ML19242D902
| ML19242D902 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1979 |
| From: | Fountain R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280799 | |
| Download: ML19242D902 (48) | |
Text
'
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION l
1!
In the Matter of:
2; IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3l of Ronald K. Fountain l
Auxiliary Operator A 4I i
Si l
Gi 7i 8!
Trailer #203 i
91 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11l May 17,1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13!
July 3, 1979 (0 ate Transcript Typec) 14; 211 and ~12 2
15i (Tape Numcer(s))
15; 17 18 191 20 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Tracy Binion 23l Gregory Yuhas Tim Martin 24, 25:
7706120797
- -i, s;
.o ue, l
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1l BINION:
The following interview is being conducted with Mr. Ronald K.
2f Fountain.
Mr. Fountain is Auxiliary Operator A, Unit 2, at the TMI Nuclear l
31 Power Facility.
The present time is 2:02 p.m.,
EDT.
Today's date is May l
41 17, 1979.
The place of the interview is Trailer No. 203 located immediately 5l outside the south gate to the TMI site.
Individuals present for the inter-i 6
view will be interviewer Gregory Yuhas.
Mr. Yuhas is Radiation Specialist, 7
Region I.
Also present is interviewer Tim Martin.
Mr. Martin is Reactor 8
Operations Inspector, PATT.
I am Tracy Binion.
I am an inspector / auditor g;
with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, USNRC.
I will be monitoring the 10 tape recorder during the interview.
Prior to the interview being recorded, f
Mr. Fountain was provided a copy of a document explaining his rights con-cerning information to be obtained regarding the incident at TMI.
In addition, Mr. Fountain was apprised of the purpose of the investigation, its scope and the authcrity by which Congress authorizes the NRC to conduct an investigation.
On the second page of the advisement document, Mr.
15; Fountain has answered three questions.
The questions and Mr. Fountain's 16i replies will now be recorded as part of the interview.
Mr. Fountain, do 171 I
you understand the document you have read?
18l 19f FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
20l 21 BINION:
Thank you.
Do we have your permission to tape the interview?
22' I
23!
FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
24 25
,ns 4
bU k IJ I
2 1,
BINION:
Thank you.
Do you want a copy of the tape or transcript?
i 2!
3 FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
4, 5
BINION:
In addition, we have a fourth question concerning an issue that is 6l c vered in the document that Mr. Fountain read concerning his right to have 7
a company representative present during this interview.
Mr. Fountain do 8
you want a company representative?
9l FOUNTAIN:
No I do not.
10 I
11 BINION:
Thank you.
Mr. Fountain, will you please give a brief description of your employment in the nuclear industry and any training or education g
that is pertinent?
14!
t 15:
FOUNTAIN:
All my training so far in the nuclear field has been entirely with Met Ed.
Ten years before I joined Met Ed, which was approximately 3 17l years ago, was strictly supervisory type work and maintenance type work 18!
on aircraft with Pan Am in New York.
So that's about the extent of my 191 background.
I 21l l
BINION:
Thank you.
At this point the interview will be turned over to 22l l
Mr. Yuhas.
23l 24 25j i
ue.
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1!
YUHAS:
Thank you.
Mr. Fountain, what we're going to do is I'll ask you a gj couple of orief questions regarding your training at Met Ed and then I'm 3
going to ask you to go through a scenario of how you became aware of the 4
incident that occurred on March 28 when you came to work, basically what 5
you did for the period of time up to midnight Friday the 30th.
At the 6i conclusion of that I'll go back and ask you some more specific questions to 7
highlight the details of what you actually did.
At t'le conclusion of that 8
part I will give you an opportunity to bring forth any comments, criticisms, I
g' complimentary comments that you may have regarding Met Edison, TMI-2, or the NRC's involvement in this incident.
So I would like to begin by asking 10i 3l you when exactly did you come to Met Ed?
12l FOUNTAIN:
At 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> on the day of the accident.
3 14!
YUHAS:
Excuse me.
This is, when did you begin your employment with Met 15:
16:
i 17l FOUNTAIN:
That would be the month of October.
Last October I was here two 18j years.
20l YUHAS:
Okay.
October of 1976, then?
21f 22' FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
23 24j 25[
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4 1
YUHAS:
Okay.
What was your first job description?
l 2'
I 3
FOUNTAIN:
Aux Operator C.
4l Sj YUHAS.
Can you describe the training that Met Ed provided you to progress I
6l fr m Aux Operator C to Aux Operator A?
7 FOUNTAIN:
g Okay, initially to get a job to begin with you had to pass an g
entrance exam which was basic algebra and so on.
If you passed that and 10 y u met all the other requirements, physical and so on, you started off with the company in the program.
I at that time had been laid off previously from Met Ed.
2!s years prior to that I had just started to work with Met Ed and I was involved with a layoff.
So they called people originally who 13
. (
were laid off first offering them a job opportunity of working in Unit 2.
]
So we had classes in the training center over in our training trailers and l
as a C operator you went to school -- I am trying to remember back -- and i
it was probably about 12 weeks altogether we had training.
The planc at 171 that time was still under construction.
We reported to the Unit 2 control 18{
room and that period where we were assigned our shifts.
Very few systems 19!
were running at that time.
So it was basically studying print books, getting c t in the plant, working with new A Operators who had started at approximately the same date we did.
And working together.
We, as time 22 went on throughout the year, you picked up knowledge of the plant where you 23 could go out there without getting lost.
At the end of a year's time we 24 had to pass another test and which moved us into the B Operator program.
25i l
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Anytime you went to school there was a weekly test.
Seventy percent was i
2!
the requirement for your passing grade at minim.'m.
And at the end of --
l 3'
you would have a group of 6 weeks, supposedly if you went to school for six 4f weeks, at the end of that 6 week period you would have to do a test overall.
5 That was the basic way Met Ed did it.
We also had oral, walk around skimming 6l that they felt a B operator should know.
This is at the tail end of your 7
year as a C operator.
You had your major test to do plus an oral walk 8
around, then you moved into a B.
Being a B operator meant that you had g
learned the primary side.
We were B operators oh, nine or ten months, 10j w rking on the primary side and then finally we got to a school.
We got i
11l ur B schooling which was approximately six weeks.
There we learned about 12 primary systems but a lot of us had already had the practical experience 3
w rkin on those systems at that time.
At the end of the second year you 13 had your oral walk around and your final test, which we all passed.
g 15; YUHAS:
16!
So you became an A operator sometime in the Fall of last year?
17f 18[l FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
Let's see... yes.
It was +.ne Fall of last year.
You went by your senority date.
20t I
YUHAS:
Could you briefly describe the health physics training that you've 21i had?
22 23 FOUNTAIN:
The health physics for our group didn't turn out too well.
We had two weeks slotted for health physics.
One was heavy in math, which was
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quite extensive, and the other week of our experience was at the same time l
2!
they had the annual drill being done for an injured worker, contaminated i
3j worker involved with the Hershey Medical Center ambulance and what not and all the -- fortunately, all the HP supervisor foremen type personnel.are Si involved with that.
50 as a result we really didn't get in the heavy l
Gi equipment training that we wanted to at that time.
You know, we had at 7
least five days scheduled for it and we ended up extending it a couple more g
days but they were still tied up so out of six or seven school days we had gj approximately maybe two or three days that we really had any kind of training.
I 10l Which was basically different instruments, learning different instruments --
and how they worked
-e but very little cn the actual maybe taking smear 11.
g samples, survey samples and that 7,ype of thing.
