ML19224C145
| ML19224C145 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco, Crane |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1979 |
| From: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906290154 | |
| Download: ML19224C145 (7) | |
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u r:mthic musicie.at UTit:Tv otsinicT C E2:1 S Stmoet See im3tL Sacrossens Causanda R3t13: Sli4 6 April 16, 1979 i
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Nuc lea r Regulatory Cosnission a tes.t w.
Mr. R. H. Engelken. Director Region V Office of Inspection &
f.n f orcen.ent 1990 Horth California Boulevard Wa Inu. Creek Plaza. Suite 202 o l e.u t Ce cek. California 94596 i
,Donet Mm=40-312 I
(Ranchopelear Gesarating station. Unit No.1 Engelken:
bear u.
i The Sacrarnento Municipal Utility District has reviewed If Bulletin No.79-05A. dated April 5. 1979.
This letter provides the i
bu trict's responses to Items 4b through 44, and 6 through 12 as requested i
t,y Bulletin No.79-05A.
This response should conclude the District's a c t t on - for Bulletin 79-05A.
i Item 4b Per telephone conversation April 14, 1979 between J. Crews (NRC Region V) and P. Oubre' (Rancho Seco Superintendent) Bulletin 79-05A Item 4b (1) and (2) is to be revised to the wording stated in Bulletin 79-06A I tma 74 and b. (1) and (2).
7.
Re vicw the action directed by the operating procedures and training instructions to ensure that:
b.
Operating procedurcs currently, or revised to, specify that if the high pressure injection (HPI) system has be=n autosatically actuated because of low pressure condition, it must remain in operation until either:
(1) Both low pressure injection (LPI) pu=ps are,in 756,20c) operation and flowin9 for 20 minutes or longer; t
at a rate' which would assure stable plant behavior; oOgg So/ y or; 5
(2) The HPI system has been in operation for 20 p0 3y /3 minutes, and all hot and cold leg tesperatures 7 3 are at least 50 degrees below the saturation terperature for the existing RCS pressure.
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F:. 11 Enge1Len April 16. 1979-l 50 degrees stbcooling cannot 5e maintained 2
af ter HP! cutoff, the HPI shall be reactivated.
The degree of subcooling beyond 50 degrees F and the length of time HPI is in operation shall be limited by the pressure / temperature consider-
.ations for the vessel integrity.
Response to Itee ab lhe District has revised operating procedures according to the 79-0:>A Bulletin and are presently revising the procedures to agree with the requireuents of 79-06A. Itents 7a and b.
Itec <c Operating procedures currently, or are revised to, specity that in the event of hPI initiation, with reactor Ecolant pumps (RCP) operating, at least one RCP per loop shall remain operating.
Response to item 4c Operating Procedure D5 " Loss of Raactor' Coolant / Reactor Coolant bs ten. Pressure" currer cly requires one reactor coolant purp to operate in cash loop.
This prrcrdure would be applicable to the con _dttion related i
tu the circumstance-.tescribed in Enclosure 1 of Bulletin 79-05.
Itent 4d Operators are provided additional information and instructions to not rely upon pressurizer level indication alone, but to also examine pi essurizer pressure and other plant paraseter indications in evaluating plant w.dttions, e.g., water inventory in the reactor primary system.
Response to Item 4d Direction has been given to the reactor operators to utilize the pressure / teog>erature relationships to ensure reactor coolant subcooling prior to securing high pressure injection.
Item 6 Review the containment isolation initiation design and procedures cna pi epere and in.plement all changes necessary to cause containment nole* ton of all lines whose isolation does not degrade core cooling w.cLility upan automatic initiation of safety injection.
Resoonse to item 6 The containcent isolation at Rancho Seco occurs at either te.6 p.ic; reactor coolant pressure or 4 psig reactor building pressure.
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l R. H. f.ngelken April 16,1979 in : :. redus.dancy assures a high degree of confidence that the reactor
...,i Iding 111 t e isola ted when required.
The containment isolation design nd prucedures have b,.tn reviewed and found acceptable.
All lines not t enais ed f or safety features are isolated upon initiation of containc:ent n.n ia t i on e;icept lines that are necessary to assure continued operation
..t r ne eactor pumps and control rods.
