Text

Transcript of ORNL 790524 Briefing in Washington,Dc Re 1958 Soviet Nuclear Accident.Pp 1-33.Supporting Documentation Encl
	ML19242C372
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/24/1979
From:	Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Kennedy R; NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	;
References
	REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7908100315
	Download: ML19242C372 (51)
	v • d • e

_

- ' - ('75k (

/

.,/ J t(

NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:

PUBLIC MEETING 3RIEFING 3Y CAR RIDGE Oli "ANOTHER PERSPECTr7E OF THE 19 5 8 SC'/IET ;;UCLEAR ACCIDENT"

-> c --

,b~f k*

2

(_

0"c. u>, t s u u v._._ m a g,L g, ug

.L Place -

Washing ca, D. C.

l Date -

Thursday, 24 May 1979 Pages 1-33 i

i 1,

l l

l T.enen.:

c:c:: w.:n c ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.

Offian Repcners LL.L Nct*h Cecrtci $treet Wesnirgton. 0.C. 20C01 NATIONWIDE COVIERAGE DAILY 0 08 7 003ts

~ ~ - - -

L

1 CR4982 a

DISCLAIMER This is an unofficia' '-=-script of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Coc=ission held on Thursday, 24 Mav 1979 in the Cc= missions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W.. Washington, D. C.

The, This transcript meeting was open to public attendance and obs'ervation.

has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, a.:d it may contain inaccuracles.

The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.

As provided by 10 CFR 9 103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.

Excressio ns of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.

No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Cc= mission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or ar p ent contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.

t 4

h f3, s

j gg 6,'( i < ' t '~ g

.i/,;i',pgk i

-m'

' " " ij j.

,,/ ss k

a

.-s t ;

s

', y y; a

^ ' '

'f \\.j Q, a. a e

,\\

)}

[-

d

I l

m I

I 1'

CNITED STATES OF AMERICA CR4982 l

2i NUCLEAR REGU' ATORY COMMISSION I

i.

I 3

i i

i 4-t I

PUBLIC MEETING i

i l

2 I

3ovvv NG 3v. O e~ ~ R.rDG= C\\d n ANO m. T.:._ R D. ToSO..ct'm.v.is:

~

s i

6:

OF THE 19 5 8 SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT" 7

s, Room 1130 j

1717 H Street, N.

W.

9, Washington, D.

C.

l

)

10 i Thurtday, 24 May 1979 i

11 i The Ccm:nssion met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m.

i

., - OR: :

12,

i 13 VICTCR GILINSR*l, Cc==issioner (presiding.)

14 RICHARD T.

RENNEDY, Cc=missioner 15 PETER A.

3RADFORD, Commissioner JOICI F. AEIAPSE, Cc=missioner i

17 ALSO PRESENT:

IS Messrs. Auerbach, S ciber, Snyder, Gcssick, and Dirks.

19 ;

.o n.

21 n.

$d 23 24.

...c.. a.wmn. i nc. 'l I

S.C !I f

i

_ r

,14 s

j e(UV

,l i,

R 4932'-

3

{0FFMAN "l

1

-l m.te 1 1

PROCEEDINGS (9:50 a.m.)

i 2'l I

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY (Presiding).

I apologize for 3

i cur late start here.

4,'

The briefing today will be presented by Mr. Auerbach 5

i

'r of the Oak Rid 9e National Laboratorv.

He and other members of 6'

i the laboratory published an article recently in " Nuclear Safeuy"l

,1

't

' magacine called "Another Perspective of the 1953 Soviet 9'

Nuclear Accident."

9' i

Nuclear safety, of course, is the subject, the 10 l l

i business of this Commissien, and we ' re ve ry much i-~a-asted i

11 l in hearin~e what v.ou have to sav..

12,

I i

Mr. Auerbach?

13 l l

COMMISSICNER FiEARNE:

Before Mr. Auerbach starts, 14 '

t I had a couple of questiens I wanted to ask him, sort of at leas: hit the framework f or myself.

16 First, since this cbvicusly relate-to a perspective 17 il 1

. an accicent er a cessic e accicent 18 l

~

that occurred in a i c:

country where we have difficulty getting informa:icn, have l,y ycu had access to classified material from either er any of 20 the intelligence agencies regarding this?

21 e, !

OR. ACER3 ACE:

With regard te this paper I'm dis-cussing today?

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

No, with regard to -- not the 24

.Jecerse Aeoonen. inc.

Paper.

We're, after all, not so much interes ted in -he paper o..c,

b l

A

,-a j $ !

l m

---.e

1 i

.e 2 l

l.

t 1,

as we are in the events and analysis of events.

~

l ll 2 9 DR. AUEP3ACH:

In the analysis of the events I'm 3

talking about ~;oday, I have had access to the Freecom or 4l Information Act material that the CIA made available to i

i 1

5 Mr. Kalish and other members of the group.

i i

6 CC.V.V.!SSIONER AHIARNE :

But Mr. Auerbach, have you, 1

7, so I can understand what you're going to be telling us, have 3

you had access to the intellic.ence community regardinc. this i.

9, event?

If the answer is no, then my next question is, have i,

10 you asked.

And :d the answer is yes, then I have a ccuple 11 i additional questions.

i i

12.

(Laughte r. )

i i

13 l DR. AUEP3ACH:

Well, Ccemi'ssioner, that's a very, i

14 !

ve:-/ dif ficult kind of question for me to address.

I'm aware 6

k

^#

c.' a s 4 #.4 = d.'...#

...,a

4 ^ *

1. 4 o #.

.". a..# a c *

..".a

m.e. a..is.=.bodv, v.

I C CMM - -. 0 5,_s n, =..,.,Nsan :

n.,1 ::..g..t.

.s what you,re 16 ;

w m

ac.

17 cine. to tell us toda.v mcdified in anv. w a v. bv. vour understand-

':t

'8

.'.1g o.#

" ". a *.

b. o d v,

^#

.i."..# ^. a *. 4 ^ *. *.

i v.

w.

1a

. R.

.,s.. - e. 3x=nu=:

No, sir.

1 20 CCMMISSICNIR.'aiEARNI:

Do you think it would be

., as 3

w w-... 4. 4,,,m a. v..,

4.m. 3Cee.m,..,

%..,..o.

31 s e.L. 7.

. o L, a-

.v w

v 22 access --

23 CCvlCSSIONER GILINSKY :

I wonder :.f you' d handle o

1 24

".a. a *-

".e e.?.

w^ #

". e ~...e e 4..c. '.

e Fecerai Reco,ters.

x.

o.c 77, T<*4

, - w A 3.s s e 4 ne

..a m i

.-t

.a n L v.u.v..c.. S.' m..4 n.

n.a...n..N r.

6 r

I d-f

e 3 5

1 6

l' 1

this question "crior to this meeting being called.

So I thought 2

I'd trv. to c.et an answer.

i, 3

DR. AUER3ACH:

That's not a j udgme:.: I can make, l

4 Commissioner.

I I

l 5'

CCMMISSIONER AREARNE:

You're not sure whether it 1

i 6

would be useful to us or not?

7; DR. AUERRACH:

I'm not sure what your internal I

3 problems are with respect to these matters.

t 94 COMMISSIONER A3EARNF:

Assuming that the question is, 4

1 10 do ycu think that information might be useful --

Il I CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Doctor, I wonder if we could 12' go ahead.

13,

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would like to. hear.

I i

Id l DR. AUER3ACH:

If I mav have the first slide.

I 15 (Slide.)

16 Abcut a vear and a half ago, Dr. Ihcres Medvede; i

I7 '

c c.te to the Oak Ridge National Labora:crv., specifically := see i

l 18 l a_4.-a. we w....

, ma ad4 e.'.c... -- uy,

--d

.4...o

-s.

2 o

3s 19 'i

--4..

, X e,. _. 4. y-

.a

... C f. 4. ; a w.a. g e s _ _4

.=

w.e s w - C a.'.' m. e.

os 20

.C c..4 a..

.c. C ' e s - a e.

4 A e....

k.a. b.e.ba 4.4.m..

A sh w

- c u* *. 4.. s w-m..ew.. s.

v 21 dramatic form in "New Scientist."

22 Sr....

.wc av. - w d - ". "4... =. d ". e s - 4. "..' =. a. d "s ~.^.

Wa a

a s

2 3 ',

s ~., -+... n.e..e.. n. ---.e. ~ u.a.

- m. e.a. g.

a ~ %.g yg.,

.q p-

%.. g -

,u en A

- aged

- m s

w 2d 't n

-.o.s.o.

Ae*a.7 4..

k 4.,

c....;

hw 4

-.4..4..g

o e3-cg, g ge..

z.

y m.

eJaceret Aeoor er.. Inc.

23 oXPa. *4..se.

g,,i g q y a.-. 4... ' 3. S e.~.4 1

i 2

y s

j

'l'l o

.te, 4 6

i l

1 i

l' The next slide.

i 2,

(Slide.)

t 3

In doing so, we, like he, relied on three kinds of 4

information sources.

The first was to go back and look at i

i 5'

what was available in acccunts by former Soviet citizens.

I i

6 Secondly, we received the CIA public information that was 7'

released to the public under the Freedom of Information Act.

a

- 4.#,

we

'e,a.

.o

.-av.iew,

.# o.'.' w.i.n

". 4 s so.-. o'

.'a=d,

he 9

S o v.i e ~. a c.i a....i.".4 -

ub.7.d c = *. 4..a. s 4..

a - ^-.' o c. v.,

.o s*-=.-..'^.c'~i..~

s y 10 fo; the clues that he alluded to in his article "New Scientist."'

11

.w.e..e.

s144e.

i 2

(e1.< awe.~)

l i

i t

i 13 The secuence of events on this thing, just to brinc i

t e

14.

1 ac i s

._w

. ne w. -.

n.4

.4 a-.

a 4c.3e o,.

oc.4

.w..

a e...

l 15 '. dissidence in November of

'76, wherein he mentioned this a

I 14 a-4a'.

..c s.. 4 asa.4..g.

.g o.

eal.

..av 2

,-. 4.w

- u. m... e., _ _.,... w..

a ww..

y j

a.s"..=~".'v. we.'.'-k..cw..

a.~.4. # e... a.

". e.c e ".." =.. w,~ o...c w.- ~.~..e,

~ -

j e

i 1w i 0 -.. u. e.-a.

4.

.<.4.n ' a A.s.e w-ms...

u.

w w

19 l

.J. o.

4...m. o. A.43. o ' ey o. b a a..'r.

3 w e. s a C C.e. e..-..m.

0. 4.-

.h...

J..'.'

y eQ y.u. e..k.

w,

1. A

.u. 4..,.T.g 3 4 a... n. a.

. 4 n.

4,,, e...

9

.~ g,

...~.g.-...g..

..u. a..

2 a

i

'I

]

weac w s{

b.4s

.w4... g

.'.N* * ' O.

,h

.'.i b,vA.

m C.* e *.

a aif

- C f.* *.

_ y...

w..

- k. a ". - -

a."..#

h e..

.V.a. #. V a. d e v. w=.*s.e

" u

'a'."

i a., a.-y e.

a.-. 4..' a.

i t

A.d ~ = s. a..,

4..

'a'.". 4

.k.

.". O - - -'.*.i # a. d.

S 6

a.... 4 s *. " C..

"..h e.. '.' C.i a. *.-

OW a-y.w w

24 -

... s.

4,...,., e a..

s.. 4 s e v.4 2. - e.<. w... s..,ac

,a.

.s..,

..... a

..s.

ceJ,ceral Reporters. Inc.

25 1

.... ~.4 w e.m.,. u.a ?.

.dk o...

.1.n - a..

A q,- j l

y g

{ J L.

e J

P 7

te 5 e

i f

5 l

1:

Mav I have the next slide.

i 2

(Slide.)

3' The area that was identified and has since been l

identified also in the CIA ma:erial is in Cheliabinsk province.

4l i

I 5'

In the CIA =ateri al, mention is made of a military nuclea.

i i

6 installation near the ccmmunity of Kasli, although in the l

7l material also, information is also stated about a nuclear I

a facility near the city of Kyshtym.

9 In these materials, talk of various kinds of 10 ;

accidents are given with particular 'mpact on the citizens in I

this city of Kamensk-Ural'skil.

i 11 i

12 ;

Dr. Tumerman, whcm I went to interview in Israel I

i I

,13 '

while I was there in September, reiterated to me his particular,

14 :

observations.

He, curiously enough, had been meeting here, in l

I 15 the Cheliabinsk nature reserve, in a clandestine meeting of 16 biologists who were anti-Lysenkcists and were meeting in 1961 I,f

.i

. u..:-

aGC a...

s v.-~. o.: n a.a..e..a.'

a -

n

..n

.v.a.s.

m-l o. "I q.4 - b..

a..a

. e

..e o. 4.,.g..a s...e

. w...e n

r..e.s. a. d. -

n a

.v 9'l 19 1 d..dv a. "..'. "a-k ave.-d'ovsk ~~ ~a..."

