ML19224B616
| ML19224B616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1979 |
| From: | Geoffrey Miller Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | Mullinix W NRC/IE |
| References | |
| TM-0431, NUDOCS 7906150423 | |
| Download: ML19224B616 (32) | |
Text
'
s 4
j TMI DOCUMENTS IN-Od 3,/
DOCUMENT NO:
~L.
COPY MADE ON 3 /# ff OF DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY
/
/ /
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY.
Wilda R. Mullinix, NRC 7906150473
[ g' e
I
c.
t.
9 TMI STATIC?l MARCH 28, 1979 ItiCI CENT STATEMENT SY G. P. MILLER STATION MANAGER m
%e 9
k lo
/_
' _y !$ '
1 i.
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMEili TMI-MARCH 28, 1979 G.
P.. MILLER STATEME'lT CONTENTS INTROCUCTION E'!Et1TS/CSJECTIVE5/ ACTI0tlS CONCLUS10ti i
4 I
e i
a.
i F
-1
a TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INTRODUCTION My name is Gary Paul Miller and I am employed by Metropolitan Edison Company as the Station Manager for the Nuclear Generation Units at Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania, and in this position I am responsible for the operation and main-tenance of Units 1 and 2 at TMI.
To accomplish these organizational objectives,
I have reporting directly to me the respective Unit Superintendents, Maintenance and Admini s trative Supe.-intendents.
I report directly to Mr. J. G. Herbein, Vice P re s i den t-Gene ra tion.
In my statement I have not attempted to produce an event sequence or to go into an analysis or intricacies of the unit ' trip as this is satisfactorily covered in other documents.
I have honestly attempted to the maximum of my recall ability to produce in writing my actions and logic on that day as I moved through those events of March 28, 1979.
The events are traced from 4 A. M. unit I approximately 8 P. M.
the aight of March 28, since by this hour ccmmand type communications were in place with the Observation Center and Senior Company official were in charge of operations.
I have been at TMI since the beginning of 1973 and I have served in the following positions prior to being named Station Manager.
(1)
Test Superintendent for TM1 Unit 1 Responsible for initial startup and acceptance testing in Unit 1 (2)
Unit Superintendent for TMI Unit 2 Responsible for planning, organization and execution of initial operations and maintenance of Unit 2 during the startup to commerical phases.
\\r.
Page 1 of 10
4 4
iMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INTRODUCTION (3)
Station Superintendent for TMI Senior Superintendent for both Units 1 and 2.
As a participant in the organization as illustrated above I was a party to the acceptance and initial commercial operation of both TMI units.
Both TMI units were put on line using a defined and formal acceptance program with criteria to assure safe and reliable ope.ation and this included the equipment, administrative program, procedures and operator qualification. I consider and have formally stated that TMI Unit-2-was technically and operationally acceptable to go "J -
on line for its first fuel cycle.
The appropriate Regulatory Agencies were fully cognizant and to scme extent participated in the abcve processes through their inspection and enforcement actions.
It is worthy to mention that many of the " times" given in this statement are from my memory and my personal observation is that all of us involved with the incident s
have an honest problem in being precise on times.
I feel this is due to the extreme pressure I felt and the fact that time seemed' to pass very rapidly.
As I arrived on site that morning, my mind firmly and quickly grasped the very.er' s situation which had developed and I knew the public must be protected but I did not entirely face until later the full extent of damage the Unit had suffered.
My primary goal was the obligation to protect the public and our actions were an attempt to minimize releases, project and reccmmend evacuation, if warranted, with maximum advance notification, to terminate the incident and to stabilize the Unit.
9 Page 2 of 30
f TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INTRODUCTION The first concern I had as I arrived in the Control Room at approximately 7:05, was to beccme fully cognizant of the situation as it existed and once I fully understood the plant conditions and the radiation emergency, I immediately took charge.cf the Control Rocm and appointed Senior people to direct the necessary evolutions in the vital
.eas to assure that th3 public was protected, that the release was monitored, ccmmunications were occurring, and that the plant was brought in steps to a stable condition.
The ccmmand set up, which I just described, met frequently throughout the day.
The group presented Unit conditions, status of the Emergency Plan actions, shared opinions, discussed technical data, and made reccmmendations.
Discussions were held with Management, and/or Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, the State, the NRC then following these evaluations, I made the appropriate decisions and so directed the implementation ta the Centrol Room and informed others both inside and outside the plant as necessary.
Basically, I set up this Emergency command team in the early hours as I arrived at the plant and the radiation emergency was in progress, by essentially fonaing my senior pecple into a network to supervise, conduct the emergency and report to me while bringing the plant to a safe condition.
