ML19225D168
| ML19225D168 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Burstein S WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290377 | |
| Download: ML19225D168 (1) | |
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UNI TED STATES
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REGION IV NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PDR:l'.Q c., 'A.,
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July 2',,
1979 Docket I;o. 50-298 Hebraska Public Power District AITN:
J. M. Pilant, Director Licensing & Quality Assurance Post Office Boy, 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601 Gen tle::len:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin :;o. 79-16 which requires action by you with regard to your reactor facility.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
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Seyfrit U
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Enclosures:
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IE Bulletin ?!o. 79-16 2.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in Last 12 lionths cc:
L. C. Iessor, Superintendent Cooper Nuclear Station Post Office Box 98 B rowr.ville, !:ebraska 63321 421 043 7908060097
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO?NTSSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 IE Bulletin No. 79-16 Date: July 26, 1979 Page 1 of 4 VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS Description of Circumstances An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility.
During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies. Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite.
The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area.
Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded key card which elec-tronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals. The licensee issues coded key cards to both licensee and contractor personnel af ter Lt'e successful com-pletion of a background screening program.
In addition, licensee site manage-ment certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded key card in order to perform required duties.
Further access within this building is not limited by other barriers or controls.
As a result of this incident, an initial licensee audit determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made.
The audit also revealed that one coded key card reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station.
Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent " tailgating" on access through the portals. Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person's authorized access.
Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner. Tailgating does not include author-ized access controlled by an escort.
10 CFR 73.55(a) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position.
10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to perform their duties.
Specific commitments implementing this regulation are described in each licensee's approved Security * -
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