'.. a.,

..=..".e.-

...ar.

r e

=

~

l

.I

' o 4" " a c.k "..e - a a.. d c "v, ~..~c.....

Sc ".e

.d.-

va.

".. ' -.- ad.

.=..4,

.= s ". a a

,1 '

sa# 4 -oa, wbc k.o 0 *.

+

abct*..' n. v

4 7. ~..e. a.. -

-.r.w

x..

avm

. e 3

4 t

l

9 I

SVerdlovsk, hO saW sCre siOns.

He stL,Oped a driver.

He 4s

.c.4-ad k..c "-a e s d a s e.-.a.d.,

s-e w." ".."...=..: - ".4...e v s.

c..e w a.... a. d

~

24 '

to take a drink of water; he was told the area was polluted 3D 59dff 8I $9CCfTWf1, IMC.

9.C g.4

h.

w3=*4r g a.m.b. s.m.4..n.w.4 e. n..

.s..e. f

.k. g y b.. d w-

... 4 36

e m..e.. e.

.wv w

j

)

~. a.

r.

f i

1, You'll note this is an e.rea with lots of little I

2!

reservoirs, with this river, the Techa River, crossing the 1

3 area; and again, which this information document speaks of 4!

being heavily contaminated and =cnitored, and citizens were S'

forbidden to fish and get food out of it.

I i

6 The next slide.

i 7

(Slide.)

3 To c.ive v. ou sc=e perspective on :he.cco. ulation 9

d e.. s.'.";,.

...4...k

.4.'s ee.-..*.. a.. *c ~.he -a...e

=~

.'... a.- a. s..

- -ae 3

10 cities in 193 9,

'59,

'67, and 1973.

And as you can see, in 11.

terms of occulaticn c.rowth and densitv., whatever teck place 12 the re, if it tock place, seems to have had nc impact en the 1

13 !

g. -w _k.

" o s e e u- ~..~...ur..d.." e s, C h. e.'.' ab.i.. s k.'.n,_ a.-. 4 -".' =..

i w.

i 14 Kamensk-Tral'skii, the smaller city, didn't have any data for i

15 '

ic73.

S v a.. d 7 c v s k, ~ ". e.~.. = 4 -

.d

v..

.i 16 If

=ay have che next slide.

17' s' c.'.4 A e. )

IS Tc gi"e you sc=e perejective of the province in 19

.-..ea..4a w..

s.

a.e= c..ne w..4 2c S.2.=a-e

..2 a.

A

..e

..w. 4 -

a 20 ! - - = " 4 - -a. -

-- we c-..

2.-a-C". e.' ' =.i.. a *s-

-~4..-a

~-d..".

..".a.

.e.=~--

a 91l

.e m. a....,.e s s e a,

.a.w..

.w. 4s w..a e wa. __. e.: c...

- c.w...

.. a v a.

w w

t 22 '

pcpulation -- in the year 195 9, Cheliabinsk had a pcpulation 23 1 m.e.'

.4 7 7 4

r.,

. e..ne o a e e ".ac'

'.9.

o..

ni

. --- d n n.-s.4..ee.=

s-e e

-e

=--

m

- ' ^

v a..- ": - - s e =.a d..". e.i.=.". A a.- a. a

.d - v a..-v.

..' a a..

4 a

sJoceral Aecor ers, It*(..

25 Sotn are provinces or states that are sc=ewhat C -T c7l

/. J '

JJ

t 9

. o.

7 I

iI; isolated or were somewhat laciated.

There are heavy rural a.

2 3 country with forests.

The land under cultivation, as you see, 3

4 e.- - e...... 4, C w.e.,

,w 4 s x,.

..w. a. : s a wc u...

.w w,.

s a c,w.

...e s a...e as

- ~..

.. r t

4 it is in Tennessee.

i t

5 In 1945, Tennessee had a secret unknown nuclear l

6' 4

s,sla.4.n c..,sc, a.

.w... e. 4... e.

7 There are scme interesting similarities.

I a

..w.e e x. s., _4 _2,

9 S.,.4 4 e.

10 Just background.

F.e climate of Sverdlovsk, however, i

11 i i s c."- ~4 ~..> -.4.#.'e.e.~.

so..-",

c#.

C.h.e="4.sk - ov.'nca.

d r.

l i

12

.i s ~ "--

a d.4.#.# e. e.*. *. " " a n

..k. a *. o.#

". e.n '.e s s a. a..

s a co.'A a-*=.

t Tha mean annual tem erature is quite low, c.articularlv for 13 e

I t

Id '

Sverdlovsk.

The mean Januarv. tem eratures are icw; lots of Ic i

s a.c w,- c ^.' u,.i...k o s 4 * = 5 ' a.

d

-.- a. a.

a

. - ~ ~

16

y., y,

.e. w a..;

.w

.w3 g a.

s...eg.,

2, 4 3., C g.4..

v, m. _.

.3 J

I. l

/l

..e o.

4..; s

.._4. w...

.y e A. y a. 4 e y,

wa, s--

.c s-.,

7 O A'. 4.. ;

3.

..w.e OC.4 a

v...

o o.

18 !

.. A.4.na. C n.n. g..

.~.4. a.

,.... e a, A aXn.r 4c.

--- 4.,

aXp.sn_._4

.a,A

.n,j 4

l 19

.a.:

4 n,

. 4 ae.,.,

o. n

.4

. w a.

, 4.. c~ >.

n. ' c.,,.,.a e

.u..,...

4.

4.,

. r

.I i

20 i

u. a. u., a ag--

.;g a.

. u.a. o. r. u.,..

42

, 4

u. o.

.ga. a.

. u.,.. a.

. u.~.n gq..

u

.-.<a.

'l 21

w...e e.. s v s.. 4 - w

._b. e.

- a..s v. s.._e 4*

w w

43 yfama_4 -

w t*, s

.y w.

r r

t.

o. g a..n. *s., g

~e.iy ggg 4..a g a.4. 4 ya.

m a.

., 4.*. 4 g *,~4~3.

w

.-=

7

.uy 23 's-l

.T.* x* e g _4ag,

.g..

-.7 p.

p X,.-.4.m.g 4

=..w. a.oc9 4.a...

.4.a.,....a.

.

a l

, *, ],

- 3

.-3..c4..- - a., 4.,. n.. e * " C.'.*. *.s

'. a *. b..e

".. a de.

y

~

r w-esceral A eoortset, t rN*.

l At

,l es T

...ay wS"a.

" ". e

.".e.X ".." '.4 d e.

4-

* = <

,l

{'1

'n i

s

te.8 10 i

i l

A i

1' (s14Ae.)

l 2

Mcw, a=cng the things that we saw, of course, was i

3, the :.act a.nat there was consistent mentien c:. contamination l

4 by strcntium 90 in particular, that were simply too high in l

i

+

i 5 ] terms of what our experience had been in Scing field work in f

6 radicecoloc.v tc have been done ex erinentall'.

i 7:

As I indicated there in the second cc==ent, the 3

activity levels ranged up to 3.4 millicuries cer sc.uare meter.

9 This is a level that is almost at the point of producing 10,

radiot6xicity when you start to calculate dosage.

11 '

C n.".v...? S s~ ' O N".R G *..*"...C.Y.v. -

W".e..

Vc" s'v,

oo hi -k.

-^ "

e

. 3

-- -e l

12 something that would be done in the normal course of experimen-i i

13 i tacion, you mean?

l i

14 '

DR. AUIREACE:

Going cut and deliberately placing 13.

~"e a'.e.d a.' * "4 e _ a_,..". a *. ' s 4

.h '..

3 16 r,...w

.w w.

.o

.- 4"

- - - -. e -...c _,

.e m.._as

_.a.

a--

es- - ed,

a. x =.. i a,

17 one plot es 100 bv 100 meters.

New that's a squared foc: ball l

la 1. 44 _3 2,

-.d

.w

. 4 s.

..4.,.a._a_

w.,se

_3,.._,=.

2

l. I y

i

.".ea..=_-..'~~...=..'..=-4^.

.".cweva,.i s..c.

i 1

.2 0 ! -. 4 4,.,

32 4.-. we,., a

.-a=--

.o "s,

..'.a - a_ 3.- a., -

"a"a-

" e =...

w i

8 211 inlikely to have been applied deliberately, assuming one knew m"

..c w ~.

ae. -:O'"

s - ~ ~... i -...

~

i

-w

~4

-.n s "--.. -" ar..- - a s v =- - au.".

a

'a-,e n

u area.

24 Further:cre, when we locked at the Russian papers

,.ncers, neeen.n. s ne.

ac and reviewed them, we found that, as Medvedev did, that thev i

C 1

c,

. v i

1.;

4 1

4

te 9 l

11 l'

were talkinc. about collecting deer -- and I'll come back to i

2.

things about water in a minute -- deer and other mammals that i

3 were contaminated, and were following their uptake and their 4

movement.

i.

5!

$cw, to support such populations you need a certain l

i

~

6 land size.

For example, 21 deer can' t be collected over a 7:

small area.

The deer have large ranges, and if you're assuming 3

that the deer, the 21 deer, are merely a subset of a larger 9

population occupying an area, you are dealing with a fairly 10 large zone.

11 '

The water bodies, of which three were consistently 12 identified in works produced in the 1960s, ranged frcm four and' 13.

a half kilometers scuare up to scmewhere around 20 square l

1 f

14 '

kilcmeters in size.

Each of these, based on the literature, 15 contained sufficient radionuclides --

16 CCMMISSIONER KZNNZDY:

"cw much of this literature 1/

.w... e.,

.s i

13l DR. ACIR3ACH:

There s at leas 115 articles.

And i

! c.

._ _xe 3.,.o a.._._._

c_.u.

_,3y - e._

__2-

__- _ w a.. " c c' i a_ s _=.~. "

.'. a..'.-

42 20 size.

.w-.e e<.

s

_22_.

,1

.. a.. w,.. _

l (d_,_4.ae.3 s

a-

-"e"='

-.. s.i.-. =.. s-v_

4..

..". e a.-..'. ' a. s

'iow,..'. e.- a.

i 1

34

...._.s.

"k.e a--=s..'='

s.".c' _i a s,

w". 4 -"

.w.

s---y.4.

2 s.euw a.oenus. inc.

24 weren't really reecreed ' il screwhere in the mid-60,s ks i

>J\\

.2

.e., 0 I,' meaninc. v.ou had somewhere between 9 and 12 years decay ~ime, 2 9 between presumably when the material was applied in some form --

3 it was done by an accidental mode.

We note there that the i

4<

ratics of strontium 90 to cesium 137 are over 100 to one.

1 f

I l

S' In the aquatic studies, wherein they get in a little i.

6 earlier, a recort gettinc in earlier, thev talked of cerium 144 s

a l

7

.o s..--. ~ 4 ".. 00

.o.-".5en4 L....' O e',

o a

.-a 4 o c'

.'0 1 ',

w.4..h 3

no indicaticn of cesium 137 at time zero.

Those ratios in i

9 the aquatic, we believe, technically would preclude that 10,

material comin2 from a long-l'ved waste disposal facility 11 undergoing scme kind of.Onting, which is what Medvedev said 12 '

he thought happened in his article.

And a long-1 ved waste i

i 13 facility would not have those ratics.

I i

14 !

I '.l.l a.' s c...e n..i -.

.". a.

..". e.

a ~ 4 o *..". a. 4 - L...i - " e w.

v

.a s

i i

15 ~

u'.n d.i s

..".e ~..c s *. d i.'.'.i u.'. -.e

. o.- a.... c.i.i a,

s

~..".4.-

.a.4. c.'

d 16 s -. 4 "...

u^

-a s t

. - ~. =.. -

sO c..a.

..".e

.'as.. 3.-

^#

.s

'. a. '..

a. '.ra..-v... c.-.. = - - s a -...

a. v a....

.". a.

d 4-17

..". a.,

,a....

s...e..,

a "n o

-=kas -'aca -".e a.4-a..-....'".. 00.-

- = w=vs "...-.;,.

-a

.- a. s...

.a y.

m.e. m..e 4 n... - 7e -

eC.r.o.A.

4 3 _ _4a 3.4...,

19 c.o. g. - r.o. g.

.r

a. y a..-y 2

f.s

-- w s

. w t

. %.a 2 e

. k.a.

a.

4s w-m.e a.e.-... n.

a.

e.e.

4,.m 30.

n.m. A. %. 4 eeape n^

l s

6V,

a

.a 7

i

.. v fy 4

a...o.

O.. 3 3.4 a.n.

g 4m.ia..

C,.. e.e..?.y w w..

4.e.gv gg l y 7]

g.4 og 3-m a..n

.e.

w.

.- o.

e,> w

b.. 4 e

b. 2 mn.e.a.4 a o.

..b.a., c n.e,

.h.e o d3a a2 1 a a s._..y. 4 m.

3a

.. e a

y a.

s i

--.4 C s,

W". 4."..i s =.'.' *...' a. ha.#

2 7. a.

