ML19242D887
| ML19242D887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1979 |
| From: | Ethridge D, Myers K METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280733 | |
| Download: ML19242D887 (81) | |
Text
.
l-i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
}l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
t i
E In the Matter of:
2; IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW Si of Mr. David W. Ethridge, Radiation Chemistry Technician Mr, Karl L. Myers, Radiation Chemistry Technician Sj i
6i i
7l 8!
Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site l
TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania ll!
r May 9, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) 1 July 3,1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14j i
190 and 191 15!
(Tape Numoer(s))
I 16f 17 18!
19i 20l 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
'22{
Mr. Thomas H. Essig 23l Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas Mr. Mark E. Resner 24 !
25:
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if RESNER:
The following is an interview of Mr. David W. Ethridge.
2 ETHRIDGE.
Mr. Ethridge is a Radiation Chemistry Technician employed 3
with the Metropolitan Edison Company at the Three Mile Island Nuclear 4
facility.
Also being interviewed at this time is Mr. Kari L. Myers.
5l MYERS.
Mr. Myers is a Radiation Chemistry Technician employed with 6
Metropolitan Edison Company at the Three Mile Island Nuclear facility.
7; The present time is 3:30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
Today's date is May 9, 1979.
This interview is being conducted in Trailer 203 just 8{
located just outside of the South entrance to the Three Mile Island g
10j facility.
NRC individuals present Nuclear Regulatory Commission individuals are Mr. Thomas H. Essig.
Mr. Essig is the Chief, Environmental 1 11 and Special Projects Section, Region III, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 12j Commission.
Also present Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas.
Mr. Yuhas is a Radiation Specialist employed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Region I.
Moderating this interview is Mark E. Resner.
I am an investigator 16 -l with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Headquarters.
Prior to taping this interview Mr.
17!
Ethridge and also Mr. Myers were given a two page document which 18!
advised them of the purpose, scope and the authority that Congress has 19!
given the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this investigation.
i 20!
i It also apprised them of the fact that they are entitled to a representative 21 of their choosing should they desire one.
And additionally that they 22l l
are not compelled to talk to us should they not desire to.
On the 23!
second page of this document both Mr. Myers and Ethridge have answered 24!
l three question which I will state for the record.
No. I do you understand 25:
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the above? And Mr. Ethridge has indicated yes he does.
Is that t
2; correct Mr. Ethridge?
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ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
4; l
5; RESNER:
6 Question No. 2 do we have your permission to tape the interview p
Mr. Ethridge has also checked yes.
Is that correct?
8 ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
i 91 l
10j 11;!
RESNER:
Question No. 3 do you want a copy of the tape.
Mr. Ethridge I
has checked yes he does.
Is that correct Mr. Ethridge?
12l l
13l ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
14 15; RESNER:
Ok we will provide him with a copy of the tape.
I will ask 16i the same three questions of Mr. Myers at this time.
Question No. 1 do 17l you understand the above?
18i 19l RESNER:
And he has checked yes.
Is that correct Mr. Ethridge?
205 21!
MEYERS:
Yes, Mr. Myers.
22 23l l
RESNER:
Excuse me, Mr. Myers. Ok.
Question 2, do we have your permission 24!
to tape the interview?
Mr. Myers has checked yes.
Is that correct 25!
Mr. Myers?
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1 MYERS:
Yes.
1,,
2:
I RESNER:
3i Question No. 3 do you want a copy of the tape.
Mr. Myers has checked yes.
Is that correct Mr. Myers?
4 Si S.'
MYERS:
Yes.
i 7!
RESNER:
Ok we will provide you with a copy of ths tape.
At this time g
gj I will ask Mr. Myers and Mr. Ethridge, Mr. Ethridge first, if they j
would briefly state their experience, educationally and job experience 10 j in the nuclear industry.
11!
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ETHRIDGE:
Job experience, I started with Met Ed in 1973, November 14, 1973.
And educational background bachelor of science degree in biology with a minor in chemistry.
I started as an analyst and...
15j 16 RESNER:
17,I' Excuse me, Resnar speaking, wnat type of analyst?
l 18j ETHRIDGE:
Chemistry analyst and about a year later my job was combined 19:
with radiation protection department and so we became rad chem techs 201 at that point.
21; i
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RESNER:
That's radiation chemistry technician?
231 l
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l ETHRIDGE:
Right.
And as far as previous experience in the nuclear 1l 2;
industry I have no previous experience.
And everything I've learned i
3l has been as far as the health physics standpoint has been on the job, 4
you know or otherwise training.
r i
51 1
6l RESNER:
How long have you been employed at the Three h,'le Island facility?
7 I
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ETHRIDGE:
since 1973, November 14, 1973.
10 RESNER:
Thank you Mr. Ethridge, now I'll ask Mr. Myers if he would state his experience for the record.
121 13 l
MYERS:
I graduated from high school in 1962.
I spent 8 years in the 141 Navy, in the Naval Nuclear Power program.
Upon leaving the navy I 151 worked for Virginia Electric and Power at Surry Nuclear Power plant 16i for a year and a half.
In 1974 I came to work for Metropolitan Edison at Three Mile Is'and as a rad chem tech.
That's it.
18i 19l RESNER:
Thank you Mr. Myers.
I will now turn the questioning over to 20 Mr. Yuhas.
21, 22 YUHAS:
Thank you, this is Yuhas.
Since there are two pecple in this 23l Interview, prior to answering the question please state your last 24!
name, so that the typist has little amount of difficulty in transcribing 25!
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the tape.
What I'd like to do is have you Mr. Ethridge, go through 2
the scenario of your involvement in the TMI incident of March 28th.
3l I'd like you start off by telling us how you heard the incident, when 4
you came to work and then for the next three days briefly your job 5l assignments.
At tha conclusion of the three day period Mr. Essig and 6
myself will ask you more specific questions about your involvement and 7
then we'll give both of you tha opportunity to talk about some comments 8
y u might have of the basic health physics program here at TMI.
Mr.
Ethridge go ahead and begin...
g 10f i
ETHRIDGE:
yl The first day, March 28th, I reported to work about five of seven and at that point we were back the people were backed up at the processing center and that's when we were told about the radiation emergency.
So they immediately pulled us out and we reported back to 14 the ECS Unit 1 HP Lab and from there I was dispensed on the onsite 15:
monitoring team Alpha.
And I was on that team till approximately 4 p.m.
And that's was about it for that day.
The second day I spent in 17!
the Unit 2 Control Room HP support.
And from there did surveys in the 18{
aux building.
20:
i RESNEk:
Auxiliary Building?
21!
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ETHRIDGE:
Auxiliary Building.
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And the second day being March 29th.
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ETHRIDGE:
Right.
3 4l 5l RESNER:
Thank you.
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ETHRIDGE:
The third day I was stationed in the Unit 1 control room g
and in brief I took air samples and checked air samples air quality throughout the turbine building and the control tower.
And that day r
g we were having problem with the airborne activity coming back into the building from Unit 2.
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12' YUHAS:
Thank you, you indicated that at 0655 you were backed up to i
13l the process center, was this standing in line, waiting to get in?
141 l
15, ETHRIDGE:
Yes, we were waiting to be issued our, our badge.
17; l
YUHAS:
Did you hear an announcement that there was a site radiation 18i emergency, or were you told by guards, or how did you hear about it?
19' 20; ETHRIDGE:
I was, out HP Foreman came out to the Processing Center and 21'.
told us to report back to the ECS.
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23j YUHAS:
Which HP foreman?
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7 1l ETHRIDGE:
I believe it was Beletz.
f 2
YUHAS:
3 The next thing you indicated was that youe we a assigned to 4l the onsite monitoring team Alpha.
i 5!
ETHRIDGE:
o Yes.
7
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10 11 YUHAS:
Ok, what kit did you pick up or did you pick up an emergency kit?
13 14 ETHRIDGE:
We picked up our radiation emergency kit and SAM II kit and 15; also one of the radiation emergency kits that has all the necessary 16!
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things..
dosimeters, TLDs, maps, and so forth, procedures.
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l YUHAS:
Did you put this in a company vehicle or did you have to use 19l your own car?
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ETHRIDGE:
We used the company van.
22i 23 YUHAS:
Was this van available for your use when you were dispatched?
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ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
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2' YUHAS:
3 Ok, how many vehicles were normally available for emergency 4
response teams?
5 ETHRIDGE:
6 We normally have one van available for the HP department I
which isn't necessarily always there.
Because other departments might 7
run short.
So we do have a vehicle problem as far as that's concerned.
8 But we were advised that if we ever were in a situation of this nature 9l, to use our own vehicle if we needed it.
10l t
11 YUHAS:
About what time were you and Mr. Burkholder dispatched to start your onsite monitoring function?
?
14!
ETHRIDGE:
I'd say approximately seven thirty quarter to eight in that 15!
16,'
time frame. It wasn't very long.
l 17l!
l YUHAS:
Ok~, after you got the kit had the kit previously been checked 181 out by someone else prior to you picking it up?
19i 20!
l ETHRIDGE:
There are seals on the kit, everytime we do an inventory 21!
and a check on it.
And we broke the seals to check everything right 22 there before we left the processing center.
23 24; i
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YUHAS:
Then you put it in a van and you came up on the radio, was 2
someone else on the radio already?
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3l ETHRIDGE:
Yes, the...I reported to the ECS and then they responded.
4 i
They told us to standby wait for further orders.
g*l 61 7'
RESNER:
For the record ECS is...
8 ETHRIDGE:
Emergency Control Station.
At the time it was located in g
1g the Unit 1 HP Lab.
lli RESNER:
Thank you Mr. Ethridge.
13 YUHAS:
Did you know who you were talking to on the radio from ECS?
I5I ETHRIDGE:
Not at that time.
16; i
17l YUHAS:
About how long did you wait in front of the processing center 13!
before you proceeded to do anything?
20l ETHRIDGE:
I can't really say, it was...I would say approximately a 21 half hour.
22l 23l YUHAS:
Ok, then what direction did you receive.
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ETHRIDGE:
We checked, we took dose rate levels west of the Unit 2 2
reactor building.
And we took iodine and particulate samples in the 6
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area around the intake buildings between the Unit I and Unit 2 intake 4
water intake and below the mechanical draft cooling towers.
5' YUHAS:
6 Did you attempt to count the airborne activity for iodine using the SAM II the filters?
7 I
ETHRIDGE:
Yes we proceeded down.
I think we at that time we came g
down to the south end down here around the guard shack.
And we counted O
them down to here.
At this point.
12 YUHAS:
Did you have any difficulty counting them with the SAM II?
14!
ETHRIDGE:
No not at that time.
We found significant readings at that i
time.
16i 17l YUHAS:
About when in the day did you start to get detectable external 18j radiation reading?
19i 20 ETHRIDGE:
I would say somewhere right around noontime, we started 21!
picking up levels.
ARound the site boundary.
And then we also started seeing some levels in our SAM II counts.
23!
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11 YUHAS:
1l Was there one area at the site that had more or higher readings gj than other areas?
