ML19224C949

Draft Statement of Policy Re TMI Investigation.Primary Objective Will Be to Make Factual Determination of Events & Causes & Util & NRC Actions Before & After Incident

ML19224C949
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/14/1979
From:	NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:
Shared Package
ML19224C945	List: ML19224C944 ML19224C949
References
NUDOCS 7907100294
Download: ML19224C949 (5)

Text

.......

('..**_'.'l I-' I~.'"*. I.

, ~. ~. '...

+-[.

' 'Y. :. L^..

~'

*~::: T::::: ~':* ~"- ':: ~-~'::-

:?!!?' : '- - - - -. - -

. = = = =

a, N

-t s

STATEMENT OF POLICY E

=.

L...._

t=

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has instituted a Special Inquiry to review and report on the accident which y.W..

-took place at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station No. 2

~

=.

beginning on March 28, 1979 The primary object'.ve of the

.I.I..'.I inquiry will be to make factual determinations concerning EES the actual events which occurred and their causes, and the

. =..

actions of utility and Commission. personnel before and T.Z during tha accident.

The inquiry will also identify areas of deficiency revealed by the accident and areas in which

=

further investigation is warranted.

The Special Inquiry will be headed by a Director and 7, _

Deputy Director selected from outside the Commission.

They Ih will be assisted by a staff of their own choosing, number-ing around 25 persons.

The Director and Deputy Director fpj will possess full independence in carrying out the inquiry,

~..

LiiEE and will be removable only for_ malfeasance or neglect of duty.

]

I.t is. expected that in selecting a staff, they will draw substantially on senior NRC staff for expertise.

The target T.._

date for completion of the. report of the Special Inquiry is

~ [

t...

November 1, 1979

=---

The Special Inquiry represents the initial phase of

[

=::= -

the Commiss.r.on's evaluation of the accident and its implica-eses r-tions.

It is not intended to duplicate the efforts of the

}"~-

President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.

'M t

77ellcoA' Y 259 178 v.

...z.

.._.......e

_.3.g..-....

m-s

=rrra.-A mrr rrr

.. = ;_=_.=

...... =. _

E-

~E.'...

%pEh

.5?~

L

= --

p.....

%==.:

w. _ _

'~~

It is designed instead so that the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

IEC mission, in order to fulfill its own regulatory responsi-

'u111tias, vill have the fullest possible understanding of A-the events at Three Mile Island, both from the technical

~~~

standpoint and from the standpoint of how its regulatory processes functioned.

The purpose of that evaluation is to N

permit the Commission to take whatever further steps may be

. =. = =..

necessary to prevent any similar accident in the future, and to improve the NRC's ability to respond to accidents.

The specific areas which the Special Inquiry will

..:.p examine include the following:

f" the sequence of events during the accident, w :-

both what was happening to the reactor and

.. =.

the response of the operating personnel;

==.

events at the plant before the accident that "f..

might be related to the accident; the operat-

= = - -

ing history of the plant.

the history of the NRC review of the utility's application for a license to operate Three m..

e Mile Island No. 2; the inspection history at 55 5 r --

TMI-2; the operating and inspection histories of other Babcock & Wilcox plants, focused on

=g. =..g

}_

any indications of the types of problens that

'. =.

arose in the TMI-2 accident.

=.25.

i.

r

/

j.=

..... -.. ~........

--E~5- :Y

= : N Y....

N.Y...N..

"~

I:Y::. Y

_l__ :5:-f_ :::.::=::....Y.?__. 3...

- - =...

2 3

sa=

4===+

ia=

4

~'

the sensitivity of Babcock & Wilcor plants to

~

I5

.z..-

accidents; unique features of TMI-2 that may

~ ~ ~ ~

have increased or decreased the severity of the

{=

accident; other design effects related to tne 7

TMI-2 accident.

.=E s:s emergency response plans for TMI-2 and their

= ~ =~ ~

review by NRC.

TMI-2 operations, including training and qual-

- 1.1 ifications of personnel, operating procedures "T;; ~ :

T and management overview; NRC license conditions on TMI'2 operations, including technical ff.=3 t

'y specifications; technical support to operating personnel and management.

... = =

--=..

emergency response to the TMI-2 accident by

.::~.;Z NRC, including staff and Commissioners, on site and at headquarters; NRC coordination with Federal, State, and local officials, the utility, industry sources, and the national

,2

• .7h.. '.'

laboratories; NRC management of the accident hm - ;

situation, including assessment and dissemina-

=

tion of information; commul:1 cations and chai..

[*

of command within NRC.

t

t..

c:=

^ ~ ~ ~ ' - ~

g g-t,,

i)g Od

_.s

/

2-

... ~ _...

.'l....,

...:::~"'

