ML19225A254
| ML19225A254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom, Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Roth W SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225A255 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907180696 | |
| Download: ML19225A254 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y,
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 5'&
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June 28, 1979 v
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OFFICE OF THE CH AI RMAN The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510
Dear Senator Roth:
I am pleased to respond to your letter of May 7,1979, requesting information regarding the exact steps being taken to guard against a repeat of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident at the Salem Unit 1 and Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 reactor facilities, and requesting the NRC to perform a complete and thorough inspection at these facilities.
Steps being taken to assure that incidents similar to the TMI incident will not occur at the Salem 1 and Peach Bottom 2 and 3 nuclear plants are presented in the enclosure.
These steps include inspections, as requested in your letter, whose primary purpose is to pmvide direct and independent NRC verification that the operation of the Salem and Peach Bottom facilities is in conformance with license conditions, with partic-ular emphasis given to those plant systems and procedures involved in the TMI incident.
We trust the ir formation supplie.d is responsive to your requests.
' Sincerely, f
,/
Y hL Joseph M. Hendrie
' Cliairman
Enclosure:
A:tions Taken at Salem and Peach Bottom as a Result of the TMI Incident
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Enclosure Actions Taken at Salem and peach Bottom s a Result of the TMI Incident Shortly after the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident, the NRC issued a lessons learned. series of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Bulletins addressing thc The IE Bulletins provided information about the series of events that had occurred at TMI and required each licensee, consistent with the reactor design, to make changes to certain equipment and operat-ing procedures and to conduc special operator training.
The i censee i
was requested to provide NRC, in writing, the details for comJetion of the immediate actions and plans for completion of the longer term items rcquired by the Bulletins.
or. a plant-by-flant basis, to ensure the proposed action is suitable fo each individual plant.
by Westinghouse Electric Corporation; whereas, TMI n designed by Babcock and Wilcox.
Both use the pressurized, light water These differences resulted in the Babcock and Wilcox des sensitive to certain operating transients.
IE Bulletins 79-06 dated April 11,1979, and 79-06A dated April 14 1979, were issued to the Public Service Electric and Gas Company an,d other Westinghouse pressurized water reactor facility operaters.
IE Bulletins require the Salem Unit 1 operator (Public Service Electric These and Gas Company, New Jersey) to conduct reviews of facility operations and procedures, perform engineering evaluations of the facility design, and implement any changes th;t may be required to ensure that the factors which contributed to the TMI incident do not exist at the Salem Unit facility.
A'l areas requiring action by these Bulletins are subject to review and verification by the resident inspector assigned to the Salem site and the NRC staff.
To reinforce the urgency placed on this effort, during the period of April 1.8 through April 23 six teams, each comprised of an IE team leader an NRC examiner from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and a third member from the IE Regional Office, vicited all operating pressurized water reactor facilities, except Babcock and Wilce facilities.
purpose of each visit was to discuss with the licensee's operationThe personnel and station management the chronology of the TMI incident and to clarify licensee actions specified in the applicable IE Bulletins The visit took place at Salem Unit 1 on April 20, 1979.
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Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, located near Delta, Pennsylvania, are boiling water reactors designed by the General Electric Company. The basic design of these reactors is different from the TMI, Babcock and Wilcoy designed pressurized water reactors.
IE Bulletin 79-08 dated April 14,1979, was issued to the Philadelphia Electric Company and other boiling water facility operators.
This IE Bulletin requires the Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 facility operator (Philadelphia Electric Company) to perform a series of specific reviews and actions regarding aspects of the TMI incident that have generic applicability to these facilities.
All areas requiring action by this IE Bulletin are subject to review and verification by the resident inspector assigned to the Peach Bottom site and the f1RC staff.
Special instructions to the NRC inspectors have been issued requiring follu-up inspections, on a priority basis, of the actions taken by the licensees in response to the Bulletins.
These inspections will ensure that the actions proposed by the licensee are in fact carried out.
NRC resident inspectors are assigned to both the Salem and Peach Bottom sites.
As part of their assignment, they routinely monitor plant operation and conduct inspections to verify that their facilitien are being operated safely and in conformance with NPr requirements.
Since the TMI incident, their efforts have also been t acted toward assuring that commitments by the licensee to the requirements of applicaFle IE Bulletins have been completed, and that specific safety-related equipment is in a state of readiness to perf 'm its function if needed. In addition to the resident inspectors, specialists from the regional office continue to make trequent inspections at Salem and Peach Bottom.
As a matter of interest, the Salem Unit 1 facility is currently 'in a scheduled refueling outage and has been in a cold shutdown condittion since April 4, 1979.
Difficulty with some or the fuel assembly rnechanisms tnat retain the relative position of the fuel pins trid straps) w caused the licensee to begin defueling the reactor for further irngection.
Plant startup from cold shutdown is not expected to occur.before' early July 1979.
The licensee's actions in response to the IE Bulletims will be reviewed and verified by the NRC prior to plant startup.
In summary, the NRC has taken steps to identify the specific causas of the Three Mile Island incident and to require immediate upgrading of equipment, training and operation. A detailed evaluation is continuing on the need for additional longer term changes. A specia7 on-si te inspection effort at each PWR plant continues to assuee that necessary actions have been put into effect.
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