I 3i ETHRIDGE:
Well, we were checking...we were told to report to the 4
5 intake air intake around the Unit 1 air intake and that didn't seem to 6
have any significant readings at that time.
Then we went out to the north weather station.
We stayed inside the site fence and we were 7
getting somewhere... it was around six mR to 10 mR in that range out 8
i in that area at that time.
g 10!
i YUHAS:
What type of instrument were you using?
12!
ETHRIDGE:
We were using a PIC-6 A.
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i YUHAS:
Was that an open window or closed when your reading?
15i 16l ETHRIDGE:
That was a closed window reaF og.
17; I
18j YUHAS:
Did you take any open window readings?
19 u.
20 ETHRIDGE:
Not that I'm aware of.
20 22I YUHAS:
About what time in the day did you get the 6 mR at the north weather station?
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ETHRIDGE:
I... late morning or early afternoon.
In that time frame.
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3l YUHAS:
Did you keep a log of the raw data that you were calling into i
4j the control room?
l 5
ETHRIDGE:
Yes, we did.
I was to make a correction we were calling 6l 7
this data to the ECS and also for some reason the ECS was sending their information over to the Observation Center so then Pete Velez 8
g was manning that point over there and he was collecting it.
As far as i
10; the logs... I had logged everything.
All our dose rates, the times and everything they were turned over to the next shift that relieved us.
I 12l 13l YUHAS:
Would you say that the six mRs the most significant reading i
that you had on the first day of the incident?
141 15!
ETHRIDGE:
16!
No, we found 10 mR around the gate going to the north gate going to the boat dock along the west side of the island and also at the entrance to the north bridge right before you go across the north 18!
bridge and se found these readings right around mid-afternoon I'd say 19r two, three c' clock in tisat time frame.
It was right before we were 20 relie 21l 22 YUHAS:
Were...during the course of the day were you ever informed as 23j j
to what the problem was with Unit 2 and what to expect?
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I 13 ETHRIDGE:
No, I can't recall of being informed of what was going on.
11 2
They moved the ECS while we were monitoring to the Unit 2 control room 3
and that indicated to me that there was major problem.
They had to 4j evacuate one ECS and the ECS the people at the ECS were also in respirators so that's the only indication the severity of the problem that we had.
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ESSIG:
While they were in respirators were they able to communicate Y"
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8 91 ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
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ESSIG:
Were from the moment that you started making surveys on the 12!
island were you pretty much in constant contact with the ECS in terms 13}
of you making you may come in at a certain point like say GE9 for example and then you'd relay that dose rate back to the ECS and they'd 15-i tell you to go to GE10 or did they give you a point by point instruction 161 as where they'd like to see it next or did they tell you to go in a certain pattern and check in with them periodically, what kind of 18!
instruction were they giving you?
19i 2Cr ETHRIDGE:
We were given periodic pinpoint instructions for example go 21l to GE9 or you know a saecific location.
The nly time we were given 22[
l any general instructions for taking dose rates was to check the west 2 31
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side at the plant boundary at the security fence.
We were ust told a
24j to check in that area and around the Unit 1 in'..ake for dose rates.
25i' But other than that we were given specific points to go to.
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1 ESSIG:
You used the PIC-6 then the entire day?
2; 3l ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
4!
ESSIG:
As far as your particular team was concerned.
5 I
61 ETHRIDGE:
That's right.
7 8
ESSIG:
g The air samples that you mentioned that you took and you 10 indicated that you didn't have any problem counting them did you tj attempt to, well, first were you instructed to collect an air sample at the at a specific point or to drive until you actually found an l
increase on the meter and then take the air samole there?
13; f
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ETHRIDGE:
We were told to...the instructions were very specific go to...for example GE9 take a particulate and iodine sample there and we 17l would take the sample and if for instance later on in the day when the dose rates were liigh while they were increasing we weren't aole to 181 count, just sit there and count the sample because of the background 191 so we had to that's when we came down here to the lower end of the 20!
I island.
We came down here to the south end of this parking lot and we 21}
l were able to count them down there.
And then we relayed our results 22l i
back to the ECS.
23 24 25l i
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RESNER:
That was Mr. Ethridge speaking.
I 2!
i 3l ESSIG:
At any time during the day were you given any instructions 4
from the ECS with regard to making adjustments on the SAM II, was it Si indicated to you for example that there was mostly Xenon 133 on the l
Gi charcoal and that you should make some adjustments to the SAM II?
7 ETHRIDGE:
8f We weren't given any type of instructions like that.
9l I
ESSIG:
The instructions then that you had for the use of the SAM II 101 were basically what was contained in the procedure then..,I should 11; 12{
make a specific reference to this procedure...it's health physics l
procedure 1670.6, Offsite Radiological Monitoring and has a section 13l 2.1 of that procedure it gives instructions as to how to use the SAM 14!
II, is that basically what you were following without it it had not 16l:
been modified then by the ECS on that first day, you hadn't been given an instruction which updated this?
17!
18; ETHRIDGE:
No, it was calibrated and we followed the efficiencies and 19!
that label on the calibration sticker.
And as far as the windows 20!
21;j having thresholds we weren't instructed to adjust them at all.
22l l
ESSIG:
Ok, as far as you were concerned then what you were measuring 23l l
was in fact iodine 131?
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1 ETHRIDGE:
Yes, we weren't told otherwise.
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O k.
4l 5{
YUHAS:
Let's move on to the next day then.
What time did you come in n the 29th? This would have been Thursday.
6 7
ETHRIDGE:
At 0700.
8 I
91 YUHAS:
10 Ok, can you describe what was going on at the North gate?
11' ETHRIDGE:
At the North gate I was...I reported to the Observation 12i Center ar.d we were shuttled over here by bus.
And then I can't recall what was going on at the North gate at that time.
It took us awhile till we got on the island.
15 16!
I YUHAS:
Did you have your pocket dosimeter and your TLD badge with you 17l when you came on?
18j 19!
ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
20!
21j YUHAS:
And did you change buses at the North gate?
22 23 ETHRIDGE:
I believe that I can't recall one of those days there 24 l
wasn't..I don't think they had that bus going at that time now that I 25';
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17 llj recall correctly.
I think we had...we hopped a ride down with one of 2
the other Met Ed vehicles and we tried to get over as quickly as 31 p ssible but one of the days I myself and some other fellows walked I
across the bridge to get into work.
i Si YUHAS:
6 When you came in through the process center what was going in the process center on the second day?
l al ETHRIDGE:
There we picked up a respirator and there was some...trying g
to think... its been awhile...all I can recall is picking up a respirator there and I was previously informed to go to the Unit 2 Control Room.
i So I picked up a respirator there and I believe I wore it over through 121 the Unit 1 turbine building and over to Unit 2 Control Room.
13, 14 YUHAS:
What type of cartridge did that respirator have on?
15li 16!
ETHRIDGE:
I can' t really can' t say.
I know at that time we had 1?
l several different type masks that were new to us, in fact.
I can't 18i really say what type of cartridge.
19' 20l l
YUHAS:
About what time did you get to the Unit 2 Control Room?
21; i
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ETHRIDGE:
Approximately seven thirty.
23 24l 25!
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18 11-YUHAS:
Can you describe what was going on in the Unit 2 Control Room?
l 2!
l ETHRIDGE:
I went in and there's..I can just remember going in and a 31 i
4j lot of people up there...and there were men...our group was sitting in i
Sj the corner, we had...they were setting up a desk at that time.
61 YUHAS:
7 Was there an HP foreman in charge in the HP, rad chem techs up ere?
8 9!
t ETHRIDGE:
I didn't see any HP foreman or supervisor there at that 101 l
time.
i 12, YUHAS:
Ok, you said you were setting up a table, could you describe
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just what equipment was there and what you were setting up on the i
table?
15.:
I 16 I
ETHRIDGE:
There was a table approxitaately the size of this and a 17!
l fold-out table type and they were..it wasn't...can't really say that 181 l
they were trying...it was going to be any type of HP control there.
19!
l We did have RM 14 there to monitor people coming in and out of the 20!
door right there, but as far as HP control I can't say that I...you 2 11 know all our equipment was downstairs in the lab most of it was down 22j l
there...it hadn't been recovered yet.
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11 YUHAS:
When you came up to the stairway to the control room was the~
2 a secondary cartrol point in the hallway that restricting access to 3
the auxiliary building?
4l Sj ETHRIDGE:
Unit 2 auxiliary?
Gl YUHAS:
Right.
7 8
ETHRIDGE:
The step-off pad which I saw later I didn't see it when I g
10 came in that morning...later on I entered the aux building and at that I
time the step-off pad was right..taere was only one step-off pad.
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And it was right there at the entrance from the control building into I
the HP Laboratory.
13i 14!
YUHAS:
Was a person stationed there at that time?
15 16; 17l ETHRIDGE:
No.
18l YUHAS:
Was there a guard at Door 11, this is the door just as you're coming from the hallway from Unit 1 coming into Unit 2 control tower area?
Is there a security guard there at that door?
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22 ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
23; 24, 25' 3 ': 1
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1.i YUHAS:
bout how long were you in the Unit 2 control room before you 2j were asked to escort someone to the auxillary building?
l 31 i
4 ETHRIDGE:
All I can say is it was sometime that morning.
I can't Sj really say exactly what time it was.
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6!
YUHAS:
Can you describe the activities of the chem HP tecns in the 7
8 Unit 2 control room that morning, what were you fellows doing?
I 9
ETHRIDGE:
I was the only one.
I was there by myself.
10, 11j i
YUHAS:
Can you describe your activitias?
j 13l i
ETHRIDGE:
I was confused.
There was i~..I really didn't know what 141 was going on.
There was no one there to tell me or to advise me what 15; was going on.
16:
i 17 YUHAS:
Was Dubiel there?
18!
19i ETHRIDGE:
Not that I'm aware of.
20l 21l YUHAS:
Was Mulleavy there.
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23!
ETHRIDGE:
Not that I was aware of.
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YUHAS:
Was either McCann, Velez, cr Hoovey, and Deman were any of 2{
those people in the control rooni at that time?
l 3
ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall any of those.
4!
5!
l YUHAS:
Who was issuing you orders or requests?
6 7
ETHRIDGE:
8 I can' t...no one no one was there... so I can' t really say g
that I took any orders from anybody or anything like that.
i 10 YUHAS:
Were there survey forms filled out and available to you from the previous day's entries in the auxiliary building?
13 14]!
ETHRIDGE:
I can' t recall seeing any... I don' t remember looking on the
]
table there seeing anything like that.
16r YUHAS:
What instrumentation did you have available to you besides the Ludlum and the HP210 program?
13t 19 ETHRIDGE:
The only other instrument I can recall was the one that I 20i used later on that day was...it was not our normal teletector..it was 21(
Zetex, is that the detector that you fellows have?
It was on an 22l j
extension type probe you know just like a teletector is.
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I 22 ll YUHAS:
Was that one of your instruments or did tnat show up from I
2; someplace else?
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4 ETHRIDGE:
That showed up... I had never seen it before.
We never had 51 anything like that before.
