ML19224D528

Transcript of 790628 Public Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Emergency Planning Task Force.Pp 1-50

ML19224D528
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/28/1979
From:	Gilinsky V, Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
References
REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7907120520
Download: ML19224D528 (51)

Text

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NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION f

IN THE MATTER OF:

PUBLIC MEETING BRIEFING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING TASK FORCE I,

Place Washington, D.

C.

Date. Thursday, 28 June 1979 Pages 1-50 s

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As crevided bv 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the f nal e

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

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5' PUBLIC IEETING I

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BRIEFING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING TASK FORCE i

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Washington, D. C.

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l Thursday, 23 June 1979 10 l t

The COmmissicn met, pursuant to notice, at 10:50 a.m.

11 !

I i

BEFORE :

12 '

i DR. JOSEPE M. EINDRIE, Chairman i

13 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner l

14 i

ALSO PRESENT:

15 l l

Messrs. Gossick, Kenneke, Bickwit, Grimes, and South.

16 '

17 ;

18 i

19 20 21 22,

23 l

24 l Acs #ecerse Recorurs, Inc.

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_P _R O _C E _E _D _I N_ _G _S i

CHMEMAN HENDRIZ :

Let's move to the brie 'ing on 2j t

3l emergency planning with Tem Carter and his task force, allcwing i

the Ccmmissioners time encugh to get another cup of cof fee or 4

i wh ate ve r.

3 i

6j (P aus e. )

j i

l CHAIPF.AN HENDRIE:

The Cc= mission is assembled in I

i 3'

all of its available might and glory and no less in ccmmand of the situation, regardless of smaller numbers, I assure you.

9 i

i 10 =

CCMMISSICNER GILINSK-

D-abably better able to I

i 11 handle it.

12,

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE :

Plc. h t.

f f

13 l Let us go ahead then and hear about the Emergency i

i 6

14 Planning Task Force and hcw we are doing.

j I

15 !

Go ahead.

16 l MR. GCSSICK:

Th ank y ou, Mr. Ch airman.

I Ycu will recall chat en June the 7th we had a 17 :

t i

discussion with the Ccmmissicn of the general subject cf la l

19 emergency planning, including the prepcsed respense, er a i

20 respense to the GAO repcre, that addressed this subject.

We also discussed at that meeting che task force 21 f

apprcach that I had prepcsed in a memo that had been furnished 2,~,

e,,

to vou.

24 And as a result of the meeting we ended up going tceneres nevamn. nee.

25 ahead with the task force cpert.tien, which I put into ef fect I

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( IN MeJO

j i '2 4

l June the lith.

1l.

2!

We are sort of approaching the end of Phase 1 of i

I

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3i the e f fo rt.

Tem Carter is prepared to go ahead and tell you I

4 where we have been, where we are, and we are aiming to go with i

5 this e f f ort.

I i

I i

6i With that, Tcm, why don ' t vou co ahead.

i i

7!

Mr. Carte r.

Th ank you, Mr. Gossick.

I, 8'

S lide 2, p le as e.

i 1

i 9;

( S lide. )

j i

1 10,

As a result of the Ccemissicn meetings, Mr. Gossick

+

i 11 i mentioned there were two directives crec. ared for the Task 1

e 12 Force, an ECO memorandum of June the lith r'.d a second memoran-t I

i 13 dum of June the 12th.

I 14,

The presentation this morning will follcw basically 15 the lines of the June the lith memorandum.

But the work of 16 !

the Task Force and the discussicns certainly cover the aspe cts 17 l cf the SECY memcrandum of June the 12th.

18 I su==arized the majcr points en the viewgraph.

r 19 Next ch art, p le ase.

20

( S lide. )

21 The Task Force en Emergency Planning is ccmp ris e d 22 of the members, as listed en the le ft of this ch art.

23 As you can see, a f airly large n" "er of pecple --

24 I think it is important th at the prespectives brought by these 2.c.a.cerc necom,, w.

25 members are ava

'="ic "o the Task Force.

I don't think we i

l

jl 3

.o i

1l could make very nuch progress withcut the representation that i

I 2;

we have.

3, i

3!

The large number tends to slew the process down t

i, 4i somewhat, but I think the benefits gained from having these i

I 5

perspectives and background kncwledge gained in the areas are I

i i

6 cf definite benefits.

t l

i 7j The Task Force in working, the problem of defining

}

a and critiquing, or describing and critiquing the present system, I

9, decided we would e. robably be more effective with a small 1

10,

working group, working in the background en describing the i

11 i system and critiquing the system.

i 12 So we established a working group under Charlie i

I

,c 13 l South, as the leader, with the representation of the offices t

14 !

there.

l 15 The size of that crouc varies scmewhat over the i

i l

i l

16 :i three to five days that thev. were working.

But durinc. that 17:

period these pecple did centribute in sc=e meaningful way.

la The first deliverable -- if you can call it th a t --

19 during Phase 1 was a lis t of issues that the Task Force felt 20 would be -- really could and shculd he addressed during che 21 prepcsed rulemaking that the Cc:=issien has under censideracicn 22 at this time.

21.,

As.vcu knew, we prcycsed en the June 19th the 24 censideration of the 17 broad issues regarding emergency Ace ntcerbt Recorurt, Inc.

25 planning.

L. are planning -- and, ir

.c.c t, it is prepared new Ohh o

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6 j l-4 l

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1; a package en each of these 17, which centains a background i

2, and status of the issues within the agency and without the l

3' factors and constraints each of the issues; and in cases i

I i'

4 where it is ac. erce. riate, alternatives that the Commission mav.

t f

want to censider in approaching the issues.

i 6-We hope to have that dcwn to the ccmmission either I

l 7l temorrow or Mcnday.

i s'

We will centinue to work en these issue during Phase :

I 9

2.

I will talk about the way we are going to handle that a 10 '

little later in the presentation, i

l 11 l As we progressed into --

i 12:

CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Could I step you for a I

f l

13 minute?

l i

14 '

MR. CARTER:

Yes.

i i

15 CCW.!SSICNER GILINSKY :

What is the relationship or i

l 16 1 the Working Group to the Task Force ?

l 17 '

!s this a group that you appointed?

I ncticed there is is cnly cne persen who is en both.

19 MR. CARTER:

Yes.

Ma;shall Sanders support 3d bcch.

20 The Task Force debated hcw we could best app roach 21 the Phase 1 goals and cbjectives in the two weeks we had to 22 work the prcblem.

We felt we needed -- you might say a 13

. splinter group to go turn the crank in certain areas of 24 describing the system while we were working the issues.

AceJesersi Recor ers, Inc.

23 We got the representatives on the Task Force to I

,u

7 3 13 I

1, volunteer the support of people that would be in the Working l

2j

Group, i

3 For example, Wayne Housten supplied the services of i

4i Mr. Priebe and Mr. Sears.

The results of the Working Group S

came back into the Task Force, and we are presently taking a i

6:

hard lock at what they have done in a very short period.

1 7

CHAIRMAN HINDRIE:

It took a mystical stroke.

They i

8l appoi-.ted a cc=mittee of others to do the work.

It shcws i

i i

19' real management ability.

i 10 l

( Laugh te r. )

ll i MR. CARTER:

S lide 5, p le ase.

12 (Slide.)

(

I 13 i 7n addressing the prcblem of describing the system, t

1 i

14 :

really the guidance frcm the Ccemissien meeting was to critique' t

15 the system.

The questien was asked several times :

Have we 16 critiqued the system?

So we tcck that as definite guidance i

17:

during Phase 1 to try to critique the systen.

18 We decided we had to get a handle and describe the 19,

system in scme systematic, meaningful way that we could 2C approach in a short period of time.

21 All this ch art represents basically is a me ch anism 22 that na used to discipline the apprcach cf gachering the 23 data frem P.he pecple th at we re availab le.

Nothing really was 24 '

generated new.

All of the data that came cut of this ce rtainly-2a- %.,

neoc,.n.inc.:

25 existed in varicus documentation and in the minds of the 1

n v-

,~v

41 G.

s-I 8

i i

i 1 !

people that supported either the Task Force or the Working t

2' Group.

It was eurely a way to discipline our discussions t

3*

thrcugh there.

i I

4' So first they lccked at the four participants, as i

6 5!

indicated on the le ft -- NRC, through the federal agencies in i

6 various phases, the planning phase, licensing, implementation,

7:

and testing, through to the actual emergency response.

