ML19241A641
| ML19241A641 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/30/1979 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7907090030 | |
| Download: ML19241A641 (60) | |
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iN UCLE AR REGUL ATO RY Co tAMISSIO N r
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IN THE !AATTER OF:
BRIEFING ON INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM
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Place. Washi.,gton, D. C.
1 - 45 Date - Wednesday, May 30 1979 Ppges
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l Telecnene:
(202)347-3700 ACE - FELERAL REFORTERS,INC.
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Offn!Reponers C't t
- 14. Nenh Cecirci Street Q
Wcshington, D.C. CC01 g\\
i NATICNWICE COVERAGE DAILY D
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DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Wednesday, 30 May 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
The.
This trans,ri pt meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
(
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9~103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this tranceript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Cor=ission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed the to any statemmnt or argement contained herein, except as Commission may.uthorize.
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f t.TNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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jeri 2l NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 3I n
l 4j BRIEFING ON INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM 1
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6 i Room 1130 7l 1717 H
- Street, N.W.
i Washington, D.
C.
8 i
Wednesday, 30 May 1979 9
The Corraission met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m.
10 11 BEFORE:
12 i DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman I
i VICTOR GILINSKY, Cor=:tissioner
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13 t
14 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 15 l I
16 i ALSO PRESENT:
(7 L.
Gossick la !
.T. Davis I
lo l R. Kenneke i
20 21 23 24 AC3Jedef al ASDorter1, Inc.
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2l CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
All right.
Once more into the
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- 3. breach, here.
i 4
I think =aybe I should just note for the record that I
5 Commissioner Ahearne is not with us because he is ill today.
i 6
That leaves me with a reasonably straight face to remark that it i
7 seems to me that at least one way I can influence Commissioners l
8llis by diseasing them; infecting them.
i 9
(Laughter.)
10 l CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Have a care. " Shoot a gern into the 11 air," and you know how that poem goes.
Okay.
12 j The next item on the agenda is a briefing on the In-13 cid-at Response program. Briefly, by way of background, this is, 14 I guess, the second of a series of about 6 briefings on major 15 elements of the I&E program.
16 Back about the first of May -- Well, memory falters; I
17 but a while back, there was an update on the resident inspector i
18 program.
I remember that because I carried around the viewgraph 19, slides to an assortment of hearincs, and was disappointed not to '
i 20 be asked about the resident inspector program.
So I now look 21 ; forward to carrying these viewgraph slides around to further 22. hearings, and probably won't be asked about incident response.
22 Okay.
So let's see.
This is number 2 in the series.
- The enforcement program will come along in another few weeks.
24 Acs-Fecei st A eoornrs, I nc.
25 MR. DAVIS:
The Performance Appraisal Team.
- l q --
it:
4 4
l 1li CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Ch; that's right.
Okay.
The 2 l Incident Response Program.
I 3!
MR. GOSSICK:
Let me just say a few words to start it 4
off.
5 (Slide.)
As the Commission is aware, the Three Mile Island 6
i into 7 1 accident was the first time that we had occasion to put effect, on a full-scale basis, the NRC's Incident Response 8 i 1
Procedures described in our manual at Chapter 502.
9 It is clear as a result of this experience that a 10 l
11 l number of changes and additions to our response plans and capa-i 12 l1bilities are needed; and indeed, some of these have already been 13 accomplished, or are underway.
14 The I&E briefing will review the manner in which our 15 respense to an incident is planned for in our present manual 16 chapter; how we proceeded in the TMI accident; and some of the i
i 17 more important steps that need to be taken to improve our re-I 18 spense capability.
,i 19 The briefing will not deal, however, with scme of the 20, broader institutional policy issues that have been surfaced in i
21 connection with TMI.
A number of such issues were spelled out 22 in the memorandum that Al Kenneke sent to you on the 1Sch, having 23 to do with our response planning.
24 (Ar 3:19 p.m.,
Ccmmissioner Kennedy left the rocm.)
Acs-Fed er al Aeoorters, It c.
25 MR. GCSSICK:
I will just menuion 4 of these areas
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very briefly that need to be addressed.
1, 2
One, there is the question of NRC operational respon-i
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3-sibility; and as you know, questions have been raised concerning I
l 4l NRC responsibility for the operations of the licensee during I
5! incident situr.tions.
Planning for incident response 'id not i
consider NRC Leing directly responsible for the operations.
Such 6
direct responsibility would have certain far-ranging impact on 7
a the Incident Response Program.
The second area is NRC on-site activities.
Closely 9
10 related to the policy matter of operational responsibility is 11 the matter f on-site activities actually performed by NRC.
i 12 '
Traditionally, NRC has not been looked upon as a 13 source of resources in responding to an incident.
Hence, NRC 14 provided only assistance, but rapidly withdrew to its regulatory 15 role as resources became available from the cther agen;ias.
16 Thirdly, the NRC relationship to the total response.
I 17 Basically, here, the question is:
Who is responsible for the I
t 18 total response -- licensee, federal, state and local -- due tc I
19 l, an incident or accident?
The limits of responsibility of NRC i
i 20 + must be clear, and I think there is rocm for additional clarity 21, in the present situation.
22 (At 3:20 p.m.,
Conmissioner Rennedy reentered the 23 j rocm.)
24 MR. GCSSICR:
For example, under the IRAP, assistance se,-c.cne Recomn. ur.c.
23 is requested.
Oces NRC direct that agency's activity, or does n,
?nq d is l.
6 I
i l that agency perform a predetermined function on which NRC re-I I
i i
7 l lies?
I i
3l I think there is a fourrh area that the Commission may wish to consider, and that is the inv araction role of the 4
Commission and the staff, in this case, as carried out by the 5
6 Executive Management Team, in responding to an accident.
We have made certain assumptions in our Manual chapter 7
about how that relationship is to work.
I think any experience 3
t we had in TMI might cause us to want to take another look at that 9
and ask yourselves whether that is the way you want it, or whe-10 11 ther you want to, in effect, take the functions that the EMT 12 was carrying out, or whatever.
I think that needs to be asked.
Perhaps another related part of it is the physical 13 s
14 and related aspects of the actions; and certainly the =cde of 15 operation, under the Sunshine Act; whether it would be easier to
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16 do it right there in the center., with the recorders on, I don't I,
1 17 know.