6 YUHAS:
Were you in masks this period in the morning? Were ycu on 7
8 respiratory protection in the Control Room?
9 ETHRIDGE:
10 Not at that time, we weren't in any type of respiratory protection.
g 12!
YUHAS:
Was there any sort of log book being maintained as to who was f
going in to the auxiliary building, the time they went in, dose on 14,
{
their dosimeters, and the time they came out and how much dose they 151 had acquired and the contamination levels or this sort of thing?
17 l
ETHRIDGE:
Not that I'm aware of.
18) 19!
YUHAS:
Can you describe to us how it came about that you were going 20j to escort someone in the auxiliary building and make a survey or 21!
whatever?
22 l
23j j
ETHRIDGE:
I was.,I can't recall the shift supervisor or shift foreman 24l who came over and asked us, you know, asked the aux operator to go in 25!
I' Jl;m I
I I
i
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23 1,
and I don't exactly know what he was going to do he had to go back to l
25 the rad waste canel, but I escorted him in and they informed me to
}
3{
also check dose rates in the makeup filter cubicle.
I 4l 5ll YUHAS:
Let me get this clear now, ycu had an auxiliary operator, 6!
cight.
i 7
ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
8 9f YUHAS:
Do you remember who that was?
10 11!
ETHRIDGE:
I know I'll tnink of it later on if I come across it.
Joe
- 13l, Manoskey That's it.
t 14i YUHAS:
Can you spell Mancskey?
MAN 0USKI, is that....
16l ETHRIDGE:
Yes, that sounds gooa.
I really don't know.
17l i
18t YUHAS:
That's an approximation.
Ok, now you said the control room operator or the control room fo eman as<ed this auxiliary operator to i
go in and operate pumps or valves from the rad waste panel?
21l 22!
ETHRIDGE:
23l Yes, he...I don't know cxactly what he was going to do in l
there.
He just...we went back to the rad waste panel, high, I believe 24!
he operated the ae ouilding sump nump and we went over to the while 25!
(
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I, 24 1l that was being operated we went to the low radiation level over in the 2l model room and waited and then he went back and turned it off.
I I
3!
4 YUHAS:
Is that the extent of your travels then?
5 ETHRIDGE:
No, well, he was at the rad waste panel, while he was 61 7
making the adjustment on the while he was turning his valves or whatever.
I stayed with... I went over and measured the dose rate there, and 8
g then I went back to check the levels in the makeup filter area, and l
ah, the door was locked at that time and I went around the other side 10(
and there were two portholes there about head high and I stuck the, I inserted the teletector in those portholes.
And that's when I got i
12j l
that reading, well it pegged the, that detector.
131 f
14!
i YUHAS:
Do you know the upper range on that Zetec?
15j 16:
l ETHRIDGE:
999R.
17!
l 181 l
YUHAS:
So the dose rate, about how far inside the portholes did you 19i push the detector?
i 20 21 3
ETHRIDGE:
Approximately 3-4 feet.
231 YUHAS:
At 3-4 feet inside tht cubicle, would that be representative 24l of a whole body dose or a contact dose on filters?
25j n ^,
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25 i
ETHRIDGE:
The filters are below that, so that wouldn't be a contact 1
2; n the filters, so it would be somewhere up about the filter.
I did, i
3l the probe did hit a pipe or some object and I didn't try to insert it any further than that, so there was a pipe right there that, that p ssibly call that a contact reading on that pipe.
5 i
61 l
YUHAS:
Did you check the dose rate at the door to the makeup filter 7l I
room?
81 9i l
ETHRIDGE:
I can't recall...I did check it...but I can't recall what 10' the dose rate level was.
It was I know that at that time it was 11' reading somewhere in the range that I did go back and get a key and I I
went back in...into that area.
This was later on.
I think it was 13) reading somewhere around two or five R at that door to the its called the makeup tank room or cubicle, gas analyzer room.
16l r
RESNER:
For the record would you repeat that last phrase I believe...
17 18f ETHRIDGE:
The door that leads into the makeup tank area which is also... its in another cubicle and it also goes back...there's a 20i failed fuel monitor and the makeup filters of them are also back 21; l
there.
22' I
23l1 RESNER:
Thank you.
24l 25i 3
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i
26 YUHAS:
Prior to going down this trip to the auxiliary operator did 1!
2j you have any idea what the dose rates would be in the area to which 3
y u were going?
l 4l E M IDGE:
5 Now that you ask I didn't, I did recall looking at some map 6l if y u'd ask before if I had seen you know if I saw any dose rates written down anywhere.
I did recall looking at some amount looking at 7
the dose rate levels a survey map.
And they were...that's the only 8
9;I thing that I could go by.
10!
l YUHAS:
Did anybody tell you how much exposure that you should take on 11' this trip?
13 ETHRIDGE:
No.
14!
15:
YUHAS:
Operations supervisor that ask for the job didn't come over 16i and say this job should take you not more than 1 R it looks like its 17l l
going to take you more than 1 R ccme out or something 1ike that.
18!
191 ETHRIDGE:
No, no.
20 21i I
YUHAS:
How much exposure would you have permitted the 'uxiliary 22l operator and yourself to receive in the course of this job?
23 24l 25{
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l 27 ETHRIDGE:
I myself I...as far as exposure to us I tried to limit it 1.
2 f r instance we went in and he operated the valve and I found low I
3l background you know, low radiation level over in the model room and so 4l we went over there and we waited until his operation was done.
At i
S that time I can't say that I was I just tried to keep it as. low as p ssible.
6 I
7 RESNER:
For the record you say "we" the other person you're refering 8
to would be...
9l t
10t ETHRIDGE:
Joe Manoskey.
11!
I 12!
RESNER:
Thank you.
I 14!
(
YUHAS:
About what was the dose rate at the rad waste counter, do you 15i remember?
16; 17 ETHRIDGE:
No, I don't recall.
18:
191 YUHAS:
Do you remember what the dose rate was in the model room?
20; i
21j l
ETHRIDGE:
No, I don't, I know it was significantly less.
It was the 22li only area around there that had a you know that was conservatively 23l
{
less than the aux building itself.
24j i
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28 YUHAS:
1.
Was this entry made in the RWP?
i 2l 1
ETHRIDGE:
No.
3 4l YUHAS:
5 When you came out did you log the survey data that you had accumulated?
g l
7 8
t 9l YUHAS:
And where did you log it?
10j lli ETHRIDGE:
Two...well, for that entry I logged it on the aux building about the 305 level one of those forms.
13{
14!
(
YUHAS:
Was this on a grease pencil or on a overlay or did you write 15l actual pen and ink survey sheet?
17 i
ETHRIDGE:
I used pen to write on an actual survey sheet.
18j 19!
RESNER:
At this time we'll take a break to change the tape.
It is 20; i
now ':i4 p.m. EDT.
21i 22l RESNER:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Karl Myers and 23 l
Mr. David Ethridge.
The time now is 4:15 p.m.
24l 25i
('s L
i S.)
a l
29 1l YUHAS:
Mr. Ethridge, do you remember how much exposure you or Mr.
2 Manoskey accumulated on this first trip into the auxiliary building?
3' I
4j ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
Si t
6{
YUHAS:
Did you write your dose down into that first tri~p anywhere?
7 ETHRIDGE:
No, I didn't.
8 9}
YUHAS:
Do you know if Mr. Manoskey logged his exposures somewhere in a log book coming out or anything like that?
11'.
I, 12l ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
13 14!
l YUHAS:
Ok, fine.
When you came out did you get involved in any 15; discussians with the operations people about the dose rates on the 16; I
makeup filters?
17!
18j ETHRIDGE:
Yes, I did.
I can't recall who the supervisor or foreman 19!
or shift foreman was.
But there was an engineer who was, who wanted 20!
l to get that makeup filter changed.
21i i
221 I
YUHAS:
Do you know the name of this engineer?
23J 24l 25 f,;.L i s 't i
30 1{
ETHRIDGE:
Yes, I do. It was Earl Showalter.
I 2!
l 3f For the record, could we have a spelling on Showalter?
RESNER:
4!
ETHRIDGE:
SHOWALTER.
5 I
Gi RESNER:
Thank you.
7 8
YUHAS:
g:
Go ahead and pick it up Mr. Showalter requesting that the filters be changed.
Makeup filters right.
I 11l ETHRIDGE:
Yes, I informed him of the dose rate that I took while I 12i was in the first time and that was about it.
He walked away.
So I 13l I
you know, in the mean time there were about four I'd say approximately 14,:
four men who came from maintenance personnel sitting there and I could tell that they were in quite a hurry te change this makeup filter, so that's..then he...Showalter went over and I think he discussed it 17' with someone else and they came back and said that we need a dose rate 18j up on top of the makeup filter cubicle thats where they go up on top 19i and they stand there you know with their lead lined pig to change the 20l f
take the plug out of the ceiling of the cubicle and that's they remotely 21{
remove it.
So I was informed to go in there and take a dose rate up 22!
on top of this cubicle.
23 24l 25!
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31 RESNER:
Who informed you to go in there?
1.
l 2!
3l ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
I don't recall who it was.
But they were l
4l really pushing me to go in there and get this dose rate.
They said we 5
g t to change this filter.
I didn't understand at that time that it 61 was just a matter of bypassing it. There was no big deal I don't think you know now that I look back on it.
There was no big deal in changing 7
that filter.
So I was given the key.
I was given the key and I went g
back.
I made a second entry in the aux building.
I went into the keup tank area back to this makeup filter area and I checked dose 10 rate on top of this approximately 2 R and that would have been the 11l 12;l dose rate the person changing the filter would have received.
Of course, that's just before they would b:tve opened the hole or anything i
so and also recall checking the dose rate on the fail fuel monitor 141 15l which was 90 R contact on that.
And then I came back out and I f
informed them of the dose rate up on top and I tried to impress upon 16!
l on them the fact that you know I got a dose rate of a side of greater 17!
than 1000 R.
And it wasn't I didn't feel that it was anywhere near 18{
the filter and also the fact that the meter only went up to 1000 R 19:
can't really tell where you can't really tell what the dose rate 20!
I actually was.
But they still seem to be anxious to get that filter 2 11 changed in fact I heard the engineer, Showalter, ha called some individual 22 l
and asked about getting a thicker cask to change the filter.
And at 23l l
that time I called Bob McCann who's stationed in the Unit I control 241' room, and I informed him of the situation and he told me definitely 25l i
{} 0 1
L i
32 11 d n't let him change the filter.
So I went back and I told the mechanical i
2l maintenance personnel that they weren't changing the filter but its i
3' just I told Showalter and I forget who the shift supervisor was at the 4j time but I told him also and they still seemed you know quite anxious 5
to change that filter so I tried to impress upon them what they were l
getting into.
They didn't know what they were getting into.
But at Gi that time I wasn't aware of the fact like I said before that they could just bypass that filter.
There was no big deal.
But my entry g
into that area I received 1.4 R that day.
I had my TLD read that g
evening.
11l l
YUHAS:
A couple questions.
The dose rate of 2 R prior working dose 12,'
I rate, nas tnat measured with the Xetex?
