ML19224C453

Offers Addl Recommendations Re TMI Incident.Suggests All PWR Licensees Submit Design Proposals & Schedules for Completing Provision for Instrumentation Showing Unambiguous Indication of Vessel Fluid in Reactor

ML19224C453
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/16/1979
From:	Carbon M Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML19224C451	List: ML19224C450 ML19224C453
References
ACRS-R-0830, ACRS-R-830, NUDOCS 7907020404
Download: ML19224C453 (5)

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, *...a May 16, 1979 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Corraission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

INTERLM RErGT NO. 3 CN 'IEREI MILE IS!./ND NJCLOR STATICN USIT 2

Dear Dr. Hendrie:

During its 229 2 m'eting, May 10-12, 1979, i.ha M risory Cce.mittee on Reactor Safeguards continued its review of the recent accident at Tnree Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 ('mI-2), including implicatiens dram from the occurrence of this accident. O.c Committee has several addi-tional recc=endations to make at this time.

Reacter Pressure.*essel Level Indicatien The Co=ittee believes that it would be pruden. to consider expeditiously the provision of instre entation that will provide an una2fguous indica-tion of the level of fluid in the reactor vessel. We suggect that licens-ees of all pressurized water reactors be requested to submit design pro-Tnis v:uld assure pesals and schedules for accomplishing this acticn.

the timely availability of reviewed designs if the Stoff ongoirg studies The Committee should indicate that early implementation is required.

. believes that as a minimum, the level indication should range free the tettom of the hot leg piping to the reactor vessel flange area.

Ocerator Traininc and Qualification Tne wtC Staff should examine operator qualifications, training, and li-censing to determine eat changes are needed. Consideration should be given to educational background, to training mthods, and to content of Attention should also be given to testing rethods, the training program.

with specific concern for the ability of the testing methcds to prealct cporator capability.

Eamination of licensing procedures shculd deter-mine chether they are resxnsive to new information that is developec about clant or ocerator performance.

Ef fort should also be made to dete..ine -tether results of examinations can be correlated with o,er-c

.ficatien training and testi.g should be sioilarly ator ability.

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Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie t'ay,16, ' 1979 examined to insure that they take account of information that is devel-oped by operation in the plant, and to determine that relevant informa-tion about other plants is cade available to operators, and is made part of the training and regaalification program. As part of this and of other more extensive studies, continuing attention must be given to the amount of information which an operator can assimilate and use in normal and in emergency situations and to the best method of presenties the in-formation to the o,erato. Tae use and limitacicas of simulators for operator training should receive careful censideratien.

Evaluation of Licensee Event Reports Because of the potenti, ally vcluable information contained in Licensee Es ent Reports (LEPs), the Committee recommends that the 1GC Staf' estab-lish for.al procedures for the use of this information in the trainire of supervisory and raintenance staffs and in the licensire and regaali-fication of operating personnel at commercial nuclear power plants. Tne information in LERs may also be useful in anticipating safety problers.

At the present time some utilicies routinely reouest that they be pro-vided copies of all LEPs applicable to plants of the type they operate or to specific systems and components in a given class of plants similar to their plant.

Certain reactor vendors have made similar regaests and use the LERs to review and evaluate the p'rforrance of their plants.

In addition, the tGC operator licensing staff has indicated that they use LERs in reviewirs operating experience at eccrercial f acilities.

Tne large nt:ter of LERs that attribute the cause to personnel error would tend to indicate that a formalized pregran of LER review would be useful in the training, licensing and regaalification of nuclear power plant personnel. The extent to which such a przram could be used to anticipate safety problems should also be considered.

Operating Procedures Safety aspects of individual reactors during nomal operation and under accident conditions are reviewed in detail by the !GC Staff and discussed with the ACBS.

Acceptable limits for r.omal operaticns are fomalized by n_chnical Specifications, sutaitted by the licensee and approved by the W<C Sta f f.

Oparating procedures fer severe transiats h'.ve receivod less detailed review by. the !GC Staf f.

It appears that sc5 procedures ' ould benefit from review by an interdisciplinary team W.ich includes p3rsonnel expert both in operaticns and in system behavior. Aho, for the lorger te a, there may be merit in considerity the developunt of r. ore,stjndard-iced formats for such procedures.

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3-Pay 16,1979 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Reliability of Electric Power Supplies Durirg the past several years there have been several operating ex,ori-ences involvirq a loss of AC power to important enginee, red safe-guards.

