ML19224D382
| ML19224D382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1979 |
| From: | Johnson W, Spangler R, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224D377 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-79-07, 50-313-79-7, 50-368-79-07, 50-368-79-7, NUDOCS 7907120007 | |
| Download: ML19224D382 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1979007
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report Nos. 50-313/79-07 50-368/79-07 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 50-368 NPF-6 Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arhnsas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: March 19 through April 13, 1979 Inspectors: //// vv h +/ So/79 W. D. J son, Reactor Inspector Date ' UebM A b~udd V/c?7/79 R. G. Spangler, Seact#r Inspector Ddte / Y k-f*2. 79 J. I Tapia, Rea or Inspector Date ' >~h k JK 9/s7/79 D. L.' Kel rey , T<eabtdr/ Ins ctP Dath '
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<A6 g A . 8. Rosenberg, Reactor Inspector (Yate ~ 67) Yb7b7 p.D. Gilbert,Reactorinspector Dste / 330 177 7907120,D D 7 fg
2 ' bl lf . P. Tomlinson, Reactor Inspector Da'te / Approved by: h N_ f//[77 T. F. Uesterman, Chief, Reactor Projects Datt / Section Inspection Summary Inspection conducted during period of March 19 through April 13, 1979 (Report No. 50-313/79-07) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of previously identified inspection items, previous items of noncompliance, plant operations, fire prevention / protection, preparation for refueling, refueling activities, reactor building containment integrated leak rate test report, inservice inspection, and IE Bulletins and Circulars. The inspection involved 221 inspector-hours on-site by seven (7) NRC inspectors. Results: Within the eight areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified (infraction - failure to adhere to procedures, paragraphs 5 and 7). Inspection conducted during period of March 19 through April 13, 1979 (Report No. 50-368/79-07) Areas Inspected: Ruutine, announced inspection of previously identified inspection items, previous items of noncompliance, plant operations, fire prevention / protection, and licensee event reports. The inspection involved 53 inspector-hours on-site by two (2) h3C inspectors. Results: Within the five areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified (infraction - failure to adhere to procedure, paragraph 7). --o
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3 Detai'.s 1. Persons Contacted Arkansas Power & Light Company Employees J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO Plant Manager G. H. Miller, Engineering & Technical Support Manager L. Alexander, QC Engineer B. A. Baker, Operations Superintendent T. N. Cogburn, Nuclear Engineer E. C. Ewing, Production Startup Supervisor D. R. Hamblin, QC Engineer T. Holcomb, Scheduler P. Jones, Maintenance Supervisor S. M. Strasner, QC Technician B. A. Terwilliger, Operations and Maintenance Manager J. Robertson, ANO-1 Operations Supervisor S. Petzel, Licensing Engineer F. Foster, Plant Administrative Manager M. Stroud, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor J. Lowman, Assistant I&C Supervisor R. Elder, I&C Supervisor R. Tucker, Assistant I&C Supervisor J. McWilliams, Planning & Scheduling Supervisor R. Beta, QA Engineer J. Brown, QA Engineer J. Vandergrif t, Training Supervisor T. Green, Training Coordinator D. Trimble, Licensing Manager F. Boswell, Safety and Fire Prevention Coordinator C. Shively, Plant Performance Engineer C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor J. 7ay, QC Inspector 2. Plant Status Unit 1 The plant was shutdown March 30, 1979, for a planned refueling outage. Unit 2 The plant shutdown following testing at the 20% power plateau. 330 179
4 3. Inspection Follow-up on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Intraction (Inspection Report 50-313/78-04, paragraph 3): Failure to record neutron count rate following the loading of a fuel assembly into the care. Appendix D to revision 3 of procedure 1502.04, Refueling Shuffle, has been modified to include a blank for recording the neutron count rate following the insertion of fresh fuel into the core. (Closed) Infraction (Inspection Report 50-313/78-u4, paragraph 3): De-energization of a channel of source range instrumentation during refueling onerations. Procedure 1502.04, Refueling Shuffle, revision 3 now contains a step 6.26 requiring that a caution tag be placed on the startup range instrumentation prior to starting refueling operations. (Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-313/78-04, paragraph 3): Procedure 1502.04 allows changea to Appendix D, Shaffle Sequence, at the authorization of only the Shift Supervisor. Step 4.21 of revision 3 to procedure 1502.04, Refueling Shuffle, now requires that the shift supervisor and nuclear engineer on the shift both approve changes to the refueling shufile sequence. (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-313/77-03) Inability to measure large leakage rate due to limitations of test equipment. The licensee has purchased additional equipment and has develaped calculational and test procedures for quantifying leakage rates up to 50,000 secm. This matter is considered closed. (0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-313/77-03) Local leakage rate testing of isolation valves from the back side. During a previous inspection (50-313/78-08), several piping modifications to alleviate this situation were reviewed. During this inspection, an Appendix J exemption request, dated March 28, 1979, was reviewed. This r.itter will remain open pending resalution of the exemption request. (Closed) Open Item 368/79-02-11 (Inspection Report 79-02, paragraph 13.d): Degraded voltage event. The licensee has performed a review and evaluation of the degraded voltage event which occurred on January 31, 1979, and has distributed an internal memorandum, ANO-0708, describing the event. A opy of this memorandum is attached to this report (Exhibit A). 330 i30 .