Now we complained about it at the time and that was the answer -- the < were all tied up.
But the next 13 class of B's that went in after us, they did receive better training as p
1gl far as with the equipment.
so..
16ij YUHAS:
To make this clear now, this was the two weeks health physics that would have been scheduled as part of the six weeks B operator training?
19f FOUNTAIN:
That's correct 20' 21, YUHAS:
This would have occurred in the Fall or the early Fall of 1978?
22l 23 FOUNTAIN:
That is correct.
There was something brought up at that time that the HP on our badge which we have, they were thinking possibly of i
k
7 i
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removing it at that time because we really were'nt in depth for that field t
2j as regular HP personnel were, you know.
We got quite a bit of training and i
3 we worked with it but we weren't really going to be classified as HP personnel 4j except tnat it hcppened in an emergency and then a lot of us were.
That's 5
where I really got a lot of my experience.
6l YUHAS:
7 I note that your badge still indicates that you are HP qualified.
8 FOUNTAIN:
That's right g
l 10 YUHAS:
Do you feel that you're HP qualified?
12, FOUNTAIN:
Now I do.
Before I never -- I got a chance to operate a lot of I
the equipment but there is a lot of equipment I have not operated.
I've 14!
taken some smears but I've never really done my own samples or gone that 15:
far yet.
I've taken air samples; I figured that out on the trucks but that's as far as it goes for me.
17l l
18[
YUHAS:
Have you ever operated a teletector in high radiation areas before?
19i 20 FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
Telectector I never used more than 2-3 times before the 21; l
accident cause that's usually for high range stuff.
Usually E-520s.
22!
23 YUHAS:
Fine.
Thank you on the training.
Let's go ahead and have you give I
us a description of how you found out about the incident and when you came 25l to work, etc.
(60 7
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8 1
FOUNTAIN:
Okay.
That particular day I was scheduled to work the 3-11 gj shift.
ti neighbor of mine (her husband works for quality control there on l
3I the Island) saw my wife outside and ran over to her and said there was an i
,4l accident at the Island.
She was concerned.
She heard it on the radio or 5
something or how she got word I don't know, but her husband was here on the i
6j Island and she knew that I worked in Operations and so came over in case I 7
was home to ask me what was going on.
I was not aware of anything happening g
except from my sun deck I can see the cooling towers and so I looked out and my comment was "It tripped."
Because there was no plume.
So I called g
10 in immediately because of her concern for her husband, I could'nt see why she was so shook up over a trip, it's happened before.
And the control I
room operator that I spoke to had a respirator on so I knew immediately there was trouble.
He was in an area that not supposedly requires a respir-
,4l ator even after a trip, so I did'nt want to tie the line up so I just hung up and came in to work in case I was needed.
I reported to the observation 15!
center and saw the shift supervisor over there.
Well, Marshall Beard, he's actually in training now, he was my shift supervisor at one time.
I told i
17!
I him that I 3 available for work if necessary.
And then Gary Hahn came to 18!
me a short.ime later and asked me if I'd report to Unit 2 control room, I
which I did.
When I reported to Unit 2 control room there was another 20l l
operator with me, Mike Demmy.
Do I talk about what I saw as I went along 21l or just exactly what I was doing?
22l 23 YUHAS:
Anyt.'.ing that you feel is of interest or importance, just go ahead 241 and put it into your own words and we'll come back and ask for some specifics.
25!
We don't want to break your chain of thought, so just go on through.
.r l J I
9 li FOUNTAIN:
Okay.
2:
BINION:
Excuse me.
Would you please spell Mr. Demmy's name for the record.
3; 41 FOUNTAIN:
Michael Demmy.
0-e-m-m y.
5 Si BINION:
Thank you.
7 8
FOUNTAIN:
He's another Aux Operator A.
We drove our cars to the north g
i gate and they let us on at the north gate.
There was guards on the gate.
Ol When we got to the #C center - process center -- normally which is fairly busy, a lot of security, there was nothing there.
Everybody had left jackets, coats were left where people had them hung up.
As I entered the...
Mike Demmy was there, his car got on ahead of mine.
He had gotten 14!
ahold of a couple of respirators.
Respirators we foune out later on, by 15:
the way, they were not for radioac+.ive iodine.
They were a different type.
i But that's what we had to use.
As I entered i.he turbine building in Unit 1, there was very little activity there and I just headed up to Unit 2.
And when I got up there the control room operator foreman told me just to 19!
stand by to wait for orders.
Now everybody was pretty busy.
Everybody 21lj that was the.re had a piece of the action.
So it wasn't the time to ask what happened.
It was just a wait.
Then I -- the MSV valves, three valves, 22 the relief valves, atmospheric relief valves were still blowing at that 23 time.
So they lost vacuum to the condenser.
My first job was to establish 24 l
a gland seal to the turbine so we could get vacuum back on ta the condenser 25l l
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Qi'i
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tlj and then we could use the turbina oypass valves to regulate RC pressure 2
which is the normal way you go about it when you suffered a trip.
That's 3
the normal way we do that.
So MQe Demmy and myself, we were able to 4j establish auxiliary steam from Unit 1 and it wasn't time where you followed l
any particular valve line up.
We knew what valvec had to be open so I went 5
6 d wn quickly in the hallway where the main valve is and we cut an aux steam from F it 1.
Well there is a bypass around it and Unit 1 aux boilers trip 7
if you cut into steam too fast.
So I cracked the bypass valve and I had g
g intended just using bypass valve to supply steam to the turbine generator seals, but it tripped anyway.
I had to wait for a while until they got it 10 back on the line again.
And we established vacuum seal to the turbine and 1 11 then we went down to the vacuum pumps.
And there was an instrument man 13[i down there to jumper out the different starts.
In other words the low oil f
pressure, the high water level, we needed them oa you know; So we got them going and then we had vacuum in the condenser.
We went back upstairs; there was another operator that got there shortly after we did and that was l
Pat Shannon.
He, by that time, was in the aux building.
He came in shortly 17!
I after we did and there was a frisker in the control room 100 count range 18t and ne just blew it right off the wall as soon as he walked in the door; he 191 was contaminated.
So he took off to Unit 1 he wanted to get decontaminated.
Then the foreman came up to me and when we when we go into decay heat we have an aux spray line we can set up from decay heat for the prassurizer.
22 So my job then was to establish the lineup for auxiliary spray in the 23 pressurizer.
So I went down to our HP area and there was no telectectors 24 l
there at that time.
There was E-520s but they were all pegged so they were 25j
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11 lj useless.
So I went over to Unit 1 HP and it was contaminated.
There was f
no teletector there.
There was nothing there I could use so on the way 2
I 3j back I just made up my mind that I was'nt going to use a teletector; I knew 4
where I was going and I knew which valve I had to open.
It was a locked 5
valve.
I had no intentions of entering any rooms; so I thought it'd be --
6 I had no idea at that time what the radiation levels were.
As I got there 7
again an HP fella came out of the aux building.
He told me the radiation 8
levels in the hallways were 100 R and I asked him at that time for his teletector but he still needed it and could not urrender it.
So I just g
10 told myself time, distance and shielding.
In other words bag it through the hallways and once I got up in the area of the valve it was pretty well shielded.
I thought I'd be all right.
Then the game was getting Scott air packs.
It was quite a few of the:a being used at that time so I used the g
g bottle that was half full.
There was no one there to assist us, no one 15,!
there to help you.
You were pretty well on your own and I got myself dressed with what we had there and went in.
I climbed up to the /alve.