13) 14!
(
ETHRIDGE:
Yes, it was.
15) 16:
[
YUHAS:
Ok, now, was that dose rate originating from the makeup tank 17!
or from the dose penetrating through the makeup filter shield?
i 18t 19f ETHRIDGE:
I can't really say where they dose rate was coming from 20l l
because the hallway going into there, if I can recall correctly was 21; there was quite bit of dose rate coming from the general area was hig; 22' because of the failed fuel monitor.
And I possibly that could be that 23 could have been given the dose rate up on top.
I don't really know.
24i 25l 7
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1[
YUHAS:
When the shield plug is pulled for the people to work the gf removal of the makeup filter what do they have a remote four foot long i
3j tools to unbolt the filter cap how is that normally done?
4 S
ETHRIDGE:
They use a chain hoist to pull the plug and then they slide 6
this cast over top and I can't recall whether they unhook the bolt first before they slide the cask over or after they slide it over.
8 But then the lid is lifted and after the cask is over then they lower g
a hook assembly down in and they pull it up and pull it in to the i
cask.
10l And another person stands by and th?re is a drawer upon the cask and he slides it in.
And they put cap on top then they have a lead cap that they put on top of the cask.
13 YUHAS:
How much do the makeup filters normally read before they're i
changed out?
15!
16l ETHRIDGE:
I was never involved in changing the Unit 2 makeup filters I
so I can't say.
ISj 19!
YUHAS:
Do either one of you have an idea what makeup filters normally 20l l
read?
2 11 22' YUHAS:
Mr. Myers, by shaking your head, does that indicate no?
23 24l l
25i 1
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34 1!
MYERS:
That's correct. I was involved in changing the makeup filters 2{
very early in the operation of the plant and at that time the radiation 3
level was real low.
Maybe 500 mR at the most so later in the life of 4
the plant I couldn't wager an inte!ligent guess.
5 YUHAS:
6 Mr. Ethridge, had these individuals been permitted to go down 7
and do this job?
In your opinion about how much exposure would have been required for each man?
8 9l
}
ETHRIDGE:
I can't really say because once the plug would have been
-I pulled and the cap on that filter I couldn't really give an educated
'l 12l guess as to what they would have received.
I told them that that with i
those kind of dose rates we just didn't know what i* was reading.
And I told them at that time that I don't care what your foreman says or tte supervisor say I would not change that filter.
i 16!
YUHAS:
Your speaking directly to the maintenance workers who had to I
do the work?
1Sj 19!
ETHRIDGE.
Yes.
20 21:
YUHAS:
After you called Mr. McCann were you contacted again by Showalter 22 or by the shift supervisor about changing the filters?
23 24l 25!
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l1
35 i
l l
1 ETHRIDGE:
It seemed to it just seemed to die off later in that day.
2{
But for awhile there I even after I told them that they couldn't 3l change it they still insisted upon getting a heavier lined peg and 4
still seemed as though they wanted to change that filter.
5l YUHAS:
6 Do you know if these four mechanical operators were volunteers, 7'
had they volunteered to go dcwn and do this job knowing the amount of radiation they might receive?
g 9l ETHRIDGE:
I would assume they weren't volunteering for that job.
1g 11j 12);
YUHAS:
Did you volunteer to go down and make these surveys inside the I
makeup room and of the makeup filter?
13l t
14!
ETHRIDGE:
I was the only HP personnel there at the time.
And no one 15!
had done the survey inside that room that I could recall.
And they had the men waiting to change the filter and they insisted on a dose 17; rate in that area which is a good idea if they're thinking about 18[
changing the filter.
And so I you know I took it myself I thought 19t that it was the best idea for me to go down and check the dose rates 20' l
first before we suited up four men and went in there and found out 21l
}
that it was.
22l 23' YUHAS:
When you made this entry to run the survey previous undocumented 24!
cubicle what..how were you cressed?
25j i _
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36 1!
ETHRIDGE:
I put on two pairs of coveralls and a wet suit for my body 2
and two pairs of boots for my feet and a pair of cotton gloves, two 3
pairs of rubber gloves and also a hood and plastic hood for my head and a Scott air pack.
4l 5
6j YUHAS:
Ok, what type of dosimetry did you wear?
l 7
ETHRIDGE:
I had my TLD and I had I don't know if I had a normal 8
g dosimeter, I think I did...yes, I did...I had a low range.
0 to 200 9
""9*'
10 11:
YUHAS:
On the Scott airpack were you in the man mode or in the pressure 12l I
demand mode.
131 e
14l ETHRIDGE:
I was in the pressure demand.
15 16l YUHAS:
Pressure demand.
Did anyone go in the auxiliary building 17' with you on this survey?
IS[
19; ETHRIDGE:
I escorted two men to the...they were going to fix a leak 20:
on a flange and I went with them and checked the dose rate in that 21;
[
area and from there while they were doing that I went over did my dose 22j l
rate and my survey and I came back to those men.
23 24!
25!
I 3 )
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l l
37
!lj YUHAS:
Were these men mechanical operators?
l 2
3j ETHRIDGE:
Yes, they were.
4l 5l YUHAS:
What pump were they working on do you know or flange?
6i 7[
ETHRIDGE:
They're the pumps down in 281 level right up from the decay heat pumps.
g 9I i
YUHAS:
Were those river water cooling pumps from the closed cooling 10{
l water system?
i 11; I
12!
l ETHRIDGE:
They are closed cooling pumps..
13; i
14!
MYERS:
You said those men were mechanical operators, you meant they..
15 16; 17;j ETHRIDGE:
Mechanical maintenance.
ISI YUHAS:
What was the dose rate down there by the close coolant water 191 pumps that they were working on?
20:
f 21l j
ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
22l l
23!
l YUHAS:
Were these people all on Scott airpacks?
24l i
25i 4 7, I
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38 i,
1{
ETHRIDGE:
Yes, they were.
2!
3l YUHAS:
What was the air activity in either area either the makeup i
4{
cubicle or the area where the 281 where the fellows were working on 5
the pumps?
61 ETHRIDGE:
I don't know.
7 8
YUHAS:
Did you collect an air sample in anticipation of changing the m keup filter job while you were down there?
10 11; ETHRIDGE:
No.
13 YUHAS:
Did you have the capability to collect air samples?
14 ',
15i ETHRIDGE: There were air samplers back in the lab that I could have 16; I
used.
17l 18!
YUHAS:
You mentioned that you had a 1000 R per hour greater than 1000 R per hour on the side, is this the reading that you had taken the 20!
j previous trip or are you talking about one now that you took on the 21i side of the shields.
22!
23 l
ETHRIDGE:
That was a previous trip and there were portholes on the other side when I made the entry into the cubicle.
There were portholes 25i
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'I
- 1
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39 i
If in that side and then I inserted the probe and then it gave me the 2
same indication.
l 3
4l YUHAS:
Ok, when these fellows came back out did you log your exposures 5:
anywhere, from your pencil dosimeter readings?
6!
ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
7 8,
YUHAS:
g How were people keeping track of the cumulative exposure 10 obviously there was quite a number of entries being made right?
11; ETHRIDGE:
Right.
i 13 YUHAS:
How did folks know how much exposure they were accumulating?
g 15[
ETHRIDGE:
I can't really answer that.
17!
YUHAS:
So there was no...no one was keeping track really of these 18{
individual's exposure or the fact that who was going into the aux i
19I building and when they came out and how much exposure they took and 21,j what the air activity was or anything like that?
22 ETHRIDGE:
There...every entry made was that I knew of that day I was 231 cscorted.
I escorted them personally.
24; 25i o
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40 1[
RESNER:
Excuse me for the record when you said I cannot answer that 2f do you mean that you don't know..or?
l 3i t
4l ETHRIDGE:
I don't know.
5!
l 6i RESNER:
Thank you.
7 YUHAS:
But as far as you're concerned on the ones that you escorted g
g you guys you did not log the time that you left the Unit 2 Control 10j Room to go down and make the entry and didn't log that you came back gf out and you didn't log what your dose was that's what I'm getting at, i
pi in other words you were not using RWP system?
1 l
13!
ETHRIDGE:
That's correct.
14 15; YUHAS:
So as an alternative one would think that kept some track of who went in and how much dose they took by what means for retrospective analysis for instance if the dosimetry system was not adequate for 181 19:
measuring dose from the Xenon 133 gas someone would have had to kept 1
track of how long you're in there so that later on you could go back and make appropriate corrections based on time and area.
So for the i
21l l
entries you made these people that you escorted you didn't log the 22j l
time that you were in there, right?
23i 24l 25l h
1 b s 1 f
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41 l
i 1!
ETHRIDGE:
That's correct.
2 l
31 YUHAS:
Ok, now you didn't log it for them, i
4l 5{
ETHRIDGE:
That's correct.
6l 7
YUHAS:
Apparently they didn't log there was no provisions it was no 8
for instance control point watch set up in the control room who was g
dispatching these people to go in?
10f i
ETHRIDGE:
No, I don't recall of any.
ll f
12l YUHAS:
Ther'e was no control point watch set up down at the double 13 g'
doors to get in the auxiliary room is that right?
l 15i ETHRIDGE:
That's right.
16;i 17[
YUHAS:
Ok, who controlled access to the auxiliary building, who made 18!
the decisions as to who was going to go in?
19i i
20!
ETHRIDGE:
21:
At that time as far as I know it was operations.
I 22' YUHAS:
Operations being the department or being a single inttividual?
24{
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42 1:
ETHRIDGE:
I don't understand...
2; i
3
-YUHAS:
Well, you were operating in an emergency mode I assume.
Ok, I
4!
under those situations any entry into the auxiliary building would 5
have been considered to be a repair party activity.
Right.
6i ETHRIDGE:
I see.
7 aj YUHAS:
gj Ok, the repair party normal organization would be Dubiel or his alternative would personally issue the word for a team to go down 10t ig and make an entry to do something Ok, and it would say how much exposure you were allowed to get to do this and what actions to be taken.
So that there would be a cohesive control over entries into these very I
high radiation areas and that a management level decision would be 14i made for the need.
For instance the idea of changing the makeup 16l:
filters has resulted in a life threatening dose.
Right.
Who was making decisions whether that life threatening dose was worthwhile?
181 ETHRIDGE:
I see.
The..I don't recall of anybody you know of making 19!
saying to me now you're limited to X number of mrem for this entry and 20r the other question as to a severity of the you know getting the jcb done I was never...no one ever told me from what I could see it was i
the shift super isor saying that ok, we have to go down and fix this 23l l
flange, for instance on that one job that I was escorted those men, so 2f from there we just we went down and.;t dressed and I went in with 25\\
them and they tried to stop the leak.
l
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43 1!
YUHAS:
Did the shift supervisor say I need two volunteers to go down 2
to the 281 because the dose rates are 30 R per hour and its necessary 3
for us to repack this pump and it's goi..g to take between two and five 4
R between five and seven R to do it.
Who's going to do it.
3 SI ETHRIDGE:
The...he didn' t ask for volunteers.