. 5 4. Licensee Event Follow-up (Unit 2) Licensee Event Rrjart 78-32 was reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. This review included consideration of corrective action, operational safety, reporting requirements and licensee administrative review of the event. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. 5. Review of Plant Operations (Unit 1) The inspector conducted a review of ANO Unit 1 operations logs and records for the first quatter of 1979. In addition, the current status of the plant was reviewed by disucssions with the operators and the shift supervisor and by a tour of accessible spaces. Within the area of logs and records, the inspector found tbat the following jumpers were not shown to be removed in the Jumper and Bypass Log, when in fact, they had been lifted: Log Tag Date Sheet Number Installed Reason 395 79-24 2/14/79 Installed per RPS Channel 'B' Test 1304.48 392 79-16-1 1/24/79 Installed per RPS 79-16-2 Channel 'D' Test 1304.40 79-16-3 79-16-4 Procedure 1005.04, revision 3, Control and Use of Bypasses and Jumpers, states in part, "6.1.6 When the purpose of the lif ted wire, jumper, or bypass has been fulfilled, place the circui; in a safe condition and temove the bypass or j amper or reinstate the lifted wire. "A verification of removal of a jumper or bypass or the reinstatement of a lif t.ed lead is to be carried out and documentr.d in a siailar manner as delineated in Sec*. ion 6.1.4 concerning tha installation of jumper bypasses and lifted leads. "6.1.7 Return the yellow CAUTION card to the shift supervisor and sign the Restored column in the Bypass and Jumper Log." 30 'BI i
6 Paragraph 6.8.1 of the facility technical specifications requires that written administrative procedures for the control of jumpers and by- passes be established and implemented. The failure to adhere t.o the requirements of procedure 1005.04, as quoted above, constitutes an item of noncompliance at the infraction level. The removal entry for each bypass tag noted above, was completed prior to the completion of this inspection. In addition, the inspector noted that the licen<ce had conducted documented training sessions among cra f t personnel on the use of procedure 1005.04, and that this training was conducted subsequent to the dates of occurrence of the infractions. In view of this, the inspector feels that the requirements of CFR 10.2.201 have been satisfied and the licensee was informed at the exit meeting that no reply to this item of noncompliance will be required. The following items were found during the inspectors plant tour: The chemical fire extinguisher (number 24) located in tF e electrical equipment room at elevation 368, was found to have been last inspected on February 5,1979. It appeared on the basis of other fire extin- guisher dated inspections that the March inspection had been completed in the first week of the month and this equipment may have been missed. The inspection of this equipment will remain as an open item (313/79-07- 01). During the March 21 tour of the Engineered Safety Features A3 and A4 switchgear rooms, the inspector found that the craft personnel working in this area did not have an Ignition Source Permit. The job in pro- gress was being conducted under Bechtel Work Request (BWR) 1-78-60 dated November 13, 1978, for DCR 589 (Installat. ion of chillers in the A3 and A4 switchgear rooms). Some welding had occurred and the inspec- tor latet observed a grinding operation in progress. ANO Procedure 1005.18 revision 0, Control of Ignition Sources, states: 1.0 PURPOSE To establish administrative guidelines to prot.ect safety relat.ed equipment from fire damage or loss resulting from work involving ignition sources, such as welding, cutting, grinding, or onen flame work. Furthermore, this procedure requires: 3.3 Cognizant Supervi;or NOTE: For clarification, the " Cognizant. Supervisor" is that AP&L supervisor who is directing or supervising the activit.y that causes a need for an Ignition Source Permit (Attachment.1). iO9 "3 "3 pe iu'