I made the mistake of running through the hallway, though,.
And I ended up 17!
I hyperventilating and suffer from claustrophbia as a result.
But I got that 18l under control after a bit and then got up to the valve got it open; my alarm as ringing.
Ana then I left.
Then I ran out of air so I had to 20!
I remove the mask just ch maybe 25-30 feet before the door where you get out.
21{
So I got out of there and got undressed.
And everything was contaminated; there was no clean area that you could use.
So I went upstairs snd the 23 same thing with me; as soon as I opened the door the monitor they had in 24:
there the frisker in there went off so I told them I had the valve open and Uhi I d
k
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12 lj; left.
Over in Unit l's HP where I left, I figured it that pretty far from 2
Unit 2; radiation levels ought to be low enough that I could clean up.
The 3f frisker there was alarming on 100 count but I figured the levels there had,
4 to be less than what I had on me so I just simply went in and took my 5
cl thes off and showered.
Threw them in the washing machine while I showered, l
6l put them back on and reported back to the control room.
And all I had was i
7 a low range dosimeter that had pegged, so I told them in the control room g
that as far as I was concerned I was overexposed and I was of no value to g;
So I said I was going to leave and see if I could get my TLD read.
them.
10j ecause I had no ideas at that time what I had.
They read it and I only had about 1 and one quarter rem, so that wasn't too bad.
And then I reported back to work in Unit 1, cause I figured the radiation levels were high I
enough with working with Unit l's refueling outage I picked up 900 MR.
The 13l one and a quarter that I had, I was over 2 rem and for me to go in the at.x building with less than 1 rem left was useless unless it was an extreme eme rgenc.,
So I went to Unit 1 and ended I up on a survey team.
I can't remember the other man's name from Salem or somewhere.
He was he was HP 17 type and an NRC inspector, I can't remember his name.
And we had to drive 18!
l towards Middletown and there is a town outside of Middletown, High Spire, 19:
in that area.
When I took the truck and started off it was 50 mR on the 20; j
road leading to the north gate, to the bridge.
And another team reported 21.
they had found an area outside High Spire that was around 20 mR from part 22' cf the plume.
And that's where we headed for but never found it.
It was 23 strictly.01,.02, 1 mR, 2 mR, that type of readings that was on.
The NRC 24.
inspector wanted us to leave our areas that we were to monitor and he 25!
7na 1 n-iOJ
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13 i
1!
wanted us to go elsewhere; there was a problem there.
I twice had to call i
7; back to the EDC area emergency command post and ask for instructions 3f because he was insistent that we were just wasting time with the way we 4j were going about it but Met Ed at that time insisted that we follow the 5l game plan which is what we did.
He nodded that he understood that I couldn't l
Gi leave and just started driving through the streets.
So that was my -- I 7
guess I worked about 15-16 hours the first day and I went home.
I believe g
I was called in the next day,'I'm not quite sure of that now.
I know I came in and again reported to Unit 2.
I knew at this time what my amounts g
l were.
This would bring us up to what?
The 29th.
Since my the levels were 10 g
under 3 R, they put me handling the HP post by the processing center, y
Could I stop for a little while to get a drink of water?
13 BINION:
We will break now.
The time is 2:25 p.m. The time is 2:27 p.m.
14!
We will are now resume the interview with Mr. Fountain.
16:
FOUNTAIN:
Okay I mentioned I worked in the HP area.
There was a control I
room operator and another operator from Unit I with me.
We were to set up 181 some kind of area where we could monitor people that were leaving at that time.
I was trying to establish some kind of post up there where we could 20j not have people leaving in a contaminated condition.
It was a little 21!
hectic up there for a while because of friskers, because of high background 22' and one thing or another but that's basically what I worked on the second 23 day.
And then I guess after that period started a new quarter and everything 24 I did from then on was in Unit 2.
Do you want me to talk further?
25j
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14 i
1.f YUHAS:
No.
That was Thursday, right? That would have been the 20th, the 2
29th.
I 31 i
4j FOUNTAIN:
Sunday was the last.
5 l
YUHAS:
What did you do on Friday?
Thursday you were sitting at this --
6l 7
attempting to set up this frisker station in the process area, right?
8l FOUNTAIN:
That's correct.
And that's what we did pretty well.
For a g
10 couple of days or so there was not a whole lot of work done anywhere in the aux building.
It was mainly they were working on systems in the control room, really trying to find out what all our problems were.
There wasn't too much work going on; it wasn't really until they started a new quarter that we really got involved with parts of the aux building again.
Pat 13l Shannon, the operator that was there at the time with me, he got burned out for the quarter.
The other operator received a higher dose than I did at 16t that time so we were pretty near maximum for entering that area at that time.
And it was mainly survey jobs of that type that we worked on until
,8, the new quarter.
And then we started going back in the aux building.
20l YUHAS:
Now I'm going to go back and ask you some specific questions.
I'm 21; most interested in when you arrived at Unit 2 control room.
Do you know 22f the approximate time you arrived?
That would have been Wednesday, 28th?
23 24l 25!
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i lj FOUNTAIN:
Around 2 o' clack in the afternoon.
I 2j 3l YUHAS:
Were they on masks at that time?
4l 5
FOUNTAIN:
Yes 6
(UHAS:
Did anyone explain to you why they were wearing respiratory protec-7 tion?
g 9
FOUNTAIN:
No.
I didn't ask anyone because I knew right away that we had 10, contamination in the air.
Which surprised me because our filter system and ventilation system for the control room was supposed to prevent this in case of an emergency like this.
I was a little amazed that it was so completely broken down.
But I didn't have to ask; I just knew that we had I
contamination in the air.
15 16i YUHAS:
Can you describe what happened in the control room when Mr. Shannon 17;,
entered the control rocm?
18!
19!
i FOUNTAIN:
I was not there when Mr. Shannon entered the control room.
I 20t was out on this line up for establishing gland seal steam to the turbine.
21i He entered after Mike Demmy and I left the control room to do this job.
22!
23l YUHAS:
How did you become aware that Mr. Shannon was contaminated?
24 25!
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16 1!
FOUNTAIN:
I heard he had gone into the aux building.
And I happened to be 2
there when he came back and he set the frisker off.
I saw the frisker was 3
n the 100 scale, because he was at the doorway and it was some distance 4
away so I knew he had a lot of surface contamination.
i 5l i
YUHAS:
You were in the control room.
6 7
FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
8 9l Oj YUHAS:
When he returned from his trip to the auxiliary building?
11!
FOUNTAIN:
That's right.
12!
13!
YUHAS:
Do you know what he was assigned to do in the auxiliary building?
15!
FOUNTAIN:
We had a lot of water in the aux building and his work was f
around the radwaste panel.
The radwaste panel is where we control all our 17!
pumps and tonKs inside the aux building.
So what his specific' job was at 18f the panel, I do not know.
19!
20t l
YUHAS:
Did you see a HP or a rad chem tech talk to Mr. Shannon, take care 21(
of him, direct where he was to be deconned?
How was that handled?
22!
23 FOUNTAIN:
You would have to ask Pat Shannon himself as far as if he talked 24I to any HP types.
When I was there there was no one to ask so I believe, if 25!
y f
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17 f
lj I can remember now, I sort of believe someone in the control room mentioned for him to go over to Unit 1 or he told somebody he was going to go over to I
3l Unit 1 to decon himself.
4!
5 Let's talk in some detail about your entry into the control room.
YUHAS:
61 First, call you give me the name of the foreman who directed you to go to 7
the auxiliary building to make this valve line up?