That is something we probably ought to talk about.
18 With that, I'll ask John to go anead and give the 19 briefing.
20 l MR. DAVIS:
Thank you.
Just a couple of reminders.
21 ' We are going to talk about 2 aspects of the Incident Response i
22 i Program today.
First we will talk about the Incident Respcnse Program planning as it existed predating the TMI accident.
23 q Secondly, we will make some general con =ents on the implemenca-24 AG E1Ceral RtOOr*3r5, IDC.
and 25 tion of the program during the Three Mile Island accident, fg It:
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i 1;, some early impressions conce ning tha.s implementation.
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2l We will be making comments on che program implementa-t 3 tion, and our comments really speak to its implementation within i
i 4{ the confines of the plant; that is, wa s : it implemented as pre-5, plannad?
l 6l Today, the staff has not planned to comment in detail 7
on the adequacy of this preplanning.
As I am sure you know, the 8 Incident Response Program is defined and derived from NRC Manual 9
Chapter NRC-0502.
That chapter makes it clear that the inci-10 dent response program of the NRC is aimed at incidents which 11 occur as a result of NRC-licensed activities.
I Our current guidance for national level emergency 12 13 planning is not a part of what we will be talking about today, 14 and it is not a part currently of 0502.
15 l The Office of Inspection and Enforcement, under this l
16 ! Manual chapter, maintains the overall program coordination with i
l I
17 specific functions assigned to other offices.
Under 0502, we 18 have the following assignments:
19 The ECO is the director of ;he Executive Management i
20 i Team, and is responsible for the functioning of the NRC response 21. organization.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement, the 22 ' director is a member of the EMT; the office leads in developmenc i
23 and ccordination of the Incident Response Program and maintains 24 an operations center, provides administrative staff for the AcgJedtral Shoorur1. Ific.
25 Incident Response Program, conducts drills, maintains procedure in
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9 l
head-1 for the operations center, maintains operations centers at 2! quarters and in the region, develop s information sources, and i
3i ensures response capabilities of the regions.
i 4'
The 2 licensing offices, NRR and NMSS, the directors 5
are members of the EMT.
They provide technical staff to the t
6 i centers.
They establish licensee incident reporting requirements, perform safety planning to supplement the Incident Response 7
8' Program, develop safeguards contingency planning, and develop 9
information scarces and review the procedures of the centers.
10 Public Affairs provides staff to the ce cer and state 11 programs provide staff to the center.
12 '
The basic concept behind the Incident Response Pro-gram is that the of fices assume their ongoing responsibility as 13 14 soon as possible.
15 I&E is responsible for managing the initial NRC l
4 16 response until the Executive Management Team is available.
i 17 After that is available, that team assumes full responsibility i
i 18 for the incident response.
1 l
as the overall planning 19.
The purpose of our planning, i
i 20 is performed by I&E, is basically to move the office staffs into a configuration or a physical location where they can carry out 21 22 their respcnsibilities most effectively in respcnding to an t
23 - incident.
24 (Slide.)
Aci%e,.i aecomn. inc.
25 Now, Mr. Thcmpson will brief in detail cn the
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9 l
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Incident Response Program.
2!
MR. THOMPSON:
The extent of NRC response to incidents is predicated on a 4-level assessment of protection to public 3
4 aealth and safety, as set forth in the next slide.
5 (Slide.)
For Level IV incidents which do not appear on the 6
l7 '511de, there is essentially no threat to public health and safety.
8 For these types of incidents, there i no onset respcnse by NRC 9( anticipated or required.
10 For a Level III incident, there is a remote threat to public health and safety that needs checking. We do provide 11 12 regional response on the scene without headquarters response, 13 expl'icitly identified for a Level III incident.
14 For a Level II incident -, _
15 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Could you give me an example I
16 of a Le' vel III incident?
i 17 MR. THOMPSON:
Yes; radioactive spills on the highway.
18 There is a remote threat to public health and safety in most of i
19 these, but for a variety of reasons --
t i
20 l CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That is Level III cr II?
21 MR. THOMPSON:
It cou d be a II, but most of those l
22 l that we see are Level I!!, for which we provide NRC respcnse on 23 the sce.ie, partly as a matter of reassuring the public and of whether there 24 partly as a means to provide furrher assessment w ewer., m.wr m. ir c.
25 are more sericus hazards involved than are apparent at the
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beginning.
2 COhh1SSIONER 3RADFORD:
What would Oyster Creek have 3; been?
I 4'
MR. THCMPSON:
I would imagine III initially, with the Si possible overtones of a possible II, but as it developed, I think l
l 6
it would have remained a III.
In those early stages on Cyster Creek, we had such limited information it would have been diffi-7 8
cult for us to say "III" or
'"II."
I think we would have called 9 it a III to begin with, with the possibility of going into a II.
I 10 -
Now, in a Level II incident, we see no immediate i
11 threat to public health and safety, but recognize a pctential 12 ! hazardous condition, if degradation occurs in the conditions as 1
13 they are identified initially.
14 For a Level II response, we do have regional response 15 expected and required, plus headquarters alert, and a standby in 16 the operations center for more active involvement by headquarters; I
i 17 staff.
i 18 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
Can you give me an example of i
l I
19 l a Level II, or a hypothetical example?
I 20 MR. THOMPSCN:
I think probably GE, Wilmington, would i
21, be a good Level II example, to stay away frcm reactors.
No imme--
22, diate threat to public health and saf ety, but the possibility.
23 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
Are ycu saying Cyster Creek 24 was a III, but GE, Wilmin ton, was a II?
Ac -;*.,, a emmn. i nc.
25 MR. THCMPSON:
At the time we got cur initial
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11 notification on Oyster Creek, I think we would have assessed it
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as a III:
No immediate threat.
CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
At the time you got it, the 3,
reactor was shut down.
a t
MR. THCMPSON:
That's correct; and in a safe configura-i S
6 tion.
There was no immediate threat.
In the GE, Wilmington, case we didn't know what was going to transpire.
As you will 7
recall, we were going through quite an exercise on contingency 8
9 planning it the situation degraded.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But the fuel was uranium to 11 oxide.
12 '
MR. THOMP SON :
But you recall we were also concerned i
l about reassurance of the public on health hazards, and what would 13 we do in the event the threat was carried out.
la COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I must say I am puzzled that 15 in you would regard that as more serious than almost any event 16 i
17 a reactor.
la MR. THCMPSON.
