ML19225D035

Transcript of 790720 Press Conference in Washington,Dc. Pp 1-16

ML19225D035
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Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/20/1979
From:	Kemeny J PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
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NUDOCS 7908030616
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{{#Wiki_filter:i TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND PRESS Cf,NFERENCE

FRIDAY, JULY 20,1979 Additicnal ecyies cf this reper: are availiable ;rer.:

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't TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS g PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND PRESS CONFERENCE

FRIDAY, JULY 20,1979 Additicnal ccpies cf this reper: are availia' le fre.:::

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I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSI0tl CN THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 2 3 s 5 6 7 PRESS CONFERENCE 8 9 10 11 12 13 9 14 15 16 17

FRIDAY, 18 JULY 20, 1979 I9 Hall of Nations 20 Edmund Walsh Suilding Gecreetown University 36th Street N.W.

21 Washington, D.C. $ 22 r d 23 2i 2 95 1 439 m g b 25 i

press conf 1 jsm 1 PROCEED INGS 1:37 P. M. 2 CHAIRMAN KDIENY: I would like to make an opening 3 statement today. At the last press conference I held before these cpen hearings -- this was in June -- I pointed out that 4 5 we had not held open hearings then in order to get better 6 organized and to be well prepared for future open hearings. 7 I hope we gave evidence that we have done exactly that. 8 The point I would like to make, hcwever, is that 9 it is an accident of timing that it was the Babccck & Wilcox 10 Company that came up first before the Co==ission, since we 11 have reorganized and since we have taken formal descsitions. 12 I hope you will not read that as singling out one si:.gle ccm-13 pany here for special attention. In the future, all agencies, 9

4 and there will be many of them that tre will be looking at, 15 will receive similar attention.

16 I have a feeling there is a danger here that came 17 out both within the hearing but is applicable to the hearing 13 itself: It is terribly easy to try to say, If only X did not 19 happen, none of us would be here today, because the Three Mile 20 Island accident would not have taken place. 2 What worries ce and depresses ce to a considerable 3 22 extent is that I suspect that before we are t'arcugh with cur I I, r =. $ 23 investigations, we may identify anywhere from :en to twentf a 1 ,e

o. 4 or more different events, any one of which, if they had not i

ev 1**3 cccurred, wculd have meant tha the Cccmission would not exist 4 4 7 e) W.-. l k,. J /.' s -L

2 I today. 2 I will be happy to answer questions. gg 3 CUESTION: Dr. Kemeny, after three days ncw of 4 Babcock & Wilcox witnesses, ' w much blame, if any, do you 5 assess to that cc=pany's construction of the facility that 6 was in operation at Three Mile Island? 7 CHAI?2GN KEliENY: See, first of all, it is not the 8 role of the Cc= mission to assess blame. That wculd be up'to 9 the courts if it goes that route. Our role is twofold, to 10 try to identify the events that happened and to try to make 11 recc==endations for the future, see whether it is possible to 12 =ake recc==endations for the future, to make sure that such 13 accidents don't happen again. O la l Therefore, le =e answer your question in that con-i 15 t ext. We cer tainly identified a number of things that hap-16 pened within this company and that they acknowledged that 17 clearly must be changed in future precedures if there are not 18 to be future nuclear accidents. 19 I am afraid we are finding that in every area that 20 i we are investieatinc. or essentially everv area. Yes? 21 QUESTION: Dr. Kemeny, does it appear new to your >1 22 Cc==ission, does it appear clear new the sequence of events 3v , that occurred and, through a number of memos, why things were. ? 23 l y 6 i I 24 ! not changed lacer on; why this actually happened? e. l 1 25 ; CHAI?2GN KZ'ENY: Do you mean specifically within I A s, C %m-i M7

3 I Babccck & Wilcox? 2 QUESTION: Yes. 3 CHAIP24AN KD1ENY: Tes, I believe we have a fairly clear understanding of the secuence of events. 5 CUESTION: Does it appear to you that there was scme 6 sort of negligence on that part now of Babcock & Wilcox 7 empicyees in not acting upon the memos, allcwing 5 months, 8 allowing 6 months to elapse before any -- then ultimately 17 9 or 19 months to elapse before any action was taken on these 10 recommendations in the menos? II CHAIRMAN KE1ENY: I den't know if I would use the 12 word " negligence" in that connection. It seers to me that 13 one sees an, unfortunately, rather typical reaction by a 14 bureaucracy -- and I have my cwn back home, so I au somewhat 15 f amiliar with bureaucracies -- in people being too busy with 16 what they are doing and not putting high enough priority on an 17 item that should be treated extremely promptly and with high 18 prterity, and I think.tir. :tacMillan conceded that. 19 The worriseme thing is, as was brought out, for 20 example, by Ccamissioner McPherson, that in most bureaucracies 21 the price one pays for that kind of bureaucratic inaction is l l 1 22 of a much lower order of magnitude than in the nuclear indus- ! 5 u i 23 I try, where a single accident can be potentially catastrar.ic. ; 7 i i i l i 24 Therefore, what the Commission clearly has to think e i 2f ahCut is, in what Ways must the nuclear industry in the future 298 1 - = o n I* / -s gi

