ML19224D150
| ML19224D150 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1979 |
| From: | Dante Johnson Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224D151 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0129, ACRS-SM-129, NUDOCS 7907110002 | |
| Download: ML19224D150 (7) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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j May 30, 1979 ACRS MEMBERS ACRS TECHNICAL STAFF ACRS FELLOWS CIVIL DEFENSE ASPECTS OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT; THE GA0 REPOP.T ON EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS AROUND NUCLEAR FACILITIES Observations made at the hearing of the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcoccittee on Military Installations and Facilities,16 May 1979.
Congressmen Present:
Nedzi (Chairman)
Whitehurst Mitchell Won Pat Beard Byron Fazio Witness List:
J. Dexta - Peach - Director., Energy and Minerals Division, GA0 Joseph M. Hendrie - Chairman, NRC I.
Opening Statement of Mr. Nedzi (statement attached)
- purpose is to investigate role of Federal government in development and e ecution of emergency planning future witnesses will include representatives from local and state civil defense units II.
Peach
(,ioined by James Douglas and Duane White, both of GA0)
- reference GA0 report, EMD-78-110, 30 March 1979.
- read opening statement (attached) 9EO
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highlights of statement a)
Since 1973 three Federal agencies have had primary planning and coordination responsibility for jeneral civil emergency preparedness k
and response: The Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA), The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (D00), and the Federal Disaster h.
Assistance Administration (HUD) k A planned executive order will combine these three agencies to
%g form the r'ederal Emer;ency Management Agency (FEMA), the purpose
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. of which is to serve as a single point of contact for ita'.e and local governments for Federal programs.
(This order not yet issued.)
b) FEMA does not automatically assume primary policy making and coordination for radiological emergency response planning.
This is continued role of NRC.
c) with regards to emergency preparedness of civilian and military nuclear facilities, GA0 report feels weaknesses in existing plans are:
- 1) the facility operator's promptness in notifying state and local authorities
- 2) these authorities' response capabilities d) areas of major concern are:
- 1) too little attention given to developing and testing emergency plans 41 states have some type of peacetime nuclear emergency plan and 5 additional states have plans in the development stage; of the 41..
9 have had full-scale tests,16 have had drills involving some, but not all people expected
+9 respond in an emergency, and 16 have not tested plans; also of the 41..
27 rated themselves as " prepared," 5 as not prepared and 9 as borderline.
Evidence indicates that an untested plan would probably be inef fective.
Where testing had been conducted, problems were revealed in communication, identification of authority, and off-site radiological monitoring procedures.
Some of the 6 states with no current plans and no plans being developed have classified military nuclear facilities witFin their borders.
2)
Emergency planning zones around.uclear power plants are too small.
3)
People living near nuclear power plants are not well informed of potential hazards or emergency procedures.
e) Because of remote location of facilities, it is the local authorities (not state) upon whom the initial responsibility falls in the event of an emergency.
Those authorities around D0D and DOE nuclear facilities are less likely to be prepared than corresponding authorities around commercial. nuclear power plants, f) GA0 recommends that NRC
- 1) allow nuclear power plants to begin operating only where state and local emergency response plans meet all of NRC's planning criteria, and 2) require if cense applicants to make agreements with state and local agencies assuring their full participaticn in annual emergency drills.g,26 j
. Questions and Answers Whitehurst: What other Committees have you appeared before? Feach: Energy and Power (Dingell) and Environment, Energy and Natural Resources (Moffe+t). Mitchell: Are areas around facilities which store nuclear weapons in danger? Peach: Potential for accident to occur exists; consultad with Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) on this. Mitchell: Can a nuclear plant explode? Peach refers to hydrogen bubble at TMI; danger at nuclear plant nat ex?losion but breach of containment. Mitchell: Why establish a constant 10 mil .;dit: ar ergency around all facilities; shouldn't wind patterns be taken into account? Peach: 10 mile radius is a minimum; notes that at one point a 50 mile evacuation radius was considered at TMI; establishment of zone will involve site by site evaluation. Mitchell People (including self) are basically ignerant of facts concerning radiation; must include education of ceople around facilities in any plan. Beard: Should a moritorium be declared on new licenses until evacuation plans are developed? Peach: doesn't have to get to "moritorium" stage; feels that gcal is not difficult to accomplish, should only add 2 or 3 months to licensing crocess. Beard: Concerned about localities with part time local autnorities. Why not incorporate the National Guard (especially around D00 sites) into plan? Peach: Possible, not considered in GA0 report. Beard: No further licenses should be issued until problem of waste is settled. Peach: This is the key issue for the future of nuclear power. Seard: Why not incorporate emergency planning in a new Civil Defense prograr,:? Peach: Pos si ble. 25(/ 32?