I tca. 7 For o.anual valves or.monually-operated notor-drive valves ditch c.nuld def eat or comprositse the flow of auxiliary feedeater to the steacs vei.e. a t vi.. prepare and implement procedures which:
require that such valves be locked in their correction a.
position; or u.
require other similar pos.tive position controls.
Response to Item 7 Surveillance procedures have been~ established, reviewed and the valve positions have been verified for the manual and manually-operated e..ator-driven valves which could defeat or cogromise the flow'of auxiliary tee >.tcr to the steam generators.
Each manual operated valve in the
. s t es.
1, locked open as required by Surveillance Procedure SP214.03 Lu.-kea Vcive List".
The motor operated valves are closed and stroked yaarterly to verify operability.
These valves open on a safety features re y a i res..e n t.
Position status for the motor operated valves is indicated
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Item 8 Prepare and implement inumediately procedur1:s which assure that tm. independent s team generator auxiliary feednater flow pats, each with luut t10- c a pa c i ty, are operable at any time when heat removal from the in t...ary sf > ten. is through the steam generators.
When two independent nn.. copocity flow paths an: not available, the capacity shall be restored a ti,in a hours or the plant shall be placed in a cooling rc.2 which c.,e > nrA rely on steam generators for cooling within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
wnen at least one 100t capacity flow path is not available, the reac.or shall be made subcritical within one hour and the facility
.. m e.: n. 4 shutduwn cooling mode which does not rely on steam generators t i.r u,u li ng w i th in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or at the maximizn safe shutdown rate.
h s; ion s e to ! tem 8 Surveillance Procedures SP 210.01A " Quarterly Hotor Driven
... :ii<.r. Feud Pun.p P-318 Surveillance and Inservice Test". SP 210.01B a.: rte:iy Kator Driven Auxiliary Feed Pimp P-319 Surveillance and
.v.-a les t". SP 210.01C " Quarterly Auxiliary Feed System Valve
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.to, and Surveillance", SP 210.01D " Monthly Turbine / Motor Driven 256 211
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-- E tt. Engelter. April 16.1979 f.u. iliary reed Purp P-318 Operational Readiness Verification Test" and
's 210.01E " Monthly Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Puw P-319 Operaticaal headines:, vert fication Test" assure that two independent auxiliary fos <bater flu-paths, each with 100% flow capacity, are operable at any time required to acet the requirements of the Technical Specifications Section 3.4.
1he koncho Seco license requirement requires both Feednter Pucps to be operable J.ithin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or the reactor shall not remain critical cad an uni.tes ropted noneel hot shutdown will be corpleted within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
I n e :. c s eyuirenents meet or exceed the tires stated for each mode of oceration o. ; a: :. e d u. the Questix 8 statement.
I t e<n 9 Review your operating modes and procedures for all systeer. designed to t r an:. t e r potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of the primary a ntainn.cnt to assure that taidesired pumping of radioactive liquids anc gs: e: will not occur inadvertently.
lei particular, ensure that such an occurrence would not be tanted by the resetting of engineered safety features instrtamentatior..
i is t a l l : uc.h sys teras and indicate:
Whether interlocks exist to prevent transfer when high a.
radiation indication exists, and b.
Whether such systems are isolated by the contaiment isolation signal.
ke s pon:.e to item 9 keviewing the operating modes and procedures for all systems e:igned to transf er potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of thu containuent indicates that on safety features actuation (1600 psig cetressing reactor pressure or 4 psig containment pressure) all valves nnn could transfer gases and liquids would close.
This includes i :. o i s t iin; the R.B. Drain Accumulator Tank to prevent automatic dus: ping to the i.ast Decay Heat Pump Room Sump.
All safety features actuation valves can be manually overridden 0:. ly t,y the conscious ef fort of the operator by placing the desired m on t r o h. e t the SF AS panels H2SF A and B in manual and depressing the open push t,uttons as desired..The operator is cautioned by Limits and h e aut ion:. of A.70 Safety Features Actuation System" which states:
because of the critical nature of SFAS. it is toperative that the consequences of any action taken on SFAS be thorougt.ly understood prior to taking that action.
Tech-i.tcal Specifications should be consulted prior to placing cny portion (s) of the SFAS out of service.
L. en se t ety features actuation clears, all valves rust be
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staositioned to their normal position.