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_ .._ ______ _ ___ ___ ___ 7 3.3.1 Shell inspect the work site prior to commencement of work involving ignition sources to determine the fire precautions necessary for the safe performance of cut- ting, welding, grinding or other open flame work. This inspection shall be used to complete the Ignition Source Permit. 3.3.2 Shall fill out an ignition source permit and ensure the requirements of the permit are understood and complied with by the person performing the work. 3.3.3 Shall ensure the final check-up inspection is completed and the completed permit is forwarded to the Records Supervisor for filing. The inspector did find that a fire watch had been posted and that pre- cautions such as the hanging of fire shields, had been taken by the craft personnel involvea. Technical Specification 6.8.1 of the license DPR-51 requires that pro- cedures administering the fire protection program be established and implemented. The failure to follow the requirements of procedure 1005.18 constitutes an item of noncompliance at the infraction level. The inspector had no other notable findings in this area. 6. Review of Plant Operations (Unit 2) The inspector reviewed plant logs and records to verify conformance to plant procedures and to confirm that technical specifications were met. The inspector also conducted a plant tour of accessible areus to observe general housekeeping and to verify selected component con- figurations. The following logs and records for January through March 1979, were reviewed: Fire Protection Alarm Status Log Shift Area Monitor Logs (March only) Shutdown Log (February and March only) Auxiliary Operator's Outside Log Auxiliary Operator's Log Waste Control Operator's Log (March only) Control Room Log (January only) Unit 2 Station Log Nonconformance Repo_ts 330 135
8 The inspector verified that the operating orders did not conflict with the intent of the Technical Specification requirements and that the Abnormal Plant Ccndition Reports contained no noncompliance items which involved technical specification reporting or LC0 requirements. The inspr.ctor noted that Standing Order 32, Fire Brigade, appeared to be outdnted. This is an open item (368/79-07-01). The following general observations were made during the plant tour: No excessive fluid leaks or piping vibrations were observed. . Seismic restraints and pipe hangers appeared to be in satisfactory . condition. Selected valves were observed to be in the required positions. . Selected equipment caution and hold tags were verified to be . correct. Control room operators were knowledgeable in annunciator status. . Selected recorders were recording properly. . Radiation controls were observed to be established properly. . Control room manning was in accordance with Technical Specifications. . No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. 7. Fire Prevention / Protection (Units 1 and 2) A. Fire Protection / Prevention Program The inspector reviewed the following elements of the licensee's fire protection / prevention program to determine compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.120, NRC Branch Technical Position BTP 9.5-1, licensee commitments and the Facility Technical Specifications: - Functional responsibilities and lines of communication for onsite and offsite organizations Administrative Controls - Administrative Procedures - - Fire-fighting procedures and pre-fire plans 330 iBb
9 - Fire brigade training and personnel qualifications - Review of records The following procedures were reviewed by the inspector: - 1005.17, Control of Combustibles, revision 0, June 19, 1978 - 1005.18, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 0, June 19, 1978 - 1005.19, Fire Brigade Training, revision 0, November 30, 1978 - 1005.20, Fire Brigade Organization and Responsibilities, revision 0, January 9,1979 - 1202.38, Fire or Explosion, revision 0, January 9,1979 Within the areas reviewed, the inspector identified three problem or potential problem areas. These areas are: Unresolved Item 368/313/79-07-02. The definition of ignition source in procedure 1005.18 does not take into consideration ignition sources with respect to the atmospheric conditions in which they are used. The licensee has been requested to redefine the term " ignition source" taking this into consid- eration. Open item 368/313/79-07-03. The licensee has been requested to re-examine the responsibilities of the shift supervisor during a fire emergency. The shif t supervisor may be respon- sible for fighting the fire or insuring the plant is in a safe condition. Open item 368/313/79-07-04. The licensee has been requested to review his pre-fire plans to verify that any toxic or other hazardous combustion products have been identified for each fire zone. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. 33T) i87