Mr. Ross was put in charge of Operations to direct the Shift Supervi or, Mr. Cubiel was put in charge of radiation conccrns, including radiation surveys, c -ite - offsite teams, accountability check, assembly of people, getting in contact with the Emergency Control Center (ECS), etc., Mr.
Seelinger was in overall charge of Unit 1, the Emergency Control Center, the Unit 1 Control Rocm and to assure that all facets of the emergency plant were follcwed, F
f Page 3 of 30-
< ~
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INTRODUCTION Mr. Logan was charged to assure that all the required procedures and plans were reviewed and to look through each to assure that every item was covered, this included the procedures for both emergency plan and for the Unit itself, and to provide me assurance that all actions were being taken and to be sure the notifi-cation calls were made, that management was notified, and all ccmmunications were in-place, Mr. Lee Rogers was requested to provide technical assistance plus link-up with his home office as he could, Mr. Nunder was in charge of technical support and ccmmunications and Mr. Shovlin was in charge of emergency maintenance.
For information, normal job fLnctions of tnese cersons is provided below:
~
Gary Miller - TMI Station Manager Joe Logan - TMI Unit 2 Superintendent Jim Seelinger - TMI Unit 1 Superintendent Dan Shovlin - TMI Maintenance Superintendent George Kunder - TMI Unit 2 Superintendent-Technical Support Mike Ross - Unit 1 Operations Supervisor Dick Dubiel - Station Chemistry / Health Physics Supervisor i,,1 Bill Zewe - A TMI Station Shift Supervisor Lee Rogers - Onsite Babcock & Wilcox Manager I felt strong in my obligations to the public and to making sure that there was minimum release of radioactivity and that there was evacuation in plenty of time, if that was required.
The phone, the pressure, the fact that the olant was in a state that I had never schooled in, ccmbined to make it almost intolerable.
The Control Rocm remained M
a r -
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INTRODt!CTION calm as I think can be testified to separately and the atmosphere of the decision making was calm, done at a removed point, done precisely, and done at intervals as dictated by the plant and no longer than 30 to 40 minutes at a time.
This statement is formated such that I will attempt to go through the three time periods, place the chronology of times and events as I can best put them, and in addition, des-cribe what I thought, to my knowledge, the plant state was, where I though we were within the emergency plan and protecticn of the oublic and our goals and purposes to reach the next succeeding safe condition througnout the day.
These facts are the best I had knowledge of at that mcment and the assessment was made in an optimum fashion
~
at that time to make the next decisicn and imolement action.
l, l
.L.
s L'
J Page 5 of 30 I
<d f
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MfLLER STATEMENT EVENTS /0BJECTIVES/ ACTIONS 0400 The Unit i Shift Foreman informed Senior Station personnel of a turbine and reactor trip in Unit 2.
Unit 1 was at hot shutdown condition fol, lowing a successful refueling and prior to the trip Unit 2 was operating at about 98% power.
This was my first notification of a Unit 2 problem.
Note that detailed events and actions following the trip are contained in other documents and are not again reviewed here.
0515
~:.
(aoprox.)
G. P. Miller called the Unit 2 Control Room to find out the status of the
^
Unit and to review recovery actions.
I was this day, scheduled to travel to Oyster Creek Nuclear Station to participate in a Refuel Outage Critique and prior to departing I wanted to be sure of the actions underway in Unit 2 at TMI.
At this time I was informed that the turbine and reactor trip recovery procedures were in progress in accordance with the designated procedures.
The plant was reported to be stable at that time, but I was informed that the Unit nad undergone a safe-guards initiation (note this had occurred in the past at this Unit and in other B&W units following high power trips, so by itself it does not raise Extreme or Public concerns).
The plant had two parameters which distrubed me and they were:
1.
A low pressure (approximately 1100 psi), and 2.
Pressurizer level of approximately 395 includes (near solid).
This call lasted about 20 minutes and the oerson I talked to was George Kunder.
Following the call, I informed Jim
,)
I pano 6 of TO
4 c2 n
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /0BJECTIVES/ ACTIONS Seelinger and Dan Shovlin of the Unit 2 trip and essentially encouraged them to go to the site as soon as practical.
Additionally, due to my concern over the plant pressure and pressurizer level, I arranged' to have a conference call with Mr. J. G. Herbein of Met-Ed, Mr. Lee Rogers of B&W, George Kunder and myself.
G. Kunder had also directed calls to the Lead Engineers to aid in the recovery actions for the Unit.
0605 to 0630 (approx.)
"di The conference call described with the above parties was ccnducted.
Parties participating in the call were briefed on the Unit crip and subsequent followup actions and conditions of the pressurizer level and pressure were described.
Following some discussion of the conditions it was agreed we must believe our instruments and it was also noted by the plant, that the reactor coolant pumps were presently off due to a i
loss of flow indication and also the electromatic valve was thought to be shut and there was no indication of radiation at this time.
