ML19224C549
| ML19224C549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/01/1979 |
| From: | Ross D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mattson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA-79-98 NUDOCS 7907020510 | |
| Download: ML19224C549 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N
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e MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. Mattson, Di*ee. tor, Lessons Learned Task For e FROM.
D. F. Ross, Jr., Director, Bulletins & Orders Task Force 3/ JECT:
YOUR MEM0 0F 5/30/78 ON FY-1980 RES BUDGET AMENDMENT tone subject memo asked for reaction to the draft RES paper. On behalf of Bi.0 Task Force I offer the following:
A general feeling from reading the RES paper is that there was too much restoration of cuts previously made) and not near enough original and creative thinking.
(An exception is the very good thoughts on pp. 17-21 of the paper, which is, to me, the place to start, and essentially scrap the rest of the paper.) I have enclosed in Taole 1 some thoughts, but time prevented a complete nisponse.
I think the preponderance of the Onplemental budget needs to shift to accident prevention, as RES is presently overcommitted on consequences studies. Their supplement only further accentuates the consequences bias; this is noted further in paragraph 1 below. Also in Table 1, paragraph 3, are some recomendations for capital expenditures to better help us (NRR/IE) to do our job.
it may be that deliverance of these items is not within the purview of RES. Nonetheless, the RES paper is the only vehicle at hand, and I am co'icerned that if the $29M supplement is granted, the cupboard may be tue ere we get there. For this reason alone NRR should temcorize (i.e., non-concur) until we make up our own proposal.
1.
The discussion in the RES paper on p. 2 (TMI specific) and p. J (broad gneric topics) are not categorized as to whether they would help reduce the probability or the consequences.
From the sketch on p. 2 one gets the impression that additional research is consequence oriented.
It scems that, if we are out to reduce risk, both probability and consequence should be studied. This will be returned to after comments on the specifics of the enclosure.
2.
Semiscale Upgrade We saw on ATWS that the steam generator model is all importa. t; the features of the upgrade are addressed to a representative secondary system.
Basically I believe this is a sound investment. However, it will not (apparently) represent the OTSG. This is a seriors, if not fatal, flaw.
Consdierable scaling studies would be needed. Atypicalities in flooding correlation in the pressurizer surge line would be a prime item to study.
Ferformance of vessel and loop level meters could be studied.
Cn Balance: Yes.
272 217 7907020 9
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.wmeer-R. Mattson jpg i gg79 3.
Upgrade TLTA In line with the general feeling that transients are better understood and monitored on BWRs, I rate this item somewhat low.
4.
Scoarate Effects Tests Tnis is too sketchy to comment on, but I believe the greater emphasis should be on system experiments. This should be low priority.
5.
Relief Valve Tests The need is under-stated. We already have a user's needs. This needs more money, more emphasis, and a greater sense of urgency.
- 6.
Instrumentation Needs We don't need recommendation, nor do we need another study. What we do need is sume timely research on instruments known to be needed; e.g.,~ vessel level monitor.
7.
Post-LOCA Conditions Probably a good idea, if it means TRAC.
8.
Equipment Requalification No; it is the non-safety instruments-that were most useful at TMI. Study them first.
9.
Improved Qualification Testing Methodology I suppose.
- 10. LOFT a.
Small break, natural circulation.
I don't see merit of natural circulation, unless it is 2-flow, and then it is marginal.
b.
Instrument test bed Yes.
- 11. Code Development This is almost a doubling in budget. Where comes the qualified people?
Some effort worthwhile here; needs key to experiments.
272 218
.a.tsco jgy 1 jg79 j i Behavior Too much money studying something we already know; uncooled fuel melts.
13.
Frigry System Integrity Why? What really did TMI reveal with respect to post-LOCA environment?
.'! te Technolooy and Engineering 3.
Containment; yes.
c.
Pump & Valve; yes, and it is probably underfunded; let's start research now; please, not another study.
c.
Damage Assessment of Plant Structure; not very exciting.
d.
Benchmark for Structural Code; no comment.
- 15. E'nergency Response If~ a real study is done, let's put enought $ in to do it right. This should
': daua for every plant site, present and planned.
l'i. "spntamination U
2eratcr/MaintenanceAction;Howmuchmoney?
18.
Risk vs Human Error; How much money?
Imorovec Reactor Safety It is here that I found the most creative thinking, although it is hard ta evaluate these thoughts without specifics as to how many man-years per item.
Except for this section, I found the RES proposal greatly disappointing.
