ML19224C951
| ML19224C951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1979 |
| From: | Fisher W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7907100302 | |
| Download: ML19224C951 (3) | |
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n asco UNITED STATES f
0, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fi e(
3 REGION til 3(
f 799 ROOSEVELT RO AD 5 '. g 4
CLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137
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April 24, 1979 h l' jh MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Region 1 THRU:
A. 3. Davis, Chief, Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch FROM:
W. L. Fisher, Chief, Fuel Facility P.ojects and Radiation Support Section
SUBJECT:
REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT THREE MII.E ISLAND I arrived at TMI at about 4:00 p.m. on March 29, 1979. My first entry into the plant occurred early that evening.
During =y seven days at TMI, I worked ill or a portion of every shift, averaging nearly 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> a day.
I left Harrisburg to return to Chicago at about 4:20 p.m. on April 5.
My assign =ent was to direct the efforts of eighteen Radiation Specialists f rom Regions I, II, and III, who were providing around-the-clock, in-plant surveillance over Met Ed's radiation protection and radwaste canagement programs. The eighteen Radiation Specialists were divided into three six-can teams, one to cover each eight-hour shif t.
The teams included two men assigncd to each unit for radiation protection purposes, one can assigned co watch over radwaste matters, and one man assigned as co=municator. A one to two-hour shif t overlap was used to inform the oncoming shif t of matters of interest or concen.
Logbooks were used at the discretion of'the inspectors to record significant matters.
Certain routine duties, such as reading control room ARM's and ?RM's and making radiation surveys, were recorded on specially prepared forms.
Considering the enormity of the problem and the lack of experience in handling an event of this size, the licensee seemed to be doing a fairly good job from my viewpoint. However, sc=e significant short-comings were evident.
Perhaps the greatest shortce=ing was the tendency to continue operating in an e=ergency frame of mind longer than necessary.
With the loss of access contol areas, counting rooms, nd other facilities, the radiation
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B. H. Grier April 24, 1979 protection operation properly retreated to the control rooms.
- Entries, for exa=ple into the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, were made ad hoc with little thought toward obtaining and recording information usef,.1 in future entries. There seemed to be little interest in reestablishing a foothold in the access control areas, in reestablishing the RWP program, in posting radiation and contamination infor=ation, and in doing other " norma 1' operation" radiation protection activities.
An eventually crippling conseq.ee.ae could have been that indispensable people would have reached dose limits quickly, leaving further work to persons less qualified. With some persistent encouragecent by our inspectors, the licensee reestablished the above controls a few days after the incident.
Another shortcoming, perhaps closely related to the above, was inadequate radiation protection organization management.
I don't say this necessarily as a criticism of the employees involved.
Rather, I would make the point that =anagement was overwhelmed by the size and seriousness of the event; by the explosive growth of their organization; by the derands placed on them by others, including ourselves; and by the loss of. heir normal facilities and equipcent.
Again with our persistent encouragement the licensee began to strengthen the radiation protection organization.
While we should take no credit for this improvement, I believe that we identified the organi:ntional weaknesses considerably before the licensee did.
An obviou', i==ediate weakness was the licensee's difficulty in co. colling the flow f people to and from the plant. For several days there seemed to be a new twist at every pass through the gate.
It took up to two hours for our inspectors to enter the plant.
Some delays were related to access authorization, some to personal =onitoring, and some to trsnsportation.
One of ny own delaye occurred when the offsite shuttle bus got trapped by a freight train that had stopped across the north gate road.
I found the licensee generally cooperative and appreciative of our in-plant efforts.
No doubt that attitude resulted from the overwhelming size of the incident and from the knowledge that our initial purpose was to help, not to regulate.
As the licensee regained control of the situation, I sensed a gradual shift toward the normal regulator /regulsted relationship.
I believe such a shift should be encouraged bv the NRC in sach incidents as soon as the licensee displays the Jbility to resuce contrel of the situation.
259 204
- 3. H. Grier April 24, 1979 My first observation regarding IE operations at TMI was the lack o f Regional manage =ent at the site.
This observation is not s1= ply retrospective; in fact, it occurred while listening to the news broadcasts enroute from King Of Prussia to Harrisburg.
I then s agan to understand the size and regional i= pact of the event and to wonder if it could be managed remotely.
Another critical observation is that I cannot see the purpose of open telephone lines from in-plant locations to Headquarters.
(In our case the line was open to RI, which had an open line to HQ.)
The problem with those open lines is that Headquarters personnel begin *.o act on siscellaneous pieces of raw fnformatic ather than on balanced, overview information provided by onsitt sanagement.
Considering NRC's lack of experience in handling an event of this size, I believe the agency did a creditable job overall. However, there is much to be learned from this event regarding sanagement, logistics, co==unication, and other functions in order to streamline our response in future events.
One final co==ent.
Not intending to slight anyone else, for much good work was evident at IMI, I would like to ec==end George Smith and Phil Stohr for imprersive performance on your side of the river and to co==end Shift Leaders Don Neely, John '4hite, and Greg Yuhas for impressive performance in-plant.
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W. L. Fisher, Chief Fuel Facility Projects and Radiation Support Section 259 205