S, We felt there were seven really -- dimensions to i

i 9,

that problem, as indicated in the middle of the matrix, from 10 '

respens 4 "4 ' i 'i es through interf aces.

I1 In describing t e system, the Working Group went h

12 l through and discussed NRC in the planning phase, as it relates

/

i 13 l to their respcnsibilities, their limitaticns, et cetera.

i 14 !

It wrote cr*/ptic notes, and a larger version of I

i i

15,

ths matrix; basically, if you picked these notes up and locked 16 <

at them new, not having been involved in de process, they 17' p cbably wouldn' t tell you very much.

But they meant sc=ething i

18,

to t.he c articicants, the Workinc. Grouc., because dere was a lo t

19,

of backgrcund discussicn.

20 To make this really useful, you would have tc excand 21 each of tnese cells into several pages.

We de not prepcse tc 22 de that.

I think it served its purycse, and we will p rob ably --

23' it would be a point of diminishing return to expand en it and 24 deve lop it out, but it was a good tecl, I believe.

Ac3J.:., i mecomn. inc. :

25 Thereafter, they described the system.

They sa en i

.I

ji 7 9

i l

i 1'

th at for about a day, and then they icoked at the critique l

-. ~

2 i and lecked at what they had written there frcm the standpoint i

I i

3' o f, ekay, what are the problems ?

What can we identify here as l

i 4

a major problem, the topics or specific prcblems, and agree on i

I i

i 5,

as a group?

i 6!

They identified 28 problems which we will briefly 7-go through in just a minute.

And they did that from the NRC I

I 3,

perspective in a short pericd of time.

They tcck NRC and lecked i

9 at planning across the varicus dimensiens, licensing, imp le-1 i

i 10 i mentation, and testing, and actual emergency re pense.

We Il gained a lot from the Three Mile Island experience.

i 12 !

There were c. ecc. le that had carticicated in Three i

/

'i i

13 l Mile Island directly that were supporting de Working Group i

i h

I 14 i or they had access to people that had been involved in Three I

i 15,

Mile Is land.

t 1

16 l W e think the actual emergency respense work that 17!

came cut of there exhibited a f airly gecd understanding cf I

la scme of the problems at Three Mi' e Is land.

19 We ended up, as I menticned, with 2 3 prchlem areas.

20 S lide 6, p le as e.

21 (Slide.)

22 MR. GCSSICE:

When you say you analyzed the NRC, 22 you also iccked ac the licensees, scate and local, fede ral 24,

areas as we11?

wecerm necemn, we.

23 MR. CARTER:

That is correct.

Yes.

j i

)

ji 8-10 I

I In going through it, they concentrated en the NRC, i

2 but they had to talk of the other three participant areas.

They 3

had to talk about the licensees, state, local and other 4

federal agencies in the description of the system and in 5

critiquing.

That is correct.

i I

6' And then on Slide 6, they grouced the 28 orablem j

7!

tcpics into six broad areas, as indicate d the re.

I i

3, The keys en the left the re we re us ed j us t a b cok-i 9 !

keeping aid, as we are going to go through the second phase.

I i

i 10 ;

It may be a goed point heres to try to draw a disctincticn t

I 11 between the issues we talked about earlier and the prchlem 12 !

areas that were identified here.

I 13 ;

B asically, the issues are broad major policy issues.

14 The prcblems, in seme cases -- in most cases -- are somewhat 15 narrcwer, practical pragmacic problems that are cperations l

t 16 ;

oriented or oriented the way we do business and the way we I

i 17, interface.

i.

13,

The issues, in s eme cases, require the benefit of 19,

public cccment and time for the Cc=missicners to really dwell 20 en the aspects and the alte rnati res and the opcions before a 21 final de cisicn is made.

22 We feel that in large part the prcblems can be 23 addressed in the staf f, with reccmmendations ccming to che 24 '

Cc= mission in a f airly reascnable period of time.

And they Ac.. seers a.comn. tnc. ;

25 can probably be implemented.

A Od 3co a u

11 r

19 i

1!

There is definitely seme overlap between two.

l i

2l We have found several issues th at will be addressed, '

i j

3i and I will talk about these a little bit as we go through the 4

p resentatien.

l 5 i Slide 7.

i i

I 6;

( S lide. )

i 1

7.

On Slide 7, we have summarized briefly the six r

i 8,

problem areas that were identified in the respcnsibility 9!

authority area.

10 !

The Working Grou= came up with 2 8 areas ' problems.

i t

1 11 The Task Force very cuickly tcck at lock at these yesterday, 12; locked at the words that had been tcgether and, backing them i

13 uo, tcck a hard icek at what the meanings were, what the i

i and made sc=e mcdifica \\

14 !

interpretations of the statements were,

i wording and in the statement to be*** -a #'ect 15 t.' c n s

'-*'-a i

16 their perspective of the prcblem.

i 17 And these statements en the viewgraphs are rep e-t la sentative of the Task Force 's inter =retation of what the prch-19 lems are.

20 Scme of these are significantly =cre impcrtan San 21 others.

S cme o f them, in scme cases, are not as imp c rt ant.

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'G.

CARTER:

The Federal F.espcnse Plan for Peacetime 24 Nuclear Emergencies.

Acsaecere a.cor ers tre.

25 It is planning for the national emergency perspective.

]

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12 i

1

". 1 10 i

i, 1l It is put together back in the early days of 1

2' emergency planning.

I guess it has been =derway five years,

I 3

scrething like that.

i j

i I

4i M2. SANEE25:

April of '77, but engoing for a nurler l

l 5;

of =cnths before then.

l t

6i MR. CARTER:

Marshall is our expert.

,I I

7; CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:

What is the relationship of i

8 that animal to things like IRAP and so on?

1 9,

MR. S ANCERS :

I would aay that FPCPNE, Federal l

t i

10 ;

Respense Plan for Peacetime Nuclear E=ergencies, reccgni::es t

11 i IRAP aa cne of the many, many ef forts that were made before I

12 FRPPNE and centinue to be made within the federal establishment!

(

13 <.

to have federal respense for peacetime nuclear emergencies.

1 j

14 This dccument also recogni::es that the NRC -- and thel:

l I

15,

AEC, before the NRC -- had done a nurter of things in terms i

16 of respcnse planning for peacetime nuclear emergencies,

i 17 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Who runs FRPPNE?

18 MR. S ANCERS -

I don' t knew that anyone is really 19 running it ncw.

It was issued as interim guidance.

20 CHAIFF.AN EINDRII:

It is sc ~. of cut of cent:01, 41 like that arceba in the movie that was going to censume us all.

s 22 I'm sorry, Marshall.

23 MR. SPLICE RS :

It was issued as interim guidance by 24 the Federal Prep aredness Agency, scen to beccme folded into

' cs #9derte Aecorters, Inc..

25 the Federal Imergency Management Agency.

There was some I

t1' r' O'y i

v'

ji 11 13 i

1 There was some centroversy at that time whether the 2

Federal Preparedness Agency really had the authority to issue

~'

3 this type of planning document.

i 4:

The Office of Management and Budget did not concur i

5 in it, and therefore I think it was issued as interim guidance. '

i i

i 6'

It never has been issued as final guidance for planning.

7 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

That sounds famili ar.

a MR. S ANDERS :

The Federal Precaredness Acency never 9'

really teck any steps to, what I call, " follow up" wich the I

10 plan, to plan, to plan.

11 GAIPliAli HENDRIE :

Marshall, all I can say is I 12 went to and testified en our behalf at least three -- and maybe !

i I

I 13 :

a dozen -- hearings en emergency planning in late April and i

1.1 l May.

And, bcy, am I glad you never told me about FRPPNE l

15

before, so I would have had to explain it to these cc=mittees 16 who are not uniformly tumultuous in their appreciation of cur i

17 emergency planning efforts,

la CCMM~SSICNER GILINSKY :

Ecw dces it conflict with 19 the Accmic Energy Act?

20 MR. SANCEES:

I dcn ' t kncw.

I wculd pre fer Oc have 21 a merier of the Werking Grcup address th at pcint.

22 GAIPJGli HENDRII:

For these purposes, T.erter,

22 Marshall --

24 '

MR. SANCEES:

A merier of the Wcrking Grcur, too.

Aes s.eerc a.comn, w.

25 '

yes, sir.