4 I and everyone connected with the nuclear indus'__y, have funda - 2 centally different attitudes and different procedures from ggg 3 w hat is customary, I suspect, in government or private indus-4 try or in almost any kind of bureaucracy that you would find. 5 GUESTION: In other words, you are asking that the 6 nuclear industry will have to be above the other industries, 7 the other energy-prodr.cing industries, in its vigilance that 6 it takes, even in its internal memoranda, its internal work? 9 CHAIM!AN KDIENY: I believe that is essentially what 10 Ccmmissioner McPherson was saying, and I agreed with what he 11 said. 12 QUESTION : Mr. Chairman, will you also have to con-13 sider whe".her that is achievable? O 14 CHAIRMA'I KE'4ENY: Certainly that is a key question 15 for this Commission. 16 CUESTICN: Ecw much weight do you expect to give the 17 f act that there is an energy crises in this country? You 18 might have been asked this already, I don't know. How much 19 weight do you expect to give that in formulating your recem-20 mendations? 21 CHAIPXVI KEMENY: 3'irst of all, to answer your i 22 indirect question, no, surprisingly enough, I have not been 3U 2 3 ;l asked that question before, but I have thought about it i 3 l 4 4 1 24 clearly, and the Ccamission has not discussed it. "herefore, l 25, I can only speak for myself. I :hink one has cc *.ake into I j} ' n K-s.,

_o I account that if there were a totally plentiful supply of 2 energy so that any one major component of it could be elimi-3 nated without serious damage to this nation, that would be 4 one context in which to make recenmendations. That is not 5 the centext we operate in. 6 Nevertheless, our direct charge is not that. Our 7 direct charge is to determine whether ' : is possible to make 8 nuclear pcwer safe i.1 the United States and, if so, hew? Y Therefore what I am se.ying is, " Gee, there must be a safer 10 way of doing it" is not very satisfactory in the present con-11 text. But equally, if we really develop serious concerns that 12 it is not possible to make this safe, then the energy shortage 13 alone would not lead us to recon =end the continuation. 9 14 nuclear power. 15 We must, I believe, as a Ccamission, convince our-16 selves that one can have a reasonable probability for safe 17 nuclear energy. 18 CUISTION: The various memos were reques ted, memos 19 1 through 5 -- 20 CHAI?lGN KZMINY: Yes? 21 CUISTICN: Is th.u 3 ny recollection of when they 1 22 were asked, when 3&W was asked to produce these? 5u i 23 CHAI?liAN :CCiY: I think Chief Counsel could answer a i I x I 24 that best. Mr. Gorinson? i i O U.2 25 MR. GORINSCN: When they were asked to produce these? l ,~$ 3 % ~A c-, 94E3 -m

6 I QUESTION: Yes. 2 gll MR. GORINSON: In June of thf year. 3 CUESTION: Prior to June 5? 4 MR. GORINSON: No, I don't believe so. 5 CHAIP24AN KEMEIY: No, I think probably that was 6 part of a broad subpcena, wasn't it, to Babcock & Wilcox? 7 MR. GORINSON: Yes. 8 CEAIPaiAN :CIENY: Chief Counsel instituted a system 9 in which, here and in several other cases, we broadly sub-10 poenaed everything connected with 'Ihree Mile Island. You 11 know, the problem is, we didn't know what there was that we 12 cught to lock at. It is a system I have never seen before, 13 but it is a fascinating system that it was a broad document O 14 subpoena which we have atso used with other organizations. 15 CUESTION: A=cng those other organizations, Dr. 16 Kemeny -- 17 CFAIRMAN KEMENY: And I simply wanted to say that, 18 as part of that, these documents and huge volumes of other 19 documents turned up, and legal counsel managed to spot those. 20 CUESTION: I guess the further question I would ask, 21 or observation I would make on that, is that the acmpany was >1 22 aware of the request, this blanket request for documents, r 3 i u l 23 i prior to its-June 5. press conference. I 7 2 I i I J 24 CHAI?2Gli KI1ENY: Yes, but as you heard frce :esti-i kh I 2 25; =cny, Our legal counsel discovered within that eno rmous tj'vg W -. - ~ . ~ a ar n, w s