8 FOUNTAIN:
Adam Miller.
g
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10' BINION:
3 Would you mind spelling that for th= record, please?
12 l
FOUNTAIN:
A-d-a-m M-i-1-1-e-r.
13l i
14!
BINION:
Thank you.
15!
16!
h YUHAS:
Do you remember the valve number that Mr. Miller told you to operate?
171 18!
FOUNTAIN:
That would be the decay heat valve 187.
19!
20' YUHAS:
That would be DHV-187?
21 22}
FOUNTAIN:
Yeah.
23 1
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18 I
i If YUHAS:
Can you describe the location of that valve?
2!
l 31 FOUNTAIN:
On the second elevation, well that would be the 328 elevation of i
4j the aux building, between the reactor building and the fuel handling building.
1 5
Where you had to climb up and some pipes you know, there were different l
6l headers coming.... There's isolation valves between the reactor building i
f and the fuel handling building and the aux building.
It's an area where 8
y u can crawl up in some lines and get at valves.
91 i
YUHAS:
Can you describe this valve Is there a remote operator?
Or did 10f tgj you actually have to get a ladder or did you crawl up.
To what height did you crawl? Did you have to lay on nipes to operate the valve?
13 I
FOUNTAIN:
I climbed up on a railing and climbed up and I had one foot on 14i tWo different headers so I was standing approximately... below me was the 280 elevation.
If I had fallen it was down the 280 elevation.
I was j
standing, oh maybe six feet off the platform where I just climbed up on.
You start from the platform, climb up and then you're standing out over the 18J space there to get at the valve.
The valve is a mechanical valve, it was 19!
I all closed.
I had to open it.
There were two other valves involved in the 20!
line up but I never did get to it.
They were down in the basement, the 280 elevation.
And I just didn't have my sufficient air supply to get down 22{
with.
24l 25!
i 1 &*
i i
l I
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19 l
1{
BINION:
Excuse me.
We are going to break briefly to change the tape.
The 2
time is 2:35 p.m.
31 4,
BINION:
The time is 2:36 p.m.
We are continuing with the interview of 5
Mr. Fountain.
6i YUHAS:
Getting back to Mr. Miller telling you to do this.
Can you go over 7
8 exactly what Mr. Miller told you?
9l I
FOUNTAIN:
10 He said, "Ron, will you go down and line up decay heat system g
for auxiliary spray?"
He told me the valve numbers and I said okay.
I 1
knew exactly what he was talking about.
It's a valve I've operated many times and every time they go, when we shut down the reactor, when we go g
I into decay heat the 187 valve and a couple other valves in the basement are 14:
15l!
always open and then they're closed after we get off decay heat.
So I knew 16:l exactly what I was going to do.
i 17,i i
Yl;HAS:
Did Mr. Miller give you a sense of urgency to accomplish this valve 181 line up?
191 20l FOUNTAIN:
No.
It was just that everybody was so busy; somebody came over 21!
l and said it quickly and it just wasn't the time for a lot of small talk or 22l questions.
Every you just did what you had to do.
231 1
24i 25i Oj 1 G
(
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l F
l l
20
{lj YUHAS:
Did Mr. Miller tell you what the dose rates would be in that area?
2!
3l FOUNTAIN:
No, I don't even think he would probably know that at that time.
i 4!
t YUHAS:
Did Mr. Miller tell you to consult with a represenative of the 5
6i health physics department; Mr. Dubiel or Mr. Mulleavy prior to making this I
7 entry?
8 FOUNTAIN:
Well there was no one there.
I know those two gentlemen and g
Y **"*"
I"
~~ *"
- 7*
10 I
any--I was trying to establish teletectors so... Well, I went over to Unit 1, there was a couple of HP types over there and they were contaminated.
They just said there weren't any; you know,. hey said "look around but we 13l can't help you."
You know, they didn't have them to give to me so...
14!
t 15i YUHAS:
Were you told to get an RWP for this entry?
17:
FOUNTAIN:
Well there was no HP.
Essentially there was just no HP, okay?
18:
19!
YUHAS:
Were you instructed by Mr. Miller to take certain special precautions 20!
for this entry?
21]
r 22$
i FGUNTAIN:
No.
This was strictly on my own, what I did.
23l i
24!
25!
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I L
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1!
YUHAS:
Did kr. Miller establish an upper limit of exposure for which you 2
would be permitted on th s specific job i
l 3
4; FOUNTAIN:
No, that was up to me.
I 51 6
YUHAS:
Okay.
Did Mr. Miller ask you if you were a volunteer to parform 7
this job?
8 FOUNTAIN:
No, but any operator there would have done the su e thing, any gj t
10f f us there.
11; iy YUHAS:
In your efforts to locate a teletector, did you ask the rad chem techs that you ran into if there was an instrument comparable to a teletector 13 g
available that you might use?
r 15!
16; FOUNTAIN:
No I did not because I wasn't aware of any.
I heard at one time I
they were going to remodel our E-520s or some of our instruments to read 171 l
higher amounts, but I had never seen any so I did not even waste any time 18[
about that.
I knew teletectors were standard instrument used.
19l 20 YUHAS:
Who decided what you should wem.~?
22 FCUNTAIN:
I did.
23l l
241 25!
i n,
,n, (f,
l
'a
/
b
I 22 14 YUHAS:
Who decided what dosimeter would be appropriate for this entry?
i 2l i
3l FOUNTAIN:
I did because there was just no one else to consult with.
I was i
4j really on my own.
si YUHAS:
Did you have any idea of what the whole body dose rates would be 6
7 before entering the auxiliary building? And I say whole body dose rates --
g those dose rates in the actual area in which you would be operating the g'
valves?
10[
FOUNTAIN:
No I did not.
All I was aware of was the HP man mentioning it was 100 R in sections of the hallway.
But I knew v ery door ard every room, I could find my way in the dark if I had to.
I mean, there was no 13l danger of me wandering from where I was going but...
14!
15i YUHAS:
But specifically the HP tech did not tell you what the dose rate is i
in the area where you would be working?
17l i
18f
{
FOUNTAIN:
No because he wouldn't have been in there.
19) 20 YUHAS:
When were you were last trained in the use of Scott air packs?
22 FOUNTAIN:
My training with the usage of Scott air packs was about 1 year 23 ago where I had to put on that special suit they have for high steam areas 24l l
and we have a trailer with smoke and we go in and find the man and bring 25j foq to; l
7 r
i
[
23 him out.
1{
That was my first and only time with training with the Scott air 2:
pack.
I 3l YUHAS:
What range of pocket dosimeter did you have on?
4 Sl 1
FOUNTAIN:
200 mR.
6i 7
YUHAS:
Okay.
When you suited up, you put on your--can you describe exactly g
gj what you wore? Was it a two pair of coveralls?
A plastic suit or--
10 FOUNTAIN:
No.
I wore a pair of coveralls and put on a wet suit because I figured the wet suit was there, I was going to put on everything that I had.
I even put on a hood--no excuse me, it wasn't a hood it was the plastic part for--I put that over my hair and then I put the respirator on.
14!
And the respirator had already been used by somebody else, anyway.
I'm 15:
sure the respirator was conta71nated because it was laying there in the 16:
hallway.
i 18[
YUHAS:
When you put the Scott air pack, on did you put it in the pressure 19t mode or the pressure demand mode?
20!
21f l
FOUNTAIN:
No I--
22' 23 YUHAS:
The demand mode or the pressure demand mode?
