ML19224B833

Responds to IE Bulletin 79-06A,Revision 1 Re Revision of Emergency Procedures for Coping W/Transients & Accidents

ML19224B833
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island, Crane
Issue date:	04/30/1979
From:	Wachter L NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19224B832	List: ML19224B831 ML19224B833
References
IEB-79-06A, IEB-79-6A, TAC-13126, TAC-13127, NUDOCS 7906270029
Download: ML19224B833 (7)

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lir. 1s::ies C. Keppler Dire.cter - Reg. ion III Office of Inspection and 'Cnforce:=er.t United States Nuclear Regulator r cor.=1ssion 799 F.oosevc3t Road C2 en Illyc,--IIIinnis

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Dear E. Keppler:

PUTRTR ISi>. Nil TJ::CI."Ak GE:E u n NG ?!_ u r Dockets No. 50-282..nd No. 50--306 In resrcnse te 'Tir--s 1 throuth 17 of IE L31etin 79-06A - Kevision 1.

the fellowing is offered-a

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1 All licensed operators snd plant ::anagement and supervisors with operatienal responsibiJities at the Trairie~ leisnd Muclear l'isnt, wi t! the exceptice ci three individuals, h ve attended a presentation of the Th: ce Mile Island -

Unit 2 (T}ii-2) accident of March 28, 1979. This presentseinn was au:iio

• aped and vill be presented to the three 10 divi.fuals who did not attend as soon as possi.ble..

The presentation covere'd th'c chrnpological seg:ence of events for the first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> af ter the accident at TMT-2, review of IE Bulletin 7c-06A vit:

e pha sis on I te=s 1.4 and 1.h, atid a question and antver session.

A :e:dsnte was take= at these sessiens, and records are being =aintained in the Training See:1cn Files.

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The c:1crge==y procedures for coping with transients end accidents have beer.

reviewed and revised te recogni::e the possibility of forcing veids in the

. Rescr.cr Coolant Syt:te= and to provide gnidance te prevent this f rom happenir.p.

As additional internatics becernes available. preceduree 9112 he revirued and revised acceidingly.

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NORTH 3CPtN STA'TE'G P O W :C R CC3 M PANY

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A design chaege has been init'1sted for edif f eation of the exixting pressurirer presocre enixident v2 th pre snurit=r level saf ety injecdien actuation logic to a two-of-three lov pressurizer pressure sc ustion lo5 c.

Itplenentation of this desiZn chanEC IE On hold _ pendinE h'RC i

review of the safety evalua tion and approval ci the technical specification change request.

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In the inte.-im. one pressarizer level input was placed in trfp on Unit y This interi:1 neasuriiFa's' tole-~perfor:1cd en Udit I if the actuation logic change. vss not approved prior to conpletion of the refueling outage in pt=gress.

On April 26, the Region 111 of fice contacted the plant advising that sll pressurizer levels should be pimeed in trip; this action was conpleted rith proper Irvirus before the end of that. day.

Item I.

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The Centain= cut. Isciaticy(CL) $1gns.1 is initiated by lov steam line pr e.s surf in e it h er 1~o~o p, c o :.n c id en t iew pressur?:cr I cv el, and pressure or high cynt,ainment _presrure.

These are the sa=c inf riaring signals which actuate saf ery injectioQIn addit'c=,

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=.anusi 1 ef 2 saf ety injection actuation fren che control borird vill initiate C7.

CI can also be i=it.iated

=anually fro-n he control board using a 1 of 2 =anual C1 con.;rol.

M =ual CI ini ti a t.ex contain=ent Ventilation Isolation (CVI). CTI cs= siso be initiated by =anual cent.2in=ent spray ac:.uatien, =anual or autc=atic safety injection initiating signals, and high containnent air particulst.e taenitor activity or high contair=:ent gas nenitor activity.

~ hose actuacing safety injection signsis, either aute=s:.ic or =anusl. ::ust

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be reset en.a " train" ba sis; 1. e., the manu.al rese: c=nnists of tvo nonentary ccen nl.s en the centrol board -- one for each train.

The enntainnent radia:1on eenitors which actuate C7I must be individually and canua2;y reset free the control room.