The ACRS believes it important that a ecmprehensive teexamination be made by the EC and the reactor licensees of the adegascy of design, testirg, and reintenance of offsite and cosite AC and CC p:ver ' supplies.

In g r-ticular, failure modes and effects analyses should be rade, if not al-ready performed, mere systematic testing of pcwer system reliability, in-y abnormal or anomalous system transients, should be considered, and cludi.

improved cuality assurance'and status menitoring of power supply systems should be sought.

_ Analysis of Transients The ACRS recommends that each if censee and holder of a construction permit 7

be asked to make a detailed evaluation of his current capability to with-stand station blackout (loss of of fsite and ensite AC power) includirg The i

additicnal complicating f actors that might be reasonably considered.

12:cP Q evaluation should include examination of natural circulation capability, Cf' ';,

the continuing availability of ecmponents needed for long-term cooling, E:U.'li~ J and the patential for improvement in capability to survive extended sta-b.L >)

tien blackout.

N also recewads that each licensee and construction permit holder k:

Tne ACRE should examine a wide rarse of anomalous transie..ts and degraded accident conditiens which might lead to water lu:,er.

Me-hods of controlling or

.n preventing such conditions should be evaluated, as should research to We Cv mittee expects it previde a better basis for such evaluations.

for g't1 r1 would be appropriate to have such, studies done generically first, classes of reactor designs and s; stem types.

Emercency Planninc An effort should be undertaken to plan and define the role MC will play fq* 3 in emergencies and what their contribution and interactica will be with

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the licensee and other emergercy plan participants includies other govern-Such ment agencies, industry representatives, and r.ational laboratories.

planning should censider:

assurance that for.a1 dommentation of plans, pr:cedures and organization are in place for actier. in an emergency, designatica of a techr ical advisory team with names a.~i alternates for the anticipated reecs cf a. erarcency situation, 264 324 N

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Honorable Jo'.aph P.. Hendrie P.sy 16, 1979 compilation of an inventory of ecuipment and raterials which ruy be needed for unusual conditions including its descriptien, location, availability and the cegani-zation which centrols its release.

The Comittee recomends that each licensee te asked to review and revise. within about three months:

his bases for obtaining offsite advice and assistance in emergencies, fren within and outside the comcany, current bases for notifying and providing infor.a:ica to authorities offsite in case of emergency.

This review and evaluation should be in terms of accidents havirs a broad rarse of consequences. The results of this revicw should be reported to the ?GC.

Decontaminatien and Recove.y The Committee wishes to call attentien to the importance of pecgram de-signed to learn directly about the behavior, failure modes, s 2r

'bil-ity, and other aspects of compenent and system behavier at SI. ar, part of the long-term recovery process. Bis progra.. should also examira the lessons learned at 7.!-2 to determine if design chances are r,ecessary to facil'. ate the decentamination and recovery of major nuclear power plant sys t em.s.

Safety Review Procedures The WI-2 accident has imposed large new pressures on the availability of manpswer r- ;ources within the tac Staff.

If prcgress is to be expedited on the new questions which have arisen and on existirg unresolved safety issues, the ACRS believes that new mechanisms should be sought and imple--

mented.

For those safety concerns where mch a mechanism is appropriate the Cemittee recommends that the Commissien should recuest licensees to perform suitable studies en a timely basis, including an evaluatien of the. pres and cons, and prepesals for p:ssible implementation of safety improvemen's. ne raC Staff should concurrently establish its cwn capc-bility to evaluate wch studies by arrangirs for support by its consult-ants and contractors.

In this fashicn, the Comittee anticip3tes that the infor atica en which judgments will be based can be developed much m:re expediticusly, and an earlier resolution of.any safety cencerns

ny be achieved.

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Honsrable Joseph M. Hendrie Vay 16, 1979 Mditional comments by Messrs. H. Lewis, D. Poeller, D. C% rent, and J. Ray -

are presented below.

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r.,x w. Ceren Chairman Additicnal Cc : ents by Messrs. H. Lewis, D. Moeller, D. Ckrent, and J. Rav The patential for a reduction in risk to the piolic in the case of a ser-f ous reactor accident by the implementation of a means for controlled, filtered venting of a contain.ent which could retain prticulates and the bulk of the iodine has been reccgnized for more than a decade. De concept was recommended for study more recently in the A:>2rican Physical Scciety Report en lightwater reactor safety and in the Ford Foundation-Mitre Report, " Nuclear Power - Issues and Choices." It is a high pri-ority item in the NRC plan submitted to Congress for Research to Improve the Safety of Light-Water Nuclear Power Pla sts (NUREC-0413). D e study performed for the State of California en underg<ound siting concluded that filtered, vented centainment was a favored epti:n to explore in cen-nection with possible means to mitigate the cansecuences of serious re-acter accidents.