.s

jl 12' 14 i

i i

1 tl

( Laughte r. )

2j CHAIRMAN HENDRIE :

Is a member of the Task Force,

i 3

and this is one for the Working Group to explain, right?

4 MR. S ANDERS :

Righ t.

i l

I 5l And here is another example of what you referred to i

i I

^

l 6 f as gced management -- I would li:<e to defer to other members of the Working Group.

/

3, MR. CARTER:

I will glad to sum up my interpretation 9'

of the Working Group.

10 !

The prcblem there -- FRPPNZ assigns respcnsibilities.

t 11 for varicus categories, and the one that seems to be in cuestien 12 '

was in the disaster area of where you actually had a 1

13 i radiological dispersicn of a large magnitude as to who should i

14 !

be in charge.

l 15 FRPPNZ points cut the Cepartment of Ecusing and i

16 '

Urban Cevelcpment would be in charged of that area.

The 17-Atcmic Energy Act s ays that we have to protect the public la and s afe ry.

That is casically the interpretation for the 19 ccn flict.

20 The legal member of the Task Force is not sure that 21 this is really a valid interpretaticn.

22 We point Oc this as sece:hing we think shculd be 22 lecked at.

24 FRPPNE is advanced by N and others.

We dink we te 3,c usi n.co m n,inc.

25 shculd have a very gecd understanding of the varicus phases

,Eo Q I 330

'j l 13 15 l

i involved and who, in fact, would be in charge and doing what j

in each of the phases,

i es t5 2l i

3 l

l 4l 5i l

6 7'

i 8,

9, 10 i

11 '

12' l

l i

13 i

14.

15 i

i 16 l 17-la i

19 1

20 21 22 23,

24 1

Ac..swerai a.cor ers, im 25

,rn O <i 6 330 u

i 2R 5644 1

1 16 iHITLOCK I

I

-6 mte 1 1ll COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It would be helpful, as we l

i 2

go through this list, if there are matters that are important t

i 3i and less important, if you would indicate the ones that you i

4, think are the most important ones.

i i

I I

Si MR. CARTER:

I would be glad to.

l 6

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I suspect a possible conflict of 7j FRPPNE with the Atomic Energy Act is probably not one of the 3l central and burning issues.

I I

1 1

9l On the other hand, with FIMA coming into existence i

l 10 l and with this plan having been the creature of pecple who are l

l 11 '

new presumably going to be part of the FIMA staf f, I think we l

12 will be dealing with FRPPNE as a planning structure or " Son of

(

13 F RPPNE" for scme time.

And I at beginning to get that feeling i

l I

14 of sinking into an abyss again.

I had the same feeling with i

I 15 lIthe u grade rule a v. ear er two ago.

i i

16 MR. SANDEES :

There is one other connector, and that i

i 17 !

is the provision in the Hart bill, the authorization bill, i

t 13 which calls for the President to develcp a ccmprehensive 19-national contingency plan for respcnding ec radiological 20 accidents.

And_it could well be, if this gces thrc ugh, that 21 the President would designate the director cf FIMA tc do this.

22 And as you suggest, he would use --

23 CHAl_:093 HENDRIE:

He would use scre of this plan, 24 as Vic says, that would burst forth as the response.

sc.-7.:n accomn. inc.

25 MR. S ANDERS :

Frca that point of view, we might have i

y r ')

v JJ

17 i nte 2 i

t I

to be taking it more sericusly in the future.

l i

2i MR. SICKWIT:

We are using -- NRC would be in the I

f 3

lead by statute.

I I

l i

4I MR. SANDERS:

Not for this one, I don't think, sir.

i 1

5 MR. BICKWIT:

For the contingency plan, yes.

I i

I I

6l CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Onward.

l l

I 7l MR. CARTER:

I will have to confess that I was warned i

6 3 !

not to bring FRPPME up.

Now I wish I had headed that advice.

9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I am sorry I knew I about it.

As !

I i

i 10 j long as I was totally ignorant, I could at least that I never II !

heard cf it.

And new pecple want me to answer questions abcut i

t l

12 )

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i i

\\

13 MR. CARTER:

As f ar as the importance of the ones in :

i Id !

the Restensibilitv, / Authority catecorv, A-3 was identified as l

i I

i *c i one cf the 17 issues, stated in a slightly different way.

But j

I 16 i the question of federal funding is addressed in the issues.

I 17!

7 believe that A-4 could 'ce a very important prchlem.

13 I will have to point out that the task force has nec addressed I9 ranking cf these yet.

We haven't entered into chat.

20 CHAI.:. MAN HENDRIE:

Isn' t A-2 ona of che really gut

• 1 issues in the energency plan, or is the state and iccal planning 22 i and response --

23 COMMISSIONER C-IEINSKY :

I don't think sc --

24 '

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

-- action someplace else in the a.:.re a.ocr ri inc.;

2ce 25 list?

t. 't

'i

-y,

't U !

l

• .) v I

i l

r.te 3 18 i

l I

i 1!

This is under category Responsibility / Authority.

i i

MR. CARTER:

Yes.

We touch on others as we go all 2

i, i

3 ',

the way through, licensing and testing.

But the national, l

4 state and local planning ccordination does need improvement.

5.

Yes, it is important.

It may be better to indicate the ones 6'

that are not as important as the others, because all of these l

i f

e 7

are important.

FP2PNE is important if it is adopted by FIMA, a

for example.

9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

It may become a governing nationali

,I

+

10 l framework.

I i

i I

11 '

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But it seems to me this i

12 -

category you cught to flag any instances where ei der govern-j t

12 i ment bcdies don' t have the authority thev. need to develco and i

i i

i l

I 14 I implement emergency plans, or require that they be developed l

t 15,

and implemented, or there are overlaps of authority which are I

f 16,

going to lead to conflict.

17 New, are there such instances dat ycu can point to?

la MR. CAR"'ER :

We will be pointing to dose in 4

19 phase two.

Yes, dere were instances or situations dat 20 caused de working grcup to identify these as a problem, in 21

= v. ceinion, as thev. went thrcugh and defined a syscem and 22 relied en their exrerience. '"he fact that dey put them in the 23 list, and den we discussed dem in de task force indicates 24 that, yes, I dink there is probably scme example behind ac.a.mc a em.n inc. :

25 ;

checsing this as a prchlem area.

t

'l

)JO v'

ste 4 l

19 l

l l

Il We will be prepared and do expect in chase two to i

l.

I 2l delineate as deeply and as concisely as we can what these l

i i

i anc 3

problems are and make recommendations en how to fix tnem, 4!

we will talk about that a little later in the briefing as to l

I 5

hcw we are going to approach that.

l t

(

6l The purpose of shewing this morning the status is I

i 7:

really the thought process and wnere we are in icoking at the i

3, problem areas.

We are really not prepared as a task force to t

I I

9 discuss in much more detail than that the planning process on 10 Slide 8.

l i

f 11 The fragmentation of the planning process is recog-i 12 nized within the agency.

We do need to do something about it.

i i

13 l.

(Slide.)

t l

l 14 '

I think we can.

I think we can make a recommendatzoni i

i 15 ;

or several recc=mendations there.

Manual Chapter 0502, I l

t I

16 '

think you remember, is the incident response manual chapter fori 17 :

I&I.

I nhink we reccgnize that needs expansica in =cre detail, la further develcpment.

Scme of us met with Rcger Mattson's Lessens Learned 19 20 Task Force yesterday.

This was a very central pcint of 21 discussicn.

ISI has a task force going en addressing these 22 types of problems.

We are going to have tc icok at them tc a 23 certain extent.

24

• We are trying to develop a very gecd interface with Ac..;.ensi mecarms. inc.

25,

Reger's task force.

We plan en briefing them cn Tuesday the i

ORg

)[nJO 7

uv

t ste 5 20 i

I i

I i

1:

10th in a working session to sav how far alone we are and l

i a

i i

2 exchange information at that time.

I 3,

I do not think that 3-4 is as important as the otners,

4, we have already discussed.

l I

t

.c !

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Could you elaborate iust a smidge s

t 6

on the coordination of NRC guidance requiring more discipline?

i, 7!

That sounds like a ceded phrase which, if I understood --

I 1

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It sounds te me like another i

l 9,

wav to sav. 3-1.

I I

i 10 ;

MR. CARTER:

It is another way to say 3-1.

We are I,

11 focusing here on the licensin process in 3-3.

