ML19224B310

Contingency Plan C-8:loss of Primary Coolant Inventory

ML19224B310
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/11/1979
From:	Metropolitan Edison Co
To:
References
C-8, TM-0512, TM-512, NUDOCS 7906140461
Download: ML19224B310 (4)

Text

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1 TMI DOCUMENTS TM-M L DOCUMENT NO:

COPY MADE O_N 11 77 0F DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY.

Supervisor, Document Control, NRC 790614046l 199 0\\4

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On Site Tech Support Group Leader J.

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F. Wilson Data Reduction & Management Group l

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4/11/79 1800 FINAL j

Rev- 0 CuNTINCENCY PLAN C'8 Loss of Primary Coolant Inventory through The calculated leakage from the primary (assumed to be primary relief valves) was gpm at psig on April 1979.

Note:

f Reactor inventory includes the volume of water in the Primary coolant Under steady 1.

Coolant System and the Makeup and Purification System.

the immediate indication (RCS) and pressure conditions, inventory is a decrease in pressurizer state temperature of a reduction in Primary Coolant level and/or makeup tenP leye1.

A reduction la prinary coolant inventory can be attributed to numerous in each situation RCS inventory losres cust be:

2.

conditions; however, replenished using water from either the BWST, RC bleed holdup tanks or the Boric Acid-Chemical Addition aad Demineralized service water a) systems identified as to source of leakage -- within the containment building building (Makeuo and purifi-b)

(RCS leakage), or outside the containment cation system leakage) unnecer, nary release of c) contained and, if possible, stopped to prevent containment water.

3.

Immediate Action to maintain RCS inventory (constant pressurizer level) by control valve MU-V17 a)

Attempt increasing RCS makeup through the makeup flow to maintain a constant pressurizer level.

If RCS inventory cannot be maintained with normal makeup through b)

MU-V17:

Divert makeup pump suction from the makeup tank to the BWST 1) and secure letdown.

Increase RCS makeup through the high pressure injection line by (MU-V16A,B,C,D) associated wi.h c

2) opening the HPI injection valvesMU-V17 should be closed; don't exceed the operating Makeup pump.

gpm.

pump flow limitations Secure makeup pump recirculation to prevent overfilling the makeup 3) t tank.

199 0\\6 O

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Final Contingency Plan C-8 Page 2 Immediate Action (continued) h MU-V17:

3.

If RCS inventory can be maintained with normal makeup throug c)

Replenish makeup tank inventory using the RC bleed tanks or t r boric acid (chemical additien) and demineralized service wa 1) systems as the source of makeup water.

i Makeup water abould be of suf ficient boron concentrat on Note:

ta prevent dilution of the RCS.

To Determine Source of Leakage 4.

Follow-up Action:

containcent/

(i.e., inside Determine the locatiou 'of the leakage a) outside containment).

r and RCS makeup (through MU-17)

Where pressurizer level is constantis greater than RCS letdown and 1) plus RCP seal injection (4 RCP's) leakage in containment.

RCP seal return flow (4 RCP's) should be checked.

Sources of leakage that b)

Ino: cation Source

1) RC" high standpipe level alarm, third

1) RCP seal leakage past erratic RCP seal cavity pres-(upper soal) to RC Drain (also high third seal sures Tank cavity pressures).

2) increasing steam generator

2) Steam generator tube level and activity failure primary / secondary t,.

leakage i;

3) Increasing temperatures in

3) Pressurizer Code Safety valves relief line downstream of code weeping reliefs.

4) Increasing temperature in

4) PZR electromatic relief block reli,ef line downstream of PZR valve (RC-V2) not fully closed relief val re and electromatir possible d< creasing RCS pres-sure.

5) Leakage to ICCW system -

5) Letdown cooler leak tube increasing temperature on ICCW failure return from letdown cooler.

s Activity in ICCU system.

through MU-V17 or

6) RCS makeup

6) Pipe break inside ccntainment MU-V16A,B,C,D considerably greater than letdown and seal return total flow.

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199 017

Fine.1 Contingency Plan C-8

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4.

Follow-up Action: To Determine Source of Leakage (continued)

Source Indication

7) RCP-ICCW seal heat exchanger

7) Leakage to ICCW system leak - tube failure increasing temperature on ICCW return from RCP-ICCW seal heat exchanger.

Activity in ICCW system.

8) Letdown inadvertantly being

8) Decreasing MU tank level, diverted to RC Bleed. hold-up MU-V8 not in proper lineup.

tanks

9) Makeup pump seal failure

9) Degradation in MU pump leakage performance with regard to increasing bearing temperatures JET

10) Seal return cooler leak, tube

10) Activity in the Nuclear Services failure Closed Cooling Water System.

5.

Follow-up Action to Stop Leakage or Contain Leakage a)

Where leakage is determined to be in the CTMT, measures should be taken to stop/ minimize the '.cakage, b)

Where leakage is determined to be in the auxiliary building (outside CTMT), the leakage should be stopped by isolating the source where

possible, c)

Where leakage is determined to be into a cooling water system, that portion of the cooling water system should be isolated.

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