In addition to the safe y injection reset and the radiatice

=enf ter reset jus: described, the ci fune:1cn and the CVI func:1cn =us: be individually and inanually rese: fren the centrol board on a " train" basis..

Therefore, c==panents actu.ated by the Cl signal.ind cc=ponents actusted by CVI are all individuM 1y sealed in (latched) so a.ha t less ef the actuatins signal vill not csuse nhese ec=penents te return to the posi:1on. held prior Oc :he advent of the acnuating sigrsl.

CI and C7! can only be resc:. c= a

" train" basis by =anual courrels on the nain centrol board.

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Mr. Janei G. Keppler April 3C,1979 Page 3

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W Fo11ccing a safety inj ec tion signs 1; either =snual or autena tic, subseque.t saf ety_injQIgnals are hIseked by a 90 see ti=c delay.

Afra: the saf ety injection sighs 1-has-bEEn =anuallFrEs~dt Tn? the tine delay interlock is satisfied, then the reactor trip breakers =ust be reset to f

.gg enable subsequent automatic saf ety inj ection signsls.

(.A M Tmergency procedures connain a '=nual irc.ediate action which requires the oper: tor to verify that the CI status panel in lit.

Subsequent actions require the saf ety inj ectien signal to be r ese t only after first verifying that all startup of safeguards equipnect has been cespleted and that the

$sf ety injection Punps' suction has transf err ed from the 3oric Acid Storace tanks to the Refuelins Water Storage Tank.

Iren 5 The auxiliary feeduster rysten at yrsirie Island is aute=a:ically initiateu.y Item 6 Procedures have been prepared and i=ple=ented to alert the operster te the sytytems of a stuck open pcuer operstad relief valve (PORV) and instruct a

the operator to isolate a stuck open valve with its associated re=ote.ly p

controlled =otor operated isolstien valve vhrn the RCS pre =sure drops belev the ?ORV autor.arie closure setpoint.

Item 7 Operating procedures which are also used as traisins instructions are being reviewed and vill be revised as needed to provide guldssce for continued operation of engineered safety features af ter autnmatic initiation.

RC Systen psranerrie indicsLion vill bc utilized to dete =ine wheu =anual action can be used to ter=icate high pressure injection. The eff ects of containmen:

ise;ation (i=1 ciated by ST) on au;ciliaries serving the reactor esclant punps;

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1.e., seal vster return isolation villy_ecuire f urthe:- evaluatie=- in order to Redsed operating procedures will be avadir>1e by Mayprovide guid 31, 1979 _ W Itee 8 W ring ne--al plane rperatiens, positive c ntrols are necessan to assure that

, saf ety rela ted valves are in their prop <r posi: lens. To evaluate this, 'no r b the required n1ve position and the methods of controlling valve position

~as: be analys.ed.

~he no =al positions cf saf ety-rclated valves were reviewed.

When in their ne r=al po sit ion, these valves are ready to respond no afety signals.

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Mr. James G. reppler April 30, 1979 Page 4 During =crual plant evolutions and tests, valves are necessarily manipulated.

Safety-reisted valve =anipulardens are controlled using Operatiens Cc==1tteu reviewed procedures. Preventive maintensnee procedures, work authorizations, and normal opera ting procedurer. control maintent_nce activities.

The operatin; procedures con:rci plant and cyste= =snipulations.

Pernanent hold cards and Section work Instructions aisn control nanipulation of vsives.

In all cases, the procedures are designed to return valves in their proper saf ety positien.

In additica, those safery-related valves that are indica ted on status panelm are checked cach shif t.

The procedures h ve been reviewed and were satisf actory.

They will be reviewed in addition =1 det. ail by May 31, 1979, and any required changes wi11 he conpleted by June 15.

of course, any changes that sub stan ti:11y affect the syste='s ability :o func: ion will be tede i= media:ely.

It is no:

anticipated that =ajor procedure revisions will be required.

The ce=prehensiveness of the existing valve control progrs=s vill aise he reviewed and any nec=ssary i=provc=ents vill be i=pi e::ented on a continuing basis.