Additionally, the rupture disc on the reactor coolant drain tank in the Reactor Building was noted to have been ruptured and therefore, we were aware that there was scme water within the Reactor Building sump.
At this time, it was decided that GPM would not go to Oyster Creek and that I would get ready and go into the plant and then report back to Jack Herbein on the Unit conditions.
L - J.
l.
a
~
Dana 7 nf 1n
4 TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /0BJECTIVES/ ACTIONS INFORMATION 1.
Approximately the arrival times at TMI station on 3-28-79 wer'e:
George Kunder - 0440 A.M.
Joe Logan - 0515 A. M.
Mike Ross - 0530 A. M. (NOTE:
Initially Mike went to Unit 1 in a normal fashion as the Unit was in hot shutdtwn condition and preparing to go critical following refueling)
Richard Cubiel - 0545 A. M.
Jim Seelinger - 0645 A. M.
Lee Rogers - approximately 0700 A. M.
~
Gary Miller - approximately 0705 A. M.
2.
Indications of radiation:
Through a review of sequence of events following the incident, I have noted that early in the incident, not sure of the time, the intermediate cooling to the letdown cooler radiation monitor gave a high alarm.
Note that this monitor has a low setpoint and in-fact we were seeking a field change and, typically, it has oeen in the alert state due to being positioned in a high background area.
It is located near the Reactor Building sump and due to the indications we had in the past, this was not considered an unusual indication or an indicator of an emergency situation or fuel damage, at thattime, early in the incident.
' ', ~
Page 8 of 30 i
a TMI 3-28-79 G. P. " ILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /CBJECTIVES/ ACTIONS 0630 The chemists had been recirculating the Unit 2 reactor coolant sample in order to obtain a boron analysis following the trip.
The first result obtained was 700 ppm, which was not considered accurate by.the operators.
Backup samples were requested and two backup samples indicated approximately 400 ppm baron.
0640 There was an indication by an area radiation man ' near the hot machine shop at a locati6n mear the sampling lines in Unit i (Note:
The Unit 2 reactor coolant sample line runs through Unit 2 into Unit 1 and to the primary sampling which is located within Unit 11.
We at the n' _.ic have calculated that the lead time for a representative sample to get from Unit 2 to Unit I due to the line length and flow-rate is approximately 40 minutes.
Source range and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation indicated upscale approximately one decade.
The Control Rcom took action immediately re-initiating high pressure injection and initiating emergency baration and also attempted to start each of the four reactor coolant pumps but indications were of only 100 amps and no flow indication therefore, the pumps were cavitating and not pumping, The pumps, therefore, could not be run and at the same time along with HP injection, emergency baration was maintained.
,1
\\ ;,
?
W 2
Page 9of 30 I
e.
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /CBJrC7IVES/ ACTIONS 0640 Dick Dubiel alGng with the Chemistry / Health Physics technicians surveyed, with portable nonitors, both Auxiliary Buildings in Unit: 1 and 2.'
Radiation indic2* ions were evident and at this time Dubiel directed that both Units Auxiliary Buildings be evacuated and Dick went to the Unit 2 Control Room.
06J5 Dan Shovlin called G.-P, Miller, described radiation problems in the Hot
'i -
Machine Shop and in the Sample Rocm in Unit 1.
At this time I was on my way to the site recognizing that the radiation indications indicated a severe problem.
At the time I got to the site I noted traffic tied up at the South Gate and due to the potential traffic at che North Gate, I entered the south end of the Island to a have access to Unit 2 as quickly as' practical.
0650 A site emergency was declared by George Kunder and Bill Zewe.
This was based on radiation monitors increasing in all areas and the Reactor Building dcme nonitor in alert and increasing.
0715 Directed an operator to man the switchboard an<
help the communications effort.
c.
(
(
.\\
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /0BJECTIVES/ ACTIONS Info rma tion (1)
Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Sump The Reactor Building normally has a sump which has pumps which discharge on a level indication that is high to the miscellanecus waste hoidup tank.
There is a pc to the Auxiliary Building sump tank, but the operators consider this path was valved closed.
Also it should be noted that the Auxiliary Building sump tank had had a blown rupture disc a few weeks prior to this event and was isolated frcm the vent header.
To summarize,
the Unit 2 Reactor Building sump normally fills up and pumps autcmatically -
to the miscellaneous waste holdup tank.
Water in significant volume as evidenced by the sump backup, was trinsfarred by ser
'ath from the Unit 2 Reactor Building to the Auxiliary Building anu I do not fully understand this path.
Reactor Building isolation occurred on a 4 psig signal at about 8:00 A. M.
Reactor coolant was discharged by scme path to the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building and did in-fact have Radioactive Isotopes in it which caused some of the high radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building.