10 B. Implementation of Fire Protection SER, Section 3 (Table 3.1) The inspector reviewed the Unit 1 and 2 Fire Protection SER to verify that those items scheduled for implementation on or before April 2, 1979, had been accomplished as per the scheduled dates indicated on Table 3.1 of the licensee's Fire Protection SER. The inspector noted that with the exception of the items listed below, all items due implementation on or before the above date have been implemented: Unit 1 Item 3.18, Control of Fire Doors - computer monitor not complete Unit 2 Item 3.3, Protection from Water Spray - change granted by NRR Item 3.19, Contrei of Fire Doors - comrater monitor not complete These three items will remain open until completed. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. C. Unit I and Unit 2 Facility Inspection The inspector toured accessible areas of both Units 1 and 2 to ascertain that the general housekeeping, control of combustibles and control of ignition sources was in accordance with the licen- see's commitments and procedures. The inspector's observations were that, in general, the general housekeeping needs improvement and that in four separate areas, the control of combustibles and maintenance debris was in vari- ance with procedure 1005.17, Control of Combustibles, revision 0, July 19, 1978. Section 4.3.3 of the above procedure requires that the work sites in safety related areas be inspected and all unnecessary debris, waste, scrap, rags, and other combustibles be removed each 24 hours and at the end of the job. In the following areas, the inspector noted that there was n, work in progress for at least 48 hours and the debris had not been removed: 330 188
- . . - . - 11 (1) Unit 1 Control Room, Panels C-14, C-16, and C-19 had paper towels, chart paper, and cigarette butts in them. (2) Unit 2 upper and lower north Electrical Penetration Rooms had cable insulation and wrappings in them. (3) Unit 1 lower south Electrical Penetration Room had rags and other debris in it. This failure to maintain the cleanliness of the areas as pre- scribed in the above mentioned procedure, is an apparent item of noncompliance. D. Fire Protection / Prevention QA Program Unresolved Item 313/368/79-07-05. The inspector was unable to determine the extent or content of the licensee's QA program as it pertains to the fire protection / prevention program. The licensee is requested to provide the following information: What are the " applicable portions" or " sections" of the QA Topical, Fire Protection Plan and Technical Specifications that apply to the Fire Protection / Prevention Program? 8. Preparation for Refueling (Unit 1) . The inspectors witnessed portions of the receipt, inspection and storage of new fuel and found that this evolution was conducted in accordance with the approved procedure 1503.02, Fresh Fuel Inspection, revision 1 with one permanent change. In addition, the inspector verified that the licensee had approved revision 3 to procedure 1502.04, Refueling Shuffle, which includes the cycle four fuel transfer sequence and core verification. No items of noncompliance or deviations were id ntified in this area. 9. Refueling Activities (Unit 1) The inspector verified that surveillance testing involving the following pre-refueling activities have been completed: Technical Specification requirements - T.S. 4.17.4 . T.S. 3.8.1 thru 3.8.7 T.S. 3.8.10 thru 3.8.12 Refueling machine operation . Ventilation requirements in the fuel storage area . 30 iB9 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -
12 Refueling interlocks . Crane testing . Refueling deck radiation monitors . Communications systems . Spent fuel cooling . No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. 10. Review of Reactor Building Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (RB CILRT) Peport (Unit 1) The IE inspectors reviewed the RB CILRT Report dated May 8, 1978, and the addenda dated October 8, 1978. The IE inspectors verified the accuracy of the report data against the raw test data for ten data points of the CILRT. Also reviewed were local leakage rate data. The data reviewed indicated that CILRT Report was an accurate repre- sentation of the actual tests. During review of the RB CILRT the IE inspectors noted that containment penetrations V-1 and V-2 had shown excessive leakage for two consecu- tive annual tests as follows: Penetration Test Date Leakage Found Leakage Left V-1 3/4/78 50,000 seem 147.3 sccm V-1 2/22/77 50,000 sccm 104.3 scem V-2 3/7/78 50,000 sccm 83.6 sccm V-2 2/25/77 50,000 sccm 0.0 It was pointed out to the licensee's representatives that, considering the history of penetrations V-1 and V-2, it would be prudent to con- sider an increased inspection frequency for V-1 and V-2. Increased inspection frequency could better assure containment integrity. This matter is considered an open item (313/79-07-06). 11. Inservice Inspection (Unit 1) 330 i c)0 A. Program Review The IE inspector reviewed the 1979 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Manual for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I which was approved by AP&L on March 29, 1979. The 1979 ISI Manual has been updated to imple- ment the 1974 Edition of the ASME B&PV Code including addenda through summer 1975. The nondestructive examination procedures incorporated as part of the 1979 ISI Manual have been approved by a B&W Level III examiner as being in compliance with Sections III, V, and XI of the ASME B&PV Code, 1974 Edition through summer