The dose rates were 6
7 not that high.
They at that time I you know for that specific job I don't think there's any problem with the 300 mrem per week the administrative 8
level that we had at that time.
g 10 YUHAS:
Who authorized you to go over the 1 R let alone the 300.
I Normally you have to get authorization am I correct to go over 1 R?
l 13l ETHRIDGE:
That's correct.
No one authorized me to go over 1 R.
14!
15:
YUHAS:
Did the HP foreman or the HP supervisor was he cognizant of 16!
17; the fact that you were accuring this much radiation on these circuits?
18[
l ETHRIDGE:
No. I had..after the survey I informed them what you know 19!
l what levels were in there.
As far as my personal dose I didn't I 20l remember having a high range but I don't remember what I don't recall 21l what that was reading.
And I knew it was somewhere above 1 R so I had 22l j
my TLD read that evening.
23i 24l 25j bSG 1 A0
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44
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What I'm trying to establish though, even in an emergency its YUHAS:
2 necessary to do dose planning.
Ok, and from what you're telling me I l
3l don't see any indication of dose planning or dose allocation except 4
for the good judgement of the individual tech involved.
In other 5
w rds before each entry there was no gathering together in briefing by l
6' a representative of the emergency organization to say this is the pump 7
this is an important job you guys are authorized to exceed the 300 but y u're not autharized to take more tnan 2 R based on changing conditions 8
because its our impression we talking to all of you that the conditions g
were Changing throughout the auxiliary building in t.he first three days they were going up and down dramatically is that not true.
I 12l ETHRIDGE:
That's right and I don't recall of any you know of any person saying OK you can exceed the 300 but no more than 2 R no limits 14)
I can recall were set.
15i 16:
YUHAS:
Simply then the objective list for operations department to 17' I
accomplish a task.
18!
19i ETHRIDGE:
That's right.
i 21 YUHAS:
Ok, when you returned from this particular job did you log 22l the.. make any log entries either to the..as to the exposures exposure 23 l
rates or anything findings.
24!
25!
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t t
45 1-ETHRIDGE:
I recall writing down now the dose rate levels in that 2
area.
And as far as the dose of the individuals I don't recall writing I
3l those down anywhere.
i 4l 5
YUHAS:
This entry would have taken place in the afternoon then of the i
Gi 29th?
Is that true?
i 7
ETHRIDGE:
That entry was later that morning.
g 9l YUHAS:
Ok, late morning then.
10 I
11!
ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
12, 13 g
YUHAS:
Ok, after you got the situation straightened out by calling Mr. McCann and clearly stating to Mr. Showalter and the shift supervisor 15l f
that you div. not feel its in the best interest of the individuals 17f involved to change the makeup filter.
You said that died later in the day.
Is that right?
18{
19l ETHRIDGE:
It seemed to me that you know the issue wasn' t pushed 20' anymore as far as getting at the time that I took the survey the guys 21; were sitting there waiting for me to come with the survey so they could go down and get dressed and change the filter right away.
And I i
brought back the survey and they just sat there...the only thing that 24l I could recall was Showalter tr3 g to get a larger pig, you know, so 25!
f:.>
i
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46 li I tried to explain to them there was a possiblity of a lethal dose and i
2f so I think that sort of tnok the I don't know what you'd say but they i
3l didn't press the issue as much after that.
i 4j YUHAS:
Ok, fine.
After this fiasco was under control, what did you 5
I Gj d f r tne rest of the day, rest of the afternoon?
7l ETHRIDGE:
8 I don't recall what...I know I was up there...I don't recall what I was...what I had done the rest of that afternoon.
I g
0, remember being relieved I don't know who by but I returned to the Observation Center later on in the day.
12l I
YUHAS:
Did Tom Thompson reliev. you that afternoon?
13l 14!
l ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall who relieved me.
15; 16!
YUHAS:
Ok, but you did not make another entry in the auxiliary building 17l t
on the 29th?
18i 191 ETHRIDGE:
No, those were the only two.
20!
21f YUHAS:
22;l Ok, when you got to the Observation Center what did you do out i
there?
23l 24 25j
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i
l 47 1;
ETHRIDGE:
At that time I should correct myself...we went to the 500KV 2
Substation and checked ourselves over there and then we went up to the 3
Observation Center and I think at that time I were yeu?... Is that q
when you were operating the TLS's.
5f MYERS:
Yes.
6
/
ETHRIDGE:
8 At that time you know I was concerned about my dose and I went up and had my TLD read right away.
g i
10' RESNER:
Is that Mr. Myers responding yes.
12!
(
YUHAS:
Who read your thermaluminesant dosimeter?
13l
\\
14' ETHRIDGE:
I put it ir. with you.
I guess I maybe I did.
16; 17;f MYERS:
Myself and Dick Benner were counting TLDs at the time.
I l
don't remember which one of the three, Dick Benner, myself or Dave 18!
Ethridge counced it's hard to say anyone of us could have counted.
We're all qualified.
20!
21i
[
YUHAS:
Ok, so the three of you sitting there reading them out?
22l 23l ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
24f 25j (g.O '/..
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I 6
i 48 I
ilj YUHAS:
And then you helped, Ethridge, you helped to read the rest of 2{
the afternoon?
l 3!
4j ETHRIDGE:
Yes, I was up there.
S YUHAS:
Ok.
You returned to work the morning of the 30th and you went 6i to the Unit 1 Control Room and assumed your duties in that area, is
/
that true?
8 9i i
10j ETHRIDGE:
Yes, I did.
I lli YUHAS:
Who was directing your activities there?
12}
l 13l ETHRIDGE:
I...it was an HP foreman present I don't recall who it was.
141 15:;
Sid Porter.
Porter-Gertz consultant was..he was the one giving most of my instructions as to taking air samples in the Control Room and i
such.
And we had a SAM 2 set up there to count the iodine and we also 17!
f sent all the samples out to be counted out at the Observation Center.
18!
19!
YUHAS:
Were you familiar with the Unit I control tower air monitoring system?
21l 22l I
ETHRIDGE:
I'm not that familiar...as far as the control room is on a 23 closed ventilation system and I can't say that I'm not familiar with 24{
z
{tQv them.
25l f
49 1
l 1[
YUHAS:
Either of you been trained in interpreting the results of the 2
Control Room air monitors for either unit?
3 4j MYERS:
I don't think I've had any formal training, no.
i Sl i
6 ETHRIDGE:
Same here.
7 g
YUHAS:
Did either one of you I knew the Control Rooms are on air...are g
on mass for various reasons early on, did either one of you think to i
10 consult either Control Rooms's air monitors and try to interpret the 11, i dine activity as measured by those detectors?
12, ETHRIDGE:
13 When I saw the increase which was on an RM 14 HP 210 program, I...we were constantly monitoring the air and so at the desk we had this HP 210 probe set up and when we saw the levels increasing that's 15 yu n w we w uld draw ur samples and we would try to count them.
16i 17 i
YUHAS:
18!
You say try to count them, you're trying to count them on SAM 19:l 2, what was happening?
l 20!
ETHRIDGE:
I would say that the background interference was too high to really say wnether or not it was Xenon or iodione.
23 YUHAS:
What type of activities in terms of microcuries for cc were 24 you getting off the SAM 2 readings in the Control Room?
25\\
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50 l
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ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
I 2!
l 3
YUHAS:
Were they above MPC for iodine?
4j 5l ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall.
61 7l YUHAS:
Did anyone do a half-life determination on the gross particulates i
or on the charcoal filters?
8f 9l DGE Not dat I am aware of.
10 1 14 I
YUHAS:
What type of advice was Mr. Porter of Porter Gertz given you j
people in the Control Room?
14I ETHRIDGE:
He was telling us where we should monitor the air and I 15!
16;l know the one... well, when the activity was going up on our HP 210 probe maybe he tried to come over and console us we did get a little I
excited and we told everybody to put the respirators on so he came 18{
19i over and tried to get the information out you know, directed us, gave us a little direction on what to do next and so on.
20j 21l r
YUHAS:
Ok, Tom do you have any questions?
22I 23 l
ESSIG: Yes, l'd like to go back to the first day for a minute.
As 24i i
specifically talked about the surveys that were made around the island.
25i l
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51 I
1.
Were these most of these were made in a vehicle you drove from point 2{
to point or were some of them made on foot?
3 ETHRIDGE:
All of them were made in a vehicle we drove from point to 4l 5
p int.
61 ESSIG:
Did you get out of the vehicle when the survey was made?
7 8
ETHRIDGE:
Yes, we did.
If we were driving from one point to another gj I kept the PIC-6 outside the window.
10 11 ESSIG:
Ok, you just had the window rolled down and the instrument.
13 ETHRIDGE:
Hanging out the window, and we could tell any significant changes if we were going from one point to another.
15; r
16; i
ESSIG:
Ok, I have in front of me the survey sheets which were these 17!
I were all the data that were taken... copied down at ECS as you were 18(
radioing it in and I just wanted to ask you about a couple of the 19t measurements here.
One made at 1545 in the afternoon of 150 mR per 20l l
hour at the front of the service building outside.
And another one 21l 22l made at 1720 of 210 mR per hour between gel and GE10.
Were these measurements made both of them made by your survey team by you.
Were 23!
l you on the island making surveys as late as 1720?
24!
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!'l 52 l!
ETHRIDGE:
I don't recall of any measurements that high.
i 2;
i 3l ESSIG:
Either the 210 or +he 150.
4l 5
ETHRIDGE:
That's correct.
l 6!
7 ESSIG:
You recall wh'at the highest survey result was that you had 8f made, while you were...that first day?
9 ETHRIDGE:
10l I recall the 10 mR at the 10 mR Beta gamma at the gate 11 g ing to the boat dock and also the this end of the North bridge where it comes on to the island.
They were both 10 mR.
12 13 ESSIG:
Ok.
During your shift which I'll define for talking purposes here as being 8 to 4 because I want to make a comparison between what 15 was done on the 8 to 4 and then 4 to 12 in terms of air samples.
It seems in looking at these sheets that were taken where the data were recorded in the ECS tha there were approximately 20 air samples collected i
18!
during the 8 to 4 shift on the 28th.
And on the 4 to 12 there were scmething like 4 and to your knowledge were there either one of you 40) gentlemen because Mr. Myers you indicated you were involved later on 2 14, in the day sometime during the 4 to 12 shift.
Were you aware of any 22l changes in instructions as far as that you were told not get so ma.
i 23 air samples or was there some reason or did you even perceive any 24 change in instructions?
25!
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53 Il MYERS:
I was on as I said before I think from around 8 to 12 that 2
evening of the first day, the 28th.
During that period of time I, I
3{
there was another tech with me and I think it was Dean Keesler, but 4{
I'm not certain of that.
But anyways the other tech with me we were m re r less running errands during that period of time.
I know we 5
6l ran out to the Main gate for some things and as far as actual air 7
samples taken during that period of time the only one I remember taken was one of behind the warehouse.
It seemed to me that well during 8
that period of time also for a matter of hours Dean Keesler or the g
10l ther tech was pulled off of the survey team and it was just me and i
the truck at that time.