Oh, no.
I wouldn't say "than almost 19 any event in a reactor."
20 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I know there are events that but I am saying that it seems 21, you would regard as T. ore serious, i
22 to me that almost any event in a reactor, which af ter all has a large inventory of radioactive material under high pressure 23 go' 24 and high temperature and so on --
ace sa:.ru secom,s. inc.
25 MR. TECMPSCN:
It is a judgment call on the potential
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1~ for degradation and the immediacy of threat, and there is a judg-a ment call.
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3i If you want to go back in history a little further, 4l; I believe that we pr:bably would have assessed, at least ini-
- 5. tially. the Brewns Ft;ry fire as a Level II, because there was l
l 6t nc immediate threat --
i 7l
'MMIESIONER GILINSKY:
I guess I find it odd that r
l the 8! you would put the Wilmington incident in the same category as 9
Browns Ferry.
Let me hear what a Level I is.
10 MR. THOMPSON:
Level I is one involving an actual II hazard in existence, or an imminent threat of impact on public i
I i
12 health and safety.
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, did we start out with 14 TMI as though it were a II or a I?
15 '
MR. THOMPSON:
We considered it a I righ-from the i
16 start.
i 1
CCMMISSIONER BRAEFORD:
What about Fort St. Vrain?
l 17 l
i MR. THCMPSON:
I believe we censidered Fort St. Vrain u3 i
19 as a "I"
to start out with, and then took it down.
MR. DAVIS:
It started as a "I"
and then degraded as 20 21 we got more information.
22 MR. THCMPSCN:
There may be a distincticn without a difference here en Levels I and II, inasmuch as in both Level I 23 and II cases, we anticipate response by headquarters staff.
I:
24 Ads.cerai Remmn. inc.
25 is the immediac
- with which those forces are brough:
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13 that distinguishes between a "I" and a II.
Essentially, however, t
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the response of the staff is the same, with not quite the urgency 2
3l associated with a II.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who assigns these levels?
4 MR. THOMPSCN:
Generally, the first person receiving 5
notification at headquarters makes an initial assessment of it.
6' 7, Normally, that decision is made by the Director of I&E; and it is really implemented in terms of whether to activate the center, 8
96 or to place it on an alert status.
10 MR. DAVIS:
Thr - is a little general, of course, 11 depending on what the preliminary information is.
The first 12 ! inclination, unless it is very apparent that it is a "I",
is to go into what we call " standby," which means that my staff moves 13 into the operations center and begins to operate the center, and 14 15 I call the other EMT members.
i 16 And then as new, additional informaticn comes in, I l.will recall them, and we will make a decision as to whether to 17 i
i 18 go into an activation alert, as opposed to a stardby alert.
But 19 the center is really working when you are in standby.
The re-20 ' corders are Norking, and my staff is tnere.
But the support 21 staf:= frca other offices are not all there.
22 MR. GCSSICK:
I can assure you that whoever On the 23 EMT assigns the highes evaluation, that's gcing to be the way 24 we'll proceed.
We would rather go that way and then necessarily Ace-Feceral Repor'ers, lec.
25 " degrade than start out lower, knowing that it is going up.
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J.
14 1,
If Harold Centon says he thinks it is more inconve-2 nient than gathering the EMT, then we will do that.
i 3l MR. THOMPSON:
Before leaving this slide, let me I
I simply note that although we have indicated national level emer-4 5
gencies, which are coordinated by the Federal Preparedness Agency 6
on the slide, today's briefing does not deal with those na-7 tional level emergencies.
I, 8
COMMISSIONER GILINSKf:
What is FPA?
9t MR. THOMPSON:
Federal Preparedness Agency.
10 CHAIPvdLN HENDRIE :
That's when you take Charlie Team, 11 is it, and head south?
12 MR. THOMPSON:
In passing, it's worthy of note that 13 the emerging organization of FEMA will involve FPA as well as 14 some other agencies to be put into it.
15 (Slide.)
16 On the next slide, I have listed the incident re-i 17 ' sponse objectives which have served as the basis for the prepara-i t
la tion of Manual Chapter 0502.
The 4 functions identified as 19 objectives far incicent response, I believe, are pretty clear 20 to most people who have been involved in recent incidents.
i 21 Cur informing job invcives a number cf different i
22 ' audiences, hcwever.
Not caly does the staff feel an obligation 22 L tc keep the Cc=missioners and their staf f s informed of the 24 status of the events, but increasingly, we find in.timate interes:
ac. ;.e.m a oon n. m.
25 on the part of spCC.fic members of Congress, their staffs, the
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15 i
l 1 White House, and a number of other agencies.
Obviously, Mr.
2l Fouchard and his staff are nearly always involved in providi~ng I
i 3' information to the media and through them, to the public.
I The evaluation function:
Ne have been questioned on 4
this slide at other times on why the evaluation function doesn't 5
6 ccme first, before informing.
To some extent that is, of course, t.
7 provided, in that there must be a decision made as to whether we such as PM a! are going to exercise our information dissemination, 9
or telephone calls.
10 And that is a f 13 of evaluaticn, but it is a rather 11 l superficial evaluation to reach an initial decision on how r
i Promptly we shou'_d proceed with our ir formation dissemination.
12
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13 l The e mluation function, of course, is a dynamic 14 evaluation of data as it ccmes in.
This was readily evident 15 throughout ths TMI experience, as data came in and became clear, I
l 16 ! that earlier assessments of the situation were changing, and re-l'7 quired again reiterating back through the informing chain..
18 The assessment of the seriousness of an event changes 19 1with time as more information is evaluated, and also affects, of ;
i the determination of what alternatives might be exer-20
- course, 21 L cised to cope with the event.
I 22 L. the " assist" function, we see a role, a va v te 6-23 pcral role, asscaisted with providing assistance on site to the l
24 licensee and his staff, a continuing assis: role of the state ACS E9Cef31 R tOCrttft, Inc.
25 and local agencies, and cbvicusly, an cbligation we have tc the
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16 1
general public.
l The last icem we have en this slide, indicating the
)
3 ' direction of activities on the part of NRC, is a "last resort" i
item which is exercised, of course, under the authority vested in 4,
l 5 the Ccmmissica in the Atomic Energy Act, and is brought to bear i
6 in the event of licensee failure to provide proper protection for public health and safety.