~~~

~

' ' ~ -

=

=

.. -... ~... = - ~... = = -

==....=..=.:.;

L......

r S

4

~

N-emergency response to the TMI-2 accident by h 5=

the utility, including coordination with NRC and other Federal, State, and local officials, and assessment and dissemination of informa-

..i tion.

~~

.5-~

implications of the accident at TMI-2 (including design of the facility, operations, regulatory actions, emergency preparedness) for other

==.

licensed nuclear power plants.

.x...

The Director's responsibilities will include periodic interim reports to the C mmission.

These reports will also V

be available to the public.

The Commission exp2 cts that the II.

Director will adhere to the scope of inquiry outlined in

.aE this Statement of Policy.

If the Director determines that other matters, beyond the scope of the inquiry as outlined

,herein, require further examination, he shall so advise the Commission.

The Commission emphasi::es that it will take whatever regulatory action it deems necessary at any time, based on

.T C m

:.=. -

information available to it at that time.

By instituting

--f;

"~7. 9..

the Special Inquiry, the Commission intends no suggestion EEE.

that it will withhold regulatory action with respect 'o t

identified deficiencies until the inquiry is completed.

L u- =."

25o 18')

E u-

/

e

[-..-

=.=--:-

__ __g.:.

..-.

p::

. :: :~.::. : :

~~~ : *'*:.

G 5

{ '. 1 E~:5--

.=:w:

The Director will have the further responsibility of

- 5{

cooperating with the President's Commission on the Accideni

[7

. = = = -

at Three Mile. Island and with such other investigations as may be instituted by committees of the Congress.

The Com-3;-

mission will delegate to the Director its statutory power t'o conduct ihvestigations and issue subpoenas.

In order to assure the indepe,ndence and integrity of the irquiry, the

~.~.~_

Director, Deputy Director, and their staff will be requested i~

to maintain records of all discussions with all persons, including Nuclear Regula1,ry Commission personn51, bearing

[

on the subject matter of_ the inquiry or the inquiry itself.

(......

.ea...

up

.ee

=

~,. X.;;

ge ET p

7.....

.. ~..

" 5d..

n nec.,

.:=.;...

^

..g DEL S=

259 182 1

~::.'..

n;. :..

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

All right.

We ought to ta RMG 15 1

--E=

f=="===

2 about form and scope.

=g=;-

'By the.way, have you had a chance t o look a't the 3

[L

'4 President's Executive Order?

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

(Nods affirmatively.')

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

(Nods affirmatively.)

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Maybe we ought to talk abo 7

1 scope for a moment.just.to see whether that affects how we 8

9 at the form ~".*..

Just running down this Executive Order, looking a

~

10 11 what they plan to do, (a) a technical assessment of the even 12 and their causes, we certainly would

. want to do that.

5.-M Analysis of the role of managing utility --

-'(. '.

13 i

14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

To some extent we have to c

=

^

=

E 15 that.

I

?I 16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I don't know just how far E

5 17 they plan to go here.

But certainly the role of the.managin f

utility in dealing with the operation of the facility is k

18 6

5 19 l something that we have got to deal with.

?

An assessment of the energency preparedness respc 20 of the NRC and other federal and state and local authoritier 21 r think we would probably stic5c' to the NRC, but' what do you

~

22 23 think about that?

}w=.

T.E?

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I guess - yes, I think w g tral Reporters, IN:.

25

. have to, but we have to step one step beyond that.

And tha 259 186

I 18 RMG.16 1

in terms of our assessment, if you will, of our relationships W

with them -- how do we interface with them, and if we --

>r 2

3 COMMISSI')NER AHEARNE:

But it still is in 1.'..-

l C.

4

'(Inaudible.)

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But one other thing.

Did we, 6

to the extent that it was our job to do so?

And I think that 7

that needs to be looked at, too, whether it is or not, and 8

to the extent that it is.

9

~

To the extent that it may be our job to call upon 10 !

those agencies.

Did we make full use of the resources which' 11 they had available?

Did we know what those resources were, 12 et cetera.

I think we have to do that.

. =.

13 But you are right, we don't assess their -- what 14 they did.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

The NRC and its relationship 16 to the various federal state and local authorities that were 17 involved in this accident.

18 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

Yes.

19 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

An evaluation of the 20 NRC --

1 21 OUMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Excuse me, I was going to add 22 one more thing.

IL 23 In that little rubric -- maybe it's a separate one,

===_

24 but.it's related to it -- and that is, NRC's relationship to 3t~=

g trat Recorrers, Inc.,