The development i

12 of the guidance is fairly well regimented.

The sffices concur.

I 1

13 It is hcw the guidance is applied, the license reviewer's i

i la '

interpretation interfaces with the otner arrices, theinterfacel i

15 with I&E and licensing.

We feel this requires =cre discipline. l l

l 1

16 '

I have to admit, also, that a=cng the task force i

17:

there probably is scme recm for discussicn there and elarcration 13 -

as to hcw that really shakes out.

That is what we hcpe to de 19 in phase two to a certain extent, to elaborate there.

It is 20 just an area that we think we need to focus on.

21 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Io we need an emergency 22 planning research prcgram?

23 MR. CARTER:

I think we need a ccordination similar 24 '

to STAR in the saf eguards area.

That is basically the thcught ra-me,s Recomn, u e.

25 behind that.

Whether or not we need to expend a large sum of "EO P.'d su uJs

i i

ate 6 21 i

l l

I l

I 1,

menev on a.crocram is debatable, of course.

We do need to i

I f.

(

i 2:

coordinate it very tightly.

l i

3i CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:

Is there research now which is i

i I

4, primarily oriented in this direction, or has as its basis i

I 5i emergency planning?

i I

I 6

MR. CARTER:

Jay Durst is the best to speak to that.

7!

MR. DURST:

Very limitediv.

The research has been i

i a

done by DOE, but our effort has been cuite minimal.

i 9

COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

These are systems studies?

i 10 '

MR. DURST:

Of any kind.

We had scme work done bv i

i 11 the probabilistic pecple.

Ecb can give you scme =cre detail, 12 :

I mn sure.

Sun I think it is very limited, is a correct i

I i

13 characterization of what we have done over the last three er i

I i

14 I four vears.

I I

I i

15 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Are you in close tcuch with t

16 what DOE is doing?

i 17 !

MR. DURST:

I would not say close.

In tcuch, but not i

18 clcse.

I am net intimately aware of what their programs are.

19 CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:

What scr of things are going en 20 new that are applicable in the area aa.d have bee.n primarily --

21 have been supported primarily becaase cf interest in the 22 amergency planning area?

23 MR. COLLINe:

ir Chairman and Cermissicner Gilinsky, 24 I think I can tell you about scme of the research that has gene ICS E9Cef 31 9 tOCr+ers, f riC.

25 cn over the last couple of years and is ongoing ncw.

One cf t', ([

') r OJO v

i i

mte '7 22 l i

l the activities that is being conducted by Sandia for us is the l

~

2 1,

lockin9 at accident scenaries to test emercency clans.

We have I

i t

3ll made some prog:,ss in that area.

1 4,i A couple of vears ago, the states came to us and i

i.

I 5

asked us to develop accidert scenarios, standarcized accident l

scenaries that could be used frcm state to state and local 6,

a 7

government to local government.

We are making progress in that And some reports have been publ.ished by Sandia en this 3

area.

9l matter.

There is research going on in the instrumentation 10,

i 11 area.

Breck Haven's radio iodine =cnitor is an example of that.

i 12 That werk was conducting through the Of fice of Research at i

i

-s 1.,,.

State Proc. rams' reques.

'i l

74 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Truly contractual support?

l 1

15 Is research the right label?

l l

16 !

MR. COLLINS:

Well, it is contractual support.

I 17 )

suppose the iodine =cnitor was the closes thing that we came la l to real hardware --

19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Instrument develcpment s cun ds a 2')

bit mere like research -- the development of accident scenaries 2

to use in tests and plans scunds like technical assistance.

2, MR COLLINS:

Ri c. h t, it is a mixed bac..

23 CHAIRMAN HENORIE.

Was that alsc cut of recearch?

24 MR. COLLINS:

Which one was that, sir?

Aa 7,cerat Recor ers, Inc.

25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

The Sandia centract.

1 0! p nrd 3.3 1

i I

ute 8 23 !

l MR. COLLINS:

That was generated at our request and i

l l

2l is beinc jointly pursued by Research and Standards, two I'

3' offices.

They have a piece of that.

The way it went was this:l l

l 4!

Sandia did the basic technical document for the accident 5

scenarics.

This was passed to Standards and Standards is I

i 6{

havin7 a research company in emergency planning convert the i

1 7!

Sandia technical scenario descriptions to useable guidance for 8

state and local governments, in other words a handbeck that 9

they can understand, because ther can' t understand the I

I 10 '

technical Sandia document very well.

I II CHAIRMAN HENDRIT-

'-it is very detai. Led, it is i

12 burdenseme to their emergency planning officers, who have to j

l 13 l break it dcwn into what dces chis mean for a test exercise, I

i Id what dces this mean in terms of the layout fcr the testing.

i i

15 MR. COLLINS:

The Office of Standards piece of i

16 business was converting tne Sandia work into the king's l,'.i English, and there is a couple of other small things like that

,I

'l 18 l going ca.

That is typ ical, thcugh.

I9 CEAIRMAN HEN 2??r:

Yes, but is it -- you knew, de 20 you see -- I can see needs for this scr cf thing from time

• 1 to time.

When the cernent is no ccc dinated emergency planning 22 research program exists, is it clear that there needs c be 23 '!

one, and has anybcdy noted the kinds of things that ought to i

24 be goin, en?

.c..s,c m n ecemn. inc.

2" MR. CARTER:

It has been discussed as the type things i,

JiO

t 5.te 9 2 4,l l

1l were going on.

We just felt that it all needed to be brought I

2 together under one fccus across the emergency planning 3

perspective, considering what was being done by the other I

4.i agencies.

There was really no discussion of, we should recc=-

5 mend a large research progr1=, we should recc==end a specific - :

6' CHAIRMAN EENDRIE :

This.was coordination of what 7'

=ay be applicable, already going on, rather than a thrust for 8

a broad new initiative.

I 9

MR. SCUTH:

I headed up this sc-called working group.

10 I am not tco smart.

I haven't found a way of delegating that i

4 11 l yet.

12 '

(Laughter.)

I i

13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

What vou do is to acccint a l

t 14 l subec==ittee.

15 I (Laughter.)

f 16,

CHAIPl".AN HENDRIE:

That is all I can suggest.

i I

17' MR. SCUTH:

I wculd like to make a ccuple of i

18 ac. c. ree. riate remarks.

The working group had ius a few dav.s 19 to create the analytical f:amewcrk and then critique it.

In 20 the process of critiquing, we had four diff erent c rgani:a ticns 21 involved in it.

22 In the prccess of critiquing, we identified these 23 '

23 prcblem tcpics that concerned us.

We formed pretty T.uch 24 a consensus a=cng us.

There was an exception at times about ac. m usi aeocr n.inc.

25 '

the proble= tcpic.

If it was in sc=ecne's turf area, we i

l

-e i

)JO uJ

I nte 10

,5

~

\\

l i

l 1l didn't necessarily get his concurrence.

But the group in I

i 1

2 general agreed that each of these 28 was a prcblem tcpic of i

l i

i I

3' some sort.

i 4:

We had a hard time even agreeing on the words to I

.t 5.

describe the problem topic.

Having done that, we then set abcut I

t I

6-trying to describe the orchlem tooics.

We have not vet cotten -

7l concurrence on the descriptions.

i S

Furthermcre, we have not yet been able to analyce 9

any of the 28 topics.

In other words, this is essentially a i

10 list of the problems that were apparent to us in one way cr

+

i II :

the other, pretty much at the verbal level.

We wrote some 12 words down that we thought captured the thoughts.

l t

i i

13 :l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

So when I asked you whether you l

i l

i 14 i had in mind broad new programs, you are just ncwhere -- you i

i I

15 are not at a stage yet where you can answe-'

i i

t 16 ;

MR. SCCT:I:

That's right.

I 4

17' CHAIRMAN H ENDRIE :

Ycu don't have an answer to that 13 kind o f a -- that level of questien, detaile.d question.

19 MR. SCCTH:

One other cc= ment --

20 CHAIRMAN HENER E:

Yes, I understand.

21 MR. SCCTH:

Okay.

22 MR. CARTER:

When we get into a dis.cussien of phase 23 two, I thin. you can see hcw we propcse 10 address these.

24 CHAIRC.N HENDRII:

May'e we ought to move briskly c

Ac. %: erne a.cor n, Inc. !

y, along.

e-6 e6 o

,n o i

CR 5644 47 WHITL/ov i

26 !