s 1 naystack a few straws that even.nany people within the com-2 pany were not aware of, as we heard, even in cases where they 3 may have gotten carben copies of it, and that is not an ancca-4 mon ocenrrence, I must,say. It happens at Dartmouth College 5 as well as everywhere else. 6 MR. GORINSON: But you said they were aware before 7 the June 5 press conference. 8 CHAIRMAN KZ:4ENY: No, not before de June press 9 conference. 10 MR. GORINSON: They were not. 11 CUESTION: Dces that same blanket subpoena recuest 12 apply to the files of the Metrcpolitan idison Company at this 13 point, and if it does not, did it apply before the Metropoll-14 t an Edison Ccmpany officials and control rcom operators i 13 appeared before this Commission in May? 16 CHAIRM.LN :G"4ENY: Subject to correction by Mr. 17 Gorinson, I believe the answer is that it does apply now and 18 did not apply in May. Is that correct? 19 MR. GORINSCN: That is ccrrect. 20 CHAIRMAN :C1ENY: I don't know if you heard my 21 statement ^vesterday, but we are going back and taking deposi-l-I i tiens under oath from a number of emplovees of GPU and Metro-l 22 ,r 3 i eclitan Edison, so those hearings did not conclude our investi-o- .a m 6 IJ 24 gation of the operating ceility. e w .i 2 < l, QUISTICN: Dr. Kameny, it is accearinc that the = 302 437'h

8 I training here has become critical; who trains what-- S&W, 2 whether it is Met Ed? -- and the differences in training. ggg 3 Will you be finding cu-now who the referee is, the Nuclear 4 Regulatory Cc= mission -- will they now be called upon to 5 answer what role they would like to play in ensuring that the 6 training of the cperators is adequate inside the control room? 7 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes, I am quite certain that when 8 we come to public hearings with the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-9 sion and before then, in forms of deposition, we will certainly 10 probe the role of NRC in certifying operator and what their 11 thoughts are on the quality of training. 12 I found the final exchange between Dr. Marks and 13 Mr. MacMillan extremely instructive in Dr. Marks' raising the O 74 problem c: t.s.is tn.ree-way civision or responsibi_3ity, in a 15 way, and that is something we have to think through, whether lo that is a satisfactory system or not. 17 CUESTION: Can you give us an idea of what direction 18 now you will take in your inquiry, new that you have finished t 19 the first rcund of everyone? 20 CHAIEMAN :GENY: Well, we have not finished the 21 first round of everycne. There is a very major area, namely w -{ 22, health -- two najor areas, health and emergency preparedness l 3 I I I i y 23 i -- that we have not yet probed, certainly, at public hearings, i a 71 24 l and I would think that l would occur -- it will be up to the hk 2 25 l Cc= mission to decide this af terncon, but I would reccmmend ec I < ? o.,~ r <r. ? pe I yj/ 303

9 1 them that that should happen at a very early hearing. o CUESTION: Dr. Kemeny, when you consider that you 3 still have to deal with that large area of health, and you 4 have to back to the utilities and go into great detail with 5 them, and the questioning of NRC officials was not in any 6 great depth at all at the public hearings in the past; do you 7 have enough time to get close to meeting your deadlines; if 8 all you've got are 2 months left? 9 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Let's see, I hope it is more like 10 three. It is short enough, even under those circumstances. 11 That is a problem and one of the dilemnas the Ccemission will 12 he discussing this af terncon, what fraction of the vast amount 13 of material that we collect and will have in depositions or 9 14 in other documents we can realistically bring out in public 15 hearings. 16 Obviously, all of it will be brought cut publicly 17 as part of our report, everything we feel is relevant, but it 18 is one of the key decisions we have to make, and I have it en 19 the agenda this afternoon to have this discussion on just what 20 -- it is a dilemna, because we have a responsibility to inform 1 21 -he public as we go along of what we are doing, and I hope you i 1 22 note that we take this verv. seriousiv.. It is also exceedingiv! 7 5U I 23 time censuminc, and one can cet only so much time of the ,l 3 a n )! 24 I Ccemissioners, and there is a very d4-"'- ~~ade-cff becween' i 25 doing a secd job, bringing cut some of the major issues 3.0., /