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ite= 9 Inadvertant release of radiometive liquids and saees dee to undesired pun;I=g or ventin; in precluded due to the isola: ion design discussed in Ite: 4.

Specifically, those systs=s designed to :ransf er potentially radione:Jve gases and 11cuids out of the primary centainment. existinE interlocks.

Ci er CVI functions, and those =2num) centrols which de=enstrate the centinued operability of the inclatien func:io=s are tabulated as A::schnent 1.

Ire: 10 a.

Our presen: =mietenance and rest procedures =plement the Technical Specification reouirements for testing redundant saf eguards ernnements.

Periodic surveillance testing provides ecnfidence that the syste. vill function as designed when required. Verification of the operability of the redundant rvsrsm (versus redundant ec onent) is not a for=al

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requirement cf present maintenance and tes procedures or ad=inistrative enutrols.

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Ctr =mintenance and test procedures presently require fune f =nal :es:ing of equipment be. fore returning to service and contain the requirsments to return the sys:e= :s nor=al with respect to all aspae:s af f ected by the maintenance or te.st centrols.

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NO MTHERN 25TATES POWacM CO MPAN Y

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Mr. Ja=en C. r ppler e

April 30,1979 Pase 5 Our r.aintenance and test procedures provide for e.xplici: notifiestfr.n c.

of the Shif t Supervisor since his authorization of the re= oval of equipaent from service and his reviev upon the return of equip =ent to zcrvice is required.

E 41 sting procedures and controls de sdcr;uately address denuut:tratien of ope ability of r.hc 3 ike component cf the redundant train end restoring to norns1 condi:1ons a cenpenent or portion of a system that has been subj ect to =.ainte",ce or test ; however, we believe that impreve=cnts can be e.ade in our admini.strative centrols and procedures to more explicitly address verification of operability of systems and subsectice::

of syste=s.

In this effort. indica ted =adificatiens of administrative controls are anticipated to be he=plete by May 31, 1979; subsequent r evisi on of detailed procedures vi13 involve a significant==p.povar 7

cornit===t with cenpletion anticipated by August 31, 1979. I le f

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13 Procedures have been revised to require NEC notification within one hour of the ti== the reactor is not in a controlled or e.:r.pe::cd condition and

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e2f=:ctance of an open channei of cc:=unica icn.

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! e 12 Operating procedures are being reviewed and will be r evis ed, if required, to provide instructices te centrol and/or remove generated hydrogen gss.

Hyd ogen can be rc=oved from the RCS by a variety of metheds including (1) RCS spray of the pr :ssurizer stess asace, (2) venting of hydrogen to the PRT v_a che pressuri=er power ope ated relief valvec, and/cr (3) desassing of the RCS via Ictdnwn.

The inpact of S.I. ini:1;it ed CI en the abilitj to degas the RCS via letdown vill recuire further i=v es tiga tio n.

Revised operating procedures vill be avsflable by May 31, 1979.

The present method for posn LOCA hydrogen centrol involves centrolled purging f roe- :he contaf::sent Building to the Shicid Euild;.4 sr.e.ulus and discharge vis the Shield Sui 2 ding Ventilatien Systen and_dilu:1cn

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by the addition of air to conta"- ant.

Operatirg procedures were reviewed and vere determined to be ad equa t e.

Yours veri truly, U

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Mr. C. Charnof f office of Inspection and Bforcenent Washingzon, D.C.

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PENE3\\TIONS UST.D TO TEN;ST7.R ?.ADICACTIVE CASES UD 1 !QU~~5 Ol;T OF FRIFARY CONTAINMENT HICM RAD

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OP.rRA3 2 L1 7 CO.M;.75 INTEP.I.OCK SIGNA 1.