H: wever, little prcgress hae. been cade en the develop-ment of sufficiently detailed design informauen on which to evaluate the efficacy and other factors relevant to a decision en passible implenenta-tien of such consecuence amelioratirq systems.

The TMI-2 accident suggests that the probability of a serious accident in which a filtered vented containment could be useM is larger than many had anticipated.

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We reconnend that the Comission recuest sch p:wer reactor licensae and construction permit holder to parform des.gn studies of a system which adds the option of filtered venting or pargirq of contairc.ent in the event of a serious accident. %e system should be capble of withstand-ing a steam and hydregen environment and of removing and retainire for ao long a time as necessary radioactive articulates ar.d the great bulk of the iodine for accidents involving dcgraded situations up to and in-cluding core melt.

Such studies could be done cenerically for caveral reacter-contairc.ent types, and should evaluate the practicality, pros and cons, the costs, and the ptential for risk reductic..

A pericd of about twelve months for a report to the NBC by licenf ass c.d construction mit holders a,cpears to represent a possible schedule.

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J. R. Ahexsath;Suchanan, NSIC NRC POR Thos. B. Abernathy, TIC CENTRAL FILE I

NRR READING SB READING MAY 2.; 1973 SB CHRON WPGAMMILL, DPM i

DCRUTCHFIELD, NRR SB BRANCH MEMBERS Mr. Tom M. Anderson, Manager Nuclear Safety Department Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

SUBJECT:

ACRS REC 0 EENDATIONS RELATING TO TMI-2 ACCIDENT i

In connection with its contf rusing review of the TV1-2 accident, the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has issued most recently tuo letters dated May 16, 1979 (see attached). Th:-a latte s rescate and/or amplify a nutter of specific recorrendations made by the Comittee q'}

in three earlier letters (dated April 7, April 18, ar.d April 20, 1979),

s and contain a nunber of additional new recomendatiens as well.

You were recuested by earlier correspondence to provide the staff with a concise discussion and position on each of the ACRS recomendations relating to T!'I-2 in the earller letters.

'a'e are now requesting that you also respond to the additional recomendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letters.

For your convenience, we are enclosing a surrary (Enclosure.1) of the addi-tional recomendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letter; please frame your responses in the format indicated in Erclosure 1.

We request that you provide your responses to these additional recor.andations so that they will be rer.eived by the staff by May 29, 1979.

If you require any clarification of the matters discussed herein, please contact C. J. !!eltenes, Jr. Mr. Helteues' telephone nuaber is (301)-

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NRC PDR Thos. B. Abernathy, TIC MAY 2 o 1979 NRR READING FILE SB READIdG SB CHRON FILE' NRRXREA D CRUTCHFIELD, NRR W CAMMILL, DPM SB STAFF MEMBERS Mr. James !!. Taylor Itanager, Licensing Babcock & Wilcox Company P. O. Eox 1260 Lynchbur9, Virginia 21505

Dear Mr. Taylor:

SUCJECT: ACRS REC 0f0Ef DATIO *:S RELATIttG TO TMI-2 ACCIDENT In connection with its continuin9 review of the TMI-2 accident, the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) nas issued most recently two letters dated May 16, D79 (see attached). These letters restate and/or amplify a nunber of specific recomendations r'ade by the Connittee in three earlier letters (dated April 7, April 18, and April 20,1979),

and contain a nutter of additional new recommendations as well.

You wece requested by earlier correspondence to provide the staff with a s

concise discussion and position on each of the ACRS recurr.:endations relating to TMI-2 in the earlier letters. He are now requestin9 that you also respond to the additional recomendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letters.

For your convenience, we are enclosin9 a sumary (Enclosure 1) of the addi-tional recomendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letter; please frane our responses in the format indicated in Enclosure 1.

We request that you provide your rc:ponses to these additional recomendations so that they will be received by the staff by May 29, 1979.

If you require any clarification of the matters discussed herein, please contact C. J. Helter.cs, Jr. Mr. pelten.es' telephone number is (301)-

492-7745.