I i

1-MR. CARTER:

Let's cc to slide 13, then, please.

I 2,

(Slide.)

3 This is to discuss Phase II.

i t

4 CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Coes anybcdy have any action i

5' papers?

6 (Laughter.)

l 7I MR. CARTER:

We are going to do two major thrusts in f

8 Phase II.

We are going to develop a comprehensive plan, as 9

detailed in Mr. Gossick's memorandum, to scope the direction and.

10 pace of emergency planning activities _in both the near term and 11 long term.

I will talk abcut those fcur bullets under the ccm-12 prehensive plan in scme amount of detail. And at the same time,

(

13 -

we are going to address the major issues.

)

1 14 '

In those issues, we will be really taking a :urther I

I i

i 15 '

look at what we send you this week or early next week.

There 16,

will be certain areas, as we will talk about in a later chart, 17 of making recc=mendations and expanding alternatives and things 13 c f that na tur e.

We will discuss that later.

19 But under the ccmprehensive plan, we are going to 20 build on -- slide 14, please.

21 (Slide.)

22 We are gcing to build on the analytical framewcrk, 23 the matrix, the description, and the criticue; we are going to

• 4 build really a brief conceptual acdel.

I think that we need a Ac.a.c ru a.comn. inc.

25 disciplined apprcach :o lecking at the problems in emergency

.c

)

o. v 2 I

27 1 i

l i

l l' planning to try and describe the total process.

There are many i

i ways to go about doing that.

I 3

There is, I would say, significant controversy on the i

4 task force regarding the value of a conceptual =cdel of whether 5

the investment in developing the conceptual model will pay 6:

dividends that will be equal to the investment in the =cdel.

? # eel it is very 7

All I can say is my personal opinion is tha~

3 much needed.

I think that we have scme very kncwledgeable pec-f 9

ple working in the area.

I think, to them, they have their 10 t conceptual model; they can address the problems themselves.

I 11 think what is missing is an ability for the novice such as I

'2 to communicate with that process and with that program.

t, i

13 Therefore, I feel ecmfortable with the development t

I I'

14 of conceptual =cdels.

I think it will serve benefits to the I

15 Commissioners and cther decisionmaking management in NRC as far 16 as budget requests, as far as benefits, and things of that 1

17' nature.

la '

The question could be asked:

Well, will conceptual 19 mcdels do very much for us in the area of Three Mile Island as 20 far as the actual emergency response?

I think this was discussed 21 briefly with Roger's task force yesterday.

I think they are 22 '

correct.

Based on what they knew and what they are analycing, 23 they can prchably take a pretty hard lcck at what is needed for 24 another Three Mile Island-type of situation.

%;.e.ne a.ccmn, inc. :

25 I think what the conceptual =cdel would allcw us to I

5

}hO C' 'U)

o. v 3 23 l

l t

1 do, though, is to link all of the phases, all of the dif ferences l

2; between planning and licensing and implementation and the actual 3

utilization of an emergency plan or a planning system.

i 4:

I have summarized here briefly what I tnink scme of i

5 the functions er benefits of a concectual =cdel will be.

We i

l 6

will be taking a hard look at that in the next few weeks in the 7'

Phase II effort.

Mcpefully, I can convince the task force that a

it is a beneficial process.

9 I would like to discuss the problem tcpics for a 10 mcment, starting with slide 15.

11 (Slide.)

i 12 The problem topics w_re ceded earlier.

The ccdes on i

13 '

the right indicate which problem topic area we think we can do i

i 14 ;

things with.

We think we can take a look au che system frcm the; 15 ;

internal perspective and what can be done to solve these problem 16,

topics, the problem areas from the short term and the near term.

17 -

There are certain paper changes we can make.

For example, the 18 0502 update; take a lock at the acceptance criteria; evaluation 19 criteria; the mechanisms that may be needed within the staff, 20 such as ccordinating groups, as we talked about; locking hard at 21 cur participation in external working eroups.

These are things 22,

that we can fix in a very short peried of time.

We can make 23 hard, firm recenmendations on them.

24,

Then, in the long term, there are institutional

.c. s.w amoc.n. inc, 35 changes that have to be addressed.

Organization of the emergency i

i 3g 15-\\

l '-

ova 29 t,

i 1l planning function within NRC, I think, would be in the long-term 2'

category.

It could be pushed into the short-term category.

3' Some of the short term could go down.

The dash line there is 4

purely a first guess at where these could fall.

i 5

We feel very strongly in the task force that we f

6 should reccmmend to you the attributes of an organization, how 7'

far we can go with the recommendation of where it would actually a

fit, and things of that nature.

That is questionable, but 9

think we can certainly address, and are obligated to address, 10 the organizational question and fragmentation of the emergency 11 planning process.

12 (Slide.)

t 13 Turning then to the external federal perspective, we 14 ' have shcrt-term and long-term things we can do there also, keyed:

1 15 to problem topics.

You will notice these problem topics up here 16 varicus times, scme three and four tines, in bo th the internal 17 and the external.

We can take a hard leck at the joint inter-la agency working groups.

We can either reccmmend establishment c '_

19 estahlish, we can rejuvenate scme, we can try to redirect scme.

l 20 In the long term, we can identify rec.uiremencs for 21 new legislation or suggest a way to icek at various areas in new 22 legislation.

We can take a lcck at reccmmendations and insti-l 23 i tutional arrangements, and, hopefully, necessarily established 24 institutional arrangements.

And there is the external perspec-w.s.e.,. a. con.n.;nc.,

25 tive for state, local, and public.

i90

- ro uo

pv5 30:

1l (Slide.)

i 2,

The areas that can be addressed, the things that we i

3*

can do, are the same between the federal, state, local, and pub 1 i

4' lic.

The problem topics that they are keyed to are scmewhat l

5; different.

And we can take those problem topics, address them 6;

in this perspective, building on the conceptual model and, hope '

7!

fully, hand you scme recc=mendations fc2 the ECO toward the S'

beginning of August.

9 Slide 18 stamarizes.

10 (Slide.)

11 This is what we can do with the issues and the prob-12' lems.

We have identified basically five categories of things 1

13 l the task :orce will do or can do in Phase II.

We can make very ;

i t

14 l firm recc=mendations of a short-term imclementation.

We can I

15, make firm reccmmendations of a long-term implementation.

We can.

i 16 expand the alternatives which we plan to do in the issue area 17 ' with 12 of the issues.

We can address -- we are plannir.g to 18 address one issue in a generic sense.

The problens and the 19 issues do everlap to a certain extent.

20 I have identified about seven issues that will be 21 addressed as we address the problem topics.

We will be making 22 recommendations in these areas, taking a hard 1cck at the pros 22 and cens and the alternatives.

And then there are three of the 24 issues we feel that we cannot address, further.

Cne o f the s e --

s..;,c.n a.cor.n. inc.

c 25 and I can give you the list -- the three that we don ' t feel we

[I JO

s

pv6 t

31 t

t I

can address, really, or shouldn't address, are issue 2, which is 2!

what constitutes an effective emer,ency response plan for state i

3; and local agencies in the issue area.

We feel that is going to 4 :! be addressed quite in detail in the problem area.

So, it will 5

he addressed in the problem area, but not specifically in the i

6!

Issues area.

7 We can transpese what we learn there into a discus-S' sion, I am sure, very easily.

9 But of more importance than that are issues No.

7, 10 !

which is the financial assistancr: to state and local governments'.

11,

There is quite a bit of ongoing effort there.

There is legis-i i

12.

lative activity in this area.

What we nope to do, really, is i

i 13 '

just address the appropriate NRC pcsture there, recogni:o the i

i 14 l cngoing efforts, the work that is done in state programs now, i

15 Dr. Solcmon's work.

So, we will not be driving that one to a l

16 i conclusion.

I 17:

And the other ane is issue 15, which is the issue la i regarding the collegial bcdy question that the Cc=missioners are 19 addressing.

We are sending you scme discussion of that issue.

20 But further addressing of that in Phase II probably would not 21 be of real benefit, cc= pared to the other things we are doing.

22 We will be, when we send ycu the issue package either 23 temcrrow or Monday, we will have a short description of each of 24 the tcpic areas and what we hcpe to approach in there, which kCW I9def 34 A t:Cr*en, Inc. l 23 l wculd be a su==ary of these.

ooh l

3coJO

pv7 32 1!,

(Slide.)

