ML19224B995
| ML19224B995 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1979 |
| From: | Bretthauer E ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906280141 | |
| Download: ML19224B995 (10) | |
Text
4' I
4 STATEMENT 0:
ERICH h. BRcT HAUER D IRECTOR, rCNiTOR t NC- 00 ERAT IONS DiV! E 10N ENVIR0tNENTAL MONITORilG & SJ2 PORT LABDRATCR" LAS VEGAS, NY HOUSE SU3 COMMITTEE ON SCIEN;E & TECHNDLOGY LANCASTER, PA JUNE 2, 1979 EP/ has been involved in the moniTorino of radiation since formation of the Acency in Deccmber 1970.
One of tne organizetional ccmoonents which became part of EPA was a Fublic health Service LeocraTory in Les Vec s, i.evada.
Th is LP5 oratory has been respons ib le f or mon i Tor i ng env i ronmenTal radiation for the U.S. nucteer testing program since 1954.
This monitoring program occuments exposure to humans and animals via air, weter and food from radio-ect ive ceori s originat ing f rcrr. nuc lear Testing in Nevaca, as well as the siv other sites in the U.S. where nuc lear testing has been conducted.
This monitoring prooram i s currently stat f ed with '52 scient ists anc 7 echnicians.
The team has responded to many ventings of radioective debris into the environment at the Nevada Test Site and is well trainec and couipped to perform emeroency as welI as Jong-term environmental mon i 7ar i ng.
Dectoyment of EPA env ir onmental monitoring stations around Three Mile
!sland was initiated cn 3/31/79.
Eleven monitoring stat ions were ccerational 4/1/79.
Fourteen addi+ional stations became coerational on 4/2/79 and by 4/3/79 a total of thirty-one monitor ing stations were cperational.
This network consis1ed of Twelve stations on a three mile ad ius f rcn the reactor with 3C uegree spacing, ten stations on a six lo seven mile radius spaced as nearly as possible betmeen the inner ring stations, and nine stations at the following ci'ies and Towns oeyond seven mi l es f rcyn the reac1or:
Bellaire, Manchester, Carlisle, hummels1cwn, 257 315' 7 9ou3o g7 G-c
3 Car;" ellt own, Yo rr., Hershey, Leoanon, and Lancaster-Each station contained an air sacpler cf apprc>d:stely 10 c.f.c.
capacity (400 cubic meters per day) with a glass fiber pre:ilter for collecting particulate caterial and a charcoal cartridge intended primarily for collecting radioactive gases i.e. th e radioisotype iodine - 131 (131 ),
7 The charcoal cartridges ccllect radioactive noble gases to sore extent, but not quantitatively.
Samples were collected on a daily basis and analyzed by garca spectroscopy using a GeLi detector.
These analyses were performed at a te=porary EPA laboratory in Harrisburg.
A few of the sa=ples were shipped by air express to Las Vegas for analysis. The 131 tini=u= detectable activity for 1 in these sacples was 0.15 picoeurie 3
per cubic reter (pCi/c ) (a picoeurie is a ciilienth of a millionth of a carie which is a b asic t er: of disintegration rate of radioactive cateria').
3 on 5/7/79.
1311 was lowered to 0.04 pCi/c The cinicu= detectability for All filters, were counted for gross alpha and press beta actissty at th e Las' Vegas Laboratory.
Ca==a rate recorders and thcrmo-luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were also installed at all monitoring s tations.
TLDs were also issued to approxi-
- stely fif ty residents living near the monitoring stations.
The gacca rate re corders meas ure gn--, radiation as a function of tiec while the th e rmo-lumines cent dosimeters measttre cumulative ga==a rad.iation.
The TLDs are relatively insensitive to beta radiation.
An EPA rwin engine aircraf t with instrumentation to monitor radiation was available on site for the period 3/31/79 to 4/10/79 to perfore airborne sample collection and tra ckin g.