(2)
Unit 2 Vent Header This is considered the major path where gas and particulates that occurred in the atmosphere probably came frcm in Unit 2 and the path was in all probability frca the vent of the makeup tank which was degassing fission products at a significant rate.
c.
f l
e
~1
e c :
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT EVENTS /CBJECTIVES/ ACTIONS Information (continued)
(3) Unit 2 Letdown System Frcm early in the incident, the amount of letdown as frcm small amounts to zero and throughout the day we p'..aed all the practical alternatives of valving and etc., also monitoring the cognizant radiation levels in the varicus rocms, to restore as much letdown as we could, but we ware never able to restore significant letdown during the day of the incident.
- ~
o r:
t E
!,e Page 12 of 30
~
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INITIAL MARCH 28, 1979 NOTIFICATICSi 0550 Site emergency declared.
0702 Unable to contact Pennsylvania Civil Cefense Duty Officer.
0702 Notified Dauphin County Civil Ce:ense (.<evin Malloy).
07C4 NRC Region I notified.
No one there bu secretary to beep duty officer.
0704 Civil Cefense callcd Bureau of Radiolcgical Health (BRH).
0707 Attempted to notify J. G. Herbein, Vice President Generation, Met-Ed.
( approx. )
Unable to contact him.
0709 ERCA (RAP Team) notified.
0709 Attempted to noti fy L. L. La vy ar, Manager, Generation Operations, Met-Ed.
(aporox.)
Unable to contagt _ nim.
0710 Notified R. M. Klingaman, Manager E:1gines.-i ng, Met-Ed.
0713 Called Radiation Management Corporation at Philadelphia Electric number.
(approx.) Answering service will forward numcer.
0715 Notified Dauphin Ccunty Civil Defense.
0715 Notified Pennsy'vania Bureau of Radiological Health (approx.)
0718 York Haven portable radiation monitor turned on, (0) reading - State Police helicopter requested and confirmed it would be sent to TMI.
(Per GPM recall and from status board in Control Room).
Notified Pennsylvania State Police of Site emergency.
0720 Attempted to contact ANI.
No answer.
(approx.)
0724 General Emergency declared by G. P. Miller.
Initiated nocification for a General Emergency (Note:
These are the same parties as previously notified of site emergency).
0725 Pa. State Bureau of Radiologicai Health notified of General Emergency via direct phone line from Unit 2 Control Rocm.
This lirc was then held open between BRH and Unit 2 Control Rocm.
/
i,,
Page 13 of 30
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT INITIAL MARCH 28, 1979 NOTIFICATIONS (continued)
On-Site radiation monitoring team dispatched in downwind direction.
0725 0730 Contacted State Police and notified of General Emergency.
(approx.)
0735 Pennsylvania State Civil Defense notified of General Emergency.
0735 Notified ANI.
No one there except for operator.
Left message for them to call us and that it was important.
0736 Radiation Management Corporation (Mr. Fred Rocco) notified of General Emergency.
0738 Recalled Radiation Management Corporation at Philadelphia Electric to tell of General Emergency.
He will forvard message.
0740 York Haven radiatica monitor reading (0) - helicopter at TMI - dispatched
~1 (approx.)
offsite teams in helicopter and one separ3tely in car to West Shore (frcm G. P. Miller and R. W. Cubiel recall of the incident).
0750 On-Site monitoring team reports less than 1 MR/hr. readings,in downwind (approx.)
direction at West Side of TMI (at boundary).
0755 Open line established between U2 Control Room and NRC Region I.
Noti fied them of General Emergency.
They will send a team to the site.
0755 Off-Site radiation monitoring teams report readings of less than 1 MR/hr.
at North Gate and Observation Center.
0800 Porter-Gert: (Radiation Consultants) notified of General Emergency and asked to provide assistance in our monitoring effort.
0800 Offsit-team in Helicopter at West Shore (Goldsboro)
(approx. ) '0' reading - we actually were ahead of the plume - plus onsite team at our west site boundary
'O' reading.
0930 ANI returned phcne call and were notified of General Emergency.
(approx.)
')
Page 14 of 30
TMI 3-28-79 G, P. MILLER STATEMalT 0730 to 0830 At approximately C800 I directed lim Seelinger to report to the Unit 2 Control Rocm.
This was based on the fact that the Emergency Plan and Emergency Control Center in Unit 1 were in full operation, Unit 1 was in a stable condition and I needed Jim Seelinger's technical help,due to his past experinece in the Unit 2 Startuo program, The Unit Status - high pressure injection was en as I had directed it to be keot on, hot leg temperature was pegged high, cold leg temperature was less than 2000, the (3) steam generator was isolated and at approximately a 95% level, the (A) steam generatar down comer temperature was approximately 51C0, we attempted to start a reactor ccolant pump in each icop, but again, we got ICC amp inc aation and cavitation without ficw indication, we were dumping steam condenser at this time from the ' A' steam generator and we put a Shift Forenan and operator in charge of each panel within the Control Rocm as we now had some extra crews in place.
