ML19221B058
| ML19221B058 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.4.3, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.4.3, SRP-09.04.03, SRP-9.04.03, NUDOCS 7907120328 | |
| Download: ML19221B058 (6) | |
Text
NUHEG 75/087
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STANDARD REVIEW PLAN U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
\\...'. *,P' OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SECTION 9.4 3 AUXILIARY AND RADWALTE A9tA VENTILATION SYSTEM REVIEW RE SPONSIBil ! TIE S Primary - Auxiliary Systens Branch (ASB) l Secondary - Instrumenta' ion and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) l Mechanical Engineering Branch (MfB) l Power Sy'.tems Crancn (PSB) l.
AREAS OF REVIFW The ASB reviews the auxiliary and radwaste area ventilation system (ARAVS) from air l
intake to the point of discharge wh(re the system connects to the gastous cleanup and treatment system or station vents to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Critaria 2, e and 5.
The r eview includes components such as air intakes, ducts, air conditioning units, blowers, isolation dampers, and roof enhaust fans.
The review of the ARAVS cove, the radwaste areas and controll'd access nonradioactive areas and their relationship to 13fety related areas in the auxiliary building.
1.
The ASB review the "unctional performance requirements and the air treatment l
equipment for the ARA'S to determine whether the ventilation system or portions of the (ystem b 3ve been designed or reed to be designed as a saf ety-r ' lated system.
9 Based on this determination, the safety related part of the system is revie.ved with respact to functional perfo,mance requirements during normal coeration, during wherse environmental occurrentes, and during and subsequent to postulated accidents, including the loss of cf f site power.
The ASB reviews safety-related l
portions of the s)atem to assure that:
d.
A single aClive failure CannCt result in loss of the system function 31 performance capability.
b.
Components and piping have sufficient physical separation or shielding to protect essential portions of the system f roni missiles, pipe whip, and fires.
l c.
Failures of non-seismic Category I equipmenu or components will not result in unfilterea releases of radioactive contaminants.
2.
The ASB also reviews sa'ety-related portions of the ARAVS with respcct to the l
following:
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The capability to direct ventilation air from areas of low radioactivity to a.
areas of progressively higher radioactivity.
b.
The capability to detect the need for isolation and to isolate safety related portions of the system in the event of fires, failures, or malfunctinns, and the capability of the isolated system to function under such conditions.
c.
To determiae that the quality group and seismic design requirements are met for the system.
3.
The E f fluent Treatment Systems Branch (ETSB) evaluates the ARAVS's f unctional performance to assure that the system meets acceptable limits for radioactive releases during normal cperations under SRP Section 11.3.
4.
The Radiological Assessment Branch (Rt.3) revie.., and evalua+.es the capability of the ARAVS tc ddect and control leakage of radioactive contamination from the system, as well as radiation protection criteria as described in SRP Section 12.3.
S.
The applicant's proposed technical specifications are reviewed for operating license applications as they rela:e to araas covere'. in this SRP section.
I Secondary reviews are performed by other branches and the re ults used by the ASO to l
complete the overall evaluation of the system. The MEB will, upon request, review the seismic qualification of components and confirm that the components, piping, and struc-tures are (esigned in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The IC$B and PSB will determine the adequacy of the design, installation, inspection, and testing of all elettrical components (sensing, control and power) required for proper operation.
11.
ACCEPTANCE CRIiERIA Acceptability of the ARAVS design, as described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR), is based on specific general design criteria and.egulatory gu'."
The design of safety-related portions of the ARAVS is acceptabla if the integrated design of the system is in accordance with the fnllowing criteria:
1.
General Design Criterion 2, as related to structures h'using the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods.
l 2.
General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures houing the system and the system itself being cepable of withstanding the ef fects of external missiles and internally generated miss:les, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
3.
General Design Criterion 5 as related to shared systems and to. pnents important to safety.
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4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related to quality group classification of systems and components.
