, mam ventilation filters mstrument dnft, minor operation,d errors, and normal and their mimmum efficiency, segregated or closed loop Guetuations in process or c ontrol characteristies-cooling systems and their maximum leakage rate, Therefore, a marpn should be left between the normal ven tilation system st ructures and their maximum operatmg zone and the limiting control setting because backDow or leakage rates at some accident-generated
~
11 st ructures of these factors. This is the "Operatmg Marpnshown pressure wase, and the building or process m Figure 2. Usually, alarms or annunciators are provided and their leakaze rate at some pressure differential.
between the oper:tmg zone and the hmiting controi
~
settmg or the safety system action pomt to promote b.
Technical Conditions and Characteristics corrective action and t o help present any significant invasion of the safety marpn.
Tecimical conditions and charactenstics should ba stated in terms of allowable quantities, e g..
A result of proper relation between the safety hmit temprature, pressure, mass of Gssionable material in or the limiting control setting and the normal operating certain systems, concertration of radioactive matenal m
/one is that the limiting control settmg should seldom be certam systems, volume of fiuid required m a system, exceeded and any safety system should seldom he chemical constitution of certain Guid.,, or allowable activated.
configurations of equipment.
2.
Limiting Conditions for Operation As an example of an allowable quantity, the y
tem perature of a cell containmg solvent extraction This category of techmeal specitication covers two equipment m mht quahfy as a technical specificatica.
gener al classes, (a) equipment and (b) technical Such a cell c'ould be assumed to contam spilled or conditions and charactenstics et the plant necessary for uncontamed solvent. If the temperature of the cell were continued operation, as discassed below:
allowed to rise to the Hash point of the solvent, a fire and explosion might result which could adversely affect a.
Equipment the confinement systems.
Seseral types of equipment are important t To denve a limitmg condition for operation, the safety of the operation and to the mamtenance of a one must consider both the minimum complement of barner betw ee-5e radioactivity mside the plant and the equipment necessary to main tain operation in the external environment. For t hese types, techmeal "no rm al" range and the equipment neccessary to specifications must estabhsh the lowest acceptable level a c commoda te abnorma! situations. For example, of performance for a system or component and the sufficient equipment in all systems should be operable so that in the event of further, but hmited and defined, or the m tmmum mimmum numter of (umponents portion of the system that must be operable or available.
failure of equipment, a power outage or other transient situation, or an error in operation, the plant could be One such typr of equipment, with its associated safely shut down and the design basis accident could be s pe ci fic a t ions, consist s of t hose sy stems and accommodated with the equipment remaining available.
components ducctly related to the control of operating conditions essental to safety and to the prevention of 3.
Surseillance Requirements accidents. Many items m this type also w1!! have safety li nut s.
As example s, this ty pe would melude Major emphasis m survedlance specifications should concentration monitors, t emperature m onito rs, be placed on those systems and components which are interhxks to control maximum evaporator temperatures, essential to safety during all modes of operation or are and radioactivity monitors on efduents.
necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents. Test s, cahbrations, or inspections are A second
.y pe is the vital equipment and necessary to verify performance and availabihty of v services which must always be available or in a state of important equipment and d te t, incipient deficiencies.
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o pos s n, for mem bers c: s a fe ty Eus
' ArtlCularly tn.e Ol lhase syste:ns that are nur and techmeal use d
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aorma! operanon but are necessary to cope comrmttees w hen such exe and foi posaions on the 9 with abnormal situations operating staff. For th:s purpose. a chart nuy be used,if preferred.with footnotes as iequired.
Surveihance requhements and hnating condinons b.
Ad mimstranve action to be taken by the for operation are frequently conglementa y. cor a hee nsee in the eve nt any requirement imposed by speatic o stem, a hmamg conden speafaation wdl techmcal speuficat ons is uolated.