At this time, I have felt that with the temperatures indicated above, there was some natural circulatton occurring and I had hoped with the HP injection to charge the plant solid, Status of the Emergency Plan Implementation
< ~.
s.
The plan was fully initiated at this time, All steps within our procedures and plans were carried out, all ccmmunications both on and offsite were fully established, accountability was in progress, teams were dispatched bcth on and offsite, all readings were less than 1 MR per hour and Iodines were less than background.
Additionally, we are making frequent announcements over the page to inform people of the situation and that we were in a general emergency and that it was real.
At this time I placed one person in charge of the Observation Center, and sent persons from the gate to the Observation 2
?
(
e TMI 3-28-79 e
G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 0730 to 0830 (continued)
Center and others to the designated assembly areas onsite.
At approximately 0730 or a little before, I had received predictions of an offsite dose of 10 R at G(ldsboro, this was based on the Reactor Building dome monitor, which was still increasing and frcm our past experience with this source calculation, we did feel these were. eally this high, but as a precaution, I dispatched a State Police htlicopter with an offsite team along with an offsite team in a car and separately, to the West Shore (Goldsboro).
Curing this time period, the command team met in the Unit 2 Snif t Supervisor's office in the Unit 2 Control Rocm ar.d we assessed essentially what our goals and objectives were during this day and during the time of this incident.
Page 16 of 30
'o
~
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 0830 to 1200 I decided that our objectives and goali for this day were as follows, and in order of priority listed:
9 1.
To protect the public and cJ assure that the Emergency Plans, procedures along with the Units procedures were fully carried.out in an effective manner.
2.
To maintain the reactor core covered with water and to cool and stabilize it.
3.
To protect Met-Ed personnel and minimize plant damage.
It ":ight be noted that these goals were restated by me to this group throughout the day in order that we maintain ot;r priorities in pn.per perspective.
The group also decided that at this time, the Emergency Plan was fully in effect and working and that the Unit was in an essentially stable condition but that high pressure injection did not appear to be taking the plant solid and this was most evident by the fact that the reactor coolant pumps still cavitated during attempts to run them.
Incore thermocouples readings were taken on the ccmputer.
The computer put out
- question mark" which means that we were not in its program, therefore, we sent instrumentation personnel to take readings at the penetration, and additionally, to me this indicated that the potential for high readings on the thermocopules were evident.
The readings we got back from the penetration varied frcm 2000 to 24000 to nothing.
The technical explana-tion that I was given indicated that they were probably hot, that if they were hot, that the.e could be melting of the thermocouples and different junctions would have been formed and therefore, the temperature indication was not considered reliable on a technical basis, but to me personally, it 4.,_
ce Pace 17 of 30
TMI 3-23-79 D$>P. MILLER STATEMENT 0830 to 1200 (continued) indicated we certainly had high temperature readings within the core, Additionally, we had had hooked up a recorder to a reactor protection channel temperature indicator which indicated that the hot leg was greater than 70C0, in other words, essentially the hot leg indicated greater than 7000 cn a zero to 800 full range scale. We had lost over 1/3 to 1/2 of the pressurizer heaters and throughcat the day we kept trying to maintain and increase heaters and control with the pressurizer.
Plant conditions were essentially the same as I described earlier and I had notified Mr. Ross that HPI must ce kepton unless I personally directed otner-wise.
High pressure _ injection was kept on at my direction.
I conducted
".1.
a meeting in the Shift Supervisor 's office and we had decided to keep trying to take the plant solid using high pressure injection and throttling with RCV-2 (the electromatic block valve) and to maintain approximately 2000 lbs. while attempting to go solid.
We charged the plant for approxi-mately three hours and pressure cycled at around 2000 lbs, and HP injection flow was somewhere around 400 to 600 gpm.
Plant parameters remained the same as I described in the 0730 to 0830 time period.
The Sarated water storage tank was essentially going to the Reactor Suilding floor ana my concern began to beccme the ability to keep a water source as the BWST was down almost 20 feet or more through this period and at the rate we were at it would have left us without water in a matter of hours.
This was not an immediate concern but one wnich I was attempting to keep an eye on so that we aid not end up with a surprise of no water available,
,9
,b
(,
(. s -
Page 18 of 30
e TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 0830 to 1200 (continu:ci The alternative would have then required me to use the water from within the Reactor Building by utilizing the Low Pressure Oecay Heat System to feed the High Pressure Injection System.
Additionally, I became concerned over the possibility of the excessive cycling on RC-V2 causing it to fail., This has been a problem valve both in Units 1 and 2 at other sites (it is in a very hot environment and has failed in the past).