. k. o.

9 9..

444 3 w...g. %. 4.. -

.v 6

i

.,..e

...w. e, es s.4...y.* a.e _6 4.

4

. 3:

.w a.

-e.1.4,ye,.

. u. e o y S a-

-.o.

a-7 co Geceral Aeoorters, Inc. '

25 '

s v...e. 4 e s ".. = y y e. a-4.

J' L.-.a.7.

. w.. a. v, '.- o. y.4 1a...=.. ".- C n.2.. d

. ". a. v.

x a

/ -) U L ). -I t.

_I o

te 11 I

13 1

use it.

That may he a reason.

Or, three, there's a technological i

i 2,

reason -- and I'11 get to that -- why there is this ratio.

i 3

If I may have the next slide.

i 4

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Are these articles all i

I 5

dealing with the ef fect of these radionuclides on plants?

i 6

DR. ACER3ACH:

Or their transport, movement through 7,

the fcod chain, that's right.

i 8

CC.9CSSICNER KENNEDY:

Is there any indication of why 9

all 115 articles we're talking about, dealing with essentially i

10 ;

the same area, O.hysical area?

I 11 i DR. ACERSACH:

'" hat ' s richt.

i 12,

CCMMISSICNER KENNEDI:

Is there any indication why, 13 i in all these articles, why the area was sie::ed upen?

What I

14 i generated the articles in the first instance?

i 15 '

DR. AUER3ACH:

According to M.

Medvedev, his 16

---a....i e

a-

"..*. *..'n a.. a w=s c-... #= 4 - --... ea_ ac.- e..

...e e.

a i

I

't 'e

". v-v d.. ca.

..e--.2.,e a.

.v.u..:. - - v e.s. m. W..., v.

io

..o_

19 DR. ACER3ACH:

And that, as a result c f tha t accident,,

1

-... e.-. =

R" s.e. i a..

c - ' - ' s.'.. a s ' a. c = =

..". e - '...e, - ' " a-iO a

- a l

...as a..

-,-.c, s,.s,

'-. e.- a. was a

.'A4^^'e

'4' 1

". a.

.-a.sa" es o-'

'.a C"-

I u'

d #d a~ = ea.

.=%s--

y a s a '. a.

o va..e..

c.#.

^

a e~.~.---.- ~,-.

r-a 4

23 l advantage of this unique study site that had been created for 24 them.

'" hat's the reason.

Tha 's why we see that time lag

>J.c.,s n ecemn. inc.

23 / he: Wee 1, ass" ting tha* VOC had an incident in '53 VCu

(-

el 9 I

c.\\

JJ

te 12 14 j

l 1

1l wouldn't see papers for three, four or five years.

i 2.

CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I think what vou're sayinc. is 31 that in the articles themselves, they don't start out with any i

4 explanation as to why?

l l

5' DR. AUER3ACH:

No.

All they talk about is an area i

t 6

experimentally contaminated or an area receiving a single 7-treatme nt.

8 CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

And then go en to list -hom?

i I

9 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

These presumably are scattered:

t 10 '

over many journals?

l l

i 11 '

DR. AUER3 ACE:

Over manv journals throughout the I

t i

12 Russian literature and over a period of ten years.

i, i

13 ;

COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

Can I ask.you a c.uestien on 14 !

v. cur previous chart?

Yoc don't have to c.e back to it.

You I

i lo h ac.m. a.....' en.e d ~ ". e

= ~- 4 o.,

..". a.. ". a _ w c "..' d e..- a c ' ". d e - -..d..3 16 a long-lived waste facility.

Do you mean that it would preclude 17'

.-. ~. 4.. c. -.- m =

ac---.v

". = ~. ".. = s '. e e.. - - a a,. '.. c.

.# ^ -

3

=

d-

'a

=.. v -.. :..".

y--

w-13 ef time?

i I

f 19 l DR. A"ER3 ACE:

Yes, five to ten years.

4 2c v

.v.u.r.c.e -.gr a a.u..r.n.e v.r 4.

..cu 2.-.u..

, csstw,.

.... e A

e

.v

'l

-- wm =

a.'.'.d

v.

'. = ~ ' a u' "3 ". s. s. =..-. a d, -.e

=~-4 3--

~

nl p.g.

a. =..=,3 p.e u..

~~.

ycn.

a..

u..,.

n

. ~. a.

e e. n -..

6.

f

,3,

g e 4 _. a 4

=_ _- a_.. c e.

7 w a...^,'us.

. 9.e '.a

.k.^

".=~., ' ".

^^

vc". -.

e 24 j let me.

I'm gcing to come to t,

z Feceral Recorreri, me.

0< r, 3

oc e

u v.m.. s S. c,. n, n.u..n.2.v O a.v.

L,

/

u 4:.

\\

w-r i,

~

u:

.s s o i

,.../ v

,a v d *) e 15 i

i i

i l'

(.e. '. 4 A e. )

i 6

2 i DR. ACERSACH:

Now, when you analyce all the areas, i

l 3'

when you analy::e all the literature in terms of the flora and 4

fauna, and then you cer:'are that against Russian biogeographi- '

1 5'

cal material, it all falls into this one area.

This is the t

f 6

cniv. area in Russia that has this particular ccmbinaticn of 7

tree species, lakes, soils, that are identified in this mixturei f

3 of articles.

The site is a likely one.

9' COMM~SSICNER AHEARNE:

In all these 115 articles, did i

10 l

l they specifically identify th s reg:.cn?

II DR. AUERSACH:

No.

Thev. don't identifv. the rec. ion at I r

12 all, except one Vincenc Cheliabinsk Province.

i I3 l, CCMMISSICNER AHEARNE:

I see.

So von have deduced.

i Id DR. ACER3ACH:

We deduced frca looking at the species 15 list the names of the organisms and the soil types; the descrip-l 16 !

4.. c:.., o.

ese_.c__.

a..a

.s.e. _. s.4, o_ s a e.

w e.,- s as.o.a..e a.

1,

_a.

I 13 1 r.u_u.. e a-. ~n r.e.. u..r u. r.

..s. o.

U y

_._ _4,,

3_ s,

2,,e a_

.., a.-

i7

.-a_

_-- a_ s e... a a.4.. a ab i e c _- _.4 ^ ~. o _#

' '. e o v =_ _ _= ' '. o c': a.".'.4. a..=.. _- a_

_ y y

20 !

o.

._..e s w.4 c..

3.,..w.e g, s a.4.,.. 3 4._ _ _m_ =_~ _. _,

_. a s,....,

_e, c __.a,,

4 e1 o.a 4

'.)

4 22

""T..

. r J C,o

.U..

.3

.a M

e.... 4. a.,.4,.m, e

./ I r., =_ s. _. o_,

w.

_ ; e.a a t

23

.w

... a 3.,.3.gg.

4.

a

.c4. a~.

.e

,7

.g,,, 2

.a a,;

w.

4.

m.

9d j *'.

e.,.w., a.w.,.) if

._ f, g

we. =. g **' = ',/", e '.E.,

e'-*a,..-'.,.

b, e 2 '.'.s t:

a" v..'. eMi a, _' e

.4."'. '. %. a.

a y.,

y..

y

e.5scerst Rapor sri, itse.

> 0

'60s C."

' ', O s

".h a.

WhC.'S a_-a 4

^#

e Tv' 4.. *...~.. a. ". '..' '

7 * ". #.48 s-4."..R ". s s.4 2 i

/

.-}

}

l

-e.-,

t 16 I

I 1l in the mid '60s got much larger, and work got started n many I

i 2

cther areas.

It's a growing literature.

I i

~

If. may have the next slide -- this is it.

Leave i

l i

i i

i 4,

that one back on.

i i

t I

5' Il'enko's Lake.

This is one that Mr. Medvedev made i

1 6

an important claim about, which gave us a great deal of concern.l 7,

Studies were conducted bv. this scientist in ' 6 9 and

'70, and he l

i 3

reported again this ratio of almost ene to 100, cne to 10 in i

i 9 ~

this ene, in the lake, of strontium-90 to cesi.e He spcke of f

,i 10 this lake based en the numbers as its having received strontium-11 ;

90 # cra the entire surrounding area, drained into the lake.

'r is c

i 12 estimate was 10-9 curies of strontium-90 in the lake.

Cne i,

13 !

billion curies.

I 14 Well, we couldn't ccme up with that type of number.

15 For one, in locking at it, we faund that the lake was an open-16 drain lake; it wasn't a closed system.

Sc that there was a 17 w _a a.

___-_._.a.._..,.4,.

.e _ a di a-._4 ~_'.v, m,.,... e....

..4-

_=

_i=.,e la '

_ _k =, %e ca"_a e

".a.v. ~- _' _' a_.

a_ d = " c '_- _... e - c_ _ _= _- _ = _-.. e. _' - ~. ~. ^ _#

!'l i

i c. i

4g_,

_4..c,u __..e.

._w,.._._ -4..._

_4..._. w._. _.. _. _..,, o _.g _4 a

e em c,_._.

__ma.

I i

2o

..".. s e v' _' '/,.."._=_-a_

_# _' a.b. e....e..,

",u#-.'.

-e*.

_4.ka.

~..".a. s.;.a.

3 21,

except in a large lake.

22 And in locking at the data, we estimated tha: the lake 23 contained betwee. 10-5 and 10-6 curies of strontium-90, about 24 a thousand _~c'd less than Medvedev.

His ass

. =:,rv neuer ms.inc.

2.5 ui

- s

=su.

._4..-

=. s

"..= ~. 4.

A.

_=_'.ed

....k e =.... d.- =.

c t

<, f

C, '-' R

/ M l t'

f, V 8- -

I f

i.

17 1l drainage basin into the lake and that all these hundreds of 2

thousands of curies sort of migrated in.

l l

f i

3 Well, that's where his ncntechnical backgrcund in s,

that area, I think, led him astrav..

Youwouldn'tcetevenoverf l

5 a period of 10 years the movement of all of the isotopes in the t,

I 6,

drainage basin i-to the ir.ke.

And, as a result, that was I

another area which we think he overestimated the macnitude of

/

the materials, and ce: haps the land mass, contaminated.

3 i

9' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

So I can understand, you're i

l 10 saying that Il'enko did not --

l I

11 DR. ACER3ACH:

Not Il'enko.

Medvedev.

j 17 L COMMISSIONEP AHEAPliE:

Il'enko did not estimate the i

13 10-9; it was Medvedev.

14,

DR. AUER3ACH:

Medvedev.

p 15 COMMISSICUER A IEAPlIE :

Did Il'enko make any estimates?

i 16 DR. AUERSACH:

Nc.

He was giving a paper en the 3

1 a

l '/ t' mathematical transper: of isetcpes between sediments and water, la and he talked of -his lake -hat had *eceived a Ocntamination.

1; COMM SSICNER AHEARNE:

Sun his paper gave the

.2 micrc-t I Curie 5 Fer 1 08 ?

0 I

1 21 "E-

^ 3 " A*.:

.88-22 CC10!!SSICNER AHEARNE:

Ncw, you're saying that 23 i Medvedev here was assuming that everything drained into the lake.

i 24 DR.'ACEE3ACH:

That the lake was closed.

.Jeeers aeocr m, inc. :

23 CC.91!SSIONER AHEAPliE:

Could ycu fcilcw through, then, L) s.

i

/ /s l

L. U -

f i

(!

18,

i i

I 1l if the lake is open and ever*rthing doesn't drain in --

i 9

l i

2l CF. AUERSACH:

It's two different things.

If the i,

3l lake is open, it's also losing material, as well.

l i

4 COMMISSIO!ER AHEAR!E :

Righ t.

So that then wouldn't S

the measured contant in the lake be less than if it we te closed i

\\

6' and everything drained in?

i

v..u. a.

_4.,.u..

7, DR. Ar,.On,Cn...

a

. a.

3 CC.v_NCSSICNER AHZARNE :

So you're saying that Medvedev' 9

nevertneless, while ass'=ing scmething would ha're led to an i

i l

10 '

estimate of a lesser tctal in the area because nothing's lost t

I 11 '

and it's all collected, still ended up with a thousand times i

t o. '

b.._4 - w3..e t

1

?

1 a' r.o u ' C".. -.

'.'., ". a. d.4 ". ' *. c=.' -"..'.='.e d '..

We d'.sa-l'. l D a'.

-a 14,

greed with his -- cur assumption is that it didn't all drain

,i into the lake; it wouldn't.

16.

CCbSCSSIC!ER KENNZDY:

And that it was an open systemj 17 He said it was a closed system.

18 DR. AUZ2.3ACH:

He ass med it was a closec syste:..

t i

jQ

[ e vy ?.q c

,m.--* A

? -%..,

W

._m g.ie.

g4 b.

m

=

7_.e..c c...

. 3,v.4..f.

a.m..

A 2.

a.

. v i

l 1

%. 3 ya.

4 b. _4-7 m '4 a, ae4 f

ereq

.s k m

b. a a_ 4 g

. 4. h.

h.e a~ ' '..a 7Q t O.g.w o.