9. ;.

The next chart depicts a first look at an everall I

3 f schedule, which starts with a parallel effort of the notice of a

4 proposed rulemaking which OGC and OPE have under way, the task l

i S' force effort which is under wav new and enterine. Phase II.

We 6:

think the implementation of the short term, the recommendations i

7, of the task force can be ccmpleted in early calendar year

'80.

g The implementation of a long term for scme of the things can 9

4, start in Sec. tember of this.vear, but probably will carrv. cut to 10 March of '91.

Now, that is purely a rough guess.

It is not 11 !

based on very much substance or analysis of what can be done.

12 '

There are more target dates that we would be shcoting for in i

13 the p.anning p:ccess.

I i

i I

14,

Now, the rulemaking effort you mentioned is going 15 ahead parallel.

We are estimating an issuance of that either 16 this week or next week.

The public ccament pericd, 60 days, i

17, we are asscning is still the appropriate number, 13,

Then we have just made very cursory estimates thare, 19 based on histories of rulemaking.

You can see the time we. have 20 put in there to take a lock at the public cc= ment draft and 21 published propcsed rule and ancther publi: cc= ment and then 22 draft and published final rule.

23 My estimate is than we are looking at the first of 24 1981 to have --

sc. ;.c.ru n.ce, en. inc.

25 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Why dces it take 10 months to 7co 10Q Ja0 h/u

eve 33 I

i draft and publAsh a final rule after having gotten public ccm-t 2

ment, drafted and published the proposal, and gotten public ccm-3 ment again?

4, MR. CARTER:

I tcck a lock just at the rules that I i

l 5

was familiar with of a ccmplex nature, and historically it has l

i t

6 taken that long or longer in certain areas.

The Upgrade Rule is i

7

one, a

MR. GCSSICK:

That has colored his thinking.

I 9

CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:

He has worked too much around the 10 Upgrade Rule.

11 MR. GOSSICK:

We 'hould be able to do it faster.

12 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would think so.

t t

13 MR. CARTER :

Spent fuel storage is another one I l

t 14 '

happen to be familiar with.

The time perieds we are 1 coking at '

15 there, it is scmething that can be certainly ccmpressed and i

16 condensed, and should be.

I am trying to show what I thcught 17 was a reasonable estimate based on history.

There are c her la rules that have gone out far faster, o f course.

19 CCMMISSICNER GIIlNSKY:

Well, T._.ce what cur experi-20 ence tells us it has taken in the past.

But it seems to me it 21 cught to be pcssible to do it a let faster.

22 MR. CARTER:

I would agree that is possible, yes.

We-23 can establish target dates.

And Mr. Gossick says we can very i

24 reasonably do that, and we can gc.

%M 89def 34 9tocrter1, Im:. '

25 MR. 3:CKWIT:

There may be pressure frca the Ccngress:.

7Eo 00f J.) O ui

pv9 l

34 t

l 1;

CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

On the Upgrade Rule, there 2'

was not complete agreement as to how much protection there cught 3

to be, and we got ourselves involved in all sorts of special 4<

difficulties having to do with safeguards and classification i

5, threats and all sorts of things.

i 6

MR. CARTER:

That's correct.

7; COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I think this ought to be 8

simpler.

9 MR. GCSSICK:

We would hcpe so.

10 '

CCFMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I see heads shaking there.

Il MR. CARTER:

It is going to be a complex rule.

The 12 17 issues, I think, are very difficult issues to grapple with.

13 i As I said, a personal estinate, not a bet.

i l

14 l (Slide.)

t 15 The last chart in the package is really an expansion 16 of the small, little part in the lef t-hand corner of the previ-17' ous chart, which indicates cur plans to address between new and 18 early August the issues in a very neaningful fashion and the 19 problems in a meaningful fashion.

20 The. cenceptual =cdel, ycu will notice there, we are 21 only devoting two weeks to that.

We realize there is a scint 22 of diminishing return that probably will not gain much past 23 that point.

We are hoping to put really five pecple wcrking as 24 fcr nine working days or 10 werking days and then secp with what 4c.a.e rc n. con.rs. inc..

25 we have there and use that product in addressing the short-tern 7cn ao J.) O o/

pv10 i

35i i

l 1

and the long-term problems.

2; The issue schedule, you can see.

There will be feed-3' back and interplay between the issues and t.he problems as we go 4,

through, especially the seven cc= mon ones that we talked about.

l 5;

That basically concludes my remarks.

I think there l

6 may be members of the task force that would like to make a few end47 7'

remarks, and then any questions that you may have.

8 9

10 l 11 12

(

13 '

i 14 '

I 15 l 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 '

23 24 Ace Foceral Aeocriers, Inc.

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3-t iHITLCCK

-3 mee 1 It COMMISSIC:.ER GILINSKY:

I am pleased to see you I

l i

2 i

taking a fresh approach in icoking at it, sta__ing from basic I

3 principles.

But I would like to see scmething a little more t

1. j tangible.

I suppose as you go on you will develcp that.

At i

i i

5 this early stage you don' t have it yet.

But I would like to 6I. knew that we intend the licensee will ecmmunicate to authoritiesi L,

7' a certain time and certain things will happen, and I still at 3

don' t have that sert of feeling frcm this yet.

I 9,

MR. CARTET:

That is an cbvious creblem that we have. l 4

i 10 'i We have really bee 2. sceping, and we have been planning and j

iccking at issues.

New we have to get dcwn to wor.':.

I 12 i

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

My feeling is when we are l,

I 13 i

all thrcugh, a gced plan is a very simple 7 lan, at it oughtn' t ;

i l *' i to be an over-elaborate thine.

It should who is i

i i

15 responsible for what, and the plan ought to

_s means fer i

16 Ehem to acccmplish what they have to do culckly.

It ought to be shcrt and simple so that everycne invcived can understand 13 19 MR. CARTER:

Yes, I agree.

I think we have got tc 20 be able for the plan to focus the decisienraker on the decisions 21 he has c make, so chat he dces nct get steered c#f into l

22 areas that really do not help him in making the real decision.

~3 We think that we need to identify these decisions in a very

'4 disciplined way, fccus on these decisions and decide hcw these sc.-.,cers a macm, me. :

SC can be worked.

,Ln OI)3 3.>o i

37 ate 2 j'

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes.

And those who have to j

i l

2l carry it cut ultimately have to participate in the prccess of 3l developing this plan.

They have to be intimately familiar with l i

4l it.

I i

5j I semehcw have the impression, at least in some 1

6i states, this task is, in effect, turned over to a contractor i

1 l

that develeps an elaborate plan.

I think that isn' what we 3

want -- a great notebcok or shelf cf notchecks dat is scrt of 9'

a Napoleonic Ccde of emergency planning.

We want to be sure, 10 if there is a prcblem, reccle will work swiftly and understand j

t 11 i what they have to do.

1 12:

MR. CARTER:

That is very gccd guidance.

It is gasy j

13 <'

for sv. stems analysts and planners to bore deep into the detail 14.

and cece back to shew hcw clever they are with a very cremendcus t

I 15 '

notebeck of things that cannot be understecd in the crisis i

16 l peried; yes, sir.

i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Tcm, at the ecment I don't see 17,'

h la '

quite hcw -his effort, which is lccking at emergency planning 19 on a bread base, meshes with what I would expect Oc be NRR's 20 lock in de f airly near-term at what sort of emergency planning al previsions cught to be implemented in the short-ern, where s

22 there are licensing acticns that, scmetime, as we ge dcwn to

m.,

su=mer and fall, we cught to begin to see if we can take.

24 !

And did I recall you saying at cne point that that wwww a.cor m. inc. '

25 aspect was left to the licensing office or --

l

}{0 b

y I

nte 3 38 i

i 1l MR. CARTER:

The members on the task force are i

i 1

l 2

addressing that croblem.

.i l

l 3

Would you like to address that one, you cr Wayne?

i i

I 4

MR. GRIMES:

I am not tco optimistic that this task I

I force process will come out with the specaric cnanges to i

6' emergency plans that need to be done.