It seemed to me during that period of time we
.1 were kind of in limbo and we weren't making any thorough surveys we I
were more or less in a standby status.
13]
14',
ESSIG:
Were you the only survey team on the island to your knowledge at that time?
16 17l MYERS:
There was another team in the area cycling off and on the 18!
island I think, now I can't remember if they were stationed on the 191 island or they were just making trips from the North gate into the security building.
But they were cycling through.
What their function was I'm not certain.
22!'
l 23i l
ESSIG:
Ok.
Question for, Essig again, a question for both of you 2 41 gentlemen, first Mr. Ethridge, do you recall who was giving you instructions 25' sto
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54 1!
over the radio during the time you were on the making surveys on the 2{
island?
3l, 4!
ETHRIDGE:
The only person I can recall by name would be Jim Seelinger i
Sj from...I remember him being...at that time the ECS was in the Unit 2 l
6 Control Room and they were in respirators.
7' ESSIG:
g He had given you an instruction with respect to where he wanted a particuiar survey made?
g i
10 ETHRIDGE:
Yes.
12 ESSIG:
And after the ECS was moved to the Unit 1 Control Room, you don't recall then who might have been giving him instructions from that point?
16!
ETHRIDGE:
You said the Unit 1, during my shift the ECS was in the 17!
l Unit 1 HP Lab and then moved to the Unit 2 Control Room and those were 181 the only two points for that I was that I could recall, you know, that theres were the only tslo points from where the ECS was run during a i
20' mock shift.
21l i
22l l
ESSIG:
Ok, I was under the impression that the ECS had been moved 23l l
around noon on the 28th from the Unit 2 to Unit 1 Control Room.
24!
25' l
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55 1.
ETHRIDGE:
Well, if it was we weren't informed.
2!
l 3j ESSIG:
Ok.
With respect to the instructions that you were given we 4
touched on this earlier and I just like to come back to it a little 5
bit again.
Specifically with regard to the air samples that you were i
6l asked to collect were you given either an instruction to collect one 7
every so often like every say every hour or were you given an instruction 8
to collect it when the ECS told you to?
9' ETHRIDG_E: They were giving us specific instructions earlier in the 10f day to go to.....
I 12 RESNER:
This is a continuation of the interview of Karl L. Myers and 14l; David W. Etheridge.
The last tape cut off at 4:55 p.m., the time now is 5:00 p.m.
15:
16' I
ESSIG:
Mr. Etheridge, I'd just like to ask you one additional question 17!
on the on the collection of the air samples, what the, more on the 18!
line of the technique that you used as far as determining when you were the appropriate point in time as to when to collect the sample.
20t I think you had said earlier that you were given an instruction from the ECS to go to a specific point out on the island GE9 or GE1 or some 22 other point on the island.
Did you attempt to, as you were driving 23 toward that point, confirm that you were actually, in the plume by 241 reading your survey meter at that point?
Did you note that you did 251 have an increase and that you were in fact in tne plume?
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56 I
tlj ETHERIDGE:
I, as I was saying before I did have the survey meter out 2
at all times and we, when they did instruct us to go to a specific 3l p int, I, we would take dose rate readings along the way, and any I
4j significant reading that I found I would radio back.
And I know one 5
specific instance where I did get a reading of 10 or more at that boat dock.
6 I radioed back and asked if they would like, if they wanted an i
air sa,uple taken at that point.
And he said go to wherever he had 7
sent me previously.
I was on my way to that point, and at that time 8
gj ten or more was the highest reading we had discovered, so I, you know, I
I took upon myself I thought it would be a good idea to get an air 10j l
sample there.
You know, if I had, what I'm getting if, I'm just 11l saying that if I found a place where I thought it would be a good idea 12{
to take an air sample, and I was instructed to continue on.
That was 14l the only problem I found during my, during that day.
j 15:
ESSIG:
Then you did continue on against your better judgement you 16; didn't take an air sample at that location of the maximum dose rate 17!
there, you continued on per instruction of the ECS.
18!
19l ETHERIDGE:
I was told emphatically, continue on to whatever location 2N it was.
21!
22!
l RESNER:
Who instructed you do to that?
23l 24l t
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57 l{
ETHERIDGE:
That was ah Jim Seelinger.
2*
I RESNER:
Thank you.
31 I
4!
5; ESSIG:
When you arrived at the location which Mr. Seelinger instructed l
Gj y u to continue on, do you recall what the, what the dose rate was at that location?
7 8
ETHERIDGE:
I don't, it was less that the ten mark which I had seen at g
the boat dock that gate to the beat dock, and I don t know exactly what it was, I had gotten some readings 6, 8 mR, and that could have I
been out there where I was instructed to go.
12l 13, ESSIG:
Along this same line where there any times when you felt that you were collecting an air sample and you didn't really have a measurable dose rate, I mean you were going, you were going to a point in which 16 17l[
you were instructed to go and lets say for example you know its the l
dose rate drop off to you're using the PIC 6 lets say it dropped from 18[
some say 6 or 8 mR per hour down to less than measureable which is one 19!
mR per hour with the PIC 6.
Where there any times when you noted that 20' to be the case that you went to a point where you were instructed to 21l l
go and the dose rate fell off to something not measurable before you 22l' got there? And if so, did you take the air sample anyway or did you 23 report that back to the ECS or did that not occur?
25l 1
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58 1
ETHERIDGE:
In the beginning the air samples were taken in areas that i
2{
really didn't have any measurable dose rates, but then during the 3
course of the day the dose rates we could finally see some measurable i
4l type of dose rate on the PIC 6.
And as far as taking any air sample 5
in an area less than one mR I don't recall of any.
61
[
ESSIG:
When you say in the beginning are you refering now to 8 or 9 "9
8 9'
I L
ETHERIDGE:
Yea, the morning hours.
Because I don't recall seeing any 10' l
significant readings until around noon time in that area.
11;,
12!
ESSIG:
Was there another team on the island at the time you were 13l making the survey?
14!
15 i ETHERIDGE:
16i I don't think so, I wasn't aware of any.
17 ESSIG:
You indicated that you were on the alpha team, is that correct?
18l 19!
ETHERIDGE:
That's correct.
20l i
21l ESSIG:
And Mr. Myers, what team are you on?
I 23[
MYERS:
I don't remember the number, but I'm sure it was probably the 24 same team that Dave was on since we were using the HP truck.
25j l
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I 59 i
l 1!
ESSIG:
Ok, Mr. Myers, what I'd like to do now is go to Friday the 2:
30th, we had from our previous interview with you, we had established F
3 that you were on the team that day that was performing a number of the 4;
helicopter surveys. That is correct?
t 5!
6 MYERS:
That is correct.
l 7!
ESSIG:
The one particular survey that was made at around 8:00 that 8
gj morning I think we had previously discussed with you and you had 10f indicated that it was you were the individual who performed the survey I
11!
f which found the 1.2 R/ hour which caused a lot of, a lot of people 2
were, that sort of stirred up a hornet's nest that particular number.
I believe that we previously established that that was in fact made by 13 an R02 was it not and that was an open window measurement, as you 15; r call.
I don't want to put words in your mouth.
16 MYERS:
To the best of my memory, that's correct.
17:!
i 1Sr ESSIG:
OK. And you had been instructed to take all measurements in the helicopter were to be open window R02 measurements?
i 21[
MYERS:
They didn't specifically say to take open window R02 measurements, 22l we just took open window R02 measurements and like I stated in the 23i previous day, when we found a high, a high or a area in a specific 24 grid location we would at that point try and get a closed window 25!
reading.
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60 li ESSIG:
- 0. K. but you did not on this particular one, I gather.
2l 3j MYERS:
No, as we had talked before on that 1.2 R reading, upon finding that reading above the reactor building we decended in elevation to 5
try and establish that it was a cloud of gas up there and not a streaming 61 from the reactor building which is what we were over at the time, Unit 7
2 reactor building.
So we dropped down in eievation and the reading g
dropped off and then we increased elevation again to get back in that gj cloud and as I remember we never did find that particular reading
- 9"I"'
10 I
11l ESSIG:
I think one thing that we may have touched on last time I'd just like to review it a little bit again, do you recall of being 1+g given any instructions, any precautions lets say with regard to actually l;
making these surveys, you should put a statement before that, that you 15 were I think it said that the door from the helicopter had been removed 16!
I and that you were hanging the instrument out at arm's length out the 17!
I i
door.
The question is, were you given any instructions as to any 18i precautions that should be taken with regard to - if you di" make an open window reading about the air currents hitting the milar wiadow on 20!
I the R02? For example had you been told to avoid that?
21l 22l Myers:
No, we were given no instructions as to which instruments to 23I use or how to use the instruments, is I think I stated before we used 2 41 the instrument of our choice and as I remember we used the R02 predominantly 25i l
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earlier in the day and then later in that day I think we used the E520 2
almost exclusively.
3l 4
ESSIG:
The E 520 was that osed in the open window fashion also?
5!
l 61 7l MYERS:
Yes, I believe that when we were looking for the readings we l
81 were using it in the opr. window and then when we found a high spot we i
gl would take a closed window reading.
l 10 gl ESSIG:
- 0. K.
I think one other question on one of the surveys made by ig the heliccpter, I think I have it right here.
I 13i RESNER:
For the record that's Mr. Essig that's questioning at this j
time.
16!
ESSIG:
I can't seem to find it, oh here it is. In the afternoon about 17l 13:30, or so, between 13:28 and 13:35 as recorded on these summary 18(
sheets from the ECS, you were making surveys which varied in altitude i
194 from 700 feet to 1150 feet ojer Hill Island and the dose rate varied 20:
I from 7 mR per hour to 6, 10, 7 and then down to 2.3 at the highest 21l j
elevation.
What, do you recall what that the purpose of that particular 22l l
survey was? ' sere you attempting to find the plume, was this something 2 31 that you, the pilot was doing on his cwr or had you been instructed by 24!
the ECS to make that type of survey?
25; 1
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62 I
l 1!
MYERS:
The ECS, when they gave us an assignment, normally tola us to 2
survey like the north to, to northwest quadrant of the island. So, i
3 what we did, and that's all he would tell us, and then we would go out 4j and fly though that location looking for the highest reading and we 5
would normally phone back the high reading; to the ECS.
At which time 6
then we were kind of stinding by for more.nstructions and then we'd circle back while wt vere waiting for new instructions and pick up the 7
plume.
During those times both on the pilot's initiative or possibly 8
g on the techs initiative, we would vary altitude and also attempt to 10 f 11 w the plume across the river just to see where it went and to get the highest readings 6nd to see how it did vary with altitude change.
So, I think that the change in altitude within the plume was more on the part of the helicopter operators than on the ECS.
14!
ESSIG:
- 0. K.
One last question at this time and I'll turn it back 15' over to Mr. Yuhas.
You, I think, both of you gentlemen indicated earlier that the surveys that you performed either in the helicopter 17' I
or by vehicle were recorded.
You were taking down the data as it was 18l
[
going, in addition to radioing it back to the ECS.