..m.,

w n.

. a zw.

u w-

.=..e,3 s.... s_ p.

m. J e4.h. 3 t

4,

b. a.

i,3.Ge.

S T.

c.

. =

i i

l

.S.9 m.p..

a'*v '.00a*CU O. 4

.k..

s 1

23 !!

CCMV.ISSICNER AEZA?'E :

If it is a closed system and 24 '

4 a.,, a.,3 _4..s

.4,

. w o..,,...

,d o,m, _, e. se...,,

..e w3.

.x.e o.a.3

..%cw acomn inc.

C

.s e c t w..

b.a.8-cn 4he-,,,. s _4 A o.

_4 y o 4 m.g 4 o h e 1 a s s

k. 3.m._._,'.J 4.t

-. =

a

=

's

/

T -*

t

f. U f.

j.

~

o. ve

.a

,2 I

i t

i 1!

an open system and not all drains in.

I I

2 DR. AUZP3ACH:

Cn the outside, that's right.

But we i

3, don't know.

He came up with a large number.

i I

4 COMMISSIONER KEL.il:

In the lake.

t h

5 DR. AUEP3ACH:

In the lake.

And he assumed it came i

6 frcm the outside.

We don't think that's a tenable technical 7,

ocsition.

i i

8 COMMISSICNER 3RACFORD:

Do you disagree with the i

9; lacge number?

10 DR. AUIP3ACH:

We disagree with the large number, l

11 because to have 10-9 curies of strontium-90, that's more than we 12,

have in the Hanford waste tanks now after -- what is it 20, I

i 1

13 '

25 years of military processing.

In other words, the number of 14 reactor-years of operation necessary to produce one billion 15 curies of strontium-90 in 1957 or 1958, we don't think exi.=t_d 16 in the Soviet Unien; there weren't enough reacters cperating.

1 17 '

Now, this lake is in --

m_ _e _ _4._._. _,._

a. m-,,. _, __ _4, 1 =,

C c.v_u. e - r s.. _ 2 2.b-n e r

_n.

.s

_4.

.e o

o.

c 19 thc gh, c get frcm -he microcuries per liter :

some estimate 20

,'I cf how much is in the lake?

21 DR. A*T: P3ACH :

No, it's relati rely easy.

That's hcw 2:

we came up with the 10-5, 10-6.

1 23 Next slide.

24 !

(Olide.)

2-7.e m i a.eer-m.inc.

25,

Well, I guess the critical question, after locking 1h c-.

ft

^ 'i j fJJ J

,a a

,a m I

20 1

i i

t 1-at this and, we'll say, convincing curselves what could have 2h been the potential accident mechanism involving reprocessed 3

wastes --

i i

CCB1ISSICNER GILINSKY:

Getting back to this lake, i

5 what significance do you attach to those n=lers?

i i

l 6

DR. AUEP3ACH:

In what sense?

C C.vXv.S c-.

e_ R nn--.c m.4 r,/ o..

h e

..a v.

e.,+.s.s.

u r.

e 8

CCmi!SSICNER GILINSKY:

Even your lcwer numbers.

i t

9 DR. ACEP3ACH:

The s:.gn:.:1cance only, agsin, is the I

10 disparity in the serontium-cesium ratic.

It raises also the i

i 11 question that the lee could have been contaminated through i

I 12 another mechanism.

It could have been chrcnically contaminated.

13 It -

part of the network of reservcirs that are in this are a, i

r 14 i and it could have received its cont =.ination through chronic i

15 peer practices, which could account for why it's also a little 16 difficult to v al with in terms of the numbers.

17 CCMi!SSICNEE Ah!'AENE:

When you're estimating what the 1

13 c,-. - _ s,,,

_4... :s ~... 3..

_4 -

.w...e c..

4_._ 3, :0 y.. as o-._,_ e a --

~

19 w,

w.e c.. _'es ee_

4*a.-

_ds a..

' +..._ a_a_

e a s "m.. a_.,,e.. '.

i I

20 DR. ACEp3;.CH:

No, but it's the only measurement 21 we've got to go en.

22 COSIISSICE R.WrAENE:

Sun in getting c your millien?

23 DR. ACEF3ACH:

Yes, we have to assume that.

Tht 's 24 :; che only n=3er we h3ve to ge wing,

.s 1 ke the strontiu.'-

n 3scera6 Reocr ers, Inc. ]

I' SC cesium ratic; we have no other source.

h.

,i i

,s V i 2'

1 i

t CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

If that number were the result 1,

b 2l of poor practice, though then wouldn't it be scme fraction, j

i 3

c.erhaps la-~er, but still a fracticn of the total number c:

m t

4 curies available?

That is, it would be more than peer practice l t

i 1

5 to lose them all.

6 DR. ACERSACH:

I am not saying you'd be losing.

When 7-you say "lcse them all" --

1 3

CCMMISSIONER 3RADFCRD:

By "pcor practice," you're 9

saying what?

10 DR. ACEF2ACH:

That they used the lake as a recipient 11,

for scme of their waste effluent stream.

'12 COMMISSICNER KENNEDY:

Or used several of the 13,

reservoirs in that area.

4 i

1.1,

DR. ACERSACH:

In that area, which drained there.

I.c CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

And.iust sime. lv. di rect iv.

2 4 c.k. a.-~, a. d a _'.' * ". u=

.adi-c a c ~. < _4. v. '.

4"

.s

--a 17 DR. ACIRSACH:

That's right.

We have no way -- I 1a i, c =. ' *. v a. d _"v, '..'.' a., * ".

.d * ' o-

. c me..._4..c,

. ".. '. ' s.n c ~..'...r.' a ". a.4 " ' =_.

~_

i

'9 I C ".M ".

.0 0 - ^. '.T. r". G

...*".4C W.

.. -w u e.

'..'~.a_a e.." " e _ a-

...... = ~ a.

d

.i n

0 4<

.e..a s_su a.

..a a - :n

.--.2.>

.. n a....,

.a

~_

..a 2

i I

r R.

aL-o3e..~r.

M, w

...,..a w 4,.w a

i,

9 C N. V ~ S S.~ ^.*T.R v~ ~.* N..c 7..v. -

_2. "; # ar.*. ~ ~_ ~

^#

" cw...". ~".'-

~. ' ".. '...

t,

. a.-

l 23 'i what is permissible?

-l 4

R DR. ACIRSACH:

I am trying c recc11ect here.

I

..s.c m i % ee ner.inc.

~5

..".4 k,

4.. s w.a e ^- = a~ e a r.d '. ' s.~ ~.rc.y a. = ".' a.- - = '. ' - " "..' a.ve a,

n.".

s l

6 l

<i-i

/(\\

f m

{) )r \\

l. t) !

e.-

22 I

i 1'

cf course, are also lower, but they' re thousands of times higher i

t 2

than the f allout.

Then they must be hundreds of times, if not t

3 thousands of times, higher.

In the case of strontium-90, it's 4l thousands of times hiwher than our permissible limits for i

I i

5 strontium-90.

It's an incredibly high nunber.

l 4

6 COMMISSIONER AHEAFNE :

What about for wacer?

I 7;

DR. AUER3ACH:

Here they' re talking about tenths of 1

3, microcuries, and I don't remember what cur current level is.

9 It's 100 picocuries, which is 10-6, 10-6 smaller than that.

10 So you're dcwn to 100,000 times the limit.

t 11 1 Well, the mecnan'sms that we tried to postulate, and l 1

t 12 without trv.in-to put any kinds of crebabilities on them, but v

i 13 :

just clausibilities:

One you mi3ht have had, there might have i

l 14 been a nuclear criticality incident that took place in conjunc-15 tien with waste precass:,ng.

Remember, we were back at a time 16 '

w.". e..

..".a.

.o"s s - =..s wa..-a.

. e s "..a."..i v.

a.-

",-..g

.e. a.....- w 4. ". "s 4

e

-d 4

17 rapidly.

Again, based on Medvedev's article, Russian sensitivity i

ja ;

.a adi a-4 +. - -.. a. c 4 -. u.4 A.. '. a e a...-

4 "e c, d.1 "..

.94.0.

.n. a.,

e.

1 1

19 l. a c,,,

se,

= - - - -." - e s ~... = ~-. - w.. a. a. ". a -

^c.'<

's-a--

..e--.

-a I

20 Waste processing was sicw, primitive.

"'here is the 1

o s s i '.4 '.4. v. c# = c o a.ve*..

4..,r: = ' e.x ' s ' n -

.#.4.- a.,

=a".---...,

'-4 r

-)

e.:.g,

- m.h.e usa s...a...s,-

a...". a.. a,

a.. d a.

". a.

~.v.

a....a.a.. i = 'a-23 were used in early waste-processing techniques.

wa. s s a.471 a

C.e..v y e.q. Cv.4

.e. M-.<v.er.

2,..

r

-~r-4 X

7,s.4m.

4 2,

-,w.

9 ~tdef al A fDCrifft, IRC.

2$ 'I 4-o 4,

s e

.=.w gas.o.

a C1'.9 4.

y".)

C.,.

t

~') / O

h., l L00 i

e. v 9 23 i

i 1

i l'

DR. AUER3ACH:

Scme kind of waste facility.

It could' n

1 2

have had -- there was a process that :s ed

-4~

ic acid, and you i

3' uced the ucmbina'icn of nitrate wastes with selvent residues i

i 4,

that might result in an explosien.

One process made use of l

i 5

ammonium nitrate.

Ammonium nitrate, as you knew, is a highly I

6, exple'ive material.

7 We had one sad incident in the United States, you a

remember, in Texas City in 1947.

The Canadians had an incident '

l 9,

at Chalk Riua-i t

10 Or, in a waste f ans, v. cu could have had a radiolv. tic I

11 '

oreduction of hv.drocen with a h'drogen-cxv. gen mixture.

And I

1 12 '

that could produce an explosive ccmbinaticn.

i l

13 l CCMMISSIONER KZNNEDY:

All of these assumotions l

i I

I4 '

relate to vaste =rocessing?

f 15,

COM'CSSIONER AHEAFSE:

Which you had said earlier, 16 the ratio.

17 DR. ACER3ACH:

Okay, new, let's cuce up to the i

1 18 ' cesium-removal mechanism.

19 'l' Next slide.

l l

S. o.

( _0 7 _4 A_e. )

21 To us, there are two plausible mechanisms fer the 22 '

removal of cesium.

Cne is somewher e in the processing it gces 1

I 22 to a high-temperature phase, 2nd cesium becomes volatile at 400 24 degrees centigrade.

And, for scme reascn, the cesium was 3 ;.e.r.i n. m r.rs.inc.

25 3 velatilized and rencved frcm the materials gcing to waste t

I

% /^

l k.

i,

_/ IT

~ /

J.

y 1U f

24 i

l i

l' s crage.

That's one possibility.

2j Another pcssibility was:

About that time, the Russians t

3 !

were very much interested in the relevance of the use of gamma l

1 i

4, isotopes for sterilization of foodstuffs.

The sterilization of i

I I

5' meat an d potatoes.

In at least one instance, there is a 6i Russian publication which talks of using huge quantities of 7;

cesium 137 to make radiation sources for food irradiation.

And 8

se ene might conjecture that they removed lots of cesium and I

9 'l processed it right away to mak e sources for their fcod irradi-10 ant.

11 :

Those are the only twc mechanisms that we can come I

i 12 1 u: with, in a technical sense, to account for the'nc enance I

1 I

13 i of cesium.

1 I

I 14 COMMISSIONER AEIA?5E:

Ecw about the ratics, though t

15 cf what you're talking about?

16,

DR. AUERSACE:

That's the cniv. way we can exc. lain the I

17 l ratics.

r la j CO.vMISSIONER AHEL h :

ven putting asife the cesium, i

i 11 you nad pcinred on: that it wculd certainly preclude --

20 '!

DR. AEER3ACH:

Lcng-lived wastes.

But no: sh c r:-

t 21 lived wastes.

Wastes a year cr two cid.

22 1 CCMM'SSICNER AHEAPSE:

It's a shcrt-lived waste.

And 231 then, with the cesium removed --

i 24

32. ACE R3ACH:

It would acccunt for the pattern of

..s.eerei aeoen m.inc.

25 distribution.

Mcw, that, of course, also tends to preclude a h3

.oi i

t i

l' reactor-type incident where you have fissicn materials spewed 2

cut.

Then ycr. get the strontium-cesium.

1 3'

CCM>C SSIC:.;R AEIAFliE:

Sc, in c her words, the only I

4, exo.lanatAcn.vou can think of is some deliberate removal 5

mechanism?

i 6

DR. AUERSACE:

Of the cesium, cr a process that vola-

.4,.aa

- -- a

~~ - d handlad d'-

d~

7,

-~~~~~- -

a*

m-eac~i-~ and 4"s*- -am~evad

=-

J-

-~

3 s e'e arate ly.