I think the task ferce i

7 will probably identify general areas that need to be worked on l

3 by the prcblem offices, that then will take scme longer time.

i I

l 9'

In view of that, I think we will have to do something separate 10 frcm that on th a short-term licensing And the stage of that 11 is, I have drawn up a personal list and passed it around to I'

t 12 a few pecple, and we will be interacting on de office level I

13,

with scme ideas of specific things that ought to be dene before, 1

l 14 :

we license new plants.

i 15 '

And I guess I have also done some thinking abcut what ;

16 the main bottcm lines are dat we have to wcrry about in the 1

17; next six =cnds to eight =cnths.

I am not sure that that kind 18 of thing will come cut of de task force.

I am a little 19 l reluctant on that, I guess, on the cenceptual =cdel.

20 CCMMISSICNER GIC NSKY:

If you have get spmething 21 of dis sort, why isn't dat part of the work cf the task 22 force?

23 '

MR. GRIMZS:

I guess it is nce One way it is framed.

24 It dcesn' t seem te be going to that detail.

s..eerm a.cor.rs. inc. :

c 25,

CHAIRMAN HZNDRII:

Cne of de problems always is, i

f 7 C (O)

D J;

u

39

te k

(

I r

i I

I I

I!

when vou trv. to take a broad and fresh lock, why, vcu -- it t

i I

I 2!

takes a while to work dcwn to the level, then, to work back 3

down frem -- from the broader issues to the level of detail --

i 4'

MR. GRIMES:

I think the planned termination point i

l 5

for the task force would be shorter than that.

It would be 1

l 6,

identifying the problems to be solved, rather than ccming up 7l with the specific pieces of the solution.

I personally see only; I

a very few things that need to be done.

I c an cuickly run 3

9 through a general list, if you are interested in getting an i

10 advanced lock at the kinds of --

)

I 11 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: Specific areas for improvements:

12 right ncw?

I would like to hear what they are.

l I

I3 MR. GRIMES:

Justin, do you have the backup slides l

I# l l cn the.crincical croblems as I see them?

1 15 (Slide.)

l' l

14

~

I have groueed them verv. c.enerally into about four I7 areas.

Cne of them is the fragnenta-' ^

-= ~ was nentioned I3 earlier, both within the NRC licensing process and between the 19 licensee and the state and local plans.

And I think there, "O

that perhaps the best way to -- one pessible way is by 91 indirection to get pecpie togetner, is to give enem c:mmen 22 l cbjectives.

23 One pcssible way is to go the rcute that GAO propcsed, 24 of recuiring concurrence in the state and local plans as a ws.cer a.cor rs, inc.

2"5 condition of the license.

That would force the licensee and n n.

400 l

aa

ate S 40, i

i I

i.

l i

1' state and local people to werk tcgether, and would force the I

t i

2, elements of the agency to work together, also.

3 The other major thing --

i 4,

CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I guess I don't folicw that.

i 5

You have state plans on the one hand and --

6 MR. GRIMES:

If it is a, condition of the license that i

l 7i those plans be gced plans and the licensee has a very large 3

interest in werking with the state and in f act --

9!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Are you satisfied with the i

emerc. en cy c. lanning in the states that have concurred in state 10 Il plans ncw?

l i

12 MR. GRIMES :

Not entirely, no.

i I

i' 13 :

CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

So this would oniv co cart i

14 l I

way toward the solution?

i 15 '

MR. GRIMES:

Right.

And I think one of the other i

16 i things that could be done to solve a number of these general 17 ;

prcblems are joint test exercises between the -- right new the 18 state dces exercises, scmetimes including the local pecple.

I 19 think if the licensee and the NRC response center were fcided 20 into these, sc=etimes we would have a better focus en what the 21 problem areas are.

22 )

A large part of it is cenmunications and understanding 22 cf each other in these varicus locations.

24 In the area of -- I have phrased it " lack of licensee 13J1def 30 R eOQfTtft, I FC.

ci preparedness" and then " lack ef state / local," and then, en 4-358 10$

i

te 6 41 i

I l

l li another slide, " lack of federal preparedness."

That is a I

2l qualitative term.

I guess it doesn' t indicate total inadequacy, i

l i'

3, but iu just says they could be improved in all of these areas.

I 4'

I think we can recuire uegrading of all of the operating ~ clans

\\

t l

5!

to Reg Guide 1.101.

I think that is a pretty common consensus t

6, among the staff, with special emphasis on the action level I

i 7,

criteria -- what you do, when, based en predetermined parameters:,

I 3'

and who you notify at what point.

4 9-I think carts of Re7 Guide 1.97 should be -- the t

10 Lessons Learned Task Force has also pointed out that some of Il the instrumentation to follow the course of an accident cculd 12 '

he improved.

13 !

Reg Guide 1.89, revised, would require qualification I

i l

14 ;

of that instrumentation also.

Again, goint test exercises, I i

15 think, would point out a lot of the problems.

16 l Under state and local preparedness, I guess I have 17 a special interest there.

We will be ccming ec the Cc==ission 13 ;

in about a mendr. with the NRC-EPA task force recccmendation en 19 emergency planning =cnes and critical isctcpes, and the 20.

Cc= mission will have to censider whether it adcpts that as 21 guidance.

If so, that is a step that could be taken.

22 Providing funding -- again, requiring concurrence 23 could upgrade, and again, jcin: test exercises.

24 The last slide has scme NRC --

a :.ni a.w r n.inc.

ics s

23 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

When.vce are talkinc about 358

', 00L

ste 7 l

44 i

t l

i t

1, funding, that isn't going to help between new and several =cnths; l

2 from new, when we have to face questions of --

t 3

MR. GRIMES:

No, this is more of an overall thing i.

4 than necessarily all of these things before the next license J

5l is issued.

I guess subparts of these should be done, I would 6;

say, before the licenses are issued.

l 7;

Lack of federal preparedness.

I think we can pursue 3

the Lessens Learned -- the Mattson Task I'orce :.s delving and l

l 9'

the I&E pecple are delving into the response center adequacies 10 and the cenmand structure.

And my view of the NEC rcle is dat' t

11 we do as mucn as we er: ciently and errectively can, anc you i

i i

t 12 work on the constraints that prevent you from interacting i

l 13 t ef fectivel"a, and those are in the time response adequacy and 1

14 the staff ability to get cur information to analyze and our 15 :

internal cenmand s tructure.

I think if you werk on these i

I 16 areas, ycu do de best you can to put the NEC into the positicn i

l 17 to interact.

13 I don't dink we wil' ever be able to walk in and W>

take cenecl, because of these ccnstraints.

I dink aliccation 20 of other federal agency resourcis is aneder area that we should 21 work cn, either by agreer.ents or by legislation, particularly 22 if we go te push concurrence in all of the states.

This is i

23 done by independent regional adviscry cc=mittees mainly made 24 up of cther federal agencies, and we are going to have tc have sc..;,cw.4 a.comn. inc. '

a5,

pretty firm ccc=itments of nanpcwer.

4

'fh l

go

.)ao e

4

I ate 8 43 I

i i

I li And lastly, I think right new we can f ace up to the i

i 1

I 2:

fact that we need higher resource and criority for emergencv I

3 planning and the varicus elements, and give them -- somehcw i

4-give them higher visibility and push on with what needs to l

I 5

be done.

l i

6 My view is v.ou can't decide on a few thinc.s.

Really,,

i I

7:

it is putting the resources on and celling the reviewers to do l

8 the details.

i I9' I have mentioned concurrence, mandatory concurrence.

10 l I think the Co==ission also cught to consider whether it shculd 11 not new go ahead and publish a rule for cc==ent which would 12,

require that, because I think if we don't by September we will 1

13 ;

crobably have levislation that sav. s tha t anyway.

That is

=v.

l i

1 14 '

reading of talking to the varicus staffs.

l i

i 15,

There are sc=e pessible problems in putting the 16 l penalty on licensees for things that states don't do.

But :

17 think unless we =cve on that, we are going to be tcld what to t

18 do.

17 CCMMISSICNER GLLINSKY:

It sounds like a sensible 20 lisc to me.

But why isn't it --

21 MR. GCSSICK:

They are.

22 '

MR. GRIV"c -

• "ey are all, in a general way, in.

23 But the specifics of what ycu do for the new licenses, for 24 example, whe ther v. ou rec.uire.cerha:s ust the plume exposure d

s ACS Et'dM31 9tOOrMrs, Inc.

