ML19224C575
| ML19224C575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/24/1979 |
| From: | Donna Anderson, Hale C, Potapovs U NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224C573 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900404 99900404-79-2, NUDOCS 7907030032 | |
| Download: ML19224C575 (8) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR RECdLATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No.
99900404/79-02 Program No. 51100 Company:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Water Reactor Divisions Post Office Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Inspection Conducted: April 3-4, 1979 Inspectorst
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hf/77 D. G. Anderson, Principal Inspector, Vendor
Date Inspection Branch
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A bl $
O Y/.2Y/77 o U. Potapovs, Chief, vendor Inspection Branch
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b b $? $~,%2r f/2t'/79 W. R. Rutherford, Senior tiechanical Engineer,
' Da t'e y
j USNRC/0IE Approved by:
NE Mud,#
9 /.29'/7 7 pC. J. Hale, Chief, Program Evaluation Section,
Date Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Special Inspection conducted on April 3-4, 1979 (99900404/79-02).
Areas Inspected:
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and Topical Report WCAP 8370 as applied to follow-up on IE Bulletin No. 79-04, stress analysis of safety related piping, and follow-up on an allegation.
The inspection involved forty-eight (.48) inspector-hours on site by three (3) USNRC inspectors.
Results:
In the three (3) areas inspected, no deviations or unresoived items were identified.
272,Ni 22 7907 0300g
_2_
DETAILS SECTION (Prepared by D. G. Anderson, U. Potapovs, and W. R. Rutherford)
A.
Persons Contacted R. J. Bizzak, Engineer J. A. Burgess, Member, WRD Safety Review Committee
- T. E. Campbell, Manager, Mechanics and Materials K. C. Chang, Engineer K. F. Cooper, Technical Assistant P. A. Cunningham, Associate Engineer F. K. Deluse, Valve kr.gineer G. R. Ellis, Senior Engineer
- T. C. Esselman, Manager, Auxiliary Equipment Engineering D. R. Fraser, Senior Engineer C. W. Gay, Senior Engineer
- E. S. Hampton, Manager, Product Assurance Systems R. W. Manz, Senior Engineer
- P. T. McManus, Senior Quality Engineer J. C. Miller, Project Manager H. L. Ott, Senior Engineer J. Pandya, Manager, Thermal Equipment
- W. R. Snyder, Engineer K. M. Vashi, Fellow Engineer
- R. A. Wiesemann, Manager, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs
- Indicates attendance at the exit meeting.
B.
Follow-up on IE Bulletin No. 79-04 IE Bulletin No. 79-04 relates to the identification of incorrect weights for swing check valves manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation and the use of these weights in piping stress analyses.
The bulletin further requires that piping systems be identified where these valves may be used, analyses be reviewed to determine if correct weights were used, reanalysis be performed for those piping systems where incorrect weights were used, determination if modifications to the piping systems should be made, and documentation of these actions.
This special inspection was conducted to determine Westinahouse involvement and to review follow-up actions taken by Westinghouse to evaluate this item.
Reporting Chronology:
} }J2 February 17, 1978, Stone and Webster Engir.;ering Corporation notified Westinghouse of the discrepancy in Velan valve weights.
May 30, 1978, Westinghouse evaluation of the generic effects of the valve weight discrepancy to affected plants.
Reconmendation to notify plants with discrepancies in valve weights which might affect pipe stress analysis for system designs.
March 16-20, 1979, Westinghouse notification of sixteen (16) operating plants and five (5) plants under constrtction of discrepancies in valve weights.
March 21, 1979, Memorandum identifying five (5) deficiencies related to internal and external documentation of evaluation and reporting of this item.
March 27, 1979, Memorandum suggesting corrective action and action to prevent recurrence for the five (5) deficiences identified above by Westinghouse.
March 30, 1979, Transmittal of IE Bulletin No. 79-04 by the USNRC.
1.
Inspection Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
a.
Details of the valve weight error were identified to Westinghouse.
b.
An evaluation of the effect of this error on pipe stress analyses for safety related systems was conducted and documented.
c.
A determination had been made of the possibility of weight errors for valves manu mctured by other vendors.
d.
The generic implications of this error to other plants in the scope of Westinghouse.
e.
