ML19224B735
| ML19224B735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1979 |
| From: | Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mattson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906220162 | |
| Download: ML19224B735 (3) | |
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W ASHINGTON, D. C. 205S5 t
5, MAY 311979
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Moger J. flattson, Director Division of Systems Safety THRU:
William E. Kreger, Assistant Director for Site Analysis, DSE FROM:
R. Wayne Houston, Chief Accident Analysis Branch, DSE
SUBJECT:
AAB SUBJECTS FOR TMI-2 LESSONS LEARflED ACTIVITY Attached is a list of subjects which the Accident Analysis Branch (AAB) recommends for inclusion in the " Lessons Learned" activity.
The list was prepared on the basis of personal involvement of some members of the AAB in the TMI-2 activities and on basis of information in a variety of NRC documents.
In some cases the subject proposes, as a lesson learned, the use of a different system or type of operation (e.g. flos. 9 and 19) in other cases the subject should be evaluated in more detail for a potential lesson to be learned.
We consider that priority attention should be given to items 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 17.
If you have any questions or comments with the recommended subjects, we are prepared to discuss them with you.
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o R.' Wayne Houston, Chief Accident Analysis Branch Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis Attachment cc:
D. Muller G. Knighton W. Kreger L. Barrett J. Collins G. Chipman F. Congel L. Soffer T. Murphy V, -
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SUBJECTS RECOMMENDED BY AAB FOR INCLUSION 5
" LESSONS LEARNED" ACTIVITY 1.
Implications on siting of nuclear power plants.
2.
Leakage of ECCS equipment inside the auxiliary building.
j 3.
Qualification of Safety Equipment for post-accide,t radiation.
.l.
Instrumentation to follow the course of an accident.
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5.
Lapability for venting reactor vessel and primary loop.
e 6.
Sampling techniques for primary loop 'ater.
A 7.
Sampling capability of containment atmosphere.
8.
Hydrogen removal system - periodic check out including on-line installation and operation.
9.
Audible indication of high containment pressure.
10.
Procedures and requirements for removing ESF eqtipment from line.
ll, Pealistic assessment of plant condition by reactor operator in real time.
12.
Data bank of population distribution for all sites.
13.
Arrangements 'ith Departnent of Interior cnd U.S. Geclogical Survey to obtain topographic maps on short term notice.
14.
Compilation of technical data and nomograms to facilitate calculations of dose, shielding thickness, etc.
15.
Licensee or NRC capability for on-line computer capability to calculate accident doses.
16.
Failure modes for charcoal filters.
g 17.
Ground migration of water in radwaste building.
18.
Ingress of activity into control room.
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Oxygen control / removal from containment atmosphere as an alternate method to reduce potential for flammability of combustible gas inside containment.
20.
Removal of radioactive noble gases by cryogenic methods.
21, Capability to flood secondary side of stearri generators.
22.
Renewed emphasis on preference of diverse methods for shutdown cooling rather than redundant methods.
23.
Assignment of personnel not connected with routine plant operations to assure status of safety equipment and with authority to declare emergencies.
24.
Actuation and operation of control room emergency ventilation system.
25.
Use and effectiveness of respirators by control room personnel (decision to employ breathing apparatus, time required to obtain and don the apparatus, effect on personnel in terms of comfort and ability to observe and communicate, effectiveness in decontaminating air).
26.
Effectiveness of cortrol room habitability boundary (ingress /cgress frequency, number of doors being used, number of people in control room).
2 '/.
Impact of operator arcions involving radiologicEl p^otection of post-accident monitcring and control activities.
28.
Operater understanding of the relationship between the control room habitability systems and activities and the " Accident Management" efforts experienced and required by the operator.
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