ML19224B932
| ML19224B932 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1979 |
| From: | Speis T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906280035 | |
| Download: ML19224B932 (1) | |
Text
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Data ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP M I 8 579 TO: {Neme, office symbol, room number, initials Date Dullding, Agency / Post) z.
NRC POR AssessionsUnit(P-50)h 2
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Action File Note and Return Approval For Clearance Per Conversation As Requested For Correction Prepare Reply Circuiste For Your Information See Me Comment investigate Signature Coordination Justify REMARKS TO BE PLACED IN NRC POR i
DO NOT use this form as a RECCRD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions FROM: (Name, org. symtof, Agency / Post)
Room No.- 8Hdg.
P-11228 2
Robert L. Tedesco, L Task Force, Phon [No.
TMI-2 X28090 i
5041-102 CPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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.il' JUN 1. 51979 NOTE T0:
R. Tedesco FRCM:
T. Speis, Acting Chief, Reactor Ljstems Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
ITEM 13 0F LL TASK FORCE, " PROVIDE DEDICATED AND REDUNDANT PENETRATIONS FOR HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS" Regarding the discussions on the above subject by the LL Task Force (during the morning of 6/15/79) I am providing you with the following comments / observations that you may find useful.
1.
Even thcugh I agree with your recommendation, as you know the use nf recombir ers is " effective" only when the rate of hydrogen production is low, i.e., the recombiners will only keep up with a very sicw evolution of hydrogen.
2.
The amount of hydrogen in the TMI-2 containment following the 3/28/79 accident exceeded the design basis - i.e., based on the amount of Zr-H O reaction allowed; it should be noted though that Reg. Guide 1.7 2
talks about hydrogen that could be as high as five (5) times the amount calculated for margin purposes (see pg.1.7-3 of Reg. Guide 1.7).
3.
Purging of hydrogen with the concurrent release of activity, even though within 10 CFR 100 guidelines might not be publicly acceptable anymore.
4.
I recommend that the LL Task Force look very carefully at this problem and consider, (a) hydrogen detection in the containment, (b) means of igniting (burning) before explosive limits are reached, or even before reaching _ limits that could threaten containment integrity (including protecting features inside containment that are required for eventual
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reactorcooldown).
In conclusion, the protection of ccntainment - even on a near-term basis, should not be inhibited by any " legal constraints" of the DBA theology.
2c I wouldshappy to discuss this further with you and provide you additional information developed by the staff during the review of advanced reactors (including the reaction of the ACRS).
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k Themis P. Speis, Acting Chief Reactor Systems Branch Divisicn of Systems Safety cc:
R. Mattson R. Denise 254 109