24 25i l
o t
l I
k l
[
24 I
i 1;
FOUNTAIN:
The pressure--do you mean by where I would be pressurizing my 2j mask to keep out...?
3t YUHAS:
4l Can you describe the Scott air pack regulator and the position 5
switch for us?
61 FOUNTAIN:
You do have the toggle sw:tch on it where you can select...where 7
g you're going yo have constant pressure in your mask and it's gding to blow g
out particulate air and keep any gases out and so on.
It had been better sealed in case of a leak.
At that time I used it the other way because I 10 i
.1j was conserving, more interested in conserving my air.
12j YUHAS:
Sc you used it in the demand code?
,,l 14!
FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
s 16i YUHAS:
Okay, fine.
When you got suited up, was there any control point established down to Unit 2 auxiliary building?
19l i
FOUNTAIN:
There wasn't a control point on the Island.
20l 21!
YUHAS:
Okay.
Was there an individual assigned to restrict access into the Unit 2 auxiliary building?
l 24i I
25!
Dj 7
'U e
i
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i 6
I i
t 25 t
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FOUNTAIN:
There was no one.
I 2l 3
YUHAS:
Were the doors unlocked and open permitting unrestricted access to i
4{
the auxiliary building?
I 5
6 FOUNTAIN:
I used the normal doors that I always use coming in and out and 7
there was just--normally where there'd be guards there just wasn't anybody.
el, g'
YUHAS:
The normal doors would have been from the control room, or from the 10 e ntr 1 tower and the 305 elevation through the double doors, down the 1
hallway through the second set of double doors and across the 305 elevation?
12 FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
I did not go that way.
I went through the set of double 13j doors that are normally marked to be left closed.
I went through that set of doors and directly into the aux building through the next set of double 1g ecers.
i 17l l
YUHAS:
So you had no continuously indicating dose rate instrument with you 18!
when you went in?
20i 21;j FOUNTAIN:
No, but that was strictly my owr. decision.
I thought at the i
time that's what I should have done.
22 23 YUHAS:
About how long did you estimate it was going take you to get up, operate these valves and get out?
25j t
' O /L
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I l
l 26 i
i 1!
FOUNTAIN:
With adrenalin, about 10 minutes there and back.
l 2l l
3f YUHAS:
Wnat dose did you assume you would pick up in 10 minutes?
41 51 FOUNTAIN:
I never really thought at the time I was probably going to over 6
expose myself but I--since I really didn't know and I thought it might have 7
been important, I was willing to go as high as--I knew it wasn' t going to 8
take me an hour.
I knew I heard of 100 R in tre hallways so I thought if I g
ended up with 5 or 10 R my age, 41, and health was fine, I thought I wanted t take that risk.
10f 11!
YUHAS:
Are you familiar with the general guidance as far as taking large single exposures like that in excess of regulatory limits?
l 14i FOUNTAIN:
No.
As a matter of fact I even questioned it with the NRC for--
15; we received--I am careful, okay?
I mean I still went in there without the j
equipment and I got out without doing it, without getting overexposed.
So I'm not actually reckless.
But I had questioned Mr. Plumlee frcm the NRC l
before of why it was necessary for us to recei /e neutron dosage from the 191 reactor building.
Because I never received any training with neutrons, I don't know what they do to you or so on.
At that time I didn't think it 21; was necessary for us to receive any neutron dosage.
I 23l YUHAS:
When was the last time you were indoctrinated in the requirements 24l of 10 CFR Part 19?
These specifically deal with the hazards of radiation 25l and radioactive materials.
'a s 3,l l
l l
i f
27 I
ilj FOUNTAIN:
That was covered when we went through our A classroom training 2
for A operators.
So that was about last September, something like that.
3t t
4l YUHAS:
Did that indoctrination include the effects of neutrons?
I Si I
FOUNTAIN:
No.
6i 7
YUHAS:
Let's get back to your entry.
Now, you're suited up, you're esti-g mating you got a half a bottle.
Did you look at the pressure gauge on the g
Scott air pack?
10 11' l
FOUNTAIN:
Yes, I just saw the needle was in about the halfway position.
A lot of them were empty.
Ad I just saw it was about halfway, so I put it g
on...
15 YUHAS:
Again you had heard there were fields of 100 R, you were prepared to take a dess in excess of 3 rem, but you thought you could do it and get 17l 1
_8 ;l out without hurting yourself?
1 19!
FOUNTAIN:
Yeah.
I knew the area of the valve should be protected because l
it had the reactor building to the lef t of it and it was actually in dead 21l air space.
You know, there really wasn't too much around there that should 22 cause me any kind of a problem.
And actually I found out, I took--several 231 days later I took HP people through the aux building for the first time 24\\
I where we actually established what kind of radiation.
It was quite a while 25j I
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before we actually established what the radiation levels were and those 2
rooms were--a lot of them were greater 700 R.
I mean it was--the telec-3{
tector--as soon as I saw it swing up to 700 I would just back off because i
4j it was senseless to stand there and watch it go higher.
I was just needlessly 5
getting overexposed.
6i i
7j YUHAS:
On this entry now, okay?
Did you ask someone to be a standby i
safety person for you?
8 9l 3
FOUNTAIN:
There was no one to ask 0:
3 lli YUHAS:
Did you inform someone specifically " hey, I'm going in the auxiliary 12lg building in two minutes"?
14!
FOUNTAIN:
No.
15j i
16; YUHAS:
Did you call up and say "I am entering the auxiliary building"?
17; 181 FO' N' 4IN:
No--
J 19r 20l YUHAS:
To make this valve line up...
21l 22l FOUNTAIN:
No.
When that foreman gave me the job I spent about 25 minutes 23 trying to find a teletector.
And finally I realized I just wasn't going to i
24) come across one.
It really wasn't too many of them on the Island, really.
25i u 'u -
i
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I f
29 Il!
So I just made my mind up I better gct in there and get that job because I 2j had sort of assumed they must be having trouble with the pressure, I knew 3
they had problems with the pressurizer and I thought mayse they needed the 4
spray.
So I thought it was time to go in.
Si l
6j YUHAS:
But the licensee management did not tell you that it was immediately
[
necessary for you to operate these valves for the protection of vital equipment?
8 9
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"Y 10l
{
11!
YUHAS:
12!
You said you ran across the 305 elevation.
13l FOUNTAIN:
Ran down the 305 elevation and up the stairs 14; 15; YUHAS:
Can you describe the symptoms of hyperventilation?
i 17l FOUNTAIN:
Rapid breathing, I was suffocating, really.
I wasn't getting enough oxygen.
And then I did flip my regulator to help me out e little 19j bit, I was breathing that heavily.
I had a suffocating feeling like I was, 20l i
you know, suffering from claustrophobia; my instincts were to tear the mask 21:
off.
Since I was on the second elevation, 228 elevation, I really wasn't too sure of what was there so I wasn't going to take it off.
But I couldn' t move either.
I was sort of leaning egainst the wall, just waiting until I 24j got myself calmed down.
It was a mistake to run; I shouldn't have run.
1 25:
/OA
?.
uu.
I
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30 1.
Once I got my breathing in a regular pattern again, then I went to the 2
valve.
l 31 4
YUHAS:
You recovered from your temporary panic and your hyperventilation, 5-then you climbed the stairway to 328--
61 FOUNTAIN:
No, this--I already had climbed the stairway.
7 8!
YUHAS:
Okay.
So you are on 328 g
10I i
FOUNTAIN:
There was a combination of the hallway and stairs, unaing up i
the stairs, then.