7l; 8
On the next slide, I have 2 points that I wish to 1
- Wa-END 9' make concerning the role of NRC in responding to incidents as 10 we had planned for these incidents in the past.
l 11 (S lide. )
12 The first one is a rather general one, and it is l
13 under that one that some actions that were taken in the TMI 14 case would most likely fall:
To be sure that all the proper 15 actions are taken by the parties involved to protect public l
l 16 health and safety, environment and property.
l l
l 17 i
18 19 l
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20 j 21 22 23 24 Ace-federal Recornrs. Inc.
25 73 -
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17 79.12.1 g.e
- 1 And coviously to keep the public informed of 2
actual potential hazards to health anc saf ety arising f rom 3
such incicents.
4 I have a series of slides now that show an 5
arrangement of the organizational structure in the incident 6
re sponse organiza tion.
7 (Slide.)
S The first one I provide very quickly in passing 9
to identify those members of the staff who participate in the 10 various organi: tional segmen ts of our ro sponse organization.
11 The executive management team involves the EDO and the 12 ci actors of I&E and the two licensing offices.
They are 13 su pported by the Incident Response Action Ccordination Team 14 ref e. red to demonica lly a s IRACT.
15 It is ' c t necessarily made up of all of the se 16 members at any given moment, but f rom these senior staf f 17 members.
The appropriate responding organizational units are 18 pulled f rom their normal home and integrated into the 19 incident response orcanization.
In the case of the Three 20 Mile Island incident, the leader of the IRACT team was Norm 21 Moseley, the directar of the division of reactor operations 22 and inspection with participation, as you know, by Vic 23 Stello frcm CER and NRR.
NM55 i..volvement in this particular 24 event was very minimal and the su ppor t provioed by other 25 senior members of tne staff, NIE anc NRR, was part of the IRACT
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18 79.1.2.2 g en I
support staff to the lower lef t of that large one.
2 The o,ce rations staf f, which normally f unctions under 3
my direction, is the high paid gof f ers who provide the opera tional cacability or the center i tself to see that it's 4
5 properif supplied to provide administrative and logistical 6
su pport to the IRACT support staff, IR ACT and EMT.
7 I've enti tted a ciscussion of the inf ormation a sse ss-a ment team in this briefing, not because I cons' der it an 9
unimportant part of the organization, but because its 10 applicacility in TMI wa s non-existent, for all practical 11 pur po se s.
12 The next slide 13 (Slide.)
14
-- shows much these same boxes in a slightly 15 different format and provides the basis on which our planning 16 has proc eeded in the cast witn each of the types of functions 17 f or these various organizational units specified to the side 18 and above the boxes.
19 In this planning, we ha ve forecast the role of the 20 commission proper and its immediate staf f as to the 21 articulation of policy with decision-making and in re sponse to 22 the incident vested in the executive management team housed 23 a.
the center.
24 The implementation of the decisions reachec by EMT 25
.o oe taken care of 'cy IRACT anc the support staffs tnat
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79.12 3 19 gsn I
f un ction unde r i t --
2 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
Is it right tnen that 3
research was not involved in this organization at the outset?
~
MR. THOMPSON: Research is part of the IRACT support -
4 5
s ta f f in any incident response as is any portion of the NRC 6
staff.
But Saul Levine, for example, is not a pre-identified 7
memoer of IRACT or of EMT, though he could be called upon 8
under 0502 to respond to any incident.
And as you well know, 9
Saul Levine and his staff was very sucportive t hroughou t 10 this entire effort, as were a numcer of "ther portions of the 11 s ta f f no t explicitly identified.
12 Standards was a big supporter, for example.
13 MR. GOSSICK: IP and OCA and PA and the whole thing.
14,
MR. THO.i4PSON: The manual chapter coes identify the 15 available on call of all the othst-portions of tne staff to lo respond to a particular event on an ad hoc basis.
17 (Slice.)
la Ti'e nex t slide elaborates a little bit further on 19 tne functions of the executive management team in the initial 20 phases of ' response to an incident and as it proc eeds over a 21 longer period of tim e.
22 I don't propose to read through the se f unctions.
You 23 have them in the ha ndou t.
24 CO V:.SSIONER KENNEDY: W ha t coes policy ccoroinaticn 25 with otner agency mean?
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20 79.l.2.4 gc6 i
MR. THOMPSON: For e xample, we ran in to s.sme que stion s 2
on TMI on who provide s ccorcination of environmental 3
moni toring at the site?
And as you will recall, there was a 4
period of time where it was not completely clear, and it was 5
ultimately resolved with another agency involved in the o
ccordination f unc tion.
7 The f unction of EMT is to provide that kind of 8
liaison witn other agency counterparts during v.ne active phase 9
of the incident re sponse.
10 (At 3: 40 p.m., Commissioner Bradf ord leaves the room) 11 MR. GOSSICK: There were some other areas, too, 12 Commissioner Kennedy.
We were working directly with the 13 military and control center at the Pentagon on such things as 14 airlif t and so forth. As we got into it, though, we found that 15 FDAA really felt that that was their charter.
Tney were able 16 to do it.
All the people were just as happy to turn it over 17 to the guys in their center.
15 COMMISS IONER KENNEDY : Coordinating calicy with other 19 agencies -- I jus t wasn't quite sure wha t it means.
20 MR. GOSSICK: We're sorting out some roles under 21 whatever policies exist at tha t time i n t ha t case.
22 (Slide.)
23 MR. THOMPSON: The next slide provides similar 24 information concerning tne IR ACT f unc tion.
This is the team 25 that is normally heaced by divisien directors f rom the line
,1 i i
21 79.12.5 c.sn I
of fico s involvec in a particular incident.
2 In the case of T.4I, Norm Modeley and Vic Stello and J
the staf f s that proviced support for enem.
4 I:lis is the guts working portion of our instant 5
response organization which provide s inf ormation to EMT for 6
their evaluation in reaching decisions.
7 (Slide.)
ine next slide we can pass very rapidly.
It's the e
repeat of an organizational chart which shows the relationsN p G
10 of support staff, operations staff, to IRACT and EMT.
11 (Slide.)
12 The next slide I pu t in here for one main purpose:
13 As I proceed a li ttle f urther, I'm going to try to 14 characterize some other things that we experiencec curing tne 15 ex tended re spon e to the Three Mile Island incident.