It seemed like each function simply adced a delta to its existing funct'on and added back in, perhaps under a different title, things that had been previously deleted.
What we need is more creative thinking.
For example, I believe tiRR could do
= better job of regulation if it started now building flexible reactor power olant simulators for our use in training ourselves as well as studying the offect of our regulations.
For a few million we could get this, and get far more benefit than, say, S5.6 million on fuel. To be effective these should be in a building contiguous to flRR.
We talk about running Semiscale in off-nomal mode, or LOFT.
I believe Nt Semiscale should be run from our Bethesda simulator so we can see how to control or racover, and invite utility operators in to do same.
us close the loop between man and machine.
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. :a.t:cn JUN 1 1970 i LOieve each operating plant should have its own simulation deck so that in one hour our flexible Jimulator would be operational on any a!, normal transient. This would be the nerve center of the new IRC. Again this is worth far inore than multiple TRAC runs.
The at,ove coments reflect the fact that RES is not focusing on how to help NRR + IE to do its job right.
I can never support a $200M budget not se grossly neglects our needs.
(One only has to read the last
- r.tcrce of p. 6 of the draft RES paper in order to confinn a s aspicion that RES is mostly " business as usual" and " don't upset the labs'. This Wd-set must be broken; NRR needs must be given higher priority. Where, To exar.ple is the NRR coniputer. We suffer greatly even today.)
I do not see enough attention to studies on flow of radwaste, or on better ways to collect and store radweste. This was a significant TMI problem.
a br'tcmline sum mry is that NRR should definitely not concur in this paper.
'i
-te no provision for it, anyway).
Further, if indeed it gets to the Commission in its present fom (i.e., a supplemental $29 million) then some of us may need o spress contrasting points of view.
.- :.!1cble to work on an ad hoc NRR paper that expresses what research we 3.
realis med.
I inc';de a complete redesign study on a BWR and PWR using only safr/-grade equipment; hardware studies and experiments on pumps and valve leAaoe and operability; idiot-proof control room; greater coupling of computer JMion to operator infcmation; NRR simulation; real-time NRR analysis
- b technio.ues, NRR computer; medem radwaste collection and storage (leak-tight arx bldg.).
A' Y 7..
,..,,g.
D. F. Ross, Jr., Director fable 1 Bulletins & Orders Task Force cc:
H. Denton F. Case V. Stello R. Boyd
- n. ftuller S. Hanauer i.. Rubenstein 272 220
TABLE 1 REC 0 MENDED RESEARCH 1.
Probability Reduction a.
Top-to-bottom design study on " control" side of plant, with empharis on upgrading control and protection to " safety" standards. The emphasis should be on feedwater control, steam bypass, secondary trips, plant computer, PORV, radiation monitoring, noise diagnostics, etc. that traditionally is not " safety" grade.
b.
Reliability and operability of safety and relief valves.
c.
RCS fluid conditions monitors (level, subcooling, boren).
d.
A better control room.
e.
Secondary "ECCS" 1.e., accumulators ori SG?
f.
Pump and valve operability studies and experiments.
2.
Consequence Reduction a.
Leak-tight RHR systems (inside containment?)
b.
On-line real-time core and system simulation, in centrol room, with CRT graphics for arbitrary initial and boundary conditions.
c.
Leak-tig' t radwaste systems (contained aux bldg?)
d.
More creative ECC systems to cope with the more likely small breaks (perhaps like RCIC, which uses core and system energy to drive a turbine which pumps cold water into RCS). Also, more creative AFW systems, possibly with a safety-grade condenser system to recycle exhaust steam fioc t" rhine AFW pump as well as steam from SG secondary.
3.
Licensing Aids a.
Four full-size control room simulators, in Bethesda, for use of NRR/:E in studying transients, operator response, procedures, etc.
b.
A modern scientific computer (> CDC 7600) for exclusive use of NRC HQ.
c.
System descriptions and computer decks for each operating plant.
d.
Real-time simulation of arbitrary transients for each operating plant.
e.
A fifth simulator, flexible and fast-changeover such that in ene hour it \\;ould be reprogrammed for any operating LWR.
(This wauld be the nerve center for the next item, which is:)
f.
A modern incidence response center.
272 221 g.
Coupling of operating plant data (core and system) to items above to facilitate routine and non-routine NRR/IE monitoring.
TACLE 1 2
h.
NRC owned and maintained off-site radiation monitors around each plant
- with remote readout to IRC, 272 222