. Nedzi: What is accident scenario at military nuclear facilities; how could weapon detonate? Peach: In scenario presented to LLL, weapon assumed to exolode during movement. Nedzi-Is this scientifically feasiblei Peach: Yes; not known if LLL agrees; neither LLL nor D0D commented on scenario. Mitchell-Weapcns seem to be more of a threat to the public than power plants; what are the probabilities involved in the two cases?... "if we are concerned about nuclear power plants, we should be terrified of weapons" Peach: GA0 will review this question in more detail', probabilities not known to GA0. Nedzi: Were sp?cific fau'.ts found in individual emergency plans? Peach: Procedures at individual plants were not reviewed in detail; portion of research done by questionaire... interested in how states felt about their own plans. Nedzi : How can a state with nuclear weapons (but no nuclear power plants) have no plans? Peach: State may not be aware specific weapons are at a facility. Nedzi: What would be the essential parts to a good plan? Peach: Key elements would include
- 1) reliable communications link between the utility and designated local and state officials.
- 2) Adequate resources to draw on to implement plan (e.g.,
radiological monitoring equipment, dedicated vehicles, access to highway patrol to define road blocks, etc.). 3) feedback; method to integrate acquired information during event, channel to correct individuals, etc. Nedzi: Were the roles of Civil Defense agencies on the federal and state levels reviewed? Peach: No. ') E O 7'O LJ-J2o III. Hendrie (joined by Robert Ryan and Harold Collins, both of NRC, Office of State Programs) - reads statement (virtually identical to testimony before Moffett Committee on 14 May 1979, please see notes of 16 May 1978) - highlights: a) relationships between authorities and federal ager.:ies not as clear as might be. b) notes that plants have features to minimize releases. c) notes that evacuation is not only response possibility (shelter, compounds to block radio-iodine uptake, etc.) d) NRC has no legal authority to require plans or testing of plans off-site. Policy is to use cooperation and persuasion... refers to NDC " Guidelines" e) very small amount of federal funds historically used specifically for radiological emergency planning. f) most facilities will have dedicated telephone lines to NRC by end of June. Questions and Answers Won Pat: notes NRC's lack of authority. Hendrie : NRC offers a wide range of assistance to the states. Don't have authority to require plans or to offer funds or equipment. If actual emergency occurs, NRC does in fact provide assistance. Mi tetyll : Why was there no noni toring for two days following accident at TMI? Hendrie: There was monitoring during first three dr.ys... I&E team, inplace Met Ed dosimeters, DOE team, and DOE a' rborne monitoring survey. Mitchell: Was Califano therefore wrong? Hendrie: Impossible to know dose to each individual. Refers to DOE / HEW /NRC estimate of doses. Mi tchell - Is FEMA the logical organization to take over in such an emergency... very similar to natural disasters... why not have a good Civil Defense program? 259 32c;
. Hendrie: Civil Defense would make a lot of sense... could pr ide disaster response for all areas, not just those around nuclear facilities... CD has radiological experience. Mitchell: Cost estimates for good plan? Ryan: NRC Staff draft report... cost to local governments for equipment, training, testing, updating... ot r the next 20 years... woi:1d be $150,000,000 for all plants. Cost should be responsibility of licensees. Byron: Why is it that NRC must wait to be called before going into action? Hendrie: In theory NRC has authority to go to site at any time. In practice NRC depends on licensee to inform them of event. Bryon : How has TMI affected the transportatica of waste? Hendrie: There have been four shipments of low level material from the TMI site since the accident. A " good part if not the bulk" has been from normal operation of units 1 and 2. One shipment went to Barnwell, three to Richland. Fazio : What would be role of FEMA in radiological emergency planning? Hendrie: NRC, which is most knowledgeable regarding specifics of of plans. C0A does not want part of licensing process outside of NRC. Fazio: Requests public hearing before Rancho Seco is allowed to come back on line to inform people to realities of situation" (expressed this request formally in letter to Hendrie on 16 May - coauthored by Rep. Matsui). Nedzi: What is organization within NRC for state planning, how large? Ryan: Three professionals before yesterday (four added then), and two state liaison officers (part time, one each in Regions I and V). Hendrie : Staff not adequate, licensing also involved in planning, I1E involved in drills. Total staff approximately 15-20 equival. int full time people. Nedzi : Satisfied with distinctions made by licensee in determining magnitude of emergencj? 259 330
. Hendrie : NRC reviewing this. NRC should have been called before 7 a.m. on 28 March regarding TMI... no detection of activity, but serious transient. Nedzi' Should plan be required prior to licensing? Hendrie : Will rethink present position. As for existing plants, question is one of timing... is this so important as to require shutdown... personal view is that shutdown would be excessive, should phase in new regulations. No fundamental objections for planning of future plants, however, more requirements in general tend to obstruct critical path... likes cooperative basis. Ryan: One argument (not personal feeling) against requirement... Why should utility be penalized because of state's inaction? y $ '.N mb David Heywood Johnson k ACRS Fellow Attachments as indicated 259 33}}