16 In order to do tha t, I think it's important to 17 re?' e sh ourselves on the physical layout of the o pera tions le center.
In particular, I would like to addre ss your a ttention 19 to the executive room.
This is the isolation 'cox into which 20 we pu t EMT, so they can have quiet and contemplative 21 environments f or them to make cecisions.
22 You'll notice thct there are three dcor s to tha t 23 r co.1.
We seriously had planned for a semi-isolaced position 24 f or EMT.
One of the fiews in our planning involved the tnr ee 25 dcors tnat are clear on this diagram.
..r, -
.)
Ji
22 79.1.2.6 g -,
1 CHAIRMAN nENDRIE:
It's a hallway.
2 MR. THOMPSON: It became a hallway and a traffic 3
pattern in a spot where an awf ul lo t of staff sightseers 4
woulc stop to see what was going en because it was the hub 5
.of where the action was.
6 So ' t was a proolem.
7 The final clide, I'v? identifiad a number of S
different stens that are in volved in any incident r e s pon s e.
9
'ti ha t I propose to do is very hastily run through some of what to actually happenec in each of these steps in the Three Mile 11 Island accident and some of the lessons that we've seen f rom 12 I&E's perspective.
13 I hasten to add that these are rather parochial 14 viewpoints that have not had prior explicit clearance with 15 other offices.
We dicn't seek them and we have le t them know 16 wha t's going on he re.
And I believe we have representatives 17 of most of the other major offices that partici;a ted in the 18 audience.
19 I encourage them to challenge me when they have 20 concerns about what I have to say and to add anything tna t 21 might clarify things for you.
22 The no tif ication pro ce ss f o r 'TMI, a part f rom 23 questions that have been raised botn here and puclicly 24 concerning the promptness or,ack of it of notification from 25 licensee to NRC proceeded very mucn as pienned; that is, ence 1
1 Jt.,
23 79.12.7 g7ch I
the regional office was reached, and there were proolems in 2
reaching the regional office even af ter the licensee had made his decision to notify us, the notification f rom the regional to heacquarters hccurred punctually within a ma tter of 4
office 5
15 minutes.
6 Once the headquarters had been notified by the 7
regional office, within three minutes of the completion of that e
call, the incident center was o perational, the tapes were 9
running, and the sta f f w a s in pla c e.
10 The EMT notif ica tion s -- that is, the notification 11 to the other members of EMT -- took place promptly and they 12 assembled in a timely fashion.
la COMMISSIONER KENNEDY : What was a timely f ashion?
14 MR. THOMPSON: I don' t have specific times right 15 now, Commissioner Kennedy.
I can ge t them f or you.
But I 16 believe it was on the order of 10 minutes, 10 to 15 minutes 17 we had EMT.
15 MR. DAVIS: Whatever it took to come from the 19 other building.
20 COMMISF:wNER KENNEDY : Tha t's wha t I wanted to know, 21 the order of time, yes.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me ask you here, pu tting 23 the accident asice for the moment, would you axpect a 24 licensee to inf orm you af ter a transient of this sort if you 25 ciscovered tha t the valves ta the auxiliary f eedwater ".ac been r' -
- }
24 79.1.2.8 ge, I
closed?
2 MR. 7HOMP SON : Today, certainly.
I believe you're 3
asking, though, in the context of a t the time that TMI 4
occurred.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes, just in general.
Coes 6
that rise to the level of something?
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRI E: You mean if the relief valve had 5
closed?
9 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY : Just tacing the f act 10 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, we would expect to be notified.
11 (At 3: 45 p.m., Commi ssioner Bradf ord enters the room) 12 MR. THOMPSON: Prior to the TMI accident, I would not 13 have expected that we be notified in a one-or two-hour time 14 period.
The requirements in the guidance provided licensees 15 on the timeliness of reporting tha t type of event calls for 16 it within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> s by tel e phone.
17 And a wri tten re port, t ha t is, the licensee event 15 r e po r t, follows up immediately with a 14-cay definitive 19 report of what's involved, or a 30-day.
20 So, yes, I would expect we would have been informed, 21 but not with the timeli ne s-tha t se now see as appropriata.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And what will we require now?
23 MR. THOMPSON: One hour.
24 COMMISSIONE? GILINSKY: One.aur.
25 MR. COSSICK: No t under centrol.
r;.
'L.
)
25 79.1 2.9 g.ch 1
MR. THOMPSON: If it's no t under con trol or not 2
readily clear to the status of plant within an hour.
Beyond 3
that, a transient wnich was controlled for wnich the response 4
was as anticipated, we would expect the re por t to be within.
5 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Su ppo se it was discovered 7
tha t 'there be a viola tion of the tachnical specifications.
6 MR. THOMPSON: Tha t would be a 24-hour report.
9 CO Mi.ilo6 iONER GILINSKY : That would still be 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
10 MR. THOMPSON: However, I believe tha: in tooay's 11 a wa re ne ss, no t only within the staff but withir the industry, 12 I believe there is a generalized sensitivity -- now that's 13 a subjective kinc of determination.
How long that will 14 prevail remains to be seen.
15 As f ar as requirements are concerned --
16 MR. 00SSICK: I think tnat that's a question tha t 17 we have to look at.
18 MR. THOMPSON: As f ar as lessons learned about the 19 notification proces s, it is clear tna t we n.eed to be more 20 readily available to licensees for notification, apart f rom 21 the question of wne ther the licensee notified us promotly 22 or no t.
23 T he re w a s a period, you may recall, wnere t hey had 24 some difficulty reaching us. There was a period curing wnich 25 we nac some difficulty reaching certain senior memoers of the e,
-
34 13-3 jwb I
1 I
l Bottom, si= ply a matter of having to convince the independent telephone company that they were going to do this job by 2 I 1
3l June 1.
I i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It sounds good.
I thought 4) i i
s' the Zion problem had been cleared up.
l 6
MR. KERR:
I got the report two days ago, 7'
Commissioner, that it had been cleared, as I had reported to I
5, you, and apparently the licensee had another thought.
It
,! involves a $30,000 cost for the licensee to install isolation 9
filters on the new cable f acilities that are into the plant i
10 a
l i
11 !
before AT&T will activate the cable.
l 12 l So the only other alternative that would permit us r
to meet the June 1 date is for them to relinquish two of their 13,
14 existing telephone circuits so we can put the emergency circuit li
!5 on these f acilitics until somebody decides whether or not they i I
l 16 are going to pay this $30,000 and get the filters installed.