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CV-31319 Prt to Cas Analy:c Ne Yes CV-31313 Prt to Cas Analy ct No Yes 4

C7-31434 RCDT Vent Rdr Nn Yes CV-31435 RCDT Vent hdt lNo Yes 5

CV-32436 11/12 RCDT P eps Dst-h Edr No Yes CV-31437 11/12 RC;,7 Pnps Dsch Udr' W Yes t

t F.A Mv-3 2040 11 sG3 Ise ation i

i No 8B M -32043 12 503 Isolation Yes l

No Yes a

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CV-32 796 P:: $ t= Sa.:pi e No Yen i

CV-3 297 Fr zr St:n Seple

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.Yes l

16, C7-31293 Pr r I.iquid Sample No Yes

.I y CV-31299 I Pr:r La quid Sar:ple Ne Yes l

'1 17 C7-31300 CV-22 301 PCS Loop 3 Hoi. Leg snpl j No Yex RCS Loop 3 Hor Leg S pi ;No Yes q

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CV-31545 I CV-31546 RCDT ro Gas Anslyzer

, No Yes RCDT o Gas Analy:ez

'No Yes i

22 CV-31092 Cnt s t Air Sa:npl e-In No Ye:.-

CV-210:2 Catm: Air Sa=ple

.n No Yes lC7-31710 23 CV-31019 Cn:= r Air Sa=pic-Ou t No Yes I

j Cnt= t Air Sample-Ou t j

No Yes e

!!A C7-31570 1 Cn te t Prg Exht I.

1soi-CV-A Yes(CVI)

Yes(CVT)i need C7I reser, parce =ede C7-31569 1 C=tn c Pr; Exht s el ec ted

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'Yes(CVI)

Yex(CVI)

=ced CVI res et, ;crg Ocdc ~

salcered 233 C7-31313 Cn:=:. Purg.e Soly C7-A Y es (CVI)

Yes(CVI),

need CV1 Teur, purp mie 07-I 312 Cn =::: Purge Sply CV-3 Yes(C71)

Ye:. (CVI)

• i se1cc r ed secd c?! rese :.. purce xde I

sele ed Su::ap A Dsch lNo 16. 7-3 % 39 11/12 Cat:n:

a Yes

~ 7-314 3 3 11/12 C r.=: Su=p A Dsch No Yeb 1

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l 27A' CV-31637 11 SCBD seple.

Na C7-21402 11 SGBD 5=nple l Yes No CV-3;.53 8 12 SCBD Sample

Yes No 1 CV-31403 l 12 SC3D sm

:ple j Yes No

! Yes 41A CV-32621 Carnt Vs1 Vac 3rkr CV A No Yes

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• C7-31524 Cntnt Vsl Vac 2rkr CV A No f Nu C-ravity Op et :<.' C!..%

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I 413 ci-31622 Car:st Val Vac 3rkr CV 3 i Nu

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• CV-31625 Cnt:st Vd.1 Vac Brk: C7 3,I No No

! Ctavity Operate: CLc:1 4 2A MS-31273

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to CA l

No No CT-31929 14 Dome Recire to CA No l n/a CV-31927 24 De=c Recirc to Anis. ( No l

No n/.:

MV-22276 Air to C=:::st Vsl

~ No No i Nn l n/a SV-33991 Air to Cntst vel Vent' No No I

r./ a n/a 423 CV-31634 Cs::n t In-Ser Prg sply A 7es(;V-) &

Yes(CV1) :

i IRadMnn re:.ct 5 na.ual recrc.M.:::

n eed CY1 reset or T. i CV-31633 Ca t= t I

In-ser Pr;; Sply R l Yes (CV1) &,' Y=s(CVI) need CVI reu.:

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Ca tst In-Scr Prg ?.xh A Yes(CVT) 61 Yee(CVI) need CV1 ru.st or Kai W. :

I i Rad Jerr CV-31310 Ca t=t In-Se.: Prg Exh 3, Yes(CV1) & I r es e r 6 :- r.,:a1 rer e.:

i Ye u (C"/1) need cv7 rasa. or Ez;.i 5::

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lMV-32271 11 Dome Rec.irc/Ar.nulus 4

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to CA I No l No n/a CV-31923 11 Dese Recire to Anla. ' No cv-31925 21 Derne Re= ire t.m GA l No n/a No Nu

,M7-32274 Air to Cn tm t Vs 2 n/a 57-33990 Nu Na Air to Catut Vxl Vent n / r, No No

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• Need CI reset and manus 1 re-open

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