257 3i6
As 1: was ceter=ined on 4/1/70 that the p rin cip r.1 rele as e c fror the reacter were noble pas es, p rinciptily, _"Le. in.ricate nobic par c a=rling gear and 133 r and P' 'Er we re air f reichted to Ecrrisburg ins t-.:-entation t: =casure F
f rc= Las Ve gas.
Deploy =ent cf noble gas s a=: '.ing s ;ations be gan on 4/ 3/79.
One of these sa plers was plac(d in the plu=e on A/4/79 and again on 4/5/79 and a 1-2 hour sa=ple taken for analysis.
Three c 1 inuous noble gas cenitoring stations were operational on 4/4/79.
Tnese stations were at a three to six =ile radius fro = the reactor at approxi=ately 120 degree spacing.
As there had been no provisions to =casure tritium c=2. nations fro: the reactor, a =obile trititn sa=pler was positioned in the radioactive plu=c on 4/4/79, and an air sample collected f or tritiu= =cas ure=ent.
Nine additional samples f or at=cspheric t ritiu= =easurernnts were taken in the plu=e at later dates.
EPA began ca=pling of the Susquehanna Plver on 3/30.
Surface grab ca=ples were collected at the Conowingo Da= and at the Colt =5ia Erid ge on the R Equehanna twice daily.
Tne River sa=plin g progra= was refined on 4/1/79 to co=plecent =onitoring by the Coc=onwealth of Fennsylvania.
Eased upon physi c al dyn a=i cs of :he Susquehanna Fdver cnd the proxi=ity to drinking water intakes at Wrightsville and Colu=bia, three additional stations were established on 4/2/79 at the Colu=bia Bridge location and tvo additional s t tions at the Conowingo Da= location. Priority t a=ples were screened at the EPA Laboratory in Harrisburg followed by high seasitivity analysis at th e EPA Laboratory in Las Ve gas.
EP A be gan s a plin g in the Ches apeake Eay on 3/30.
Four locations on the Bay were scaled ts-ice daily and the. sa=ples analyzed as were the Susquehanna River sc=ples.
Sa=rling on the Chesapeake Eay was discontinued 4/7/79.
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4 conj unct ior with ine Commo1wea'Th of Pc nnsv ivan i a, a cr ogram for same:ir; ar drinking water was cevelc;ed.
uer 100 sources of crinking wate were ident if i ed wi thin twenty miles of TMI.
O# these, 2! were surface water suppiies and were, therefore, designate as priority sampling sites.
Samples fram +hese priority sources were gemma scanned for gross contamination at
'5 the E?A Laboratory in Harrisburg, where the detection limit for I was 70 pCi/l. This detection limit was too high to comply with the maximum I I concentration leve: for continuous exposure of l through drinking water of 3 pCi/1, or the guidance for transient exposure being proposed by EPA's of fice of drinking water of 35 pCl/l.
To measure the necessary sensi'ivity level all samples were sent to.the EPA Laboratory Montgomery, AL, for analysis.
The I3I detection 1,mits were targeted at 15 pCi/l for I.
On 4/6/79 daily drinking water sampling was discontinued except for mejor drinking water supplies on the Susouehann 3 River, i.e.,
Lancaster, Columbia and Wrightsvil le.
Daily samplin at Columb!a and Wrightsville was discont inued on 4/6/79 and Brunn - Island added as an additional sampling l o ca t io n.
Daily sampling continues at this time at the Lancaster and Brunner Islard sources. All samples are analyzed by the EPA Laboratory in Las Vegas.
Daily sampling by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was also instituied on ef f l uent d i scharges fr om TM I on 4/4 /.79.
These samples are analyzed by EPA's Harrisburg Laboratory.
131 A cont.inuous i mon itor -wesf ins'ta l l ed. 4/12/79' on the pr.i nci oa t d i scharge of the reactor.
This mon: Tor s hou l d pr ov i d e an ear l y a l e rt of a 131 significant I discharge te the Susouehanna River.