10 I publicly, and probing them publicly, and saving enough time 2 for the Commissioners to be able to think and eventually to 3 reach findings and recc=mendations. I don't know where the 4 Ccmmission will come out. 5 QUESTION: When is the next sequence of hearings? 6 CHAIPl4AN KDENY: August 1, 2, 3, three days of 7 meetings. I don't knew yet what portion of that till be pub-8 lic precisely because of the dilemna I have new mentioned', 9 and that will be determined this afterncon. 10 I think we have to get into the Federal Register 11 early next week, don't we, Stan? 12 MR. GORINSCN: Yes. 13 CHAIFl4AN KDENY: So, clearly, it will be public la early next week. 15 CUESTION: Mr. Chairman, Mr. MacMillan said today 16 that in his June 5 press conference he did not think it was 17 relevant to discuss the Dunn metcrandum. At the same time, he 18 said at that press conference that the = cst important single 19 facecr was terminating the HPI pumps, which was directly the 20 subject of that memorandum. Would. . agree that that was 21 irrelevant to his topic of discussion that day? The Dunn

• g 22 memorandum was irrelevant?

av 23 l CHAI??A'i KE:ETY: It is a question of judgment, of 2 i l i i 24 I course, that.vou are asking me. I don't think " irrelevant" is; i 2 25 ! qu te the right word. On the o the r hand, Mr. MacMillan may be-32o as=r .s own-

at 1 quite correct in saying that if you simply take the f acts as 2 they were, that there were sufficient instructions out amongst 3 the cperators, that they should have been able to handle that 4 situation. 5 Let me therefere ccm. ment on that. Clearly, what 6 Mr. Dunn is trying to da is t say, in adfect, that although 7 those instructions are cut there, he P.ad some doubt whether, 8 under certai.2 circumstances, the operators will come up with the right reaction. 10 To me, the more telling -- as you may have noticed 11 in my question -- to

, the more telling memorandum is Dr.

12 Hallman's memorandum, because Dunn is asking, in effect, 13 to reinforce what I am quite sure is out there amongst the la instructions, and he is worried that the operators might not i 15 do what they are told to do, and when statements are made 16 that the instructors had enough information and should have 17 been able to react, the question in my mind -- literally 18 taking that statement, it is true -- but the question in my 19 mind is, was it reasonable to expect them not be be confused, 20 cr no groups to be confused, and that is why I singled out,

o. f in av. questioninc. the Hallman memcrandum -- remember, Hallman !

l ># 22 is confronted with the Dunn memoranda, which bring cut exactly! r i 5 $ 23 ' the kinc or scenario Mr. MacMillan cescriced, and then they a = j 22, have sericus doubts on whether to propagate the Dunn menc- $h I1 9 randum because ths5 system mi~=ht cc solid. i 3% m ~ is < >s,s

1>. I And since I know they were worried about its going 2 solid under different circumstances, but their first reaction O 3 to a memo -- and they hold it up -- a memo that says, Lcok, 4 things can happen here; if they step the HPI the core will be 5 voided -- in other words, terrible things will happen -- 6 they worry, yes, but the p_ ice for that is you might, the 7 system might go solid, which might lead to sc=e damage that I 8 think everybcdy would agree is minor compared to the Three 9 Mile Island accident. 10 The question I really wrestled with late yesterday 11 evening is, even if al] the instructions were there, someone 12 as capable as Dr. F:ilman under very calm.ircumstances is not ?3 sure which way to go on this. Was it reasonable to expect the 14 cperators, in the heat of an accident, to be that clear and not 15 to be confused by it? 16 QUESTION: What do your people, your staff people, 17 tell you that they find wculd be the consequences of going 18 solid? 19 CHAIS. MAN KEMENY: .et's see, first of all, to be 20 safe, before our report comes out, we will have that very 21 thoroughly checked cut, but at the first look on it, a fairly i i 4 .[ 22 careful lcck, they feel that it is conceivable that some damage 5 V 23 ; could happen because of -- it is _:cssible that no damage wculd, 2 1 J 24 h a n. c e n. It is.ecssible that s i m e. l v. the famcus saferv. valves -, 25 i these are not the PCRV but the official safety valves -- would,: k I i I7O [d[1 is/ l#4 77 367