1 17' COMMISSIOtiER GILINSKY:
That would be two out of la hcw many?
19 MR. KERR:
There are 50 circuits in total feeding 20 that plant.
seems li. e a reasonable k
21 CCMMISSIONER GILI2iSKY:
It 22 use to be putting then to.
23 MR. KIRR:
I'm very optimistic that we ' re going ::
24
=ee the June 1st date.
ACR E deral 40Corttr1, if*C.
?
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY :
You sly there are 50 circuits
)
J t;,
35 13-4, jwb
\\
a l
t 1;
feeding the plant?
MR. KERR:
Yes, 50 pair of cables.
2'I 3
And we' re asking them to relincuish two cable pairs I
4!
so we can satisfy the termination of this hot-line circuit in i
5' the plant.
l 6l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
In another line of work, t
7l you'd probably get the customer complaining to the Public i
i Utilities Ccmmission that the phone company was being a little 61 1
9 intransigent, but it would be the first recorded complaint I
10 ~
of one utility against another.
11 l (Laughter.)
12 MR. KERR:
We have had some situations similar e
13 to this which have been involving a power utility denied 14 access to the telephone company utility.
Actually, fortunately, 15 we were able to resolve the two or three cases that did occur.
I 16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It sounds like you've been i
i 17 pressing them pretty hard.
18 MR. KERR:
Well, I've had the Vice President of 19 AT&T throwing all of his travel assignments, riding herd on 1
20 us' and recei'cing status reports.
I'm convinced they're going 21 to meet the June 1st date, possibly with the exceptien of these 22 five, and it depends -- two of thet depend on the licensee 22 and the two-strike situation.
I don't see hcw we can do too 24 much about that, unless they alicw us access.
AwIfdef ti RtOOrttr1, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER KIm1EDY:
What is the cost of this?
n:
,1
,t
36
,13-5, jwb i
i i
MR. KERR:
The FY '79 costs we're estimating :or j
the remainder of this year will be about S455,000, and we're 2j I
3 projecting FY ' 80 costs to be about $1.2 lilion.
l
\\
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
S1.2 million?
4, 1
t 5l MR. KERR:
Yes, Commissioner.
i MR. THOMPSON:
Proceeditg with another aspect --
6 i
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
With those telephones in place, l
7l i
i l
l and with 24-hour coverage in the regional of fices as well as 6;
i 1
I here, I've got a notion that we'd get a good deal of talking l
9 s
I with the licensees that hasn' t occurred before.
jo.
l 11,
MR. THOMPSON :
I'm quite sure that will be the l
i 12 case.
I believe it's also reasonable to assume that even in the absence of more stringent reporting requirements, the l
13 i
likelihood of receiving a much lower threshold of event la 15 reported to us because it's expeditious, easy to do, is quite I
i 16 likely.
I 17 l McVertheless, the question of reporting requirements t
I ja j will be addressed.
Other aspects of communications associated with 19,
Three Mile Island, we were acutely conscicus of our dependence 20 on the one mcde of cc=municaricns.
That is, telephones.
We 21 dependence
-"a*
are examining other possibilities to enhance 22 23 in the future.
24 For example, nhe NEST Team did respond, as :
ACSJ ed te te A 400 r*f ft, I nc, 25 believe you hecrd in other forums.
's a very sophiscicated l
37 13-6 jwb l
1 1l communications network involving both land lines and very 2l high frequency radio.
It could have been used, but it was i
3i not used within the NRC chain.
It was used almost exclusively 4l by COE in its cwn environmental monitoring and aerial ~
l 5.
=onitoring at the site.
It ceuld have been availah'e to us I
6!
had we called for it.
We did not call for it.
i i
7l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It was physically present?
l t
t 8i MR. THO!GSON :
It was physically present.
It could i i
i I
l 9i have been put into operation for us very rapidly had we needed I
t t
10 to go to it.
11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why was it that we did not I
\\
l' 12 ;
call for it?
i 13 MR. THOMPSON:
I don't have a ready answer for you.
14 CHAIIUiAN HENDRIE :
I think by the time it got there, 15 Dick, the Signal Corps was there on the 30th, and by the time 16 they got --
17 MR. THOMPSCN:
The difficulty we had with tele-i8 phones was primarily the 29th and 30th.
By the 30th, we had 19 !
the augmentation from the White House and ATs? and we weren' t i
20 i quite as acutely conscious of our telephone limitaticns.
21 So it was two days after that that NEST was there.
i 22 I should ccm=ent in that regard that this was characteristic 22 of the respense we got from other agencies, and not repre-24 seatative of any slowness on the part cf IOE.
s,/=cera6 Aeocr trs, Inc.
25 We requested assistance frOC 1 number of agencies, p-o,
l 13-7 jwb j
38 i
l I!
including DOE, on a rather phased basis, as it becare clear l
i 2!
to us that the problem was =cre severe than we had originally j
3 anticipated.
s 4
Had we, on the morning of March 28th, said to DOE i
5
" roll with everything you have, ARMS, NEST, and everything else,
l c
you can get there," we are quite confident, based en their
'I 7
subsequent. response, that they would have been there in full l
l l
5 force by the evening of the 28th.
l 9
Very quickly, running through some of the other i
10 items on this :
ct slide, the f acilities that we had laid out 11 vere used pretty much as planned.
We had a much larger 12 }
staff response than was anticipated.
As a result of that, 13 the population of the center.as very high.
14 We had some ventilat n problems, some comfort 1
15 problems, some access control problems.
I mentioned earlier 16 the traffic pattern involving EMT, and also the lack of space.
Feeding and housing was a problem.
Then particula:ly 17,
l 18 i acute in the IRACT room was a noise aroblem.
l9 We needed scme insulation to provide a little 1
20 !
more clarity of telephone conversation and interpersonal I
9I conversation.
Based on our experience at Three Mile Island, it's
,4-quite clear to us that we need more space set aside to take m'
4-care of large events, and the possibility cf having to handle 2#
v4*ceral AtCCr'ers, IFC.
,e more t. nan one at a time.