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NRR READING SB READING DCRUTCHFIELD, NRR WGAMMILL, DPM SB MEMBERS MAY 2 31979 Dr. Glenn G. Sherwood-t'anager, Safety and Licensing Operation General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, Califernia 95125 1

Dear Dr. Sherwood:

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SUBJECT:

ACRS REC 0!?iEf!DATIONS RELATING TO TMI-2 ACCIDE!'T In connectf on with its continuing review of the T!:I-2 accident, the l

Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has issued most recently two letters dated May 16, 1979 (see attached). These letters restate and/or amplify a nurber of specific recomendations nada by the Comittee

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in three earlier letters (dated April ?, April 18, and April 20,1979),

and contain a number of additional new recomenddtions as well.

You were s equested by earlier correspondence to provide the staff with a concise discussion and position on each of the ACRS recomendations relating to TFI-2 in the earlier letters. We are now requesting t!.at you also respond to the additional recomendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letters.

For your convenience, we are enclosing a sur.cary (Enclosure 1) of the addi-tional recontendations contained in the l'tay 16, 1979 letter; please frame your responses in the format indicated in Enclosure 1.

We request that you provide your responses to these additional recornenditions so that the', till be received by the staff by May 29, 1979.

If you require any clarification of the natters discussed herein, please contact C. J. Helteres, Jr. ftr. !!citemes' telephone nunber is (301)-

492-7745.

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NRC PDR J. R. Buchar.an, NSIC Thos. B. Abernathy, TIC CENTRAL FILE <

g SB CHRON FILE SB READING FILE NRR READING FIL 58 BRANCH MEMBEnS EY 2 31979 WGAMMILL, DPM DCRUTCHFIELD, NRR Pr. Warren Nechodon Manager, Licensing & Compliance Exxon Nuclear Conpany, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, Washington 99352

SUBJECT:

ACRS RECOM"ENDATIO!is RELATING TO Tt'I-2 ACCIDENT In connection with its continuing review of t h TMI-2 accident, the Advisory Corraittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has issued rost recently 16, 1979 (see attached). These letters restate two letters dated May and/or anplify a number of specific recomendations nade by the Comittee in three earlier letters (dated April 7 April 13, and April 20,1979),

and contain a nurter of additional new recomendatf ors as well.

You vere requested by earlier correspondence to provide the staff with a concise fiscussion and position on each of the ACP,5 recorandations relating to T".1-2 in the earlier letters. He are nou requesting that you also respon.1 to the additional recorrendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letters.

For your convenience, we are enclosing a sunuary (Enclosure 1) of the addf-tional recomendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letter; please fram your responses in the foraat indicated in Enclosure 1.

We request that you provide your respenses to these addi'.tanal recomendations so that they will be received by the staff by P.ay 29, 1979.

If you require any clarification of the matters discussed herein, please Mr. Helteues' telephone nur.ber is (301)-

contact C. J. Heltenes, Jr.

492-7745.

9-Si r.cerely,

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J. R. Buchanan, NSIC WGAMMILL, DFM Thomas B. Abernathy, TIC DCRUTCHFIELD, NRR NRC PDR g p,31979 CENTRAL FILE NRR READING FILE SB CHRON FILE SB READING FILE SB MEMBERS Mr. A. E. Scherer, Licensing Manager Combustion Engineering, Incorporated 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095

SUBJECT:

ACRS REC 0ff'.ENDATIONS RELATIt:G TO THI-2 ACCIDENT In connection witi1 its continuing review of the TMI-2 accident, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has issued nost recently two letters dated May 16, 1979 (see attached). These letters restate and/or amplify a nurber of specific reconcendations c.ade by the Corr:ittee in three earlier letters (dated April 7, April 18, and April 20,1979),

and contain a nur.ber of additional new recomendations as well.

Ycu were requestu by earlier correCondence to provide the staff with a concise discussion and position on each of the ACRS reco=endations relating to TMI-2 in the earlier letters. We are now requesting that you also respond to the additional recomendations contained in the ".ay 16, 1979 letters.

For your convenience, we are enclosing a sumary (Enclosure 1) of the addi-tional recorrendations contained in the May 16, 1979 letter; please frame your responses in the format indicated in Enclosure 1.

We request that you provide your responses to these additional recocr.endations so that they will be received by the staff by May 29, 1979.

If you require any -larification of the matters discussed herein, please contact C. J. I!eltenes, Jr. Mr. Heltenes' telephone nudmr is (331)-

492-7745.

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