Dei.u2ed w ntten procedures govermng normal typicWly estabhsh the nummum per wrmance level, and c.
the survei!!ance requuement wdi pressnbc the frequencv o peratior, ab ner mai a t uat ion s, c me rgencies, and and scope of tests to demonstrate suc ; performance.
mamienance operations that may af fect plant safety.
d.
Locs and records of operation, maintenanct.
Sun ciliance requnervnts also m aude efnuent changes to procedures and equipment, te:ts, inspections, mona aru.g and sit e enuronmema! momtonag. The cahbranuns, incidents, mvest;;anons, and review s.
object of ef3uent and ra; rom catal momtonng is to e.
Review and approval mechannms for v en fy and de nonsn a t e d.a t th in te gnty and authonzanon of new procedures as w eh as coanges m perfor man a of the han as des:med to cont am procedures, equipment, and process, and for detemuning radmactivity juve been adequ ate protect pubhe whether such changes can be made withm the existmg
's heahh and safety.
techmcal speatications.
f.
Traimng progams for plant personnel.
Whenever po ssible. the I quem an d type of g.
Periodic renew and audit of operan 3ns, surveilla,ce should he baw on qwn mative data denved includmg performance of both equipment and operating throuch expenence or exper oeat < ' a posWe rate at person neh which deteurs rught ocem or at a bch hmns might be h.
Reports to the AFC.
exceeded. SurveilLace pregams should he permthcally eununed and modified as nm man to reDect new data V. CH ANCES IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS or t ondutons.
AND IN PLANT EQUIPMENT 4.
Design Features The technical speciGcations discussed la this guide are mcorporated u to the beense issued tor the operation These t e c h n i cal spea Geanons cover design of a facihty. This means that the imuts and conditions charactensues of speaal impm tance to each of the set forth ir th specitications become legal bounds ph' acal barners and to the mamten ece ef safety wahm which the beensee is required to operate the i..upns in the des:gn. ne rnnapal objecove of this facht y.
s-otegory is to con tr oi J.arge s in des;gn of utal e qui pn.cn t.
The sy s te m or socaficanons described above is mtended to po vide a reasonable depee of Dexibility to Seleen of specdic mens m th:s ca*egory should be heerace mananment for as control of operations in the pretbeated upon an eununation of all. eqmpr ent and interest of saf ety. Furthermore, m recopution of the rnatenals aswiated w nh (and madmg) eac. barrier fact that, as knowledge and expenence accrue, changes with resp: to:
in specificanons or in equipment may become desirable Whether a change m design would affect any or esen necessary, the rules of the Comnussion provide a.
techmcal speancation; for two categones of changes:
h.
Whether any margm of safety anoaated with 1.
Changes m techmcal specitications or changes an> technical speciGcatmns would be at tected,and that involve an "un re new e d safety questmn" (see Whether the equipment its performance is s 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50) require prior review and c.
covered n any other techmcal spe<d cation.
authonzanon by the Commi3smn.
2.
Certam changes m plant equipment and 5.
Administratise Controls 1ro i80 er"<<at"e,'">> 8e m"ae 8x <ne '<<" - " "" "t e""
IkL Conuntssion authonzation prouded he is able to mak( a The Safety Analys;s Report should contain a fuU suitable tinJin. to the ef fect that the change does not description and dacussion of orgam/ation and invohe an unreviewed safety question.
admimstrative s3 stems and procedures for operanon of As equipment ard pe rson nel pe rformance data the laahty.
become ava:lable t hr ou p.hou t the operatmg hfe of a faahty, earher studie and data should be regu!arly
.Techmed speoneanons of this category should con sist of summarv statements and descriphons ot.
reconsidered and updated to redect actual experience.
When a she al a tethmcal specificanon appears 9 admmistranve anangements for the fonowmg subjects:
Organizatmn, showmg lum, of authonry trom in order, its effect on reiat ro equipment and procedures a.
top (hcensee) management on threup all aenuties, both should be analy/ed and evaluateu. The basis for the techmea! and operational, with a descr:ption of the "ol d" spea ticatmn provides a sta r t mg pomt for m
mminium qualifications estahhshed N>r key management evaluanori of th: chance.
