ML19246A359

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Forwards Addl Info Items Received During Ad Hoc Subcommittee on TMI Incident 790430-0501 Meeting
ML19246A359
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 05/02/1979
From: Major R
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To: Bender M, Etherington H, Lawroski L
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Shared Package
ML19246A360 List:
References
ACRS-SM-0102, ACRS-SM-102, NUDOCS 7906180622
Download: ML19246A359 (1)


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.k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 1

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May 2, 1979 M. Bender H. Etherington L. Lawrcski D. Moeller

SUBJECT:

ADDITIONld. INFORMATICN ITF.S RECEIVED CURING THE APRIL 30 -

MAY 1,1979 MEETING OF THE AD HCC SUBCCriMITTEE ON THE T41-2 ACCIDENT The attached items, listed below, are 'being sent to those rembers who did not attend the above meeting for their information.

(1) Memorandum from P. Shewmon to D. Okrent, Re: Recommerdations to the Commissier., April 18, 1979.

(2) Memorandum for E. G. Case from D. F. Ross, Re: Summary of Meeting with Combustion Engineering (CE) - Corrective Actions for Combustion Engineering USSS Plants as a Result of Three Mile Island Unit 2 Incident, April 12, 1979.

(3) Memorandum for E. G. Case from D. F. Ross, Re: Sumary of Meeting with Westinghouse-Corrective Actions for Westinghouse NSSS Plants as a Result of Three Mile Island Unit 2 Incident, April 12, 1979.

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Memotandum for E. G. Case from D. F. Ross, Re: Summary of Meeting With B&W Regarding Natural Circulation Considerations, April 18, 1979.

(5) Draft set of Minutes, Re: Meeting between NRC Staff, B&W, Toledo Ed.

Davis-Besse 1, Duke Power-Oconee, SMUD-Rancho Seco, dated April 24, 1979.

(6) Nuclear Regulatory Core..ission Staff Report - Evaluation of Long Term Post Accident Core Cooling of Three Mile Island Unit 2.

(This is a Draf t S6R), dated April 1979.

(7) A copy of the T4I-2 Emergency Procedure 2202-1.5, Pressurizer System Failure is available for your inspection at the ACRS office.

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RichardK. Major,/

Reactor Engineer Attachments:

As stated cc:

R. F. Fraley M. Libarkin l - r 6M J. McKinley H. Votess w/att.

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WASHING TON. O. C. 20555 April 18, 1979 TO:

Dave Okrent, Chairman T4. Consequences, Subcommittee FMi:

P. G. Shewmon SUMECT:

RECOMMENDATICNS TO DIE CCMMISSION I won't be able to attend the Monday of your meeting on T4I, so let me put some cm.m.ents and questions in writing.

I feel our resporse to the Conmission has been too narrow.

I am not too sanguine about the approach I will characterize as "if we are just clever enough and try hard enough we can design a plant which will cope with all accidents".

We should try, but shouldn't limit our interest to pushing for more analyses of how to recover degraded plants from potential.,;cidents.

We have completely avoided any talk with the operators involved or their supervisors. Since the operator will remain a vital factor in avoiding such accidents, what do we plan to do about learning their perceptio. of the accident, and getting into what should be done to strengthen that line of defense? Are we in effect precluded from this by the need to hold public meetings on matters which may be litigated? If not I think its time we heard from Met. Ed.

We've touched two ispects of aid to operators - how to get the operator clearer indications of plant status, and clearer instructions on how to take a degraded plant into natural circulation cooling. Rese only address our perception of what we think would have helped the operator.

I feel uneasy guessing at what a person's problems were.

Have we ever gotten into operator training and examinations, e.g., what are the philosophy and goals? hho will be looking at that? hhen?

A second general area is how the NRC organizes to respond to accidents.

It's probably just as well to let this go for a month or two, but not too much more. R ey should be working on it, and we should ask and listen.

A part of the " response" question is the identification and organization of technical expertise. A division of this vat ind ica H a n WMn question is that of chemical ex; weakness that shows up in severz DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously entered into system under:

Mo3 MCu anO 19 Osl'{6011 No. of pages:

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