9 CC.vMISS!CNER AEIAP2TE :

When vcu sav "a e'cccess.," v.cu 10 don't mean in the midst of an accident?

11 'l DR. AUE.03 ACE :

No.

i 12 !

COMMISSICNER AEEA? LIE:

Again, it would be a deliber-1

(

13 ate removal.

14 DR. ACER3 ACE:

Celiberate removal.

i I

15 1 CC.v24ISSICNER KENNEDY :

With some kind of acciden:

'l 1

i i

C..,.., a.: a... u. a,

1C s

......3 av. sac.

..w. a i 1,/.

sR.

-.r n-~.

. a 3

13 '

C o.w... a a~. - v_.2.,

4 r w 7_ - v_.

N.*c

_ %.o.

.,, n. c e a m.

c _: an u,,_a n,

.4

~.....

y.

.i

+1 n.- 2 2, m, n :

a.n n.

u. 4.,.< o.c.

u l,

..2..

y 20 '

CCMMISSICNER.'dIZA. lie :

Secause you'd still have scme 21, cesium.

a 22 CR. ACERSACE:

Next slide.

(

23 l (S lide. )

u 24 T c

"._'m-

--...'"o_4...,

~..h e -. ~...' "...i -.. -

". _' m-. are.,

. 4: <ai secor.es, inc.

].C.,

go. f wo.

4 3.7 '4.4.m. -

.s k g., *.. u. 4 g 3mo..

g _w 4 3 _ _4 7..,

3. 7

%., q,7.b.

k.,_ g Ao o.A.

,..a m y

3 y y h;

[,' i O ~

t

---~s.

e.,

,..w.

~~

-m m-

- ~ _ - -

26; 1;

my ccaments scmewhat, is that, ene, that an exhaustive analysis 21 of the Soviet literature is aarranted.

i 1

1 3'

COMMISS!CNER AHIARNE:

You mean =cre exhaustive than i

4l you've done; is that what you mean?

l 4,

5 DR. ACER3ACH:

More exhaustive than we did f or this 6

paper.

We have since done a more exhaustive analysis of it.

7 Medvedev's conclusions about the source and extent of 3

the centamination ene may be untenable.

The evidence exists 9

for a fair-sized area, greater than 25 square kilcmeters, i

i 10 accidentiv contaminated with high levels of radicactivitv.

3 v.

a "high levels," we mean approximately or greater t' an one milli I 11 '

12 curie per square meter of stronsium-90.

t 13 COMMISSIONZR GILINSKY:

Ecw larc.e an area was he l

4 e

14 talkir; about?

1 15 >

DR. AUIRSACH:

He was talking about thcusands of 16 square miles.

17 The best explanation presently seems to involve ISl accident, although a chrcnic water-bcrne release cannct be I

I

??,

_-.-_?

ng..

.x. -

..u.e

- a_, c _-. - - _i s -. _

.a - __, r_ _:.s,

,-n.

a_,

,a A

aA a

- e e

20 rule cut a nuclear explosive or reacter accident as the scurce.

21 COMMISSICNER AHIAENZ:

_f "chrcnic water-borne 22, release," doyce mean centinual dumping?

I.

23 DR. ACER3 ACE:

That's right.

They had an operating 24 facility there which was continuously releasi.g material.

. s.e.<. A eoc nm. x.,

25 The dcminance Of cerium 144 at the start of one e

A by3

c. i t.

+

27 l l

I aquatic study suggests that fission products were one to two 2

years old when released.

3 The isotopic ratics in the terrestrial studies indi-I 4

cate that r. intervening cesium-removal mechanism was involved.I I

S The ccmbined information suggests that the explana-1 i

i 6

tiens involving release frcm a radicchemical separations high-i 7,

level waste stcrage f acility are presently mesu credible to us,

i 3

Just one last slide would ce more informative.

9

( S lide. )

10 This is, again, to bring you er remind ycu of the I

11 rations of fission product waste activities to cesium 137.

12 This is just fundamental nuclear physics.

After so many days 13 1 of decav., v.ou see the ratio of strontium to cesium is always one, i

l I

end?2 1.t '

all the way through five years er =cre.

i t

15

'. 6 i 4/

la l l

19 l

a I i

,1

.I I

l

,, l

.3 24 m.cerei mecomn inc.

s I

SC av t

[

~*

3 e

h b I u

I J Js

eo-o

.a.

1,. C

.o8 '

y.,,

., :..n..

i t

-a nte a i

1 ll CCMM SSICNES-GII,INSKY :

Whv would thev. want to take 4

, l

.w

.a.,y 4.,. o.ge

_. coss.o

. e e s.4....

e e

I 3

DR. ACER3ACH:

There is no explanation, sir, other e

.t!

than the one that they wanted to use or create large-scale i

i I

5 cesium irraciators for grain.

That would be the only reason 6

to take them cut, unless you had sc=e other kind of storage,

e. >

cu.w...y g g -n 4.r..e.

e e - e.nce

.ha...".e" 4a

-r.,. 7v. r.., v..

.w

.w a.

.a i

24a. e...o g 4.,. - on

~..".a'.

A.a..-'.

Was

he.-a. = c - c.

a...'.

.a e vo_

3 9,,

- u. a _-...-wg a e

,3. a...

... 2.. <.m,.o v.nv...

.r

~

u.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Is there any evidence that l

11 j

.go_ e waa-cus

^#

"..". a '.

.. g _ am c.. _". e s....

4 ".. '.

I v.

e.

I 1

12 i COMM SSICNER AHEARNE:

You said that in your answer, i

f i

13 I

.ou said, to this caper.

Then.v.ou went on and mentioned that v

l i

i l

1.1 vou have done a =cre extensive sort of analvsis.

i t

i 1.4 mC ; C t.,.

..a Ve a..y

.. a _4.: _. 2._4o..s yCn..-..

.1 n o _4

.. s w

3

.v w

i a,

'l 16 i.w.a s e c'

..x. a...c.- a_

e x. e..a _4 + Lo 2... - j,.

4.

I 1i

.q.

.q..r q.. c.u...

c.

..w. y

.-...4

=

-w v

..o

...e y

.o-;

e 13 I a

o_. _4.. - ~,,.. 4., c.o a

.w,.

.o y,. s

.2 ma 4..

_42e...

_4..

. o_ a.,.

., s

.m

.i't 19 '

3 w..

_. a_ c _4 20 l

~~

s -.w_. _.e.c - m,...".2.:.

T.r.'"<. r. ". -

v. -..-. a r _.- < = d.e.

".e._s.

o a-

1 44.w..o.

.,.e o.

c e s _= r e.=. _- ~., ~ _'..v ^. < a s ce a.-.

.= ~..

,d a.... = _'

a

-c 2:

".,c.-.. e.- a _' a_ a s a_.

2, ". v u' '.. =... -

.-"'.4..~3

,,t'..

..".e w =. e _ ". c.-.a, 4

2

,s 23 '

release?

21

.e :-. M L....: :o' c.a.

c.

w e Esdef at AfDC?ters, Inc.

I

- W 23 1

[ w'*.V.V.. c c'"

g. ra

.%r.... ':.'" V..

.n.,. _

a,_4." " c,_.". e,

. b. _4..X'.

.w

..-p

... o.

-. ;w

,l r

?

k--

[,

wl l

t

,+

.)

te ;

29 l

1; release is much = ora credible?

H 2f DR. ACERSACH:

I think what I'm really saying, what 3

I'm really trying to say, Ccmmissioner, is that all the evidence-4 sugcests that here was a major nuclear facility and runninc.

i i

5 under some head of steam.

It is not inconceivable that ~hev l

6' were both chronically contaminated --They may have had one

,4

'i accident, they may have had two accidents.

We don't know.

But 3

it would suggest that they contaminated a large area.

9 CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Whv. do vou sav two?

i 10 '

DR. ACEREACH-Why do I say two?

i l

II COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Maybe it would be three?

i 12

.n a v " e

.# ^"w-'.

i

=

w.

i

!e I3 I DR. ACER3AC.4:

We have no way of arrivinc. at that.

i We 1CCk at these mixed rePCrts.

We Can identify, at leaOt We is '

.X,.. _,

.,*v,.s.e...

.S.

.. a ea

.u

..,e

.da.e a e

.. A

.w..

I6 w,.v... g c.?

.vr.q e*n..r.n.p er..

N. Cw,. b. a o 4s

b. 4 -s

a. a.7 1 v p

~^ y 4

.4.

a w

t 17 j.,. 4 c., a,

.s 2 * '.'.. e

". O C e s.'."",.=.". d v ^ ", *ae.". '. 4 C P.

"..". a * " ". a ". a *f "y e a m

"~

a.

w.

u w

+

l a l._

...,e

_ee..

a. __=._e

.__,.--..c.c3.wa

.==s.

iw-..- "es.

t w

f i

1R l Y

a w w.n u.,. c.- a... n,f a.~..,..e C.u.,. 4 l

n

.C.~.3.4 n

3. u. a.. u..,..

Aa a

a u..

.~.

,,, a-ww w-w

.m w

w

.w

=

AT'r* Qn* u*.U.

nao....4..;

.%.,....e

%...,./ m.

.C.. WaA.

4 9

AR.

w e w

21

_4..

-y..

e 4ed w.:

. 4...e.

w w..s.4 s....

.4... a..

o.

-3,

...-. --.rw.

f

.w a9

..v,"..'..-

..". a. w c "w.'d

i

. C.uv..' D' S '. V' '.IT.R

.'.T.re'b%"h..-

's k.e.-a.

r 1

t b

'ead vcu.

"e.'..'ava.,

.-w=.".

'2' - "m

.=..s w e.-

"w..a ". e. o... o., =.. q" w

w w

na 4-

.n Ao

.u.a. - a, s.4,..i

.a..' a a s e. 4 - 4.....c

~. 8 n.u..,. 4 o.,. u. n.-

vn,,

v C,4 n.:

w w

~

3 5ederal A eCX.,riffl. I nc. -

SC

.m wg 3..

a w.4 A p *. ". "..C."".

v."

'es3.'.'< *.' v, '.

.. 4

k.....C.,

. k.g..,

b..,,7 m,

,A 6-i

^

~

,y.

r~

{

r

/

"I L I b.',s n

i s

I

.a.

30,

j 1

i l

DR. ACER3ACH:

I would be technically unable o do i

t 6

2

..w. 3 *..

3>

C e.v%1.S S v r v.=.-.. an'.u._an.e. v.

e.. n w,

.sie A./e A_e,,

n,.

u. a..,

u. a A.

~-

o v,

4 drawn the conclusion that the Soviet emphasis upcn radiation 5

protection, et cetera, was a result of this?

6 DR. AUERSACH:

That's right.

y 7h C C.v_NII S S I O N E R A*i E A R N E :

And that pricr to that 8

DR. AUEREACH:

There was very little, cr, as he puts 9

it, the radiation geneticists and radiation biologis s had no i

10 '

influence with the Khrushchev government because of _ysenko, Il and they were unsble to convince them.

The physicists were 12 the truly elitist groups in the Soviet Union in getting what 13 -

thev. saw as problems arisinc. and ce ttinc.. them under control.

7 i

i 14 l This accicent, to use an Americanism, scared the 15 bejabers cut of the rest of them and got the others to see the 16

,, w y..

1' y M,A _ c_ o_ __ C N.--s

.. N!

,t :

.nas there ever been in.his a:

cs ve la 1i _ _4._ e_ _-,.. _- a.

- a _ a e.. n n.

. o.., m a.,.

.-... m,...,.. _,__ _...,.

__c u

J 19 '

3a. n. r.e _e, r =.

v.e.;. a. s.e.

2..

da_s.-

4..

We..a.a.

J nw.

i l

2C 'I

. oxaz.

.n.-

_. n. a_ _-,. __- a_

..... A a. _, _ o-u.

,.. e. a...- a.

n _-

. cxaa

.n..

a...

v v

i 1

2I humans.

I "2

Cn.ADi S c.

.h.--s s n.1 2 4 R.i.

s.s.cw _. want to : n.sn asx:.ng 2

u o

23 '

v.

_.;.. 4 4.

". s o #. ". ' ~. ~

l

.w.e 3 ". e s.. c...

"..".e

~ " e s '. 4.. w a s.-

0_.4 '

^"

3 24 !

.w...e 4

a.1 1. 4 - a.,. C e a - a.... 4 e s.o

..a y a.

A.4 C,o. s s.4c..s. 4. k.

w m

a u...

sJecers R eoor~ers. tnc.

25 [

s -., e c.4. - _... s W.4. u.

w..a.,.,,. A.4 M'. r:w= n w=....

a..,, y _.-..,

g w

,I

/

,)

g s'./ l

[

V

e4

]

31

.i I

l 1

t'.at mav have had seme information is always useful.

2 CCMMISSIONER n'i 7 DE:

Ts always useful.

3 COMMISSICNER 3RAOFCRD:

When you say you haven'

.ock,e A." o.

.4.'..' o

...a +..i o n e.-*. =.4. 4.n g *. o ". " =. c... a... 4.. a *. 4 c.a.,

w.".v.