257 310
U. ; l t sampling was inliia ed or. 4/5/79'with the esia: l i s nmen-of ninc cairy farms for daily semsiin;.
L; un'ii ina-ilme mile semp;ing had been cond ucted by t he Comic..eal t h of PennsyJC3nia, FDA and Metrcoolitan E c i so r.. The EPA semplino pr oc r at was desicned to complement efforts of I
these organizations. The minimum deTectability of l in those milk samcles analyzed by EPA was 20 pCi/ liter.
The rout ine environmental program for the Middletown plant, or any other nuc lear f acility must assess the radiation exposure of the general popu-lation via four principal pathways.
These are:
integrated whole body exposure as measured by some type of dosimeter (usual ly TLDs),. internal exposure resulting f rom inhalation of airborne radioact ivity, and ingestion i
of drinki ng water and contaminated mil k or other f ood products.
The monitoring sys+em operated by the licensee prior to tne accident ad dressed al l of the above exposure routes.
A TLD network comprised of 20 stations was in routine cperation.
AT 10 of these locat ions the Comronwealth of Penns; lvani a al so placed TLDs. 'f or. Qua l ity Control purposes.
2.
Air monitoring siations were in place at eight locations concentrated in the predominate down-wind dir ection.
Through a contract with NRC, Fennsylvania was operating air sampling instrumentaiion at two sites.
A!! air samplers were eauipped with pref Liters for col lect ion of particulate materials and charcoal cartridges for col lect ion of reac tive gases.
3.
Drinki nc water was rout inel y analyzed f rom locat ions within 15 miles b h ()
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ut ill zing intake f rom the Susquenenna River.
Tne ae:ection limit for I (the fission product radionuclide with the lowest
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permissible concentration) is approximately 0.5 pCi/l compared to the drinking water standard for continuous ingestion of 3pCi/l.
4.
Mil k samples were rout inel y col lected f rom f ive f arms and anal y. ed 13I to a level of 0.5 pCi/l ;or 1.
Radiostrontium analyses were a l so pe rf o rmed r eg u l ar l y.
Split esmples of both milk and water were analyzed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
In addition to the environmental monitoring of the area around the site,
- nere cre in-plant systems which cont inuously monitor the stack ef fl uents and the liquid radiological waste both bef ore and af ter d i l ut ion (prior To discharge to the Susquehanna River).
The l icensee's monitori ng program, with a cual i ty control program conducted sy lEC and Pennsylvania is adequate for rout ine operation with the except ion that cetter TLD coverage of populated areas is recommended.
The experience at the Three Mile Island did, however, point up dif ficulties a n.' some inadequacies when dealing with the emergency situation.
The delays encountered in placing additional monitoring equipment contributed to t he uncertainty of the general population exposure immed i atel y f o l lowi ng the accident. The nature of the initial release of radioactivity (i.e., primari l y noble gases) ccmplicated the monitoring process and raised questions as ho the sensitivity of the dosimeters for measuring the type of radiation to which they were exposed.
In addition, effluent monitors on the stacks were pegged at fut i scale and were not able to prov ide a measur ement of the intensity of the radiation being released
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Tc ine a mosphere, it would appear that any need for additional monitoring applies not To the nomal operating condition, but to the emergency situa* ion.
In
.his resoect, it is the capability to rapid ly supplement tne rout ine mon itori ng program which i s need ed.
The experience of the EPA in perf orming rad iation moni Toring f or the nuclear testing program at the Nevada Test Site may of ier some be nef ici al suggestions.
For both air and milk sampilng, the EPA has established a network of standby stations which operate only when neM ed.
Arrancements are made for the placement of samplers and supplies eT ap pr opr i ate l ocat ic ns.
Sampl ing i s it.itiated by t el ephone rec uest To thc station operator.
In the event that the networks are not act i v a Ted for r real monitoring purpose, they are act ivated to test their responsiveness at least semi-annual ly.
Around thc sites of most power reactors, locations representative of -population centers out 'to perheps 20 miles would prcbably suf fice for air sampling.