3.o-5
i When a change or modificatior. i.. -caipment is necessary to justify the change, a revised basis should be contemplated, it should be exam:ned for i:; effect on provided. In addition, a revised basis should be sub-related evipment and procedures and for its effect on mitted whenever a determination is made that an exist-the validity of the basis or related technical specifications. In this way,it can be determined whether ing one is not vahd, regardless of whether a specification v
the margin of safety would be adversely affected. Where change is proposed.
CELL or BARRIER VESSE L GLOVE BOX BUILDING DISTANCE I
l I
I t
l l
l A
O F F-SITE F ACILITY NORMAL ABNORMAL TO CELL R
~O CONDITION OPE R ATION OPE R ATION GLOVED l
l BUILDING l ATMOSPHERE I v
ENCLOSURE I
I I
Figure 1. RELATIONS AMONG PHYSICAL BARRIERS AND FACILITY CONDITIONS
)42 181 9
3 6-6
e o
3
> Danger Zone Unacceptable consequences may occur.
J 3
> Ailenance for Uncertainty in Onset of D. na;.a or Consequences
)
SAFETY LIMIT 3
> Safety Margin Allowance for control or safety system action plus calibration uncertainties and instrument inaccuracies.
j LIMITING CONTROL SETTING 3
b
> Operating Margin Necessary to allow for instrument drif t, minor operational errors, and fluctuations in process or control characteristics.
j NORMAL OPERATING LIMIT 3
> Zone of Normal Operriion
)
i7 1]
L
't L Figure 2. LIMITS ON SAFETY PARAMETERS 3.6-7
EXHIBIT I s
SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR TECHNIC AL SPECIFICATIONS Title (e.g., Temperature Control of Waste Evaporator 4 s
Applicability. System (s) or portion (s) of the facihty to which the specification apphes should be clearly defined.
Objective. The reason (s) for the specification and the specifie unsafe condition (s)it is intended to prevent.
Specification. Safetly linuts and limiting control settmg(s) for the important variable (s), or the condition or surveillance requirement imposed.
Bases. The Safety Analysis Report should contain all pertinent information and an explict, detailed analysis and assessment supporting the choice of the item and its specific value or charactensocs. The basis f or each specification should contam a summary of the mformanon in the Safety Analysis Report in enough depth to indicate the completeness and validity of the sour ce matenal and to provide jushfication for the specification. Subjects which may be appropnate for discussion m the bases are:
I.
Technical Basis The technical basis is derived from technical knowledge of the process and its characteristics and should support the choice of the particular vanable s well as the value of the vanable. The results of computations, expenments, or iudgments should be stated, and analysis and evaluation should be summanzed.
2.
Equipment A safety hnut otten is protected by or closely related to certain equipment. Such relation should be noted and the means by which the vanable is monitored and controlled should be bnelly mentioned.
For specifications in categories 2,3, ar.d 4 of the text of this guide, this section of the bases is par ucularhc important. The function of the equipment and how and why the requirement is selected should be noted here in addition, the nicans by which survedlance is accomplished should be noted. If surveillance is required penodically, the basis for frequency of required action should be pven.
3.
Operation The margms, and the bases therefore, that relate to the safety limit (s), the operating hmit(s),
and the normal operating zone (s) should be mentioned. The roles of operating procedures and of p<otective systems in pardmg against exceedmg a hmit or condition should be stated. Brief discussion should be meluded of such factors as system responsds), process or operational transients, malfunctmns, and procedural errors. Reference to related specifications should be made.
4 Assessment of Risk The degree of confidence in the value of the vanabic or the condition specified or the uncertainties associated therewith should be stated as prceisely as is possible. The potential results and ef fects of exceeding the hmit should be rnentioned. and the risk resulting therefrom should be evaluated.
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L.
3.6-8