25 I the. laboratories and to all the technical institutions on which 259 184

19 RMG 17 1

we were calling for enormous amounts of advice, if you remember

,m,-

C.7 2

And I think that needs to be,-- that is sort of what we were 3

talking about earlier, the role of research in all of this, l

4 and NRR.

.S COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That is partly covered by 6

response of NRC, and partly through dealing with other federal 7

agencies.

~Mainly highlighting.

8 COMMISSIONZR KENNEDYr I was thinking -- no, I was.

thinkingnotohfederalagencies.

I was thinhcing of, you know, 9

10 I calling vendors and private secter and universities.

11 But it is, I guess -- I think it certainly can be, included?

12 if we understand it_to, it can be included within.

13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

It's NRC - and there are a 14 whole set of things.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But it is ve;y much more 16 NRC-focused.

17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's right.

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Then the Presidential

.19 I inquiry.

Okay..

(d)- An evaluation of the NRC's 5.icensing, 20 inspectior, operation, enforcement procedures as applied to this 21 facility.

I think that that is something that we have to do, 22 l and I think we probably have to' go beyond that,. in thinking abo

.d #1 23 what does it say for othen facilities.

P.~~

~; ~

24 (1_T~

Whether that needs to be part of the initial effort,

.r.: n,mnm, inc.

25 j though, I'm not sure.

259 i<3s l

l l

1,

20 I

_ _ mm COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Wel1, I think to the extent e=_-e g

r.....-

La-that, for example, if there are events at Davis-Besse, 3l C

at Rancho Seco that were very similar,'what happened with that information is probably part of it.

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, maybe the answer is 6

as applied to this facility and relevant to this facility.

7 COFDiISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.

O It is relevant to this accident.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Relevant to this accident.

10 1 CObSiISSIONER KENNEDY:

Do you want to stop it there?

11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Well, what did you --

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I'm thinking in a sense

=

h the generic implications in the licensing process of what we see as the total response.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I wonder if we should grab 16 all of that up ric;ht now for the first six-month effort?

I7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That begins to slip cver into I8 what I was trying to say in the beginning. There can be very easily

--~and I thought that the previous draft that we 20 had last time had slipped over into concentrating on the

~

~

21 sweeping conclusions and ' recommendations which we have to 22 address.

([..__

'23 But we have to' concentrate initially into trying

,. [. me a peu

, pd=-

to lay out all of the factis relevant to this.

' cs., ;eral R eporters, Inc.

25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I'm afraid of we --

259 185

21

.:h2 1

COMMISSIONER KEWEDY: That's all right so long as a

L.. _... _

ji 2

we understand and it is understood generally. And I think a 3

policy statement should make that clear, that we are talking C

4 really about a two-phased enterprise. That is one phase which 5

is a detailed examination of facts, and the~ drawing of some 6

conclusions in respect to those facts; following which there 7

will b,e then some sort of an analysis of the total.' context 8

in which our business is conducted.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It may be many phased.

10 1 It certainly will encompass all of that --

11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I think there's going to be, c--

12 however, a great pressure, one which I would certainly expect i-Ar 13 and understand, I feel it myself, to find out not just what 14 happened here, but more importantly what does this mean for 15 everything that we're doing?

16

-Are we confident, or can we be confident that we 17 hav e found all the holes, if there are such, in process and 18 in technique of analysis,et cetera, which will prevent this 19 sort of thing from arising ever again.

20 I think that's what the objective has. to be. We h ev 21 to find out ultimately 22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: The question'is, do we 23 have to do th m right at the outset?

g_.

Y 24 COMMISSIONER K'ENNEDY:

k.eral Recorrers, tric.

What I'm saying is, the pressu.

25 I certainly think, ought to be on getting to that position as 259 187

~

22 mm 1

quickly as possible.

We can't allow it to look as though we

!=t=

E- -j*

2 N5 are pushing that off, you know, for months, years. We need to 3

come to grips with that question.

C 4

COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

It's got to be pushed off 5

honths.. Because we have got to understand, first.

6

~

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Righ.Y..