During this same period we lost auxiliary steam and we were attempting to put the auxiliary boiler back on line but we had problems with the auxiliary boiler and therefore, we had to break vacuum and steam the A steam generator to acmosphere.
"0TE:
At my direction, the 3 steam generator was maintained isolated at all timcs as we had suspected,
from the early hcurs it had a leak.
We had samples taken in both steam generators and tnese confirEed that the A steam generator was not contaminated.
This was done prior to steaming to the atmosphere. Addition.lly, we put a man out on the roof as close as practical to the steam pipe and during steaming, consistently got readings indicating no activity.
The ccmmand group met periodically throughout the morning and restated our cbjectives, re-reviewed the emergency plan and ccmmuncations and our concerns became one of a fear that HPI might be short. circuiting the core to the Reactor Building floor and that possibly the core might not be covered and the potentia. of having RC-V2 fail (open or shut).
Instruments available did not convince us that water was in fact on the core but my firm decision was to always maintain high pressure injection.
The group discussed and I directed that we go down in pressure and attempt to use the core flood tanks t) convince ourselves that the core was covered and possibly through this mechanism we might get the plant towards the decay
')
2
TMI 3-28-79 G.P. MILLER STATEMEili 0830 to 1200 (continued) heat mode which we considered at that time to be the ultimate condition and place of stability and safety.
Additionally, we had level indication
~
on the core flood tanks and the core flood ccmes in directly over the vessel through separate nozzles and we felt this would give us additional assurance that the core was covered.
Curing the pressure decrease I specifically directed and it was implemented that HPI, tha* is, High Pressure Injection was maintained at all times.
Status of the Emergency Plan The on and offsite *ejms were fully out, the wind had changed several times but as with early in the morning it was blowing very slowly, I to 2 mph and at times essentially it died.
During the times that the winds shif ted or died, we did obtain onsite readings which were above 1 MR/hr.
Readings through this period offsite were less than 1 MR/hr. and Iodines less than background.
We had had one Iodine s. ken in Goldsboro that indicated essentially background, we had directed a backup sample be taken using helicopter, it was taken and it was analyzed at a separate facility (Holy Spirit Hospital in Camp Hill) with Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) help and it was at this time that we discovered that our Iodine results were high, that is, in the conservative direction by a factor of approximately 1000 and we used this conservatism throughout the day and therefore, we simply felt that there was not an offsite concern at this particular time and additionally we were not in any level of action in accordance with the Envirormental orctection Agency (EPA) guidelines, and the State concurred with this evaluation and it should e
a TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 0830 to 1200 (continued) be noted that we had an open line with the state throughout the whole day frcm both Control Rooms and an open line to Region I of the NRC and that NRC inspectors were in both Units who had knowledge of the data and essen-tially did not object to our course of action and there was not a public concern.
We did have at.
time onsite readings in the area of 7 to 14 3
MR/hr.
Additionally, accountability was completed during this period so we knew where all tha site perscnnel were lcoated.
Our concern became to assure that the people in the designated assembly areas were not exposed to high readings and therefore, we decided to send people both on and
~
offsite, except for-the ones we needed, home.
This would allow us to minimize the exposure of our own people and by this time we realized that the normal work day was not going to occur.
Several times we sent pe sonnel through the entire site including all buildings to assure that the site was evacuated.
Additionally, throughout this period both Units were in and out of respirators and due to the high readings in Unit 1 we moved the ECS (Emergency Control Center) officially to the Unit 2 Control Room to minimize exposure of personnel.
A review of the communications in effect at this time were:
1.
All the required lines and com.munications in the Emergency Plan were fully in effect.
Teams were constantly mcnitoring and sampling to assure public and Met-Ed personnel safety.
2.
We had a direct line to the BRH starting at 7:30 to Mr. Gerusky and Margaret Reilly of that office.
j '>
P
(_
t-
[. '
3.
Mr. Lee Rogers of B&W, starting at about 7:45 and intermittently was talking to Lynchburg home office through himself and Mr. Greg Schaedel.
TMI 3-28-79 G, P. MILLER STATEMENT C830 to 1200 (continued) 4.
The NRC had a direct line in our Control Room to Mr. Don Haverkamp of the Region I office, 5.
The Unit 1 Control Room also had a direct line to the BRH in Harrisburg.
6.
The NRC had representatives in both Units Control Rocms.
MRC representatives onsite, frcm this group's memory, personal legs or security logs as available today, At approximately 10:10 in the morning Mr. Neely, Mr. Galina, Mr. Nimitz, and I believe Mr. Higgins, Approximately 10:34 in the morning, Mr, Smith and Mr. Baunack, Approximately 10:30 RAP
~1.