A'rrangements fer additional milk sampling should be made with dairies ratner +han ind ivid ual f arms in order to rapidly screen milk which is representative of relatively large geographical areas.
Positive results can then be used to indicate waere sampling should occur at the individual pr od ucers.
Similarly, arrar gements shoul d be made with downstreem users for sampling of drinking water on cemand.
Additiona! TLDs sho'ul d aiso be avalIable ior irrmediate p!acement fs! !owing any accident.
In-plant monitors must be capable of measuring the level of radis 257 32i
act iv i Te which might ce released in an accident.
As seer ai Tnree Mile Island, these levels are l ikel y to be high.
While it is necessary To measure af fluents in the range of permissible discharge, higher range measurements are also needed in order to assess the rate of release.
In addition, it would be desirable To have the on-line monitors in the plant automatical ly alert the fEC and the appropriate State Agency.
At the present time no steps have been taken to impiement the reccmmendations g iven here.
It is anticipated that the recon.mendations of the tRC anJ the Presidential Commission, together with the results of the Hearings of this Committee wil l lend impetus to improving the emergency response capabi l ity.
I have been asked To discuss how to keep rout ine monitori ng f rce beccming so rout ine that val t.:b le i n f o r7nat ion is overlooked.
In my opinion, this is basical ly a systems analysis problem which can rely heavily on cceputer technology for its solution.
The mass of data generated by any rout ine monitoring program, particuiarty negative data, can l e ad to a loss of interest in individual data points.
Assuming good quality contrel on data generation, report ing by exception is recar. mended f or management revi ew.
This type of system would establish limits on all types of data for normal operation av only data falling out side those limits would be report ed to responsible individuals.
At the same time, trend analyses.shoul d be perf ormed on the data in order to provide early warning of changes in normal operation.
257 322 There has been great concern over the proposal by Metropolitan-Edison to discharge water frcm the containment building to the Susquehanna 4
9 c't er t rcarment tc remove radioactive cent acinct ion.
Tne levels cf radioactivity in this water will be reduced to confor to those all owe d by their licens e to operate the plan..
These allowable con centrations are de_;1gned to assure that concentrations of radionuclides in drinking water do not exceed federally prescribed standcrds.
Although concentrations in tne outf all may exceed drinking water standards, this water will bc further diluted by water from the Susquehanna River.
The calculation of an appropriate dilution factor is thus of prime importance and will vary depending upon the stage of the river at any given time.
The low estimate for dilution, trans zitted to EPA verbally by the Iepartment of Environ =ent al Iiesources of Penr,ylvania, is a f actor of 24.
- sing this dilution factor 131 a discharge at the level of 300 pCi/1 for 1 (the maximum per=issible discharge concentration) would result in 12 pCi/1 in finished drinking water at Lan cas t er, Cmu
- bia or Krightsville ignoring any retrval in the treatment procesa.
This value would exceed the drinkinE water standard 131 of 3 pCi/l of 1 for continuous (70 year) e xpo s ura.
Federal guidance for transient intake which limits the dose to 50 m rem / year, averaged 131 over one year, has also been provided.
Again, for 1 this would allow 36 pCi/l in finished water. Within this guidance for allowable concentration, discharge at a level of 300 pCi/1 would not res ult in exceeding the proposed variance to the EPA drinking water standard.
Its our understanding that clean-up of the water to approximately 10% of the allowable dis charge limits has been set as the tarpt for decontamination.
Tne EPA would expect that the best practical technology would be e= ployed to achieve the 10% target figure.
257 323
Tne cne radienuclide which vi'; not b e.
rezeved f ra: the wcter 1: t rt 1t=..
It is, therefore, recon:acnded thc a tritit= analysis be perfor ed f ollowin F decontamination. but prior te dis charge in crder to assure th at 6
concentrations are below 3 X 10 pci/1 (the t:ac f or tritit=.)
It is f urther recce= ended that downs t rez: users be advised of intended discharge of this water to the River.
Tais co=oletes =y p repared s tate:ent, I will be pleased to answer any c ues tions.
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