t3 1975 addenda. In the areas inspected, no discrepancies were noted between the 1979 ISI Manual and requirements of Technical Specification 4.2.2 and the ASME B&PV Code. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. B. Data Review and Evaluation The IE inspector reviewed B&W Inservice Inspection Procedure No. ISI-240, revision 3 for liquid penetrant examination along with the records of inapection for pressurizer spray line joint No. AH-15 for compliance with the requiremen~ s of ASME B&PV Code, section XI. Also checked during this re iew, were the batch certifications for penetrant materials ied aad qualifications of personnel performing the examination. The IE inspector reviewed B&W Inservice Inspection Procedure No. ISI-120, revision 6, for ultrasonic examination of piping along with the records of inspection for pressurizer surge line joint No. PSL-5 for compliance wiht the requirements of ASME B&PV Code, section XI. Also checked during this review, were equi.pment calibration records, material certifications and quali.fications of personnel performing the examination. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. C. Observation of Work Activities The IE inspector witnessed the calibration and manual ultrasonic examination of a butt weld in the "A" main steam line, joint No. MSA-64, per procedure ISI-120, revision 6. Reportable indications were found and recorded on the inspection data sheet. The in- spection equipment, technique, personnel and calibration for the areas inspected complied with the procedure and sections V and XI requirements of ASME B&PV Code (1974 edition with addenda through summer 1975). ' . No items of notcompliance or deviations were identified. 12. Review of IE Bulletins and Circulars (Unit 1) The inspector discussed with licensee representatives their response to IE Bulletin 79-01, Environmental Qualification of class IE equipment. In addition, the licensee's action with regard to the following circu- lars were reviewed: 78-16 Limiterque Valve Operators 78-17 Inadequate "uard Training 330 191
. 14 The inspector had no findings in this area. 13. Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletin 79-05A (Unit 1) IE Bulletin 79-05, " Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island" was issued on April 1, 1979. Additional requirements for licensees with Babcock and Wilcox nuclear steam supply systems were set forth in supplement bulletin 79-05A issued on April 5,1979. During this inspection, the inspector began his review of the licensee's actions taken in response to this bulletin. A. Onsite Review of Operator Training The inspector verified the following by review of training records and by discussions with licensed operators: (1) That operators are aware of the specific details of the incident to the extent available. (2) That all operators have been instructed on th? specific meas- ures which provide assurance that engineered sefety features would be available if required, in particular, measures for returning such systems to operable status following mainten- ance and testing. (3) That all operators have been instructe:' on the specific and detailed measures to assure that automatic actuations of emergency safety features are not overridden. (4) That all operators have reviewed plant tuiomatic actions initiated by reset of engineered safety features, that could affect the control of radioactive liquids and gasces. During the next inspection, the inspector will verify that opera- tors have received training on all emergency, operating and admin- istrative procedure changes initiated as a result of the Three Mile Island incident and IE Bulletin 79-05A. B. Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) The inspector reviewed valve / breaker / switch alignment procedures for certain ESF systems against current Piping and Instrumenta- tion Drawings (P&ID's) to verify the adequacy of the licensee's alignment procedurca. The systems reviewed are listed below: [) 0 I92