I was breathing pretty heavily when I got to the top.
6 12l i
13 YUHAS:
You composed yourself and then you began to climb up on the hand 14!
rails in the piping to operate the valves?
16; FOUNTAIN:
That's correct though there was another hallway involved.
I had to walk down another hallway to get to where I was going to climb.
IS(
19:
YUHAS:
When you climbed up to operate the valves, did you have a key that you had to unlock a chain or any locking mechanism?
21; 22f FOUNTAIN:
That's right, I had my own key with me.
I knew I would need it 23 when I got up there so I had it tied around my wrist.
i 24l 25!
no L
s>
g
[
l l
f 31 If YUHAS:
About how long did it take you to unlock the valve and open it?
2t i
3f FOUNTAIN:
It to;k me about 10 seconds to unlock; it was sort of a little 4
fumb'.ing to get the chain and lock off.
I did open it fast as I ever 5{
opened it.
It is a fairly stiff valve but I didn't waste any time.
61 YUHAS:
At that point you climbed down off the pipe runs, off the hand rail 7
8 onto the platform?
9l 1gl FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
I 11t YUHAS:
When exactly did your low air breathing alarm go off?
13 FOUNTAIN:
That was ringing while I was up there opening the bottle but I 15l!
knew I had about 3-5 minutes of air supply.
16!
17:l Can you describe the free 'all distance from that decay heat valve YUHAS:
I down to the 281?
18(
19i FOUNTAIN:
32 feet per second per second.
21!
l YUHAS:
No.
In other words, if you were falling off the platform, off the 22l pipe run that you were on, about how far would you fallen before you landed 23 I
on something?
24 25i o r, Lv' l
l f
32 i
i lj FOUNTAIN:
Not very far because there's headers coming all the way down 2{
there; you would have bounced, you know, you would have struck something 3l f r sure.
I doubt if anybody would fall without striking the anything.
41 YUHAS:
We don't understand each other.
I'm asking if you had fallen off 5
l 6l while you're operating this valve, how far before you reach potential 7
energy of zero?
I 8!
FOUNTAIN:
That would be 328 down to 280.
Is that what you' re asking me?
g Down to 280 level.
So that would be 48 feet, t
11l YUHAS:
So you are on the platform, or you're on the pipe run, your bell is 12l ringing, you are assume you have about 3-5 minutes to get out.
Okay?
As you started your egress route, can you describe whether breathing resistance 14!
increased and when that breathing resistance increased to the point that you had to rip off your mask?
i 17l I
FOUNTAIN:
I was pretty much going under through this.
And all I noticed 181 was when I got--I started--I walked fast down the hallways; I wasn't going 19{
to try running.
I really went down the stairs pretty good but as I was 20!
running through the lower hallws; getting up towards the end of the hallway 21!
it was just like sucking into a vacuum.
I didn't really notice any change 22 because my mask collapsed.
Since I was breathing heavy it was not the case 23 where I could have held my breath.
Because I knew I had to take this off 24!
i anyway and put my other mask on that was laying in the contaminated area 25j i
anyway.
I just knew you're contaminated when you got there, you know?
os uvi cc -
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32 i
l 1{
FOUNTAIN:
Not ve'.y far because there's headers coming all the way down 2
there; you would have bounced, you know, you would have struck something I
for sure.
I doubt if anybody would fall without striking the anything.
31 4j YUHAS:
We don't understand each other.
I'm asking if you had fallen off 5
6l whi'e you're operating this valve, how far before you reach potential 7
energy of zero?
8 FOUNTAIN:
That would be 328 down to 280.
Is that what you're asking me?
g Down to 280 level.
So that would be 48 feet.
11 YUHAS; So you are on the platform, or you're on the pipe run, your bell is ringing, you are assume you have about 3-5 minutes to get out.
Okay?
As
]
you started your egress route, can you describe whether breathing resistance 15l increased and when that breathing resistance increased to the point that 16l; you had to rip off your mask?
17 FOUNTAIN:
I was pretty much going under through this.
And all I noticed 181 was when I got--I started--I walked fast down the hallways; I wasn't going to try running.
I really went down the stairs pretty good but as I was 20!
running through the lower hallway getting up towards the end of the hallway 21 l
lt was just like sucking into a vacuum.
I didn't really notice any change 22' because my mask collapsed.
Since I was breathing heavy it was not the case 23 where I could have held my breath.
Because I knew I had to take this off 24!'
anyway and put my other mask on that was laying in the contaminated area 25i l
anyway.
I just knew you're contaminated when you got there, you know?
ton UO i
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33 i
1{
YUHAS:
So then this was on the 305 elevation before you ripped off your 2
Scott air mask in order to get out?
I 31 4
FOUNTAIN:
Uh-huh i
6l YUHAS:
Okay.
Can you describe your physical and physiological conditions 7
at the time that you got out of the auxiliary building?
8 FOUNTAIN:
g I got outside and I just sort of sat down for a little bit.
Just until I just felt better from all that exertion.
I just took my 10 I
g, clothes off and put my other clothes on and went back upstairs.
Put my i
respirator on.
13l YUHAS:
When you got back upstairs to the Unit 2 control room can you describe what the frisking found?
15 :.
16i FOUNTAIN:
Well the alarm went off when I opened the door, so of course--I can't remember who I talked to any more, who turned and looked at me because they could hear the monitor going orf.
I told them I had the valve open and I was going over to Unit I to clean myself up.
And that was all.
I 21;j did not actually even enter the control room.
22 l
YUHAS:
But there was not a rad chem tech there to survey you to find out 23!
just exactly where you were containmined?
24l 251
(
34 flj FOUNTAIN:
There could have been.
At that time I don't know.
I dian't 2f look for anyone.
I just--
Sl 1
4j M AS:
So you were not surveyed, no one performed a detailed survey on you?
5 6i FOUNTAIN:
No.
7 8
YUHAS:
You just assumed you were contamined--
g 10' FOUNTAIN:
I doubt even if anyone could because it didn't matter where anything was.
It seemed like every monitor we had was alarming.
13 YUHAS:
When you got to the Unit 1 decon area, did you survey yourself in detail prior to showering?
e 16 i
FOUNTAIN:
I couldn't too well because the monitor was alarming.
It was, 17l it's very hard to--it was on 100 count and was ready to go off scale.
As a 18l matter of fact it did several times on its own.
So I just took it for--I 19!
had no idea what I had on me.
20i 21l YUHAS:
After you took your showers and washed your clothes did you resurvey 22 yourself then?
231 1
24i 25!
t
.'g 6
l l
35 li FOUNTAIN:
No, because the instrument was alarming.
i 2:
3j YUHAS:
At this point you went back to the Unit 2 control room, is that 1
correct?
4{
5 6
FOUNTAIN:
Yes and then I frisked myself there and it didn't seem to be too f
bad.
Because I had washed my clothes; I had threw them in the washing machine.
g 9l YUHAS:
Can you qualify that a little more? Were you on the times ten 10 g
scale when the instrument did not peg or...
12l FOUNTAIN:
I think I was on the ten scale at that time because 100 scale 3
wouldn't have made it.
14j l
15:
16l:
YUHAS:
Did you discuss with someone specifically this trip and what happened and the fact that your pocket dosimeter was offscale?
18!
FOUNTAIN:
I told the foreman t:1at I wouldn't be any more use to him.
I was pretty sure I was overexposed and he said "then we'll get your TLD 20j i
read" and I heard Pat Shannon was overexposed; he got 3 and one quarter I 21l guess.