25 '

PAGs for the new licenses --

i

)

4

=te 9 44 i

1 1

1 1:

COMMISSIOtER GILINSKY:

You may have sc=ething further'.

i 1

2 But this doesn' t yet get at -- isn't yet at that detailed i

I3' level to --

4, MR. GRIMES:

As I say, this is a personal list with 5

which sc=e may disagree sc=ewhat, because I haven't gotten l

6 cc==ents back frc= pecple.

i 7

There is one other slide, Justin, that gives a a

detailed list of my first thoughts.

The first One conforms i

9' with the Reg Guide 1.101.

I think everybcdy is unanimous on f

10 that, a thercugh review to that Reg Guide.

11 Number two is emergency planning to consider 10-mile i

12 plume EP'.

That would depend on what the Cc==ission does with i

i 13,

the NRC-EPA task force emphasis on action level criteria in i

i l

14 l the review process.

That I mentioned earlier.

15 And then partial instrumentation for wide-range 16 inscuments and cualification of these instruments.

And then, 17 '

state and local.

I think we could probably, again, go to the 18 10-mile :cne.

If we go to a 50-mile cne for new licenses,

19 we are going to overlap a number of states that don't have 20 concurrences.

21 Mest of our new licenses ahcut te be issued

~"e 4-22 ' next six =cnths are eithar in : states with concurrences or very 23 +

near to concurrences.

So I think that kind of thing is 24 prcbably a gcal, if not a requirement to push towards, to have 4c. s.eers m.oe,.n.inc.

25 all of these essential elements in place.

'05 ic o J.J O I U

t I

see 10 45 l

I, I

I' And then I think one thing we should think about is i

2 an exercise of the state and local plans with the licensee and l

l i

3 NRC participation fairly early in plant life, to establish l

4' that everybcdy has been through the thinking process once, at i

5, least to the extent of conmunications.

I don't knew if we can i

i 6

go to the extent of =chilizing people to go out and take readings 7

er whatever; but at least to conmunicatiens and getting pecple e-a 3

to their duty stations.

I I

10 I

11 1

12 13 ;

i Id l

1 l

I 15 16 17' la 19 20 21 22 23 24

% 3-4Wer39 A t00r*srt, Inc.

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CR 5644 -

46 Whiticek t9 i

I

$11 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

For myself, I was -- I hcpc 1l i

2 this will cet fed into the Task Force prccess, because I was 3

lecking to the Task Force for guidance en hcw to deal with 4

the applications for operating licenses that are upccaing in i

5 ;l the ccming few =cnths.

i 6

And we

.m not going to have this rulemaking process 7:

ccepleted for s c=e

ire, even if we it de it f aster than laid a

out he re.

t 9

So I don't knew exactly hcw ycu are getting it 10 organized, hcw ycu are working it cut, Lee, but I would like I

11 to have :taff reccmmendations scen.

12-MR. GCSSICK:

That is our intent.

13 {

COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Cn essentially interim 14 requirements, en emergency preparedness.

15 ;

MR. CARTER:

That is our cbjective.

16 MR. GCSSICK :

That is exactly what we intended, 17 including these and other things that have been discussed hcre.

la CCMM'SSICNER GILINSKY :

During the period, until 19 we have a final rv' a.

20 MR. GCSSICK :

Again, as ycu say, we ccce tc you with 21 the recccmendaticns.

It wasn ' t p lanned, I dcn't think, the 22 thcught th at the Task Fcree itself is going to de all of the 23 things.

There 's gcing to 're packages of things 24 CCFv'< <'#UER GIIINSKY :

Ch, no, no, no, no.

Buc it ac=J eerei neoor en. inc.

25 seems to me the Task Fcree needs to lay cut a set of propcsed

,c

)g.,db b

i

47 jl 2,

i 1

1, requirements that would supplement er mcdifv;what we new have

\\

2l cn the bccks would require it.

3 MR. CARTER:

As indicated en Chart 19, i f you still 4

h ave th at h andy, Jus tin, in the shcrt term, we hcpe to make 5,

very firm, specific reccmmendations there as to what should 6,

be changed.

7-For example, the reccmmendation on the adequacy of 10 1; for example, if you make the assumption that 101 is 9

adequate and satis f actory, you can approach -- Brian 's 10 approach very comfortably.

We would like to lock at 10 1, I 11 think and make a reccceendaticn as to whether or not we 12 feel it is adquate.

l 13 l And then these implementations will be, I think, i

i i

14 ;

very specific -- the reccmmendaticns, very specific, t

15 '

CCMh2SSICNER GILINSKY:

I don't kncw that B ri an 's 16 reccmmendations are exactly the right enes, but I hcpe your i

17,

group is going to do this.

13 MR. CARTER:

We will be addressing this.

19 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY -

Giving attentien to then 2c and give.them critiquing and supplement them in any way thac 21 ' you feel apprcpriate.

22 MR. GCSSICK:

Tcm, maybe you cught to address, i.-

23 the August 3 final report en shcr term -- could you jusc 24 deceribe what that is going to 1cck like, what it is gcing tc ice 8edefst ASCCr' art, Inc.,

25 include, what it will nct include?

358 108

ji 3..

i 43 i

i, i

i I

MR. CARTER:

It is depicted on Chart 20, Justin.

i 2i

( S lide. )

3 The August 3rd repcrt will include a detailed dis-4, cussien of the issues as f ar as reccamendations in ce rtain I

5 enes and expansica of alternatives, and the pres and cens of i

6' those alternatives en certain enes.

7 And then we will have what we have -- what 3

Mr. Gessick called the ccmprehensive emergency plan for i

9 emergency planning to really enccmpass the secpe and direction 10 of emergency planning e f forts within the staf f.

Il There will be very specific reccmmendat:cns on each 12 cf these prcblem areas, cr more problem areas if they ccme up, i

13 ;

as we go through the conceptual =cdel and others, with 1

I i

I8 specific recc=mendations en hcw they should be implemented in 15 the short term and the icng term.

i 16 In scme cases we vill probably recccmend specific 1<'

changes to the way things are dcne, er augmentation of the 13 way things are dcne.

I9 And in other areas we will have to identify very

,0 specific tasks that shculd be undertaken and reccamended be 2

i 21 taken by the program of fice rs.

22 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Are you going to take up 23 the organizational cuestions within the Ccemissien?

'# 4 MR. CARTER:

The organizaticn of the Staif.

Ace ; c.,u m eoo, e,s. ix.

ac CCMMISSICNER GILINSRY:

Of.he emergency iO'

)

b 3

g v

~0 s

ji 4 49

^

l 1

preparedness --

2, MR. CARTER:

Collegial body.

i 1

3 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY : -- within the Cctmissicn, l

4; should they be ccnfigured as they are new?

Should they be i

5' cctbined?

Should they be put somewhere else?

6 MR. CARTER:

I believe.we can address very rigorously 7

the attributes of an organizaticn to carry cut emergency 3

preparedness in the Staf f.

9 I am reminded of the safeguards censolidaticn work 10 that has been undertaken the lasc few =cnths.

I chink we 11 run into these same turf problems.

I think ycu run into the 12 same emotional prcblems when we do it.

13 !

As to whether we con make a final recc=mendation i

1 1

14 that should be here or there, that is dif icult to do.

l 15 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

You may not want to get th at i

16 specific but, as you say, you may want to say, whatever is 17' done, it cught to have the f olicwing characte ris tics.

la MR. CARTER:

That is what we hcpe to do, yes -- ve ry 19 de finitely.

20 MR. GCSSICK:

And the pluses and minuses cf dif ferenc-21 coarses of acticn.

C n yu o a m... R m--.-,.I:n.L.,..

,, e o.

n z.

ma 23 MR. GCSSICK:

Yes.

24 CHA*F_v.AN HENDRIE :

Very gccd.

Ac.;,cer m.ocr in, inc.

25 :

Brian, why don' t you dig up ccpies of these slides 358 110

50 I

4, e

.~

I 1,

that you flashed?

2, I would like a ecpy.

I suspect Vic would.

3 MR. GRIMES:

Yes.

4l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE :

We wish the Task Force and the i

5 Working Group, and its asserted cc=mittees, well.

It is an 6

important subject, and we appreciate the brie fing.

i 7'

Thank you very much.

3 MR. CARTER:

Thank ycu.

9 CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:

Thank you ver/ much.

10 (Whereupen at 12:05 p.m.,

the hearing was 11 adj curned. )

.d t9 12 13 14 '

1 15 16 17 la 19 20 21 56 23 24 sc s :erei necer-en. W.

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