'V
~
7., --
i
13-8 jwb 39 i
i 1
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Are wc 7apable of handling 1l
(
I 2l more t'.lan one at a time?
I'm not talking about space.
3 !
MR. THOMPSON:
Well, Commissioner Kennedy, based
}
s i
i i
4l on prior experience at the time of the Browns Ferry fire, I think we could.
But we are not well-equipped to handle two 5
i, 6;
events.
We could establish a sat 9.llite of fice in another I
7-office and handle a second event, but to say we are ready to i
s>
handle two events would be unf air to characterize it.
4 1
9, Staff availability and f acilities?
10 COMMISSIONER KZNNEDY:
Yes.
I i
11 MR. THOMPSON:
Only on an ad hoc basis.
We'd have j
i i
12 to ad hoc it and displace somebody out of their office, i
l 13 which can work, but it's not very effective.
j r#
i 14 Information resources, we believe that there is a f
i t
15 need for better real-time data.
I think this was abundantly i
l 16 clear at Three Mile Island because of conflicting info = nation 17 available from different sources.
18 We are looking new at the question of hcw real-19 time data needs could best be met.
Attempting to identify 20 what those data needs might be is a broad plannir.g concep 4
i 21 that wculd cover a variety of dif ferent types of incidents.
22 One, the traps we were fearful of being caught in is that we 22 planned very well for emergency feedwater transients, and 24 overlooked other events,
w-Neni a.com<i. ire.
25 It could be equally as debilizating to the public p-Jtj J
40 13-9 jwb i
and to us, so we war.ted to be very careful to consider what
)
l 2l kind of data it is that we want, and what's the best way to 3l 9"* "' '"
'h '
?>
4j COMMISSIGNER KENNEDY:
You also haven't gotten it.
i i
What do you do with it?
S, I
MR. THCMPSON:
When you have it what's it going 6j i
7l!
to mean to you?
If you get so overwhelmed with data that you can't analyze and use it, you're better off having much less, i
l l
9j or at least not any worse off.
I i
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Prompt response to raw data 10 I
i i
11 ;
can cause catastrophes.
i MR. GOSSICK:
I think we might want to talk to 12 f
,~
13 l the German.
Yes, that was the result of some incident they
(
had.
I talked to one of the chaps over there just recently y,
I l
and asked him what use they ' d made c ' it, since they'd started 15 i
i
! monitoring it.
He just didn't have too much to say.
He said, 16 "Well, we watch it to confirm whatever we might see with the 17 13 plant."
19 l So it's little question as to really what is 20.
provided.
MR. THCMPSCN:
We feel at this stage that cne of
'l the things that's needed on information rescurces, as much as 2;,
23 anything else, is scme further training of the staff on what 24 is available where.
ac.;.cere n.cocvs. me.
We did have some liaitations on the readily 25 Y
/
13-10 jwb 41 I
1
\\
l.
1 available documents for TMI in the immediate vicinity of the I
2 Operations Center.
Access to the files was adequate and we l
3:
were able to retrieve it, but that was hampered somewhat by l
a lack of understanding on the part of scme me=bers of ti -
4 i
1 5,
staff on what was located where.
I, So there's some training called for in that regard.
6:
7j Technical support, we were overwhelmed with how 5
much was available.
I menticned the phased involvement, j
i I
i Particularly interagency, we found cooperation was excellent 9
i i
i from a number of agencies that we had not anticipated having l
10 ;
(
i 11 much support from at all.
l 12' And it turned out, for example, the Federal Disaster 13 Assistance Administration was tremendous in their support, i
(.
i 14 and that's not to downplay the support we got from any other i
l 15 ;
agency.
I mention that because it surprised us a little bit 16 the extent to which they can provi?e support, and the willing-17; ness with which they did provide it.
i la Other agoncies that provided a lot of support, we 19 had a pretty good handle on what they could do, and they did I
i just about as we had anticipated.
20 !
There is more need for ccordination of technical 21 22 support provided particularly by other agencies, particularly 23 in the on-site situation.
We went through a pericd of time 24 !
where a number of agencies were doing their own thir.g_-- no
- . d'Jder al A fDor*tr1, I nc..
25 that anything was wrong with what they were doing, but there s
13-11 jwb J2 I
l' i
il s
l was no cohesiveness and no ccordination.
1; COMMISSIONER KEMIEDY:
Isn't that what the ipr.T was
'l l
i
?
3' supposed to take care of?
-s 4i MR. THOMPSON:
Yes, it is.
But one of the things I
\\
5 that isn' t clear is whether the requesting agency should i
direct and coordinate the activities of the other agenciec, 6
i l
1 or those supporting aguncies should respond in a preplanned 7l j
f ashion and simply go do what was preplanned.
And then at 1
5 1
some later stage assemble it.
9 I
In the Three Mile Island event, it was clear that lo :
i 11 we could have improved the on-site coordinatiet.
That's not
\\
12 to criticize what was done at.the time.
13 COMMISSIONER KEN:iEDY:
That is something that need.3 s.
i 14 to be resolved on an interagency basis.
There needs to be some 15 '
sort of emergency agreement.
The IRACT, for example, might i
I, 16 l well be reinvigorated and restructured.
MR. THOMPSON:
Yes.
When we were down a few weeks 17 l I
18 ago to brief the Commission on IRACT, you'll recall that we 19 1 mentioned that we have been working -- been in close contact 20 with DOE, the Secretariat, for an early reassessment of IRACT 21 by all the signatory agencies, and solicitanicn ancng the 22 cembership.
That is continuing, although I can't tell you 23 at this. tine that a date has been set for such a meeting.
2.*
Administrative support within headq.arters, we ';ad
. 81K2tf 31 2#Co r'er1, l.9C.,
25 excellent response to all the administrative needs that we
)
13-12 jwb 43 I
i i
identified in a very timely fashion, from Dan Donahue and all j
i of his staff, and those within I&E, as well.
I think we car.
2l 3l do with scme more preplanning for providing administrative i
support to sites of incidents, although I believe that the a
i 5j response provided by Region I and other agencies and the l
i 6:
administrative support to the Staf f support at the site was e
i 7l excellent.
i I believe we could have made it a lot less S
i i
9, agonizing by some more preplanning.
i Information dissemination, I believe a_1 of you 10 i
l who are in this room are f amiliar with the vehicles with which ;
11 i
12 !
we disseminated information in the TMI case.