15 High Pressure Injection Low Pressure Injection Core Flooding System Reactor Building Cooling System Reactor Building Spray System Reactor Building Penetration Room Ventilation Svetem Hydrogen Purge System Emergency Feedwater System References for this review consisted of the following procedures and P&ID's. 1104.02 Revision 5, PC 3 1104.04 Revision 5, PC 1 1104.01 Revision 3, PC 2 1104.33 Revision 4, PC 4 1104.05 Revision 6 1104.43 Revision 0, PC 3 1102.01 Attachments D and F, Revision 5, PC 6 1106.06 Revision 3, PC 3 1107.01 Checklists, Revision 2, PC 6 M231 Revision 16B M232 Revision 14 M23J Revision 13 M236 Revision 12C M261 Sheet 1, Revision 10 M261 Sheet 2, Revision 5 M264 Revision 5 M204 Revision 20B M206 Revision 17A M212 Sheet 1, Revision 18 M212 Sheet 2, kevision 4C M210 Revision 16D M205 Sheet 1, Revision 2 The following apparent discrepancies (Open Item 313/79-07-07) were pointed out to licensee representatives: (1) Operating Procedure 1107.01 Checklist G: . Breaser 5171 was listed for Control Valve (CV) 2410. a. This breaker is for CV 2401, Reactor Building Spray Pump P35A discharge valve. b. Breaker 6252 for SV-7413 was listed with its desired position as "open." This breaker should be closed since it powers the solenoid which allows a reactor building cooling system bypass damper to open upon safeguards actuation. 7
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16 Breaker 5134 was listed as a spare with its desired c. position as "open." This breaker serves CV-2815 and it should be closeo. CV-2815 is a steam driven emer- gency feedwater pump recirculation valve. The same problem existed for breaker 6134 and CF-2816, the other recirculation valve. (2) Cperating Procedure 1104.01, Attachment A - This procedure contained a typographical error in a footnote which resulted in stating that CV-2415 and CV-2419, the Core Flood Tank isolati(, valves, will be closed when reactor coolant system pres ure is greater than 700 psig. (3) Operating Procedure 1104.33 - Step 8.3.4 of this procedure sbould include a requirement to open CV-7446, a hydorgen purge system containment isolation valve, when placing the hydorgen purge system into operation. (4) Operating Procedure 1102.01, Attacit ent F - CPV-13 and CPV-14, the penetration room ventilation fan discharge valves, should be added to the Category E valve list. (5) Operating Procedure 1106.06 - Section 6.3.2 of this procedure contains a typographical error. This step should require closing CV-2620 instead of CV-2626. (6) Operating Procedure 1106.06, Attachment A - This valve align- ment should list FW-11B, the P7B discharge to the condensate storage tank, as locked closed. This valve should also be added to the Category E valve list of OP 1102.01, Attachment F. Licensee representatives have informed the inspector the.c they do not utilize " independent verification" of valve / breaker / switch alignments when performing those alignments following extended outages and after maintenance / test activities. C. Inspector Discussions with Licensed Operators The inspector conducted shift crew discussions wi' licensed operators of Unit 1 or spril 8 and 9, 1979. The 41owing items were covered during these discussions: Six speci.ic contributing factors as described on Page 1 and . 2 of IE Bulletin 79-05A. Preliminary Chronology as provided by Enclosure 1 to IE Bul- . letin 79-05A. 330 i 4
-17- Seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous blocking . cf both auxiliary feedwater trains. Need for prompt reporting of serious events to NRC. . Necessity to avoid premature resetting of ESF systems in- . cluding core cooling systems, and containment isolation sys- tem. Need to avoid premature tripping of reactor coolant pumps . during transients requiring forced core flow. 14. Unresolved Item (Units 1 and 2) Unresolved items are mattu _ about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or deviations. There were two (2) unresolved items identified during this inspection. (Details, paragraph 7). 15. Exit Meeting (Units 1 and 2) Exit meetings were conducted on March 23 and 30, and April 5, 6 and 13, 1979, with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant Manager) and other members of the AP&L staff. J g ?)hb ' '