He got his all in one shot.
And he already had some from Unit l's 22l outage to that put him over 4 rem for the quarter.
23 24
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v
, g.
25i OU I
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36 1!
YUHAS:
What foreman did you tell this to?
l 2:
I 31 FOUNTAIN:
This would be Adam Miller.
4l 5
YUHAS:
At that point did Mr. Miller say he should talk to Dick Dubiel or 6,
Mulleavy or one of the HP foremen?
I 7l FOUNTAIN:
There was too much going on in there at that time.
This stuff 8
I gj here was really minor.
I niean what we were dealing with at that time we were talking about contamination and that would wash off.
I did have a 10 whole body count, though, that showed some internal contamination, 40 i
nanocuries I think he said.
Or 54 nanocuries, I think it was at that time.
Altogether I ended up with 6 whole body counts.
And there was another
{
1ater time I even got more internal contamination from another job.
l 15i 16:!
YUHAS:
Has the licensee described to you the hazards of radiation to the extent of the significance of internal depositions of radioactive materials?
17j l
18!
19)l FOUNTAIN:
We've been told basically protection against contamination but not so much of what it will do to you or how it affects you.
We all know l
that iodine will go for the thyroid basically, this type of thing; but 21l l
nothing along the lines of what kind of problems can happen.
22j l
23l YUHAS:
Are you during the emergency assigned to work in a party?
25!
l
( M
'0 \\ @
i r
i 1
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37 l
If FOUNTAIN:
It depends on what you're doing at the time.
You're responsible i
2 for basically your own building during an emergency and if you're an aux i
3-building man you're assigned to a survey team normally.
And under this 4
case here we assist HP.
5 Gl YUHAS:
Have you participated in emergency drills?
7 FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
Where we would wait, we practiced this possibility happened.
g I was involved in two practice drills.
g
(
101 YUHAS:
What did you do in those practice drills? What function did you serve?
13 FOUNTAIN:
One I had to enter the aux building and take some readings on 14; Unit 2 down in the makeup valve alley.
And the other one I did not have 15; anything to do; I was just a standby.
17 YUHAS:
Can you describe to me the effects, the biological effects, of receiving a dose of between 10 and 100 rem?
20!
FOUNTAIN:
21lj Are you talking about what damage you can do to your body, j
or...?
22l 231 l
YUHAS:
What affect does it have on your body?
24l 25l l
i t
og. *i
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s
t
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I
{
38 I
flj FOUNTAIN:
As far as I'm concerned, none.
I haven't ever been told that it t
2{
doc; any kind of--I always thought as long as you kept under 3 rem a quarter, I
3l y u know, nothing should happen basically.
4!
t YUHAS:
My question was on the dose of up to 100 rem.
5 6l FOUNTAIN:
Dose up to 100? Yes, that was described to us and there is some 7
damage at 100 but it repairs itself.
It's not a deadly dose and at that 8j time I was prepared.
I knew I had 115 in my bank.
I was prepared to go to g
100 if necessary, you know, but it just did not have to happen.
10 11 YUHAS:
Okay.
Who read your TLD?
i 131 i
FOUNTAIN:
One of the HP men.
He took it over to a trailer and read it.
14 15i That's when I got a hold of Tom Mulleavy up at Unit 1 control room and he had someone read it for me.
16i 17!
l YUHAS:
Did you discuss with Mr. Mulleavy at that time your trip thrcugh 181 the aux building?
19j 20l l
FOUNTAIN:
No I did not because his problems were much greater than mine.
21!
l There was more of a need elsewhere.
So, there's nothing to say.
22!
i 23l l
YUHAS:
Okay.
Martin, do you have any questions?
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39 1
MARTIN:
Tim Martin.
Ron, I'm trying to tie dcwn the approximate time that i
2 you arrived in the Unit 2 control room and what you found there.
To help l
3l me tie this down, can you describe the conditions that you found when you 4,
entered the Unit 2 control room? And if possible, what operations were 5
occurring?
6 7
FOUNTAIN:
Mike Ross had complete charge of the control room at that time.
g He was, he took over the actual operation of it.
He was giving out the g
verbal commands and orders and the team of men that were operating the 10 p nels were responding basically to his orders.
He would be going from the If com; uter back to the panel and so on because somebody has to take charge, whicn seemed sensible to me.
There was more people in the control room 3
than usual, and there was one group of men always going in the Supervisor's office where they would talk or phone and come back up.
I mean that's I
basically what I saw.
The CR0's foremen, supervisors on the panels and 151 g
each would take a section of the panel basically.
And what they were trying to do was establish RC pressure because it was n ry erratic and the 17l 18jl reliefs were lifting and they had no control over that, you know?
Pressure would build up in the RC system, they'd have to bleed it off, I mean they had no choice.
I had heard there was a primary-to-secondary leak in the B 20:
l steam generator and I knew everytime the atmospheric relief valves would go 21!
off, well, we were just having more contamination going out.
There was 22l another time that night too, by the way.
I was over in Unit 1 at that time 23 when they had to shut the ventilation fans down in the aux building and 24l since they didn't have a flow path anymore, I know the levels started going 25!
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lj up in Unit l's turbine building and so on.
We had to put the masks back on i
2!
over there.
I 31 l
4l MARTIN:
When you arrived were the reactor building spray pumps operating?
Si i
FOUNTAIN:
I could not tell you that.
I did not look at~any instrumentation.
6 7
I did not even go near the panels at all because it was serious enough that only qualified people should be there.
You know, just out of curosity, g
there was no place for anybody that was curious.
g 10I i
MARTIN:
You indicated that +lere were steam reliefs lifting.
ll!
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FOUNTAIN:
Oh yes.
13; i
141 MARTIN:
Were these the main steam reliefs or the atmospheric dumps?
15i 16!
FOUNTAIN:
That I could not tell you either.
I know the atmospheric dumps 17[
l relieved on overpressure in the pressurizer and loss of vacuum and circ 18l water and so on to the condenser.
That's their purpose, their main purpose.
19!
And we dij not have vacuum at that time, so I assumed at that time it was 20 the MSV 3 valves that were opening.
Logically to me that's what they were; 21l 22j and later on I don't know which ones they were.
23l i
MARTIN:
You indicated that we had lost vacuum in the condenser.
How did 24l I
that result?
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FOUNTAIN:
That I do not know for sure either.
That was that way wher I r
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got there.
I heard that they broke vacuum in the condenser because of loss i
3 of aux steam from Unit 1.
You see Unit I has their aux boilers and they 4j supply the steam; aux steam to us when we're down and we're not making our 5l wn steam.
But the unit does trip a lot and evidently it tripped for too i
6j long a time they had to break back.
7 MARTIN:
g Were they feeding the steam generators with the condensate pumps g
or the emergency feed when you arrived?
10I Iy FOUNTAIN:
That I cannot tell you either.
l 1 21 Yt'HAS:
Do you remember as close as possible what time you made this entry into the auxiliary building?
l 15; FOUNTAIN:
That would be around 5 o' clock at night.
?
171 I
YUHAS:
Then you were in there less than 15 minutes?
18[
19i FOUNTAIrt:
Yes.
20t 21l I'
YUHAS:
Do you remember a closer 71 umber than that?
22.
23l FOUNTAIN:
Probably about 10 because I really didn't waste too much time.
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42 I
1 YUHAS:
At this point I would like to give you the opportunity to give us l
2t any comments you might have about the way the incident was handled; about i
3{
Met Ed; about your involvement; about the NRC's involvement; anything that i
4f you feel is important, this a good opportunity to make yourself heard.