13 Preliminary notifications, it became quite a
['
P' s
m 14 library before we were finished.
Joe Fouchard and his staff 15 may want to have something to say about this.
1 have not even 16 consulted with him ahead of time.
They were very active, 17 l obviously, throughout the entire period.
1 4
There were briefings conducted of other agencies.
18 19 In particular,. we had daily briefings of FDA and other support 20 agencies through hhem at a scheduled time every day, and I 21 would L=agina on the other of a few hundred contacts by i
22 telephone with various outside interested parties -- menters 23 of Congress, their staffs, the committee staffs -- on a 24
- frequent basis.
- .c.r., a. con n. me.
25 I believe the information dissemination, at least g-
13-13,"vb 1
f I
I t
from our parochia] point of view at the Center went reasonably II I
i Uell, although it could have been improved, and there are some 2i I
I l
t of us that right have been a little happier with some of the 3
l but I believe the in ormation dissemination was not l
reaccions, a
I i
5l too bad in a subjective appraisal.
I That completes the points I wanted to make.
If 6
i you have questions, we'd be glad to respond, j
7 i
CHAIRMAN 'dENDRIE:
Questions?
l
-e 1
MR. GCSSICK:
There's a long list of what 9
10 l seemingly are kind of mundane questions, but just to give you 11 an example, " the taping of conversations. "
\\
The reason they were taped was for a quick playback.
12 If we wanted a report repeated, we found one.
That's not all f~
j3 1
that convenient to do -- although there is that capability.
14 There are two tapes going at one time.
I don't think anyone 15 i
16 ever envisioned that this was to be considered an historical i
17 record, and of course now with 13,000 cassettes or something about to be distributed to how many tens of thousands of 18 19 places, but, you know, I think this is a question that
'O >
probably has to be addressed.
Do we tape everything?
Shoul? we have line mikes 21 l that are cao.turinc. conversations that c.o en in there?
Make sur:
i.
i
- 3 that every phone c'11 -aat gces out of there is recorded?
24 Identification of callero?
It's going to be hard to find ou l
n _OtCtrat A tOor*tr1, l r.C.
25 on some of those tapes who's talking.
That's just an example
13-14 jwb i
45 l
l i
r I
1l of some of the nitty gritty kind of things that ccme ocL of i
2 this.
3 MR. DAVIS:
I think in Mr. Kenneke 's memorandum j
s 4l there are some policy determinations that at some point have I
i 5';
no be addressed, but I&E is not awaiting the addressing of I
i 6i these policy matters.
We are moving on an operational basis.
i l
7' The policy matters that Lee mentioned -- like what 3j is the operational role of NRC?
What is the role of the Commissioners as one of these events unfolds?
What is our 9
i 10 !
on-site responsibility?
This type of thing, whica will il l really affect --
i 12,
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are'you going to give us 13 some options?
s a
14 (LL'ighter. )
i I
15 MR. DAVIS:
Not 'oday, Commissioner, but eventucily t.
16 they will have to be addressed.
But I could like to assure 17 you, we are moving on the operational level to take care of la those obvious deficiencies that we saw in ways in which we 19 can inprove the operations center.
20 And that concludes the presentacien.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Thank you very nu h.
21 22 CIAIRMAN HEND?lE.
Thank ycu.
23 (Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m.,
the meeting was 24 afjourned.)
A. sa:.rai =.comn. inc.
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PURPOSE COMPRESS NRC STAFF INTO A CONFIGURATION WHERE IT CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT 4
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PROGRAM SCOPE IE NRC NATIONAL
RESPONSE
RESPONSE LEVEL EMERGENCY (FPA)
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INCIDENT RESPONSE OBJECTIVES e IN FORM aEVALUATE e ASSIST e DIRECT
NRC ROLE IN RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS Assure: Proper Actions are Taken to Protect Health and Safety, the Environment, and Property From the Consequences of !ncidents Which Occur as a Result of NRC-Licensed Activities.
Assure: Public is Kept Informed of Actual or Potentia! Hazards to Health and Safety Arising From Such incidents.
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CIDEM RESMSE ACTION COORDWARON HAM URACD INFORMATION ASSESSMENT TEAM (IAT)
Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, IE Represantative NMSS
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Representative, NR R Director, Division of Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety Representat.ive, IE Inspection, IE Director, Division of Safe 0uards Ins,m: tion, IE g
Director, Division of Operating Reactors, NRR
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IR ACT SUPPORT STAFF OPER ATIONS ST AF r' Staf fed, According to Type of Staff of Executive Office ic:
Incident, by any or all Oparations Support, IE, NRC Of fices Maintains NRC Operations Center a
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ACTION IMPLEMENTATION COO R DIN ATION TEAM un ur I R ACT SUPPO RT/
OPE R ATIONS SUPPORT TECH. SUPPO RT STAFF O
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e Activate I RC Provides Guidance for N RC Actions e
Coordinates N RC Joint Activities e
Coordinates Policy wit, Ot7er Acencies e
Approves Pua ic nformation Re' eases e
IN otifies Senior Government Officials e
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Assures Notifications Disseminated Swiftly e
Performs Actions to Carry Out IR Functions Inform Evaluate Assist Direct Coordinate o
Directs I R ACT Support Staff e
identifies Problem Areas e
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IRCIFFIRB1TATIm IIOTIFICATION INITIAL RESPONSE ORGANIZATION COFfiUNICATIONS FACILITIES INFORMATIU1 RESOURCES TEOfflCAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT INFORt% TION DISSEMINATION
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f;RC INCIDENT RESPCflSE PROGPJf1 PURPOSE The purpose of this briefing is to provide the f;RC Commissioners with information on the basic precepts in planning the f;RC Incident Response Program; how it functioned during the Three Mile Island accident; lessons learned to improve the program, and activities initiated or planned to make appropriate modifications.
SCOPE The briefing will provide initial staff impressions of the operation of the Incident Response Program.. The discussion will be limited to the response of NRC once it learned of the accident and how the staff responded with the information provided.
It is not the purpose of the briefing to evaluate l':ensee response, fiRC decisions or the effective-ness of other agencies.
BRIEFING OUTLINE I.
Planning Prior to TMI II.
Implementation of flRC Incident Response Program III.
Lessons Learned for Improving the Incident Response Program IV.
Plans to Change the Incident Response Program r;
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