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I agr ee with that.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:.That effort has got to 9

feed off this effort. So that effort needs to absorb --

10 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What I'm saying is we ought II to, at the very outset, commit to that.

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Oh, there's just no question 13 about that.

14 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

I think whdt Dick's saying 15 is we hav e to make it explicit.

16 COMMISSIONER KERNEDY:

Make ic very explicit.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I agree.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

We ought to try, therefore, 19 to compress that initial timeframe to the extent that it is 20 possible to do so.

That there's a continuing -- and it's clear 21 that in a very very restricted timeframe~we are going to get 22 to those basic questions.

~

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Right.

23 O ;=bi 24

,(;; i nemorrers. Inc.

And exactly how that will be done will get mapped

, era 25 out in the near future and will probably start --

259 1BB

~

23 mm4 1

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Let me say, some of those ess 6...-.4.

t thi,ngs, of course once we say that that's what we are committe v-s.=

2 3

to do, and that's the objective of the enterprise, that', of 5'

4 course, is what your Board or DiNector or whoever it is is going to come to grips with very quickly, m has got to map 5

6 that out.

7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: See there, you've got --

8 that's the problem I had last time.

9 If you say the fundamental objective is the 10 1 sweeping set of recommendations, then our group, whoever we' 11 set up is going to focus, aha, that's what I have to focus on.

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It's too all-encompassing.

13 COMMISSIONER AREARNE: And they won't develop that 14 detailed record of what happened.

And we're ~ going to be stuck 15 with trying to, months later, resurrect how it really happened.

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That gets to the poi'nt.

, 17 Make it clearly demarcated as a two phased exercise.

18 COMMISSIONER AREARNE: Yes.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And its first initial phase 20 to be completed by X date, the Board, or whatever will do the 21 following.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right.

[t 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

M It then will turn to, you g j~-

24 know, and report within X number of months or weeks or whatever, ach., ;eral Re:>orters. Inc.

25 on the.following questions.

e 4

')/

10

24 mm5 1

But it ought to have in mind that that's where it's r--"

2 301:3-C 3

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It depends on what you set

('

(_

4 up. And it's still not obvious to me.

The right solution is 5

not the same group.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Okay. But the separation is not from factfinding and evaluation, the separation is 7

factfinding and evaluation.of this accident and evaluation for 8

9 what it m eans for our process.

10 COMMISSIONER AREARNE: No. See, in my mind I really 11 see a demarcation of factfinding on this accident and those things germane to 1t. And then an evaluation of, what does that 12

}

LL5 13 mean.

14 That's the demarcation I see.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Okay.

I guess I would have 16 Put it, let's deal with this accident, and then deal with what does it mean for the rest of nuclear. regulation.

17 18 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:

I think when you start concluding there would be two kinds. of results,

,19 I think you are going to end up with, when you examine this accident, 20 some are really going to be very accident-specific and you will 21 have some conclusion that it's really unique in this particular 22 23 situation.

52~=

24 And the others will be more characteristic of.the f,

4 Jeral Reoorters, Inc.

25 licensing investigation, operational process in general.

259 190 6

l 25 mm 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would expect this Ifi 2

initial effort to bring up things such as, suppose that W.=~

3 operator training was inadequate.

I would expect that to come

(.-

4 out of this intial effort.

5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

But that's an almost sweeping 6

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Not necessarily.

~

'l It may have applied to this specific case. And then 8

if you go on and say, well, what does this say about our 9

operator licensing process, I would sort of hold off until we 10 1 have been able to absorb the facts in any evaluation of thi_s Il case.

12 I don't think we ought to be holding 1.p our conclu ~

13 sions about this c se until some later date.

52 I4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I agree with that.