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Ense1Len April 16.1979 it a cc<itainment purge was in progress, the' purge would be ten.1noted by 5f A5 (closing the isolation valves) or by High-High i < J1o t t on on the reactor building monitor which would secure the contain-ocnt Supply and exhaust fans.
Item 10 Review and modify as necessary your staintenance and tast proc e dures tu ensure that they require:
Verification, by inspection. of the operability of a.
redundant safety-related systems prior to the reswval of any safety-related system from service b.
Verification of the operability of all safety-related systems when they are returned.to service following saintenance or testing.
A ceans of notifying involved reactor operating personnel c.
whenever a safety-related system is raroved from and returned to service.
s Ry ponse to Item 10 10a. Administrative procedure AP-3 " Work Request" was reviewed w i thin the requiresents of a, b and c.
The Outage Coordinator, who n.a intains a senior Control Room Operator 1.icense, reviews any work and p operly indicates the logging of tests for redundant safety related equipnent a:. ri: quired in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of the Technical specifications.
10b. Verification of the operability of safety related uaintenance is accornplished by performing a specified test as determined t,3 an Enginecr.
The test result is evaluated by the Engineer and if the acceptance criteria is saet, it is sent to the Shif t Supervisor for iisle t'.u l' 8 cllce.
10c. The " Work Request" procedure requires Shif t Supervisor not if icot t on prior to any work on safet,y-related eruipsaent when the
- ,y s : em a.or he recoved from service and his signatur e when returning the te.i. to c,peration.
System conditions are state ( in the Shift Super-v);,us's Log.
Item 11 All operating and maintenance personnel should be rsade awcre nt the extrecie seriousness and consequences of the sicultaneous blocking t.f tu.u. oux 11 t o ry feeckater trains at the Three Mlle Island Unit 2 plant t :.a c.:ner actions. taken during the early phases of the accident.
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Apr11 16, 1979 I-sponse to item 11 All opercting personnel have had training and are awarn of the Training sci tousness and consequences of the TMI incident.
Maintenance personnel do not change valve e, t rei..c 13, 1979.
c% etca April 1
koncho Seco and have been fastructed that they do not have w o :.
po:. i t i on: i t th l:, a u' hor i ty.
I t er.i 12 key f ew your prompt reporting procadures for NRC notification very early notification of serious events.
tu a :. s u re M ponse to item 12 District has designated the Technical Assistant to assure The This individual with assistance e.-r ny notification of serious events.
Flont Superintendent and the Mariager of Nuclear Opsrat.icas will very t e.-. t r.esuf f scient fnput to the NRC Region V of notification and necassary
- , u pp l y inf oncation to provide an understanding of the status of Rancho Seco ope at iny during any event requiring notification.
Procedural controls have been e.tabl(shed in three Administrative h ocedure to cover the spectrLas of events req.f ring.NRC notifications.
1)
Admin. Proc. AP-22 " Reporting f Reportable. Occurrences" Sec. 3.1 Reporting This section states notificatic of Supervision and the Chat ruwn of the Plant Review Cosmittee. The PRC Chairman determines if the event is NRC raportable within Regulatory Guide 1.16 and takes the notification actions as necessary, which includes NRC Region V.
Proc. AP-21 " External Plant Report"
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Admin.
This procedure summarizes all the reports necessary to comply with the regulations.
Each staff se:::ber has specific assignments and responsibilities for reporting.
Th,- Plant Superintendent is re:,ponsible to notify the NkC of any radiological incident as stated in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations.
This includes 10 CFR 20.403(a) which requires imediate notification by telephone follcwed by hard copy to NRC Region V.
3)
Ene rgency Plan AP-500 In case of Overexposure. Fire. Sabotage or Plant Evacuation the Ea=:rgency Plan Implementing Procedures require the NRC Region V to be notified by the Emergency Coordinator.
These notifications are verified quarterly during dri11s and are carried out in scenarins simulating accident 256 2'4
I, r,r. f:. H. Enge lken April 16, 1979
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If we can be of any turther assistance. please call.
Sincarely yours.
John
. Mattin:ce Assistant General Manager and Chief Engineer i
- 4on.on C. Moseley. Director cc
- Divistm of Reactor Operations Inspections ison carner 1,
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