13 1 lift, and therefore lots of water would spill out and there n' could be sort of a mess in there, but compared to what actu-3 ally happened, it is a third order consi.deration. 4 There is a possible second order cent leration that 5 Dr. Hallman is worried about, that there might have been sc=e 6 equipment damage, but again, anything we hcve so far been able 7 to establish is a scenario that that damage is again negl:- 8 gible compared to the dangers of not leaving the high pressure 9 injection system on. 10 CUESTION: What is a "=ess," to translate this into 11 down time? And loss of generation? I2 CHAIP31AN KEMEh"f : It translates into down time. It 13 translates also into -- it is more complicated than that, in 1B) ,4 the sense it translates into events happening that, under 15 normal circumstances, you would worry about as a safety hazard. I 16 I mean, a pipe might bur s t, but that is a small price tc pay 17 if you can prevent the core from being uncovere?, anc indeed 18 the HPI system is designed precisely for that, as I understand 19 it -- that even if a pipe bursts, thev can still keen. the core 20 from being unccvered. 2' But, you know, under normal operations, you do wcrryl i g 22 about the pipe bursting. It is not a gcod thing. It might j s i i V 23 l create a safety problem, and you are in a mess there. Your { 2n } 1 i 2 24 l i core may run drv., or steam is

a. cine. to be generated and all

$h 25 ' kinds of r.ajor problems cc.7.e abou: 20 public health. Then it t I g _- _ s '

1*. I becomes a second order consideration. 2 \\' CUESTION: Dr. Kemeny, you came down very strongly l 9 3 against B&W cn this issue. What about the NRC? What can you 4 tell us at this point, do you know, dat the NRC did or did 5 not do as a result of the Davis-Besse transient.? 6 CHAIP24AN KEMENY: I think I would prefer to hold my 7 answer on that because I would suspect that that would cer-8 tainly be a subject,for public hearings later on. Although we 9 have started our process of depositions, we are only part way 10 t hrough en that, and I think we know from this example here 1I that it was very difficult to maka an overall judgment until 12 you have folicwed through whu'. happened to va-icus kinds of 13 memoranda. 14 But certainly crai" ions of MRC's reaction to Davis-15 Besse are interesting questions that we are probing. 16 GUESTICN: It, Chairman, one more question that I 17 had was, did your investigation confirm that B&W's testimony 18 that cperators are instructions not to turn off the HPI pumps 19 below 1,600 psi was correct? 20 CHAIPlGN KEMENY: Let's see, do you remember the T1 exact wording of that, Stan? p$M. I 22 MR. GCRINSCN: Cf what? l N' @{v r t; 3 w 23 CHAIPJ".AN KZ:iEn Ihe emergency instructions. Ne a 1 ( 2 24 MR. GORINSCN: Without der in front o f me, I I i 2f' couldn't quote them wi-h any degree Of accuracy. '3,* a lfgQ r 3d) I

15 I CHAI?l4AN ZIMI:rt: No, I think the problem -- 2 CUESTION: Could you just tell us generally? 3 CHAI?lWI KIME:Pl: Yes, let me give you my impression 4 cf it, okay, and I have never gone through operator tratning, 5 but my impression of it is that if they correctly recognite 6 the nature of the accident, yes, they do have clear instruc-7 tions not to turn the HPI off. 8 The catch, of course, is that they testified that 9 they were totally confused abcut the nature of the accident. 10 CUESTION: In his questioning of Dr. Roy today, 11 Deputy Counsel elicited the information that as a result of 12 TMI II, 3&W has now directed its customers to readjust the 13 set points on the -- number one, on the pilot-operated telief %lk 14 valve openinc, and, number two, en the reactor SCRAM, based 15 en vessel pressure. 16 Sut he did not go the next see and ask what those 17 new set points are. Do you happen to know what they are? 13 CHAIFJWI KIMI:rl: No, I cannot give you the exact 19 numbers, but I can tell l'ou what the qualitative chance was, I 20 and this, I believe, was ordered by the Nuclear Regulatory i l 21 Cctmission. 3 22 2&W's set points Mre such that the JORV opens e 5 i V I 2 23, before the reactor trips. Therefore, it has a chance, in a t a I } i J 24 l relatively minor transient, that the PORV cpens, iets out i 3 25 i enough pressure, and therefore tne reactor does not trip, 1 3]D 439 fassi

.6 I which means they can stay on the air. 2 They have reversed those two numbers so that the g 3 re, actor trips first before the PORV opens. The Nuclear 4 Regulatory Cc= mission, I guess, was nervous as to whether i 5 is really gccd, even in a minor transient, to have the PORV 6 open without the reactor being shut down. 7 I don' t knew if a really detailed -- I think there 8 were scme statements, and they were cautious ones, tha t this 9 has not been thoroughly investigated.. I do not knew at this to stage whether that was a good change or a bad change. 11 CUESTION: Thank you. 12 (Whereupon, at 2:00 p. m., the press conference 13 was concluded.) 14 15 16 17 18 l i l 19 20 t 21 t ) i u i u! 3/I m@ w a 9.$ j e i \\ o a e}}