4 y

5 would that be?

I 6

DR. ACEREACH:

Well, crimarily because our group 7-,

.i s.a. '

q u =.'.'.#.4 a.d 4n t.".a. a. t 't.

We #^c".s

s..*-..'.v c a.

he a,... e....

W e *. ".4.. k

..".a *.

.d '. a.".c u.1 4 " a.

3

a.....'. -. e.. *. a.' - a. c ' o g.d - a s' ev i

s c..e ". o d v,.

~.

a k a. s a

.=..d - =.. ".... o.#

s k.4 '.',

",e-="se

.'. c '. =-

= ~. k v

.< d 9'

i.

~,

10 i v.ou've ot to get -- a good c.ortion of the literature is in v

11 Russian.

You've got to then get it translated, and you've go:

12 to have semebody wic knows Russian also icoking over it, to 13 i make s_ e that the translator is not losing nuances, even as l

I 14 '

much as punctuation at times.

15 And so, it would ta'<e some c.eccle with a medical-3 t

16 b.4c ' ^ c. d

=.' ",a c.k,- ~".d,.=.. d.=.' a c a.'..'. a

.- =...";,cc4.,"- a a.'.=..

y 17 1 " ac.k v. o u.*.d, I

..".4..A',

44 -

- ". a. a.. '

-. a -

' C '.<..'.. g.

a

..o m

m i

t 19 i

--.=..'.'"y 1, o '<. 4..g 3.-

.' <. a s,

4-t..'.'

y,,, L '.- o.

7 C'.4..c, 3,.

-a e

.A a

t I

!? '

C

.v.y

.e.c.a m-R

.=.r~.-m.: m.e m av---.

,,,, 7 A t

4.

w.e -

see.._-

v w

s v 20 !

4.. A 4 a -..,

.# c - a.v..=...y.' a,

w"e ".a.-

.."..'a-

". = d " e a... =

w-I t

71 l

.-.4.."..'..;

4.".r.'.. 3 4..~.o ke *a e.-

w.-

.=.~..=.d..".c.-.a.

.- o..' a..= a e '.

~

9 eu.

.::Av...au.

u..w. 4.

=~

-.7 C,

4.

w

s.

4,, L,., a.

., e w.

4.

r..

o 93 '. 3.', e, 3 3 3.... 4

" c.a C "w.' # g e

.'.,.^ =~a'.=-*..=.#..

4.*.

.=...". e.- W a V

~

I y.u. a.

u.a.,.

. o v...e

u. 4nn. nog Lana. n' a,.a.

.3 3.4 a 4 as_a_C.

n,.

O.

nn 3

y e.5sceral Aeoor ers. Inc.

2$

. h. e

.h...

3 m e m L,.7.m.

4 n.

ywy

.v t

)!

f[

a 4

f

... _. ~

. e.*

77 I i

t a

e I

1 4C w, " h e a.'.' e " a '..iC.".s

..b. a *.

'..".e.* *. w e." a.

k. "w C. e " "".. ~" *.." s

,' of casualties.

...il l

l o.v.v. a. ** n e r..o. n.c..rd.o vr.

m. u.a. 8 s.v.e..o A a.,<.

A.

c a

v 4

w s.

4 j

I

^L r..a n c.u..

m.ha e s.v.e d,/e A.a...

An h o,.

v

..Ac..

n.e s

.t DR.

n v

i 5

Information materials talk a little about that as well.

If

, aw-4

.das so,

4. wo 1.,..,. a "e

,.-e.s m.a".' v an.'...o c. ~..=... s e. o."

6 4.,.

7 scienti,ic : acts :cr people to know a.cout.

C *e.v.v..' S n- ' n "4 o.

n'.u..ra'.o v. e -

7 n..-" '.. g ~ o d. o

..h e a.. =.' v. 2.i

.r.

- s 3

w..

9 of the waste theories, have you discussed with the United States, 10 the Enera.v.

eccle, the Department pecple that handle waste e

11 disposal?

i 12,'

DR. ACER3AC'J :

Yes, we have consulted with waste 13

c. eoc. le, technical pecple, in our own laboratorv, and we've also,

i i

1 i

1.t,

had the benefit of input from waste management people An a

i. 5

....we c.

h. o ne

..ajo.,.

ac.43., 4.es.

ne

,., C..

u..,.,..: n a,.

L w.v v. D w

e. c..=..n. n.=.= n~.,v r.

=...

I6 4

e.

vv

~..

w.

a w.4 A. %.e

. ww e

V*r

.i, w.s, 4

9 "s.-.

..44.

.O n. r 2 e * "* u..

1 *s

c. 3 w.

~n w.

i

,3 l u.a, 2

..w A,

3 a.I.s.o..,. a.w. R.4...

4, i

m

,i 1

19 C^..vM'..<.-^N..ra" n'.~c.Tn'.:."< r.-

.' s.4. a

.# a.'.

w~ ~.~.^...a.',..-

". a.,

~

i a w 4. 4

...,.j,w,,

e, g. 4.o.g 4,,,.

4,. =

w g.u,

4A w

' ' ^ ' ' '

a.' s v^

4g 4..

...a. ;. Va.

.a.4 a.. s s. e A w4a

.d.4 w

.n e,,,

w.

i

's

n.. ACr.ec.n=Cu..

- o...ava A4 s w-.

a o. A W

a

... o.

...e C..a 4.o....s a.. d w

.w w

... e..., 4.# "..

"d.i '...b.

s.

..o

.w 4

...o,.

ko.v,er 1o 3.

. ". e s *,..'. a ~ s.

.w

'~

y.

j

-.l r-

. g e.7,

.w, L w~.. v.

D.c. c e.w..>.

..y -

v.

n.=. rn.

.3 4*

av v

w g

s J eCet at R toor'tr1, it%C.

1.C

., m e

.w4.

4.m.. m.

.,. i...<. 3 43

.m. n.

mAay., g y. m, w w g...)

... s w.

.ww e

)

G.i t

/. I e

,s

-l 9

9

.3

a 3,,

_a_

6 i

l 1l DR. AUEREACE:

No, to some.

I don't know about all.

.o '. i CC.'01ISSIONER GILINSKY:

Of course, it's been published.

1 3 li DR. AUERSACE:

In " Nuclear Safety," which is, of i,

l course, reviewed also internally by your staff and by the DOE 4j I

i 5

u..a.:.

l 6

CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I should have mentioned at 7-the outset that Dr. Auerbach is the director of the Environmental 3

Sciences Division at Oak Ridge.

a 9,

Anything else?

d 10 (No response.)

f 11 -

CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Thank.v.ou for a verv.

i 4

1 i

12 6 interesting presentation.

13,

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Is,the secretary here?

Or i

i 1

14,

c. e r h a o. s, Victor or John Hoyle?

I had rec.uested at the time I

15,

when this came un that we also receive information from the 16 j intel.igence agencies en this.

Has this also been set up?

1 ','.

.N P.. Cu' A.-

W '.. a_

.e-,... ". = -

n'...b.

~

..y f

1 8 !

..i....e w e w e _- a.

.". a ".... c.-_4 _# _# _' c "._'.v, e..4 n3- "c ".

"_4=__#_4..ca-u'. c.

d

=

r i

17

_=.

w.e a =. e

~__4.e.

?..

A_ _4s e-2 s _ r.. w _" * ".

..k. a C.....4 s a _'.=.. a,

..".a.

20

~..=4 c _.4 "; ^ #.

..".e v^ ^ _~.._i s s.i.. 4.. d.i.=. a_ d.. ". =...hev wa...a. d

.a.

_d e # _'.. 3

,1 v._.k,,.:.

z.

2 w,. 4

._2 _:4 g

,a-u e _4 n = a e.,..

e t,

b d'*.Lr.u.P-

?A W O. M.UTt' c ts7 7 4.7 o_.

r.m.k.a.n.8'.

et

=

99

,,-n..

.a 3D-s...

j-44 a..

s w,......, c. _4,.,

u. _

,2 e

,, w.

r. _ _,.4 _c -.y

.9 3 C n..uv...e m.r.

e a.

eu 42

. a_ a.__4.,. n

. c _,.r.

3 2-E ederal A SCOrTer$. Inc.

-3 25 (Whereur. en, at 10:40 p.m.,

the meeting was ad,ourned.'

85

.6

, c.

,l

.a - $ l

206 Operating a

xperiences yg a u M<d.

M Edited by William R. Casto Another Perspective of the 1958 Soviet Nuclear Accident By J. R. Trabalka,* L. D. Eyman,' F. L. Parker,' E. G. Struxnes,' S. l. Auerbach

Abstract: The occurrence of a maior Sortet nuclear accident milit 3ry ntsclear waste during the winter of in volvung stored. reprocessed. long.;ivedfission sast:s has been 19S7-1958. They both belie ve, on the basis of reported by former Sorter cratens. Z. 4..tfedvedev, wrtnngin information supplitd to them from a v3riety of the popular sc:ence mata:ine New Sclentist, bel:eved that the accident resulted in s:gerificant loss oflife and required the s ucces, th t the accident resulted m. a signutcant loss permanc tr tsacua::can of the cmlian population from 2 !arge of life (hundreds of people) and required the area (several thousa,a square mdes). Althoudt.tfed>eder perToanent evacuation of the ci\\ilian population from 1 appears to ita,e reached untenable conclusions about the exact large area, ortg n and extent of:he contamutatedat:2. It dxs appear that a credible case can be n:ade for an accidental airbor se rele:s.

Extensively edited and unevaluated information ofjitsion aastes ut the ge'reralgeographiclocanon he suggested. released from the files af the U. S. Cential Intelligence /n view of t/ie g'owust importance of nuc! car powr as a world Agency (CIA) to a citizens' group ridicated the s encre source. an exhausnve rrncal review of the Soncr literature is warranted to resolve doubts abour the exact nature presence of military nuclear facilities near th0 city of

k. h (F.ig.1 ).

Althougn. the acciden t has been as and consequetces, indeed even the occurrence, of the posadared acc: dent designited in various reports " as the "Ky shtym Disaster." the choice of the name appears to be Retrospeenve accounts by former Sov:et c:tizens -4 asscciated with the largest city near the acc: den: site. have indicated the presence of an extensne, unm. The actual facilities reported were located northeast of habited area centammated by radicact:ve rnatenals in Kyshtym.5 The c:ty of Kasii may be 2 more suitab:e Che!iabmsk Province un the Crai Mountains) of th<. reference point for the actual :ocat:en (Techa. Sung.n USSR. Two independent sources (Medvedev'.2.* 2nd of the nuclear fac:hties desenbed in the CIA docu. 3 L Tumerman ) have md:cated that the h:ghly radio _ ments. These fac ht:es were located among many lar;e active restricted area, wh:en !!es between the c: ties of !akes in the upper Techa River drainap The Techa Chehabmsk and Sverdlouk, w2.s established after an River ;tse!f reported!y has been contarancted w:th 5 cplosica at a storap site for longdived hign4evel radicactivity throughout its course The CIA docu-m en ts' mdicate the occurrence of a nuc! ear re!ated

l. R..cacaika and L D. Eyman ne Research Staff ine: dent (or incidents) and subsequent hrgh 'evel radio.

members :n the Ennronmenat Se:ences Dinsion at Oak R:d;- actne cent:minatien in this area between 1956 and Na tional L2 bora tory, F. L Parker is a professor :n the 1961, must procaciy during me w:nter of 1957-1953. Ennronmenr21 and Waer Resources Enrneenn; De;rniment No cause was c!earfy ident:iled; the pos3;bdit es at W nderbdt t 'niversit y. E G. Sttmess :s an a ssoc:a te direwr of ne Enntenmenal Sc:ences Dmsron 2t Oak R.d;e sunested were either an e~plosion in a h:;hJev:!. waste %tional Laboratory. 2 id S. l. Auerbach :s the Direc:ar of :he 5"E 3f'3 Of M *

E" #

d' ' M'2f Enntenmen:21 5,iences Ct men u Qik R:J;c % tional weapons test. The scope of the acc: dent. in human Libornory. terms, was not well.dciined but appeared to :nvolve NUCt.5 A A SM E TY. Vos co '.o