5!
6 FOUNTAIN:
The only time I felt things were bad for auxiliary operators was 7
the first day because we had no support.
None at all really.
And from the g
second day on, though, we had plenty of support.
Though some of the support gl we've had I didn't think was always qualified people, because it seemed like t1ey would hire from the street at times.
You can notice when you're 10{
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getting taped up that you weren't taped properly or the person wasn't experienced at it, you know.
So sometimes I felt more qualified than the g
person helping me out and I knew it should have been the other way.
They should have been far more qualified than I am.
And once there was enough 15 pe ple in the control rocm I felt that everything was going to be all right 16!
because at the beginning there was plenty going on in the panels and I wasn't too sure for the first day of two how things were going to turn out..
18l But when I saw the extra personnel coming in, and a lot of brainpower there, then I felt sure we could handle what was going to happen.
Criticisms 191 on Met Ed--I really don't have a' because at that time their problem l
really was strictly keeping up with the problems of the primary system.
And with all the newspaper confusion and TV people and one thing and another, the public relations probably didn't come off too well.
But that's strictly because they could really only keep going at what was happening there.
I 24],
25;l think one of our big problems we got here really is a combination of--
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1; possibly the NRC and with Met Ed--is the seconuary side is very important.
2 And I always felt the secondary plant did not have anywhere near the same 3
attention as the primary plant.
And it seemed like, well, you always worry 4
about the primary plant that tripped but you g need the secondary plant to 5
help you with that primary plant once the trip has happened.
And there was 6j many...
7 BINION:
Excuse me, we are going to have to break to change the tape.
The g
g time is 3:04 p.m.
I 10j BINION:
It is 3:04 p.m.
We are continuing with the interview of Mr.
Fountain.
13 FOUNTAIN:
Your secondary plant normally is -a lot of times is what causes y ur primary plant to trip.
And there was just a few systems in our secondary 15r plant I think are pretty shaky.
And I think our condensate system is one 16 :,
17li of them.
Condensate, feedwater flow.
With our polishers we had no really good automatic bypass valve.
And we've tripped that plant (and this isn't 18; just criticizing the company, I'm talking design now) and I think the NRC 19' really should have been involved in the design more of the secondary plant, okay?
admit it, because it was there; it happened many times but you could change a light bulb on the condensate polishing panel and trip it.
You 22' know, you could get water in your instrument air, close your valves and trip it.
This all hcopened.
'ad I just feel with the flow we have for 24) condensate and feedwatet, we were pushing those polishers to their limit 25l
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if all the time.
It was just the design in that crea, I think that was the 2{
weakness.
And on a trip the operators got to take the time off for watching l
3; their primary plant to establish control again in the secondary plant.
And 4{
that's where I think the company and NRC have to get together and go over 5
that secondary plant.
That's really about all I can think of right now to i
6l say.
i 7
YUHAS:
I have a couple additional questions.
At one point you alluded to g
gj the fact that when you were serving in High Spire you had an NRC inspector with you.
10 l
11!
FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
I 13l YUHAS:
Do you remember who that might have been?
15l FOUNTAIN:
No, I do not.
That was the first and only time I ever met the gentieman.
17!
i 18l l
YUHAS:
Let me give you a few names and maybe some descriptions.
It was 19!
not Karl Plumlee, right?
You would have recognized Mr. Plumlee.
20!
21l FOUNTAIN:
No.
t 231 YUHAS:
Okay.
Was it a radiation specialist either by the name of Nimitz?
241 l
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FOUNTAIN:
No, it was not.
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3f YUHAS:
Okay.
Neely?
l 41 5l FOUNTAIN:, No.
6l 7l YUHAS:
Dr. Gallina?
8 g'
FOUNTAIN:
No, this was a fairly young fellow.
10t YUHAS:
John Serabian?
11 i
121 13f FOUN W N:
No.
i 14l YUHAS:
This was on the 28th, right?
Or the 29th?
One or tne other.
15; 16l FOUNTAIN:
Yes.
This would be on the 28th.
I was over in the observation center.
He got out of one of the trailers and got on the car or in the truck.
But he definitely was upset for a while because I wouldn't do what he wanted at that time.
20' I
211 YUHAS:
Can you describe him a little bit?
23 FOUNTAIN:
No, not too well.
Basically...
24 25l i
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46 1!
YUHAS:
We all look alike, huh?
2 i
3l FOUNTAIN:
We all look alike.
(YUK, YUK, YUK) 4l 5
YUHAS:
Okay, I have one additional question, it's a rather sensitive 6
question.
Is there any reason that you may feel an individual either 7
deliberately precipitated the event that occurred or aggravated the conse-g quences of the events that occurred on March 28?
i 91 FOUNTAIN:
10 No, I don't think it was deliberate; I think, too a plant with this magnitude of valves, I think we are facing the problem of keeping an inventory of what we got in the plant in what position.
Because those two g
feedwater valves, 12 valves that were selected in the closed position, I g
could see how that could happen from doing the weekly surveillance of the feed pumps, the emergency feed pumps.
I've done it many times myself.
The 15l week before I worked Unit 1 and the will transfer an operator from one unit 6:
17[
to the other and I did the emergency feed pump surveillance to the steam turbine, steam driven emergency feed pump over there.
And when it came 18!
time to cut steam into the turbine, the turbine or'. / windmilled.
And when I got the foreman down there because I was new in that particular area of I
the plant, and I knew that my valve 1ineup was correct but the turbine 21{
wasn't staying, I had even checked for instrument error going to the auto-matic valve that cuts into the steam.
Here we found the valve was closed 23 I
and the handmill was screwed all the way down mechanically blocking it 24 I
closed.
It didn't open and then, but I unde stand the following week they 25!
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found the same thing again.
So I think that's a week spot where key valves 2
can be put in the wrong position and no one seems to know why and I don't i
3j understand that.
i 41 Sf YUHAS:
Let me ask you a question about that.
That is the manual override i
Gi.
f r a pneumatic valve, right?
7 I FOUNTAIN:
That's right.
8'!
91 YUHAS:
10 Why would--and I assume it would be an all auxiliary operator--why yg would you override that?
i 12 FOUNTAIN:
Only if he was told to.
Because operators are basically lazy 3
people; they don't go around turning valves.
We turn enough valves that you just don't get your kicks touching ther.: any more than you have to.
So I can't think of any reason for anyone wanting to close any valve or open any valve unless they were specifically told to.
17l;1 18{
YUHAS:
Let's get back to the specific question of overriding the pneumatic valve.
That's a fairly deliberate act, isn' t it?
21, FOUNTAIN:
Uh--
22l
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23 YUHAS:
Routinely you don't override pneumatic valves, right?
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tlj FOUNTAIN:
No.
Usually you have a switching order.
l 2!
YUHAS:
3, Is there any surveillance procedure that you know that would cause 4l you to override that valve?
5 FOUNTAIN:
No 6l I
g!
YUHAS:
Can you describe when you wr
.d override pneumatic valves like I,
g; that?
10' FOUNTAIN:
Red tag.
That's the only time I would think of I would ever do i
it~
12!
i 13f YUHAS:
14; At this time I'd like to thank you very much, Mr. Fountain, for i
comit;g in and talking to us.
And I cer'ainly appreciate your candid responses 151 to our questions.
i 16:
I 17l l
BINION:
This concludes our interview.
The time is 3:11 p.m.
Today is 181 May 17, 1979.
20f I
[End of Interview]
2 11 22 23 I
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