15 I think, to me, at least, a logical progression is 16 the factfinding, and I keep thinking, I can',t imagine amassing 17 facts without, at the same time, as you are amassing them, 18 beginning to see a picture which tells you something and which, 19 therefore, is already in the nature of conclusions. They emerge 20 you know.

21 I think conclusions are reached as you are going 22 ' along.

r 23 q

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Sure, you postulate, and then m-_

/r }

24 you get some more and you refine it, and you get some more and C;~.: amorrers, inc. g

\\-

25 you refine it. That's certainly true.

2bh Y'

26 mm7 1

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes. So by the time you get

.e.- -

I....

l through the factfinding, you have essentially reached some 25y 2

3 conclusion. And it's then a question of refining thode, 4

thinking about them more deeply.

5 And it's almost inconceivable to me that I could draw conclusions without thinking what I would do about them, 6

7 you know, which is in the c.ature of recommendations.

8 That's on the score, however, of the immediate 9

case. You know, what could you have' done in respect to this 10 1 case that would have helped the situation?

11 Or, prevented it?

12 Now, there's the next ' step which is, does that have

- ::n generic application, or was it peculiar to this particular 13 14 circumstance?

15 COMMI3SIONER AHEARNE: But Dick then if we conclude 16 that that's really the right way to go, then you are faced with 17 either one of two things:

18 Either you go immediately to the Advisory ' Committee 19 Act, or you exclude cutside-cf-government people.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Not if you had this directora-21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I don't see why.

~

22 COMMISSIOFER AHEARid: Oh, I think you do because you are now setting up a panel, which is going to make -

give 23

'-~

24 advice. And it seems to me that is the advisory committee.

Aher.) se::orrers. Inc. ;

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Oh, excuse me.

') r q ' 1 O

b

/

l ib

27 mm 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: They are staff to a p :.=.

2 directorate, and in the other case they are g;

s vernment o

3 employees.

L 4

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: No, I'm talking about in 5

Dick's case, it's a panel.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But they are go'7ernntent 7

employees.

8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's what I said, your two choices are you either have government employees or you have 9

10 i the Advisory Committee Act.

11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: If you have your panal?

12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Right.

13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I think -- 1 can't conceive D

tht you are going to get some guys -- well, mayb2 you car, just 14 factfinders. They me going to find the facts and they are going 15 16 to say nothing more.

17 It's going to go off and leave you with a whole 18 report which says, "Here 's what happened," period.

.19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKv: Let me ask you, do you wcait 20 to break for --

John doesn't eat lunch.

21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

This is a particular religious 22 day.

At 2 o' clock I have to leave.

[L 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I was planning on the same Ehh 24 thing.

(... _.._

=.

A.:eral Reporters. Inc.

25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I can come back tomorrow, 259 193

28 mm 1

but I have to leave today at 2:00.

t=::=ut Tgg*

2 What I'm trying to get 7.t is, if we are really 3

going to go into asking a group to provide conclusions and

(:

4 recommendations which encompass all of the --

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

How would you see getting 6

that?

7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: See, the two options I.

saw 8

getting it, is after this task force had completed its fact-9 finding, the task force is heavily weighted with NRC people.

10 1 And the reason I did that is I felt it's very -- it's necessary l,

li to have goed access to all of the facet; of the agency pulling

~

, g_.

12 to work together.

And that you also wanted to have people who w

e-13 were quite familiar with the procedures and with reactors to L

~

14 lay out, make sure you understood the facts.-

15 At the end of that.I saw either -- and I didn't talk 16 to counsel so I don't know whether either is legal -- I saw 17 either the chairperson and vice-chairperson er outside people 18 in my construction, then separately hear the facts.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You mean outside the agency 20 or outside the government?

21 COMM.'SIONER AH"ARNE:

I saw at least one of then 22 being outside.the government.

But I saw tb a b' ing asked to e

23 provide their individual views.

51=

24 i

Or, alternatively, to try to hold a public mee ing AA :eral Reporters, Inc.

25 in which just the whole group was asked to provide thdir views.

259 19'-

29 mm t

I didn't know whether either of those would still p_ _~_..

\\L__

2 enable us to keep the first group.