2. varen Aord 1979

',;}O E.,.1 /"gV JUi

J CPER ATING EXPERIENCES 2o7 ) 6:* 2nd Tumerman's subsecuent account, Medvedev con. I p cluded that the accident actually cecured in an area { Fetw ten the large Ural cities of Che!iabinsk and Sverclovsk 4 Sverdlovsk, east of Kyshtym.* We have no reason to dcubt either the veracity or sincerity of the reports m:de by these former Sonet citizens. However, we me.na-unw cenc;aded that addition:1 objective information might ? A ? be a:eded for a se:entific evaluation of the incident. 3 -, ~(J [ The nrst (and most comprehensive) reports are V '( kg o g go_ M' un s.en r ) a t tnbutable to Medvedev,"2 an internationally 1 oso 3 ou ury.ech e '*o O rec snized geneticist now living in Lorm aming a w sntvr m W 0 s 3 recent visit to Oak Ridge Naticnal Laboratory, he 2 retterated h:s daim that the location, year of < ano.in. Arg,,.sn / occurrence, areal extent, and even the type cf nuclear a 73 3a I i j accident could be conGrmed within reasonable limits Coam u by a entical ana]ysis of the extensive USSR radio-ecology !iterature based on studies of the contaminated area (over 100 pubi; cations). vnaurwna. 82 MEDVEDEV'S CASE Fig.1 Geograph : region in which rnajor Soviet nuclear Medvedev's centention was Orst published in an acciden t reportedly occurred. , radroad; road or (where named) rivert - , boundary between article in the popular sc ence magazine New Scientist.2 i Sverdlovsk and Cheliabinsk provinces. Response to this artide tas b.en mixed and in some cases highly critical.a,' A careful examination of Medvedev's artide provides some support for the some less of life (magnitude undetermined), evacua-reported negative respnses. For example,in onc lins tien of the civilian population from a large area, and of reasoning, he suggested that 1 y 10' Ci of "Sr wr.s establishment of a restricted, radiation contamination present in the watershed of one large contaminated zone near the Kas!i site.8 lake.2,t If t is assumed th:t the watershed area is one The CIA documents appear to corroborate some or two orders of magnitude larger than that of the lake important aspects of the condusions drawn by former itself (10 to 20 km ), de enginal 'evel of surface 2 Soviet citizens. However, any objective observer must contamin tien is calculated to be approximately I to also conclude that there are significant inconsistent t0 Cilm This ccncentration is 103 to 10' peater ele :ents present in these two separate sets ofinforma-than evels reported in terrestrial uudies (~1 mci /m ) 2 tion. For examole, two CIA reports, based on inter-in the same area. Yet Medvedev ccnduded that runoff views con f ucted in November 1961, are questicnable and etcsien from the ter.estrial :cne was respensib!e in terms of their re!ationship to te Kash incident (our for the activity present in Se 'ake. If one assumes dat nemenclature). Intemal inconsistenc:es about dates in the activity reported to be ut the !ake's watershed :s de two reports, coupled with de locatica of r eged correct and that.all te "Sr anginated from Sssion in radioactive fallout (130 km scuth of Kasli), r.ise piutenium production reactors,2:s would correspond serious doubts about their validity or Wat er refer to to a reactor operating history of 10 to 10 MW(t)/ 8 6 the same event. A disturbing feature of both :ets of year in order to generate the "Sr waste inventcry informat:en, ro m We CIA and from te Soviet required.' This is dearly inconsistent with Me kncwn citizens) is the notab:e abrence of eider 'irst-or accumulated.ustory of reactor operation / d y,peslin 2 second. hand accounts of the incident itse!f or cen-the entire world dunng 1957 2nd 1953. Fureer, e Grmed authentative nfermation related to its after-total act:vity of "Sr wastes m terage at Hanford (the math. The absence of Srst. hand informat:en oriz:nally primary U. S. production site fcr weapons-y2de piu- !ed Medvedev to conclude in his criginal repert' ' hat tenium) in 1973 was 1.27 x 10' Ci'-:ess than tr.e ace: dent occurred near the etty of 3!agoveshensk Medvedev's estimated I x 10' Ci afte a much :enger (over 300 km west cf Kasli). From his literature search time. wet.En snETv. vos. :o. No. 2. varen-era tm ij _ ! b i.i Y d

208 CPERATING EXPERIENCES Both terrestrial and freshwater studies reviewed by activity was probably associated with the same genual Medvedev indicate that Cs was a minor consutue..t a re a. in the contaminated zone. For example, in %e The major thrust of Medvedev's argument is that terrestnal studies, concentrations of "Sr reportedly certain radioecciogy studies were conducted in areas 2 3 'Cs far larger and more heavily contaminated than ene rarged from 0.2 mci to 3.4 mci /m, anu 2 concentrations rangec from 4 uCi to 7 pC /m would expect te have been set out for purely ex-Further, in another aquatic radioecology study dis. perimentai purposes. For example, two con.aminated cussed (that conducted by Rovmsici), there is no

akes were reported to be 4.5 and 11.3 km in area;3 0 2

evidence that '3'Cs contributed signiScantly to the another con aminated lake was estimated by Medvedev total initial activity. Cerium-144 was the dominant to be 10 to 20 km in extent. In addition, at least 21

sotope (' *

Cel"Sr activity== 10 : 1); ' " Ru and deer were collected from a contaminated terres: rial site "Sr appeared to account for the remainder estimated to be at least 260 km2 in area.2 The areal

('" Ru!"Sr activity n 1 !). 'Ihe conspicuously low estimates were based on the carrying capacity of the levels or absence of 3 "Cs in there studies, coupled system in relation to the size of the samp:e collected. with the observed tevels of '"Ce and '"Ra, arzues We should point out here that we believe $at the ~ strorgly agamst an accident resulting in release of assurnptions Medvedev used to estimate the size of mater:als from a long. lived-waste burial facility-the study areas appear to be valid. Our own calculations of case so Srmly maintained by Medvedev. the areas required to support the fish populations and the deer herd are in reasonable agreement with his. Howevec, we recognize that if the total populanons CISCUSSION were removed, rather than a subsample, these es:ima:cs wuld be inrclid Thus +e actual size of the con-Crit:cisms leveled at the interpretation of both the taminated areas might be much smater (order of scale and type of accident may appear to be warrmted maznitude) than previously stated. Another estimate of by the evidence presented by Medvedev himseh. The the contaminated terrestrial area.2 based on the migra endence in Soviet radioeco:ogy publicat: ens alonc tion-rate of rodents during a lifetime, is not well-indicates a mo:e complex case than that suggested by founded and was not considered fur:her. A reaso. table any observer (including critics) thus far. The incon-estimate of the total minimum area required in the sistencies in Medvedev's argument might have led some cited studies is well in excess of 25 km2 under the to doubt even the existence of a nuclear accideat. most conservative assumptions. This area is far greater However, one m ust recognize the likelihood $at in size than an'y known radioecology study area Medvedev encountered difficulties in interpreting infor. established by deliberate design. mction about an actual nuclear accident because :te is a Genetics studies conducted on the contaminated geneticist attempting to d:aw conclusions in areas in area indicate that the levels of "Sr were approaching which has not been formally tramed, i.e.. radio-radictoxic levels (as indicated by significant increases g] ecology and nuc! ear technology. Thus it wou:d se-- m enromosome aberations 2nd other zenetic effec:s ). y prudent rirst to perfcrm an objective analysis of the yet much of the rese.ach effort reviewed t v Medvedev 7Q informaticn he presented, w:th no pnor judgments has been on studies of radionucade transport in $e j being made about either the :ype or the scale of 2 assoc:ated ecos:. stem. Biological studies involvm g potential nuclear ace: dent ur an altema:ive source of a radiatoxicity and radionuclide transport are ge n. radtoactive contammanon. erally considered to be mutually excmsive because An independent source, L Tumerman.2 repor:ed r adicto:cc:ty confounds inves:igations of radio-1 en:cunter'ng a zone of radioactive con tartunation nuc!ide cyc!ing. The reported levels of "Sr con-ex:ending along 20 :o 30 km of the..:ghway between tamination (~1 mci /m ) are many orders er magni- -j Cheliabinsk and Sverdlovsk in 1960. The zene was tude above hese required for analytical purposes T encountered nor$ east of Kyd:ym, approx:ma:Hy (fallout background < 1 x 10-* mci /m through 100 km south of Sverdlovsk. Tumerman, former head 1972)3 and would be considered high (by the of the Biophysics Laboratory at de Institute of authors) for anything bu: radiation effects 2:adies. The j 3 Molecular Biology in Moscow, would cer:2 inly appear pa' tem of "Sr contam: nation in 2 ICO-m p;ct from to be a credible scientific observer. The CIA reports, the contaminated terrestrial area (Fig. 2 in Ref. 2) (jp al$ough highly edited, also indicate that some type of appears to be c'most random-hardly mat which cne g abnormal occurrence involv:ng the release of radio-would design for 2 carefu'ly controlled experiment. N*' NUCt.S A A SA mY. Vot ca.No I, Maren-Apr:I 1979 Y w a

CPERATING EXPERIENCES 209 Again, we agree with Stedvedev's conclusion about those already ctred by Medvedev would be required to these pomts. We can also estimate the initial "Sr de6ne preperly the study area. surface concentrations in the two !akes studied by Revinskii by grrphical analysis. The estimated are21 CONCLUSIONS "Sr concentrations are both approximately 0.3 2 2 mci /m (mean depth 1.0 and 1.9 m, W: believe that Stedvedev may have reached respective!y)-far higher than one uould consider untenable conclusicas 1 bout the exact source of the using in research on such large systems with such a radioacave maten21s and the extent of the origmal lengdived, radiatoxic material. We be!ieve that there is centammation zone. From all the ava: lab!e evidence,it sufGeient evidence that these study areas were not appears that a fair!y large area (X5 km-) con-de!!berately con <sminated for research purposes. but taminated with relatively high 'evels of rM ;acavity rather that radieecology studies were designed to take (sl.0 mci /m "Sr reference radionuclide as opposed 2 advantage of a !arge, inadverteatly contaminated area. to < 1 x 10-' mci /m2 from nuc! ear weapcns fallout) a The predous estimate (by Stedvedev ) or 1 x 10' probably exists in Cheliabinsk Province of the USSR m Ci of "Sr in the drainage area of one large con. an area northeast of the city of Kyshtym. D.e total taminated take is much too high for several ressens area of contammation may be significant!y greater than (one reason was cited previously). The onginal estimate indicated; Ste dvedev's literature citations do not of 5 x 10' Ci of "Sr in lake water is perhaps provide mictmation for an accurate estimate of the reasonable, but the activity in biota and sediment may total area invcived. have been only a relatively small multiple (CO) cf this On the basis of the cited radioecology Uta, a total, not 1000 times greater as suggested by waterborne release (i.e., invdving contamination of a Stedvedev. We be!! eve that this assumption resulted river system, a series oflakes/ reservoirs, and associated from a misinterpretation by 5tedvedev of statements Goodplain/ marsh aru) cannet be completely ruled made in the original papers.7a 2 out; however, the occurrence si an accident cannot te If the lake m question had a closed drainage and conclusively demonstrated. For example. cne cou:d the "Sr activity reported in the water represented specu! ate and suggest that the contanunation resulte d only soluble material (no suspended sediment in. from imprudent chronic releases from a large c!uded) under equilibrium conditions, we might obtain chemical separations compiex over a number oi > a total activity 20 times that in the water for the entire However, proponents of this argum wcu'd ha~ Iake ecosystem [i.e.,1 x 10' Ci of "Sr (r(ef.10)]. negate the observations of Tumerman and some at Since the lake described appears to have had an open informatica provided by the CIA. Thus the most dramage,: all, or a signiCcant fracticn, of the credible case does appear to invcive some sort of n 2 radicactinty may have entered from upstream water. acc: dental anborne release. T;"fi bcrne (e.g., r:ver) sources (or, ccnverse;y, from direct The disparity of reported "Sr/ 3 'Cs activity F7 airbome inputs to the lake 2!cne) rather than from its rat:es in terrestnal studies re!ative to :msparateId ['I Q mmediate watershed. Equihbnum condincnr did not Sssien wastes and the Jaminance of "Ce ntavity at appear to ex:st in 2ny event 2 d 2 Thus the total the start cf one aquatic study suggest '!) hat an uinty m the 'ake and its own "stershed may have intervenmg mechamsm for ' 2'Cs removal s.25 present N een much 'ess than 1 x 10' C1. D.e pe2t dispanty and C) that 'eng-lised wastes (aged >! car; sere net retween the "Sr concentrat: ens in other terrestnal prommen t!y involve d. The absence d *.crt hved areas subjected to study and the surface ccccentration Sssion products a radioecolegs studies suggests that 2 app!!ed to this lake (and its watershed) are *Hminated events invclvmg nuc! ear explosives (weacons test. under this set of conditicns. weapons acciden t, cnstructicn accid:nt Helvmg Nte dvedev suggests that the nature of the piant 2nd nuclear explenve. etc.) er reaetcr acaden:s as tne e!e ~, 2mmal species described in resear:n papers.ndicates sourca of he decantanananen are act resent, urf 3 the approximate ;eegraphical 'ccauca ef 'ne cen. cred:bie un:ess data adecnen and ana: pts sere a tammat:en cone Cne reference apparent!y ;pec-Ses dela)ed :or a pened of time. the Cheliabmsk reg:er 25 the source af bier 2 abrained However, 2 number of cses can be postulated tar research purposes. We wcu!d spee that, p,en wherein the vennng mechanism :s not reCeced :n the i enough micrmancn. th:s techaque of bicgeography re ueng centaminat:en produced. These wou!d in. f wcu d be usefut however, addmenai sources tei one elude (1) acc: dental detonanon ci a smail nuclear

M Nuc:.saa susm u 20. w :. ve scr i 'sts

\\4 7

210 CPER ATING EXPERIENCES device (either a weapon or construct:0n dedce) near a

3. W. E. Far ell, EvSonet Sdentnt, Now in Israel, Tells of radiocremtcal separations or waste storage factitty,(2)

Na,;! ear Dmster,New York Timer. Dec. 9,1976, p. 3. conventional explosion followmg a nuclear cr'tieahty

4. Evidencc on the Urati incident Aew Sci., 72(1032): 69.

fDec. :3/30,1976 L eithcr in a radiochemical separations plant or m a waste

5. utter (with enclosures) from G. F. W.tson, U. S. Centra' storage tank, (3) expresion following igmtton of highly Inteilgence Ageni.y, to R. B. Pollock. Ciann's Slovement flanvnable solvents used in some radtochemical for Lie and Eftic:ent Energy, Nov. 11, 1977;

Subject:

sePrations, (4) detonation of certain rutrate wastes in Informanon Relat::1g to a Nuc! car Disaster AJ'eged to Have a LJiochemical separations facthty or hir.h. level. waste occurred in the Ural stountains in the Sonet 'lruon in 1958. storage tanx, and (5) venting of a high level. waste

6. P. Stubbs, The Twenty Year Secret New Sci. 74: 363 storage tank by an exp,losion resulting frorn either fNor.10.1977).

steam pressure buildup or igrution of radiolytic

7. A.

L II'y e n ko, Concentnuon of Srronnum-90 and hydrogen. The range of possible explanations for the Cacaum-l37 by Freshwater Fides. Probi. Ichthyol (now contamination zene in Cheliabinsk Province appears to

1. lchthyol) lngL Transi.), 10: 360-862 (1970).