(NRC team) here with a plane or a helicopter, I am not sure, At approximately noon Mr. Stohr and Mr. Raymond were here and at 11:C0 P, M',
that night, Mr. Keimig was here, I might note that there seemed to be an abundance of the NRC from about noon on, and we and myself personally were very careful to assure we communicated with the NRC; they were very satisfied with the irtarface and provided us communication and advice as they could, but it was made very clear that the decision process and decision maker was the Licensee, that is me, One other entry of interest to the site that I could remember would be Mr. Sid Porter on the phone early in the day and as the magnitude of the situation became evident, he came to the site about 8:00 P, M. along with some HP techs., approximately 4, frcm the Salem plant, r
I
(, ' ( '.
(
ri' J
e :
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 1200 to 1430 Plant parameters remained about the same, again I insured HPI (HP Injection) was maintained and additionally, the communications between myself and Senior persons in Managemerit, plus the State, plus the NRC were increasing to a very high level during this period and : > pressure was of an intense level and that the grasp of the situation and a sericusness was beginning to take hold on all of our people.
I was directed to stop steaming because it was felt that I was releasing radioactive steam.
I considered that steaming only the ' A' steam generator was satisfactory since I did not feel we were in fact releasing radicactivity through this path.
I had been pressured to, do _this throughout the morning but I could not do this without a vacuum as I did not feel it was respcnsible to give up my heat sink which was needed to help assure the core was cooled, but I was making attemots to redraw vacuum and to secure that steaming.
Eventually, I was directed to stop steaming, and I did. We did at that time, have some vacuum and were able to steam internally.
It should be noted that we are designed to steam to atmosphere in this mode without a vacuum for this plant car.dition.
Plant pressure came to about 440 psig at about 1430.
Core ficod tanks went dcwn about a foot or foot and a half which to us indicated that we did have a high level in the core and this gave us some reassurance that the methods we had been imploying were keeping the core covered.
Additionally, I was directed to go the the Lieutenant Governor's office, and therefore, I had departed the site at approximately 1430 with as much information as I could about the incident.
It should be noted that I returned to the site about 1600.
Prior to leaving the site, I had seen the
^)
e T
Page 23 of 30
4 TMI 3-23-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 1200 to 1430 (continued) first response on the Tg and TC ins trumenta tion.
This seemed to occur when we pumped HPI heavier to the C injection leg and after the pressure was lowered to core flood ability.
Since the response of the temperatures had occurred, this made us feel we had some natural circulation as both T and g
T indicated, ccming close together.
It should be noted that at approxi-C mately 1400 I heard a loud deep noise and at that time the Reactor Building spray pumps started and subsequent to the events of this day I learned that this was a 30 lb. pressure spike which ocuurred in the Rentar Building due to Hydrogen.
Note that prior to my leaving for the Lieutenant Governor's office in Harrisburg, I had directed the steaming through the atmospneric valve be ceased and only be recommenced at my direction.
Please note again that we had not seen any activity with a man and a meter on site and I did not feel that we were releasing radioactive steam, and the steam generator samples indicated there was not contamination of the A steam generator.
The emergency plan was fully in effect including offsite communications and we had full agreement with the State that there were, at the time, no offsite actions rer.uired based on cur EPA guidelines, our past experience and our emergency p'an requirements. Plean note that they consistently reviewed both'the onsite and offsite readings throughout the entire period, as Dick Dubiel did an excellent job of keeping us current, watching the wind, watching for wind shifts, discussing actions with the State in attempting to hold down the tremendous amount of communications and presaures to evacuate or to increase the severity of the incident beyond what we had seen at this time offsite.
Page 24 of 30
a TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 1600 to 2000 The unit parameters remained essentially the same as described earlier, we did maintain our charging lineup through HPI and heavier to the (C) leg to maintain the A instrument response on temperature indicating better heat removal as we had earlier, and this convinced us we had as mQch natural circulation as we cculd get to remove the heat frcm the core.
We were additionally steaming the A steam generator to the condenser and with the temperature response, we did feel we were getting natural circulation and discharging a minimum amount of BWST water to the Reactor Building floor.
Our concern still was that tbe unit was not in its final condition and that we_would eventually run out of water in the BWST and 1.
at this time we were still hoping to get down to the decay heat point, or'to get a solid water condition in the loop and start a reactor coolant pump.
Status of the Emergency Plan We continued our on and offsite monitoring and at this time, we did see readings offiste of 2 to 3 MR/hr. while scme on-site readings were 10 to 20 MR/hr, due to the wind dying <ith most readings 2 to 3 MR/hr., typically, and 20te that during the day we had a helicopter overhead giving us readings which was extremely helpful, and we had at one point during this per'.cd 10 MR/hr. above the Unit 1 Cooling Tower and 20 MR/hr. at 3, feet above the Reactor Building Unit 2.