t-

, COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Let me say, you know, the 3

\\-

4 fact that you have an inside government, but outside-the-agen body, doesn't exclude you -- Just because the Advisory 5

sorn vt 6

Committee Act doesn't come into play, it certainly doesn't 7

exclude you.

Indeed, I would visualize it at the end of 8

the enterptise at some point, or maybe even at some point durin 9

the enterprise, I could see it. But certainly at the end, a 10 1 public meeting at which they would lay out what they believed 11 and --

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I wonder if we could just c

gs.

13 run down and finish the scope here.

\\.

14 Running down the White House List. and see how ours 15 would differ.

I think we could get right back to thi:

16 discussion.

, 17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Okay.

la COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

D was an evaluation of the

19 NRC's licensing and ~other activities as applied to this 20 facility and this accident, really, which would include any 21 other relevant information that should have been considered 22 before the accident.

23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Uh, huh.

=

E......_

24 COMMISSIONER GILINSEN:

(arai neporters. Inc. I The next point they have is 25 an assessraent of how the public's right to information and so 25?

3 30 mm 1

on was served.

L====

%=

2 D

I think we ought to take a look at our own.

3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I think we ought to take a look at our own, but that's a much broader --

/

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right. THat's what I'm saying So we are really kind of just going down this list and saying 6

7 we a re NRC-centered. --

8' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: -- at the way we handle relea 10 ' of information.

11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Right.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I agree tothat.

E575 as 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: F, they say appropriate L

14 recommendation lased $n the Commission findings.

15 And I would, at this point stick to pretty much 16 this insta.L and look to an amplified effort to really

, 17

. consider what does this mean for our whole process.

18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.

'19 COMMISSIObER GILINSKY:

Okay.

20 Are you going to write that up, Len?~

21 MR. BICKWIT: Yes.

22 COMMISSIONER GILIN KY:

c Does that pret.ty well cover i

23 it?

~

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

A.Jeral Reporttrs, Inc.

The last statement, by limiting it to this particular thing and leaving the other to some 25 i

25?

19<,

~

31

1. ~=-

mm I

broader -- I keep saying that I think that our responsibility

(== =

2 here is essentially twofold, and you cannot aparate,them.

3 And indeed, it's the second that is the broader implications, C

4 which obviously in the cirewestances, is the most important.

5 You've just get to deal with that.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me put it this way:

I 7

think that's right. Maybe I.said it wrong.

8 You, really do want any explanations they have that 9

go beyond this incident. But I think to really weigh those, yo 10 I really have to have an examination that goes beyond this plant.

11 There's just a lot of things yet have to look at. And I just

(_g 12 don' t want this group going off and investigating all the

{

plants in the country.

13 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

All right.

So long as you 15 know, at some point -

16 COMMISSIONTR GILINSKY:

We have got to do that.

We 17 ' have got to say what does this mean for the entire process.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Somehow that's got to be, I9 in the construct of the scope.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Of course. Right.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Counselor, you can figure 22 out how to do it.

We are agreed. The only question is how to (g

23 say it.

.L*;

:.M 24

'=

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Make sure you're agreed.

4.( ser i newnen. Inc.

25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

THat effort is not going to 259 197

32 mm 1

cnd in six months.

~

GiNa In other words, when we start talking abou lj[jf 2

what does this mean for the rest of cur process, that's 3

something we're going to be thinking about for somettne.

\\s 4

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I would agree, Dick, but 5

the distinction I see is that whatever group we end up 6

setting up here, 'their scope really doesn't go to that broader 7

issue.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I accept that.

I accept that 9

But what I'm saying is we cannot assume that this group, having 10 1 completed in whatever timeframe we set, there's going to be II a very long time before we hear anything more about the other.

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

.== =

~

No, no'.

I would hope that 13 anything -- a_further effort would start sometime during the 14 six-month period.