8. B'ireau f Radi i gical He Ith and the Training Institute, be potentia'ly much broader than the explarqtions Radiolor:ca! #calth Handbook Report PB-121?S4(Rev.),

sugpsted by Medvedev or his cntics. U. S. Department of Health, Educanon, and Welfare, NTIS. The implications of 2 catastrophic release frorn a 1970. nuc! ear waste storage fact!!ty are obvious. We believe

9. National Academy of Sciences. R&J,'oacnce W.:stes at che that 2n exhaustive entical analysts of the Sovie t

1. "l#'d #""#^ " A I'#* ### ##"l'* N AS' #d5h'";'

ton, D. C. 1973. literature associated with both nuclear technology and

10. F. Ya. Rounskii, afethod for Calculaung the Radioactive radioecology is warranted in order to resolve doubts impurity concentra non in the Water and the Bottom about the exact nature and consequences,indeed even byer of Sugnant Reservoirs, Sor. A r. Energy (Engl.

the occurrence, cf the postulated accident. Trans!.), ISl4): 480 885 (Apnt 1965).

11. Uruted Nations Sc;enufic Cornrnittee on the Effects of Atomic Radi1uon,laniw g Rad: anon: Levels and Effects, REFERENCE,9 rot /. Levels, Table 26,, 36, Urated N:tions New,ork, 1972.

1. Z. A. Stedvedev, Two Decades of Dissidence. New Sci.

12. A. I. II'yenko, Some I~.:2tures of Caeuum-137 Concen-72fl025): 264-26 / (Nov. 4.1976).

tration in Fish Popula:.ans in a Body of Fresh Water, 2.Z. A. ifedsedev. Facts Behind the Sonet Nuclear Disaster, ProbL /chthyol (now.i. IchthyoL) (Engl. Transl.), 12: New Sci. 74(105c): 761764 (June 30,1977). 149-153 (1972). Outages at Light-Water-Reactor Power Plants: A Review of 1973-1977 Experience By R. l Sco tt

Abstner. ne resuits of a revtew of ourne ex;;enence at This artic!e examines Se outage.penence of ;i;nt.

nuc! ear mer plantr lor :he ;eviod 11~3-1 ??7 are give r. water reactor nuclear p'wer plants for t!.e years 1F3 Sper:lic2ily. the outages erpertenced were examused to deter-mme :au:es. frequenc:es. nme, etc.. to ree if tre'sJs aree s te m n way n caniered to errJewr or n'rer ns:ght: :ould he otrautel. De Jara reviewed be the time accumulated when the pnerator was co, ee: resent 210 reactor.yc2rr of expe-ence-13'". of the coral on Une. i.e., when n 1 electric:!y was or 3duc:d. accumulacon en :he Les:c1 States ar : Ire end of !9'? Tlurtee t The data on t' outa2:s were oot.med : rom ehe tottes and :uo ;? pres presc*tt :he Jara, and a mmmarr eyes penClic ope'3 ting epor s of the anhudual po.s the m portant ledact: ens. lants and/or fro:'. data reported by the Lcen*'e for the N u c! ear Regula t ory Ca mm a to n 's S P C1 'R. L Scott is a staff member af the Nuclear Safety monthly publication Opemig l.'mts Stas.wport;. ' Informanen Center at Oas: Ridge Nanonal Laboratory. The annu1! comp!!at;cns 3f outage expenenec :nd NUCU*AR SAFE'Y, Vos 20, No 2, Wrch Aprd 1979 l'1p.C M .s p j i,il : - r~ \\ ' I *! b bd bd%. bjdhh}) hI IO

I { INFORMATION SOURCES 1. ACCOUNTS BY FORMER SOVIET CI"'IZENS 2. CIA RELEASES TO PUBLIC 3. SOVIET SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS i i k_ V s IN CO LI.

O I i SEQUE!JCE OF EVCtJTS 1. f4EDVEDEV AltTICLE OtJ SOVIET DISSIDEt1CE (11/76) 2. "SCIHt1CE FICTION" RESPOtJSE 13Y SIR JOllt3 IIILL (UKAEA) 3. TUMEllMAN REPORT (12/76) l 4. !!EDVEDEV ARTICLE Oil "NGCLERR DISASTER" (6/77) 5. f4EDVEDEV VISITS OutiL (10/77) 6. CIA RELPASE TO U.S. CITIZEtJS GROUP (11/77) _n Ul \\~ J r ';. 3

c..

0 e H H M t,n o o o o o o 9 o o o o 's o o tw C3 4 M to 4 (%

J o

o o o >+ H H ,-e H ,#9

-31 idl

l l CIIELIABINSK PROVINCE POPULATION DENSITY / arf 7A 2 2 km YEAR POPULATION km 4 1959 3 MILLIOt1 34 8.8 x 10 1970 TN 3.9 MILLIOt1 36 1.1 x 105 1966 LAND UNDEll CULTIVATION - 32 PERCENT 1966 PRIllCIPAL CROPS :GP AIN, FODDER - 97 PERCENT W U Ex. CD % s'

CLIMATE SVERDLOVSK CIIELI ABINSK TEMPERATURE i MEAN ANilUAL 1.2 C (34 F) 1.5 C (42P) MEAN JANUARY -17 C (4.5 F) -16 C (2.5P) MEAN JULY 17 C (63P) 18 C (65 F) PRECIPITATION (mm) MEAT 1 Atit1UAL 400-500 ~400 SNOW COVEll 500-600 ~500 PERIOD (days) PitOST FltEE 115 118 SNOW COVElt 166 155 ICE COVElt 159 (ISET R.) 159 MIASS R.) <n L/ I C' ~O

SOVIE7 RADIOECOLOGY STtIDY SITES IlEPORTED DO NOT APPEAR TO IIAVE HM!'t1 DELIBERATELY CONTAMINATED AREAS TOO LARGE - WATER BODIES (4.5, 11.3, AND + 10- 2 0 SQ. KM S UltPACE ) AND TERRESTRI AL AltEA WilERE 21 DEER WERE COLLECTED. i ACTIVITY LEVELS TOO IIIGli EITIIER FOR FIELD OR WASTE DISPOSAL ItESEAltCII AREAS 90SR UP TO 3.4 MILLICURIE/M2 IN TERRESTRIAL Al(EAS AND 0.2 MICROCURTE/ LITER IN AQUATIC STUDIES. PATTElHJ OF CONTAMINATION IN ONE PLOT (100 M X 100 M) NOT Utll POltM EtJOUGli TO DAVE BEET 1 DELIBEllATELY APPLIED.

p L:

) CD

ISOTOPIC RATIOS REPORTED IN RADIOECOLOGY STUDIES TERRESTRIAL (9-12 years DECAY TIME'3 i 0.6-3.4 millicuries /m2 Sr-90 4.-8. microcuries/m2 Cs-137 j AOUATIC (INITIAL CONDITIONS) Ce-14 4 : S r-9 0 : Ru- '6 Cf 10:1:1. NO INDICATION OF Cs-137 AT TIME .<0 J

3 e

IL'ErlKO'S "Il0T" LAKE - AN ENIGMA 1. STUDIES CONDUCTED Ill 1969-70 (12-13 years DECAY) O.2 microcurle/l Sr-90 0.025 microcurie /l Cs-137 l 2. OPEfl DRAltlAGE: WIDE FLUCTUAT10fl IN RADIDACTIVITY C0flTENT 2 Ifl AREA l 3. LARGE SYSTEM ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 20 km OVER OtlE QUARTER METRIC TON OF PIKE (ES0X LUCIUS) COLLECTED DURING 7 months Ill 1970; 3 Iti 10-12 kg CLASS 4. ESTIMATED TO C0tlTAIrl 105 -- 106 Ci 0F Sr-90 (P L- )

e Z M J O>Z M M E M ^ W W W M C - H d W D Z M W W H Z H X Z 3 H t.n U W < E W C v 3 E W Z tn t.n t.n W W H M W H >-- 0 Z W 2" < (n > W U LLJ % W >< C O LL. > H H O - M J w M n O Z < Z U C., a U W M in 3 W < cr = a e O W f.n W O J J W H % >= tM CD D < C H O $C CE > W H Z H y Z J 1 .::. M - W X < W Z U u W J d LA. E H C 1 H J I-O >. >- Z -I Z _J W Z O U C Z > O - C E C O R <= v H = = M c W W J U Z D O Z U < 40 0 C W ' ) Q '- ,i,,> A. p -b.$ 5 ~ mm 'm w m-wom- 'w o w wp - - + e n-w oom

D E S S E COR P E ) R C R 0 O 0 FS 4 E ST MS SA ( ! W ? S i AR E liA R CE U EL T MC A U R L1 E 1 l A P T V M O O E I M T T E C R i U l G D O 7 I 3 R l l 1 P T s A E C P Y O T TO I L S I I T 0 A I L D O A V R 1 2 'J ; y b 's I' l i ,f: i

OUR CONCLUSIONS INDICATE THAT AN EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET LITERATilRE IS WARRANTED MEDVEDEV'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOURCE AND EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION ZONE MAY BE UNTENABLE. EVIDENCE EXISTS FOR FAIR-SIZED AREA (?: 25 SQ. KILOMETERS) ACCIDENTIALLY 2 90 CONTAMINATED WITH HIGH LEVELS OF RADI0 ACTIVITY (~-1 MILLICURIE/M SR) IN CHELIABINSK PROVINCE IN THE U.S.S.R. BEST EXPLANATION PRESENTLY SEEMS TO INVOLVE AN ACCIDENT, ALTHOUGH A CHRONIC WATERS 0RNE RELEASE CANNOT BE RULED OUT. DEPORTED IS0 TOPIC RATIOS (IF ACCURATE) RULE OUT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OR REACTOR ACCIDENT AS SOURCE. DOMINANCE OF CERIUM-144 AT START OF CNE AQUATIC STUDY (I44CE:90SR ACTIVITY RATIO -- 10:1) SUGGESTS THAT FISSION PRODUCTS WERE l-2 YEARS OLD WHEN RELEASED. ISOTOPIC RATIOS IN TERRESTRIAL STUDIES (90SR:137CS ACTIVITY RATIO 7 100:1) INDICATE THAT AN INTERVENING CESIUM REMOVAL MECHANISM WAS INVOLVED. COMBINED INF0Ff4ATION SUGGESTS THAT EXPLANATIONS INVOLVING RELEASE FROM A RADI0 CHEMICAL SEPARATIONS /HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STORAGE FACILITY ARE PRESENTLY MOST CREDIBLE. oC ,s r. ' nj\\ -.- _~

a RATIOS OF FISSI0t1 WASTE PRODUCT ACTIVITIES TO Cs-137 s DA'vS IS0 TOPE 350 S00 700 1800 Sr-89 0.45 Sr-90 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Y-91 0.92 0.16 Zr-95 1.1 0.23 I Nb-95 2.5 0.54 Ru-106 0.84 0.64 0.44 Ce-144 14.0 9.6 S.7 0.39 Prn-147 1.8 1.6 1.4 0.62 j PERCENT OF IfilTIAL ACTIVITY 2.4 1.5 1.0 0.3 _n ./ ! b j ~; , \\}}

ML19242C372

Text

.

Subject:

Navigation menu

Search