ML19224B314

Final Contingency Plan C-20:emergency Plan for Criticality Incident

ML19224B314
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/12/1979
From:	Metropolitan Edison Co
To:
References
C-20, TM-0513, TM-513, NUDOCS 7906140478
Download: ML19224B314 (3)

Text

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TMI DOCUME?,Ts DOCUMEt,T No:

TM-TI3 b " 7 f 0F DOCUME T PROVIDED BY COPY MADE ON METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPA17.

Yf Supervisor, Document Control NRC 790614047F e

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Superintendent. TMI-2 Control Room, LII-2 On Site Tech Support - Admin Assist.

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"'I!ML CONTINGENCY PLtl C-20 EFERGENCY PLui FOR CRITICALITY I!!CIDEtir 3

Init?.a1 condition:

Natural circ-ation RC pu=ns off - powcr available '

Pressurince solid Pressure biced end feed control by =akeup pe=p and letdown syste=

Sy=pto=s:

~ Criticality incident occurs in lower reactor vessel region or top of -

t once through stea= generator Due to =aterial (pellets)

Cc=ing out of fuel pins Indications:

Increase in RC pressure and increase in incore ther=ocouples [C vMM -

Increased RC flow Increased activity of pri=ary sa=ple Incore/excore detector increase in flux Pro =pt critical incident would cause fast expansion of reactor coclant "

vole =e and corresponding pressure rise that =ay lift safety and relief vnive.

Action required:

I==ediate:

Start reactor coolant pu=p LA or another reactor coolant p u=p i f lA fails to start.

Reason for above: forced pri=ary coolant flow should disperse Seo=etry of the fuel pile and cause reaction to cease ~ based upon c

geo=etric buckling needed for criticality.

If relief or safety valve has lifted, tlyen start standby =nkeup pu=p and increase flow rate fro = operating =akeup pump.

Rrason for above: since relief valve has lifted the charging pumps

=sy charge additio al boron to further provide shutdown targin.

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If relief valve has not lifted, then continue previous b1ced and feed n:ethod of pressure control.

Caution: s ta rting o f RC pu::p in.:olid *ater syste= will cause pressure fluctuation initially acd subsequent gradual increase in pressure due to pu=p heat into syste=,

Makeup pt..:p charging rate should be reduced accurdingly.

The secondary side heat recc, val systea balance will be initially affectai by the change in average te=perature of the stea=

generator pri=ary side, the heat balance should return to initial values plus a slight increase in total heat transferred per unit ti=e.

Subsequent action:

Maintain forced convection pri=ary coolant flow to avoid refor=ing of georatric bucklin, configuration.

Increase boron concentration in pri=ary coolant to avoid recurrence.

Obtain primary coolant sa=ple to verify increase in fission products.

If relie f valve has lif ted, deter: tine gaseous concentrations in - ; -

contain=ent and take appropriate action to reduce, i.e., H reco=biner.

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