Where applicable, notification had been made to affected plants in a timely manner.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
A review of the Westinghouse Topical Report, WCAP 8370, Section 17.1.3, Design Control, and Section 17.1.15, 272 273
. flonconfoming Material, Parts or Components, which summarizes the.=thods used by Westinghouse, Water Reactor Division, to de. scribe their activities related to the design process and control of nonconfomances.
These activities are defined, implemented, and enforced according to the following procedures:
(1) OPR-110, Design Control; OPR-300-8, Resoonsibility for PWRSD Systems and Components; OPR-300-2, Field Deficiency Reporting System; OPR-600-1, Identification and Reporting of Substantial Safety Hazards, Significant Deficiencies, and Unreviewed Safety Questions.
(2)
EFP-MA-1, Infomation Control System; EFP-MA-2, Design Control and Documentation; EFP-MA-3, Documentation and Verification of Handwritten Work and Computer Runs; EFP-MA-7, Review of Stress P.eports; EFP-MA-8, Design Specifications; EFP-MA-10, Certification of ANSI B31.7 and ASME Section III Piping Stress Reports Written within Mechanics Analysis.
b.
A review of the following documentation to assure that procedures have been implemented in the identification, evaluation, notification, and reporting of the errors in valve weights:
(1) Transmittals: Letter, Stone and Webster Engineering to Westinghouse, dated February 17, 1978; SSA-4.13.1 Hand-written Memorandum, Recomendation to notify certain affected plants of the valve weight problem, dated May 30,1978; WS-RAW-089, Overweight Valve Issue, dated March 21,1979; PA-HHB-79-062, Procedural Control of Design Deviations, March 27, 1979; MM-RCSA-524, Preparation of Revised WCAP 8252 to Address flRC Coments, January 24, 1979.
(2) Drawings: AEP-1-5421-12 and 16, Containment Unit tio. 1 RHR Pump and Accumulator Discharge and Safety Injection Piping System, January 16, 1979 and February 21, 1975.
Velan fio. 78704, 6" Primary fluclear Swing Check Valve, March 16, 1979.
(3) Topical Peports: WCAP 8252, Dccumentation of Selected Westinghouse Structural Analysis Computer Codes, May, 1977; WCAP 8929, Benchrnrk Problem Solutions Employtd for Verificatio1 of the WECAft Computer Program, April, 1977.
272 274 (4) Calculations: AEP 6" Branch on the Hot Leg Loop Bending Stress, April 3, 1979; Maximum Piping Stresses-All fot'r Loops, A3ril 2,1979; AEP Loop 2 6" Safety Injection Line-Deadseig1t, April 2, 1979; AEP 6" Hot Leg Safety injection Tor all Four Loops-Seismic, April 2,1979.
(5)
Computer Run No. AEPSPECTRA
.1, April 2,1979.
c.
To detennine the generic implications for valves manufactured by Velan and other vendors, Westinghouse perforined weight measurements on valves which had been shipped to selected nuclear plant sites.
Tce shipping documentation was compared to the measured weight of the valve and its shipping crate.
The estimated weight of the shipping crate was then subtracted.
The results of this type of measurement on twenty-six (26) separate shipments indicated a range of from 0-35% in valve weight error. Westinghouse also performed actual weight measurements on twenty-seven (27) different valves in four separate vendor shop sites.
The results of there measurements indicated a variation in error in valve weight of from 0-33%.
d.
To detennine the generic implications for errors in valve weight on piping stress analyses for plants in the Westinghouse scope of supply, twenty-one (21) domestic plants were fot.nd to have discrepancies in valve weight used in original analyses. Westinghouse has thus far reanalyzed piping systems in six (6) plants and report that the results clearly indicate the reanalyzed stresses are below the allowable limit.
3.
Findings In this area of the inspection, no deviations from commitment were identified.
The following unresolved item was identified during this inspection:
The inspector noted that after Stone and Webster had notified Westinghouse of the discrepancy in the weight of Velan Valves and after initial evaluation by Westinghouse, that management of Westinghouse had recommended notification of affected utilities.
The shop order holder responsible for notification of the affected utilities, identified in the May 30, 1978, meeting, failed to follow-up and notify the utilities of the discrepancy in valve weights and their impact on piping stress analyses. The affected utilities were not notified until nearly eight (8) months had 272 275
. passed.