As the wind would stop during this period the readings would at points get as high as 70 MR/hr. and we were in respirators most of the time.
I had Mr. Hitz, Shift Supervisor, conduct a tour of the Auxiliary Building with the operators and we did note that there was water
(. s J
Pace 25 of 30
-I
\\
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEME.1T 1600 to 2000 (continued) backed up in the Auxiliary Building sump.
We reviewed the Environmental Prctection Agency guidelines and we had not reached any of those which required evacuation or any,oublic action and communication was still occurring anc the State was reported to me to be in full agreement on this point.
It is important to note that for the most part, I was given offsite readings of less than 1 MR/hr. except for a few indications above that level.
At this time I felt that the public was being protected and that our major concern was to get tr.e Unit to a safe conditicn and to stop the release.
L.
']
,,'l 7
Page 26 of 30 G
4 TMI 3-23-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 1700 Management (Jack Herbein and Bob Arnoldl ordered me to ccmmence taking the unit solid at a higher pressure, and addittanally, I had gotten word frcm Lynchburg to attempt to maintain 400 gpm HPI to assure core cooling and this was implemented at this time. I was at this time also attempting to get preparations underway to again start the reacter coolant pumps, During the day I had lost scme vital switchgear which disabled the lift and backstop cil pumps for tne rt ctor coolant pumps.
During the afternoon we made
/aricus attempts to trouble shoot and reclose the necessary breakers to cotain pcwer to these pumps, we had nigh exposure risk problems due to radiation levels-in the building (Auxiliary Buildingl and I very carefully 1.
had to proceed to insure minimum or no injury to personnel and yet be timely to ready the RC pump for starting.
4 t
u e
i Page 27 of 30
[,
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 1930 We had available the CC (Direct Current) oil lift pumps and we attempted to start the 2A reactor coolant pump.
I had selected 'A' loop due to the fact that its instruments had shown the most response on temperature and natural circulation was thought it and thereby, thought there might be water in the A loop and enough for the pump to be effective.
The 2A pump did not start snd we went over to the 'lA' reactor coolant pump using the CC oil pump and energized / bumped it and it did in fact run for 10 seconds, pressures and temperatures responded immediately and it indicated co0lant flow.
We secured the pump, waited approximately 15 minutes in order to assure that we didn't harm the motor frcm an electrical standpoint, as it is normally required to wait Ih minutes between starts due to the excessive -tarting currents these pumps experience and based on our need for this pump I did not wa:1t to damage it at this time since we needed it to assure flow and put us in a stable condition on the Unit.
', ' l'
(
2 Page 28 of 30
~
TMI 3-28-79 G. P. MILLER STATEMENT 1945 I directed the Control Rocm to start the lA Reactor Coolant pump, the pump started, ran and had flow indications, pressure dropped from 2000 to 1320 lbs., temperature equalized in all loops to 3800, and the planc, for the first time appeared stable and we were convinced that we.now had necessary flow and cooling to maintain the core.
It should be noted that during this same period, that we were concerned about the release ard some way to stop it, we inspected and troubleshot the Vent Header, which is very ccmplicated, and we were laying poly on the floors over the water in an attempt to stop the drying out or release that could be occurring frcm there.
The highest readings, which I was given, offsite for the day for the information occurred at 2230, that is,10:30 P. M.
and that was at the Airport and these readings were 12 MR/hr. and at Kunkle School near the tunrpike at 13 MR/hr.
This completes the sequence of events for this day of March 28th through 8 P. M. at night.
By 8 P. M. I was still in charge of the Control Room but I was essentially under the direction of Senior Management and we had at this time an abundance of NRC people and observers and I spent many per ads of clearing the Control Room in order to maintain the calm atmosphere that was evident throughout the day.
Page 29 of 30
_I
r
.c 9
TMI 3-28-79 G, P. MILLE; STATEMENT CONCLUSICN It should be noted tha* *.his emergency lasted for an extended period but the atmosphere within tne Unit remained calm and professional.
The response of all Met-Ed personnel was excellent and the ccurage of the operators, health physics and maintenance personnel was evident throughout the day and that there was not, during the entire time, a period of panic or unsureness within that Control Rocm.
I personally feel that we must suffer the public pressure and media distorticr as we have, and that we should be criticized that we surely could have done better, but it is my hcpe that the full story and the calm decision making that did occur are eventually.1 put before public attention, as I believe we minimized the exposure of the public, of our cwn people, and placed the plant in a stable condition and frcm a situation which cone of us had been schooled in and which few of us, including myself, had probably never believed we would ever be in, I lef t the Unit 2 Control Room at approximately 0300 3-29-79,
]
/
/
e l
1 L,,/ /
t G. P. Miller 5/7/79 Manager, Generating 'tation-Nuclear l
e Page 30 of 30