What specific 191 sheets of paper were you using? Were they full sheets of paper like this? Were they 8 by 11? Or were they smaller narrower strips of 21l paper, and do you know what happened to those?
Did you turn them into 22l some specific individual at the end of your shift? What was the 23l
[
disposition of those sheets?
24j 25!
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63 11 MYERS:
When I was on the survey teams, both the on ground survey 2;
teams and the helicopter survey teams, we used tablet paper to record I
3l our readings with location and time then the team designation and at i
4 the end of a period of runs, or at the end of a day, we turned the 5l sheets into the observations center.
6 i
7 g
RE.qER:
Who did you turn those sheets into at the observation center?
9 MYERS:
I really don't remember, I wouldn't, it was just the people at 10lf the desk in the observation center.
I 121 I
ESSIG:
Do you recall recording the type of instrument on that sheet
,3{
1 that you would record the fact that sou had used an R02 earlier in the day and then an E520 later in the day?
15 s 16!
MYERS:
No, I did not record when we changed instruments.
181 ETHERIDGE:
19:
I recorded everything on the tablet provided in the emergency kit. And the when we were relievel W drove over to the observation 20l l
center, all our samples and -i C :st was in the van and I turned it 21; over to the next shift.
a tntj aok the van and headed back on the 22 island.
23 24!
l 25!
,o,
l 64 ESSIG:
1!
0.K. then the survey sheets may have stayed with the vehicle s
then?
2 3
ETHERIDGE:
I didn't remove them, I left them in the vehicle and I 4f showed them to the next shift and just to give them an idea that it 5
- Y "
- E*C
^" *'
61 I turned it over to them and they proceded on to the island.
7 8
ESSIG:
- 0. K.
I think that concludes my questions for the moment.
g 10 YUHAS:
I want to address general questions to both of you now.
To start off with has the licensee requested to hear these tapes and would he provide them to you?
13!
14!
ETHERIDGE:
This morning, our supervisor, Tom Mulleavy, had a meeting 15 with us to give us more or less a plan of the day and at that time he 16!
asked, he told us that Met Ed has requested to hear our tapes, but 17 that we didn't have to let them hear it.
He wanted to know who was 18l going to allow them to listen to their tapes and who wasn't.
19t 20r RESNER:
Would you spell Mulleasy for the record please?
21, 22!
l ETHERIDGE:
I'll try, it's Mulleavy.
23!
i 24l 1
25l l
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65 1
-RESNER:
Thank you.
2' YUHAS:
Mr. Myers were you present at that meeting?
3 4l MYERS:
Yes, I was.
5 6i YUHAS:
OK, fine.
Let me ask you generally to each make a comment of 7
y ur bservations as to the degree of control, and I'm speaking specifically 8
in the health physics area that was excercised throughout the incident.
g 10' MYERS:
I, throughout the initial three days of the incident, I felt 11,,
that for the situation we had confronting us and for the amount of people and the and the sophistication and the amount of equipment we had to try and control the problem, I felt that, in my impression of 141 i
the situation was that things went smoothly and I felt that at most 15:
16:
times we had a pretty good handle on what was occuring.
We were able 4
i to monitor and control the areas as much as possible.
I feel that 17!
I most of this control or the results of the control were on a major 18!
portion due to the judgement of the techs and the operators, the 19!
auxilliary operators and the C operators and such, and also the 20(
mechanical maintenance people who were involved, as and possibly that 21l we did lack some good judgement from the control medias as to, to 22 control of the personnel in the field during the work.
24l 25!
j
~~ Q 4
Ig u d i
66 ETHERIDGE:
I also, I agree with Karl Myers in the fact that with the 1:
2 instrumentation that was available the, that we did the best job as i
3j p ssible.
And I felt as though we had the situation as far as the 4
area monitoring under control.
The problem that, this is my personal view, that the problem that I could see was that we weran't aware of 5
6l the total situation and as we were on the monitoring teams and and I can't really say that it's anybody's fault cause maybe they weren't 7
aware of what was, I'm sure they weren't aware of what was actually going on.
So, I, I agree with what Karl says and I don't have much i
g else to add to that.
i 101 l
11' RESNER:
Could you be a little more specific when you say you weren't 121 l
aware of the total situation.
131 14I ETHERIDGE:
I, At no time during our communications with the ECS were 15) we told exactly what had happened or what was going on.
The only thing that I knew was that they moved the ECS from one point to another 17 and that was the only indication that it might be a severe problem. I 18!
thought that at any time they were going to call us in and say 0.K.
19?
i fellows good job, time to go home.
We really didn' t have a feel for 20' things.
But I don't know, maybe this caused the confusion in there 21l and also its kind of hard with an on site team and all the off site 22' teams to communicate with everybody on one of those walkie talkies.
23 We did have problems with communications.
24 25:
[
i.
a l
i 0
[
67 i
l 1l RESNER:
Could you be a little more specific.
I 2!
3 ETHERIDGE:
The problems weren't with us, but sometimes we had to call 4
a team over on the west short to talk to them and maybe relay the 5
inf rmation to the ECS.
6j RESNER:
Is that because the radios wouldn't transmit that far to the 7
ECS?
g 9
ETHERIDGE:
I assume so.
Or, maybe there was a blockage somewhere 10 that the ECS was not in the right direction to receive the transmission 11, from the from the team on the west shore.
13 YUHAS:
Let me ask you a few questions about instrumentation.
You 15;l give us the impression that there may not have been an ample supply of 16l high dose rate instrumentation available.
Can you make a comment on i
l that?
17l l
18!
ETHERIDGE:
The ample supply of high dose rate instruments, I think, was not just, well because of the accident it came about but before 20i this I, I feel as though out teletactor supplies as such, things like t
21!
that, were not adequate.
And and it just came to light during this t
22f accident.
23j i
24l 25!
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68 I
l 1!
MYERS:
Prior to the accident, we always had a shortage of dose rate i
2 instruments and the shelf where we placed em to be repaired was always i
3l full of dose rate instruments that needed to be repaired.
There was 1
4 no pressure, or it seemed that no one took the initiative to, to push 5(
the instrument shop to put the people on repairing the instruments, I
6{
which should have been a very simple job.
I think they were considering 7
at that time farming out the repair of the instruments to an outside g
concern and I don't know from the, from the lack of interest shown by g
supervision both in HP and Instrument it almost looked like they 10' wanted to get rid of our repairing our own instruments, which it seems to me was a very simple job for the highly trained technicians in the instrument department to handle.
That's my opinion.
i 13l
]
YUHAS:
Let me make an observation, I've audited the records of availability of instrument, these are the Calibration sheets that you fellows put 16{
out, that's the date calibrated, date due for calibration, 0.K. And as of the 28th my review indicates that of 16 teletectors that you have, 17,'
only 4 teletectors were in service and within calibration.
Is that, 181 would you confirm that?
In other words are those the right forms to look at to make that kind of a decision?
20!
21l' ETHERIDGE: I, I would assume that's the best form to look at, you 22j l
know, for the operation of an instrument, if its in service, out of 23t l
service, calibrated and such.
241 25!
1 77 x..
i / J
f 69 1
RESNER:
Question to both of you.
Was anybody specifically assigned 2,
with the responsibility of getting these instruments repaired?
31 i
4l ETHERIDGE:
The, every once in a while it seemed like they would be on 5
a push so they would assign one instrument tech to, to repair these 6j instruments and they would do so you know, when they had the time, but i
7l as we stated before the shelf was always full, well not necessarily 8
full, but always had instruments on it that needed repair.
9 RESNER:
Who would do the assigning?
10l l
11l iy ETHERIDGE:
Of what?
i 13 RESNER:
Of the particular instrument tech to do the repairing job.
15:
ETHERIDGE:
That would come from the instrument foreman or supervisor.
I 17!
YUHAS:
Let's move on to training.
Could you fellows describe the 18!
formal health physics training you've had in the last two years?
20!
l ETHERIDGE:
The last two years, I can recall having an emergency drill m
training, which was last fall, and as far as any other formal training, we were-no other fornal type of training, that's all I can say right 23 r:a.
24l 25l
,-3 f c, n l
70 i
7!
YUHAS:
Mr. Myers?
I 2!
3 MYERS:
As Dave stated other than emergency drill training which 4;
concentrated on the monitoring teams only, or mainly on the monitoring 5
teams with very little emphasis shown toward repair parties, other I
6 than that training for drill purposes I can recall having no formal HP 7
training in the last two years.
8 gj YUHAS:
Before me I have both of your training records and we will see that it indicates that in December of this year you received 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 0
of health physics training.
Could you explain what that training is?
12 l
YUHAS:
Excuse me, correction, it is December of '78, I think of last 13l year.
i 15j 16l' NYERS:
Unless its possible tiiat I could have forgot this training, I I
would wager a guess that, that some foreman might have, I don't know, 171 f
i took us on a tour or something and then went back u a documented a 18(,
couple of hours of training for it, I have no idea.
I _. " t remembe.
having the training to tell you the truth.
20j 21; YUHAS:
Mr. Etheridge, do you remember spending 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of training 22 in health physics in December?
Etheridge:
I can't say as though I've 23 l
had 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the past two years, as you asked before.
24j 25i l
./
ie J f
71 i
i l
1!
RESNER:
Mr. Myers, you said that, you hypothesized that some foreman 2
may have taken you on a tour and then come back and logged it in as 31 training.
Have you heard of that practice at this facility?
4f I
5 MYERS:
If 1, I think possibly I have heard rumors that this has 6
occurred but that's strictly what it would have been - a rumor.
I 7
can't say that I've heard anything concrete, in regards to that.
8 ETHERIDGE:
Maybe you'll remember when, now this involves, this is g;
10 inv lying chemistry which is the other half of our job, our training yy as such, for Unit 2 was, our training week they would hand us a diagram:bluepri n 12 f the plan'. and say here trace out systems.
So, I, you know, that was training, as such.
3 14i YUHAS:
I wonder if you would both of you, perhaps Mr. Myers first, 15 just, read off from your training record the training that you supposedly 16 17l[
attended recently and could you describe what the training was as you read it off and whether or not you attended it?
18; 19l MYERS:
Ok, 2-2, no I'm scer - I'll start at 8/24/79.
Commick (phonetic) time sheet trairing - 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
21l i
22I YUHAS:
Is that health physics or not?
23 24l r.g 1
i ) U L-25l
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l
72 MYERS:
This is not health physics related and I do remember having 1!
2 training on the time sheets.
9/14/78, what is that accountability 3
access training G-2 1670.93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br />?
I'm not familiar with that procedure.
It's possible we were briefed on it.
I don't remember it.
9/25/79, 4
5 We had five hours first aide, I did have first aid training, half a day in the not too distant past.
Unit 2 HP in start up training 24 6
hours 12-1-78.
Now if, if this is 12-1-78 he documented 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> HP 7
training, I don't know what time span he might have been refering to.
8 g:
We couldn't have had it all on 12-1.
10 RESNER:
11;,
For the record, you're refering he to who?
i 12l l
MYERS:
To a foreman, some foreman logged this I guess.