This deficiency and four (4) others were identified by Westinghouse in an investigation conducted by their Nuclear Safety Department.
Corrective action and action to prevent recurrence on these deficiencies is presently undenvay at Westinghouse. The Inspector will follow-up on these actions taken by Westinghouse in a later inspection.
C.
Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping Westinghouse activities related to stress analysis of safety system piping were reviewed to detemine the general scope of Westinghouse involvement and to define the division of responsibilities (between NSS and AE) for piping analysis at selected plants.
This effort included definition of design interfaces for three of the five reactors which were shut down pursuant to NRC show cause order issued on March 13, 1979, and was also aimed at providing general infomation concerning Westinghouse design responsibilities and methods used in other licensed facilities and in plants under construction.
The following infomation was obtained:
a.
Westinghouse did not have the responsibility for stress analysis of safety related piping in the three (3) Westinghouse plants subject to the March 13 Order (Surrey 1 and 2, Beaver Valley 1).
b.
Westinghouse has performed dynamic stress analyses for the large diameter main loop piping and branch connections of several later vintage operating plants and for plants now under construction.
Design interfaca between the NSSS and AE scope of supply vary between individual contracts. The Westinghouse scope may include only the large diameter recirculating pipe and nozzles or may be extended to include Class 1 branch piping connected to the main lcop.
c.
Consistent with the design specification, the stress report for piping within the Westinghouse scope of analysis assumes no responsibility for the accuracy or correctness of the forces and moments at the interface boundaries which are supplied by the balance of plant designer.
d.
According to the n.anager of mechanical and materials engineering only two computer programs (WESTDYNE and WECAN) have been used for dynamic stress analysis of piping systems in plants for which Westinghouse had this design responsibility.
e.
A description of the WESTDYNE program is included in Topical Report WCAP 8252 which has been reviewed and found acceptable by NRC.
272 276
. f.
The WECAN program was originally included as chapter 3 of the previously referenced Topical Report but has recently been re-submitted to NRC as a separate Topical (WCAP 8929) WECAN uses time-history dynamic analysis and is currently considered by Westinghouse at their standard method of dynamic piping analysis for new plants.
D.
Follow-up on an Allegation During this inspection of Westinghouse, WRD, IE Headquarters initiated an investigation of an allegation that in essence challenges the technical adequacy of certcin design criteria provided by Westinghouse.
The design criteria involved are the type and number of plant operational transients that are used in analyzing and evaluating the designs of plant components.
The inspector noted that attachments to the allegation were identified as technical information Westinghouse had supplied Stone and Webster and a Northeast Utilities briefing document prepared for internal use.
The basis for the Westinghouse design criteria, departures from and changes to the 1974 criteria related to the allegation were discussed, evaluated and compared with their current criteria.
Several of the examples identified as "not conservative" in the allegation were discussed in detail with Westinghouse systems design and analyst representatives.
The results of the review did not reveal any findings that would substantiate the allegation at this time.
However a significant amount of additional detailed review work is required to provide total coverage of the allegation.
Resolution of this matter will require investigations at Northeast Utilities, their contractor and most likely additional discussion with
. Westinghouse.
The reduced number of occurrences used in the evaluation of the fatigue life of certain components will be given immediate consideration within NRC.
Specifically, the need for regniring licensees to count transients and relate them to the basis for the established design life of components will be evaluated.
E.
Exit Meeting An exit meetiog was conducted with Westinghouse management personnel at the conclusion of the inspection on April 4,1979. Those individuals indicated by an asterisk ir. the Details Section of this report were in attendance.
In addition, the following were present:
272 277
. T. fl. Anderson, flanager, fluclear Safety H. H. Brunko, flanager, Product A.ssurance J. J. Lescisin, Technical Advisor G. fi. Lilly, flanager, Electrical Systems Engineering J. A. Puharic, Senior Engineer L. E. Race, Senior Engineer The inspector discussed the scope of this inspection and the details of the deficiency identified by Westinghouse and reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. fianagement representatives of Westinghouse.cknowledged the statements of the insepctors with respect to this item.
272 278