~

15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Befora this one is finished?

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yes.

17 But as stuff becomes available from this effort, we.

18 start thinking about another effort.

I9 COMMISSIO'NER KENNEDY: That's what I'm saying. Our 20 scope construct has to identify.

21 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:

That's agency scope, not the s

22 scope of whatever group is set up.

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Okay.

24 c,h_.....;

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Hs.

_arat ne:errers, Inc.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What we're talking about is t:

23/

i/v e

33 g mm 1

scope of the agency effort.

D b

And then in that construct, we're saying this group 3

is going to do rhia. and another group is going to do something b

4 else, and we need to say that, I believe, at the outset.

5 CORMISSIONER AHEARNE: Fine.

6 CORMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I think we agreed to that.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes.

8 CORMISSIONER KENNEDY:

If you can. figure out how 9

to write it counselor, we are all set.

10 I CORMISSIONER AHEARNE: We are not yet all set.

11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

We are talking about scope.

12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.

Cg 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Scope we're set, essentially.

14 Now, there are some Sings, by the.way, that are 15 in considerable detail.

I found most of them to be useful.

I 16 doubt that one needs to put all those things into --

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Where are they?

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: They are in this paper we had

19 the other day.

20, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay..

2)

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I think many of those certainly are useful, and therN ought to be scne way in which 22 23 we could communicate those.

e=.-.

= =

24

(-

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: ':'he problem I had with this --

1,%...:eral Recorrers, irsc.

2.'

so when I rewrote the scope, I tried to adjust it -- is I felt 259 199

~

s.

1 34 this scope is really the broader, whole-agency scope.

E COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes.

ign=m 2

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE.' And what I tried to"dc is 3

modify it to bring it back to the scope of this accident 4

and relate it to thi's accident.

COIOiISSIONER KENNEDY:

All :ight.

COMMISSIONER GILIESKY:

So I think we have reasonabl 7

clearly distinguished what we do as opposed to what the' President's group does.

The question is, how are we going to do it.

g COMeiISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes, that does seem to be the --

12 s....

==_.2 F

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And we have got 4 6 minutes.

L (Laughter.)

~~

^

15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I would suggest the first thing to decide is, do you want this group to reach conclusions and then the second would be, from what structure?

COleiISSIO.NER GILINSKY:

I thought we just decided that we did.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: RElated to this accident.

21 COrciISSIONER AHEARNE: I'm willing to.--

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I must say if any one of them has any thoughts that go beyond, I am going to be interested 24

.w{==Jeral Re:mrters, Inc.

in what they are.

25

) R I.

n c o

'L U V fjf

'. '. - t, 35 I

g g mm COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I hope they communicate them

(;==:= :.:.

2 ek COMMISSIONER GII;INSKY: Yes.

3 l

COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I disagree th@.the group ough to do that, but I'm willing to go along with having uhem do 5

that.

But I think that means that you are going to end up 6

bringing the Federal Advisory Committee Act in at the beginnin 7

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

When you say " con (iusion" 8

what do you mean?

9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Drawing conclusionc from what 10 I they found out,21ich I think means advice.

11 Is that correct?

12 7.7 MR. BICKWIT: Sure.

Yes.

t 13 t

{

. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

So once they -- if there is a non-government enployee on, say, a panel,'and if they provide 15 conclusions, does that, or does that not bring in the Advisory 16 Committee Act?

17 MR. BICKWIT: If it's a panel, yes.

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Wait a minute, John.

, 19 Suppose we go with your model of a director who 20

!' C ects a senior staff wi.th these six guys, and they -- you 21 know, they are a bunch of people that work for them.

22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: If a non-gcVerhiment person is

(

23 ggga hired u a temporary employee, are they now a government

~""I 24 uio n,ponen. inc.

employee?

25 MR. BICKWIT: I believe not.

j 259 20i