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A AKANSAS POWER S. LIGHT C M PANY INTRA COMPANY CO A AEspONDENCE Arkansas Nuclear One Russellville, Arkansas March 14, 1979 g%; e'" ANO-0708 MEMORANDUM TO: File . FRCM: B. A. Baker - SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One Incident Report - Voltage Dip on . 4160V. System, January 31, 1979 Description of Incident: During plant startup, "A" MFW pump was rolled up to speed @ * 10:40, January 31, 1919. During the course of establishing main FU flow to the steam generators and te.minating emergency feed operations, a low-suction pressure condition ( < 600 psig) occurred on the main FW pump resulting in the auto start of all but the running condensate pump @ 11:45, same date. This simultaneous start of A, B and D condensati: pumps caused a current surge on the 4160V. busses which lowered the voltages on 2A-3 and 2A-4 ES busses to below the undervoltage relays' (127-2A3, 127 2A3, 127-2A4 & 127-2A4) settings. These relays A B A B energized undervoltage relays X-1 through 4 in each bus scheme. The ES 4160V. bus auxiliary relays tripped out all running ES motors and caused an auto start of both emergency diesel "A" HPSI pump was running to support SIT . filling generators. operations, IP-7B emergency FW pump was operating, and "A" and "B" SW pumps were running to support routine opr. ration; all tripped out instantly on undervoltage relaying. both SW pumps re-started through interlocks with the emergency diesel generators. The normal feeder breakers A-309 and A-409 did not trip open due to voltage sensed by the 127 relays rising above their setpoints within the 2-second time delays in their undervoltage trip schemes, probably because of the loss of bus loading resulting from ES motor trips. Since the normal bus feeder -- breakers did not open, the emergency diesel generator output 330 4q6 breakers did not close onto the busses. ,, EXHIBIT A
., File March 14, 1979 ANO-0708, Page Two Simultaneous with the ES bus relaying operation, the voltage dip caused relaying within the SDBCS to transfer control frem the turbine bypass valves to tLe atmospheric dump valves, which were isolated because of des 2tn problems. This caused the 5% turbine bypass valve to close and resulted in elevating secondary pressura sad primary temperature. Loss of emergency FW flow also tended to increase primary temperature; the elevated temperature led to a reactor trip which occurred @ 10:50 from DNBR and LPD trips on PPS channels A and D. " ., Analysis: The primary cause of the voltage perturbation incident was the simultaneous auto start of all condensate pumps not in pull- to-lock and not already running. Each pump auto start scheme incorporates a time delay relay in the low MFP suction pressure interlock, but all were set identically ( 10 seconds). Several factors contributed to causing the low HFP suction pressure transient which caused the condensate pqmp ryto start. Among these 1) Failure of the main FW pump ind condensate pump recirc. are: valves to operate in auto mode, 2) Lack of low range main FW flow indication for ;he control board operat9r. 3) excessively high setpoint values for condensate pump auto ntart, 4) operator error in not starting a second candensate pump prior to rolling the main FW pump. In terms of ES equipn. ant operation, no evidence of any failures was noted and all systems functioned as per design. Had an actuation signal been present, the secondary loads would have been stripped through the Millstone relaying and the voltage dip terminated, assuring an operable source of off-site power to the ES busses. However, to preclude recurrence, all major electrical motor start schemes were reviewed in light of determining if simultaneous automatic starting - characteristics were desf.gned in. No other schemes aside from the condensate pumps were found to have such features. As a result of this study, a design change has been initiated to stagger the auto start time-delays of the condensate pumps such that a minimum of 2 seconds will exist between successive pump auto starts. An engineering evaluation of the aavisability of resetting the interlock setpoints to a lower value has been initiated. The board operator on duty has been counselled regard'.ng following procedures. A separate engineering evaluation has been requested concerning replacing all electric valve actuators such as those on the Main and Condensate pump recirc. valves with pneumatic actuators. - O -[ );pJ l /
. . , . - , File March 14, 1979 ANO-0708, Page Three The fault in the SDBCS which caused secondary pressure control to shift to the atmospheric dumps on voltage dips has, since this incident, been determined and corrected. ,J. P. O',Hanlon [[ cc: B. Terwilliger . NRC Resident I&E Unit 1 & 2 C/R's , . e S . % %W
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