Which one I 13!
have no idea.
But I don't feel that I've had 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> worth of HP 14!
training for Unit 2 and startup, nc, 2-2-79 I, according to this I 15i have 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> training safety meeting that's probable true, we probably
- 16i, did have a safety meeting.
7-20-78 haalth physics TLD's, I'm sorry, l
health physics training, one hour.
4-4-78 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> TLD issuing, 2 18!
78 unit 2 AA unit, one hour, I think I remember having lecture on the 19i AA unit in chemistry, yes, OK.
20i 21li
[
RESNER:
So that's a chemistry training that's not a health physics 22l l
training.
23 24!
25i l
f n 7.,
'77 L
73 1{
MYERS:
No, that's not HP.
i 2;
YUHAS:
3 Mr. Myers, is this form accurate to the best of your knowledge?
4l As far as the health physics training.
5 MYERS:
No, to the best of my knowledge, I feel, that its not accurate, 6
it's probably grossly exagerated at the least.
7 8
YUHAS:
Mr. Ethenricer, could you comment en your training forms, 9 l, t
excuse me, Mr. Etheridge?
10' 11!
ETHERIDGE:
Do you want me to stick strickly to the HP?
12l l
13l I
YUHAS:
Yes, I want you to comment on the HP training as shown on that 14!
form for the last year.
15; 16 ETHERIDGE:
- 0. K. the Unit 2 HP and startup 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 12-1-78, I don' t 17!
i remember any training there.
The Rad Chem Tech tests, yes I did take 18!
that.
Radiation emergency drill, yes, that was at 10-30-78.
Health 19l physics,.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, 7-13-78, I really can't say.
Weekly HP instruction 20:
1-27-78, I don't know what that refers to.
TLD system, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 11 21!
22;l 77, I did have training on the TLD system, that was just operating the l
machine itself.
Radiation emergency d-ill 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, 9-21-77, I would 2 31 l
say yes, I probably did have that training. Operation of Radeco, 241 that's radeco inverter operations that's the, I'm sorry, the radeco 25l u
3
/o>
> a
( ) i. ' 5 -
?
i p
74 i
If war a lecture.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, 9-20-77, and the inverter operations.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 2
9-19-77, to the best of my knowledge that was probably in with that 31 radiation emergency drill.
1 4l YUHAS:
I think that's far enough back.
Let me ask you a question, 5
6 when you receive health physics training is there a sheet, documentation sheet of your attendance.
For instance, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of health physics 7
training that seems to me like someone would document that in terms of 8
an sheet or a test or quiz.
Do you remember anything like that for g
that for that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of health physics training?
0l 1
l 11l ETHERIDGE:
No, I don't recall any 5neet being passed arounc.
I 13l 14l YUHAS:
Do you recall the training?
r 15, ETHERIDCE:
I don't recall the training.
17!
YUHAS:
Do you know of any requirement for startup to get the operating 18!
license that all of you were supposed receive some training in health 19!
physics as it pertained to the startup of Unit 2?
20j t
21j j
MYERS:
No, I don't.
22' 23 ETHERIDGE:
Same here, I don't recal? of any training or any requirements.
i 25j A
~
g.t e
I
75 1!
YUHAS:
Based on your comments then do you question the credibility of 2
these two trair.ing records?
3 4l ETHERIDGE:
Yes, I, my overall judgement of this whole sheet is that t
5' every time they talked to us about something, it was logged, and I wasn' t aware of it.
6 i
7 81 I
RESNER:
You weren't aware of this as being logged or...
g i
10' ETHERIDGE:
I wasn't aware that it was being logged as training.
I, some of these things I recognize as formal training, but a lot of it i
12l I, I can't agree with this as being a formal training schedule of any i
type.
14!
t 15r RESNER:
Is there any information on there that is documented on your 17!
training record that you have never come in contact with before not at all familiar with 181
. Resner?
191 ETHERIDGE:
Looking down over this I can't see anything offhand that I 20~
hadr.'t come in contact sith at one time or another.
21 1
22l RESNER:
By contact through conversation with one of your superiors or 23 through some formal training?
24 25l l
^
i t e
(.((
lU i
76 1!
ETHERIDGE:
That's correct.
I 2!
3 YUHAS:
0.K. Let's move on to another topic.
Generally, do you document 4.
either one of you, instances where individuals do not follow or adhere t'
5 to health physics procedures and practices?
6 ETHERIDGE:
We do have a form, HP violation notice, that we, if we see 7
8 anybody who isn't followir.g procedure we can write him up for that.
9 YUHAS:
Do you do that?
10 11 ETHERIDGE:
No.
It seems like to me that if it is done, it's never followed through,,ith.
141 i
RESNER:
Let me break here to change the tape, the time is now 5:40 15; i
p.m.
16!
17 RESNr,:
18!
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Myers and Mr.
Etheridge.
19l 20l j
YUHAS:
We were just talking to Mr. Etheridge, you were saying why you 21j don't fill out the health physics violations ferms.
I 22I 23 ETHERIDGE:
Well I think from the management level they don't enforce 24 things strict enough.
Where as, if we fill one out we know, well I 25l
,p3
',(,p /
iu' i
i
- l 77 1!
have the general attitude that it won't bt rectified.
And that's, 2
basically it's an apathetic problem.
3i i
4j YUHAS:
Mr. Myers, have you ever witner. sed any violation of health 5
physics procedures and filled out a form?
Had any experience with 6
that?
7 MYERS:
No, I've never filled out a HP violation.
g 9
YUHAS:
Is that because you've never seen HP violations?
10j 11 MYERS:
No, I'm faciliar with it, and, and if I ran into the situation where the other person involved just flatly refused to take my advice, i
then I would have filled one out.
But I never felt the situation 14!
15 16:
YUHAS:
Are either of you aware of any instances where operation especially licensed operation personnel, and auxilliary operators did not adhere to high radiation area control procedures?
20!
i ETHERIDGE:
I'm aware of one incident it, which occured recently.
It 21l!
involved a shift supervisor.
I don't recall which shift we were on at 22l 1
the time.
But, I worked, the other Rad Chem tech on our shift is Ken 2 31 l
Burkholder.
So, the specifics of this, I don't, I'm not that familiar 24) i with, but, in general what happened, this shift supervisor entered an 25!
l 3 n'
/
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u-i is L.
f
l 1
{
78 I
i l
area, did not, he entered a high radiation area which was locked.
A i
i l cked area is greater than 1 R.
He came back out and went through 2
i 3
the monitors, he was contaminated, the teletector which he took was 4
contaminated and Ken Burkholder, the other HP tech asked him where he 5
He said, "I don't have to tell you."
So, from what I understand was.
there was a little dispute there, and finally he got it out of him, 6
tht he was, I don't recal'. the area, but he was in this area, it was a 7
1 cked area.
Permission to be in there had to be granted by the HP 8
department and the shift supervisor, which is what he as.
So, you g
I know, that, it was total neglect of any HP rules.
10' 11 RESNER:
Do you recall this gentleman's name?
l 13!
l ETHERIDGE:
Yes, it was Ken Brian.
14i 1
15' YUHAS:
I know Mr. Myers is anxious to leave.
If you'd like to leave you can pick up your copy of the tape tommorrow.
What shift do you 17 work tommorrow?
18i 19l MYERS:
I'll be off tommorros.
20' 21, t
YUHAS:
You'll be off tommarrow.
22!
23 MYERS:
I'll be here Friday.
24l i
25\\
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I0'k
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I
I 79 l!
YiahAS:
0.K. Friday we won't be here, we won't be back till the following 2{
Tuesday.
So, if you drop by that Tuesday.
3 4
MYERS:
How soon will we be...
5 YUHAS:
6l Well, just about to offer review the op change and add any 7
further comments and then I will have one more question.
8 MYERS:
I'll just wait.
g i
10 YUHAS:
Do either of you have any further comments about that health l
physics department?
l 13l ETHERIDGE:
g I feel that our department has, doesn't have enough control over a lot of situations.
Operations, Maintenance, they sort of 15:
dictate what's to >e done.
Many times, well I shouldn't say many times, but, I know of instances where you inform someone that they can't do a job for, this is general I can't really recall any incident
)
18!
19l either, but you can't do a job and then they'll go back and tell their foreman and all of a sudden a call comes back from our foreman or 20[
t supervisor saying that yes they can go in, you know, whatever the case 21{
I' might be.
It seems like the Operations and Maintenance has too much 22l control o,er the HP Department from that standpoint.
And it seems 23l like they want to get a job done at all cost.
The only time we've, 24 well 300 mR/ week was the only limit, you know, adminstrational limit i
25!,
1 O
(
() (d ('.
V' e
k i
(
80 I
l lj that we ever had.
I think alot of jobs throughout could have been, 2
you know a lot of exposures, I, maybe they could have been avoided by 3l sitting down and discussing the importance of the job to begin with.
i 4j I feel as though in general our HP Department needs something to give I
it a little more backbone so that we have more control over situations 6
and from my viewpoint the apathy runs from the management level down.
i 7
We haven't been trained in alot of cases and we're not on top of things.
We're the, seems like we're the last to know and we're the 8
gj first to hold up a job.
They never tell us anything, and then it t
0 always comes back on our shoulders, this HP is holding up the job.
So, in general that's my summation of the HP Department.
It just needs a little more backbone.
I think the training stinks, well lack of.
14!
YUHAS:
Ok, fine thank you.
I'd like to ask you a question on a very 15; basic plane, and that is, do either of you have any reason to suspect 16!
17!
that an individual may have deliberately, precipated or aggrevated the l
event that happened on March 28, 1979.
You two.
18; I
19i MYERS:
No, I have no reason to suspect or feel, and I would find it 20j i
hard to believe that anyone caused or aggrevated the situation or 21l accident.
No, I don't.
22,{
23 ETHERIDGE:
I don't feel as though any one individual acted to cause 24i the situation, but getting back to the training, the lack of training 25!
fna 190 i U -
.[
e
j f
81 i
1 is not, I don't feel as though it s just in our department, I think 2
it's widespread.
There was a general push to get Unit 2 on the line.
3 The operators were being shuffled between Units, primary operators.
4 They're called auxiliary A operators.
They were shuffled back and l
f rth between units.
Both units have different valve designations and 5
6 I can see where possibly that, it was difficult for them to keep up i
with everything.
I know that in our job it was difficult for us to 7
g keep up with everything because there wasn't any proper training.
g' Getting back to my point, I think that the overall lack of the training might have caused the situation.
I think that the company brought it 10l on upon themselves.
12l l
YUHAS:
- 0. K.
On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we want 13l to thank you for taking 3 or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of your time to come in and talk 14!
with us.
We appreciate your candid response and we would advise you 15i that the tapes that we will provide are your personal property and 16!
it's up to you to do with those as you please.
17!
l 18!
RESNER:
Thank you gentlemen.
The time now is 5:50 p.m. Eastern 19!
daylight time and this concludes the interview of Mr. Myers and Mr.
i Etheridge.
21l
- 22f, 23[
241 I
i 25!
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,