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as relattd to seismic desigc. classification of system components.
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
7.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, as related to capability of the system to remove smoke.
8.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems out,ide containment.
For those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methnt.s of applica" tion are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. PEVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures below are used during the construction permit (CP) review to determine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the Preliminary Sa'ety Analysis Report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
I or the review of operating license (OL) applications, the procedures are utilized to t
verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the Final Safety Analysir Report.
The procedures for OL reviews include a determination that the content and intent of the technical specifications prepared by the applicant are in agreement with the requirements for system testing, minimum performance, and surveillance developed as a result of the staff's review.
Upon request from the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in %bsection I.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such inputs as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
As a result of various ARAVS designs proposed by applicants, there will be variations in system requirements. For the purpose of this SRP section, a typical system is assumed which has fully redundant subsustems, each having an identical essential (safety features) portion. For cases where there are variations f rom this typical arranoement, the reviewer would adjust the raview procedures given below. However, the system design would be required to meet the acceptance criteria given in suMection II.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material from this SRP section as may be appro-priate for a particular case.
1.
The SAR is reviewed to verify that the system dev ription and piping and instru-mentation diagrams (P& ids) show t% ARAVS equipment uvd fgr nyrae/ operation, and g!90 al 9.4.3-3 Rev. I
the ambient temperature limits for the areas serviced. The system performance requirements are reviewed to determine that allowable component operational degradation (e.g., loss of function, damper leakage) and the procedures that will be followed to detect and correct these conditions are adequately described. The reviewer, using results f rom failure modes and ef fects analyses as appropriate, determines that the safety-related portion of the system is capable of functioning in spite of the failure of any active component.
2.
The system P& ids, layout drawings, and component descriptions and characteristics are then reviewed to determine that:
a.
Essential portions of the ARAVS are correctly idertified and are isolable from i
non essential portions of the system. The P& ids are reviewed to ver fy that they clearly indicate the physical divisions between such portions and indicate design classification changes. Syst(m drawings are also reviewed to verify that they show t hr: means for accomplishing isolation and the description is reviewed to identify minimum performance requirements for the isolation dampers. For the typical system, the drawings and description are reviewed to verify that two automatically operated isolation dampers in series separate non essential portions and components from the essential portions.
b.
Essential portions of the ARAVS, including the isolation dampers separating essential from non-essential portions, are classified seismic Category I and Quality Group C.
Component and systern descriptions in the SAR that identify l
mechanical and performance characteristics are reviewed to o rify that the above seismic classification has been included, and that the P& ids indicate any points of change in design classification.
3.
The reviewer verifies that the essential portion of the system has been designed so that system function will be maintained as required in the event of adverse environmental phenomena or in the event of certain pipe breaks or loss of offsite power.
The reviewer evaluates the system, using engineering judgment and the results of failure modes and effects analyses to determine that; a.
The failure of non-essential portions of the system or of other systems not designed to seismic Category I standards and located close to essential portions of the system, or of ron seismic Category I structures that house, support, or are close to essen;,ial portions of the ARAVS, will not preclude operation of the essential portions of the ARAVS. Reference to SAR sections describing site features and the general arrangement and layout drawings will be necessary, as well as the SAR tabulation of seismic design classifications for structures and systems. Statements in the SAR that verify that the above conditions are met are acceptable. (CP) b.
The essential portions of the ARAVS are protected from the effects of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, ano internally and externally generated missiles.
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Rev. I 9.4.3-4
Flood protection and missile protection criteria are discusced and evaluated in detail under the Section 3 series of the SRP.
The location and the design l
9-of the system, struc+.ures, and f an rooms (nbicles) are reviewed to determine that une degree of protection prcsided is adeqJate. A statement to the effect that the system is located in a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or that components of the system will be located in individual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both flooding and missiles is acceptable.
The essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of high c.
and moderate energy line breaks. Layout drawings are reviewed to assure that no high or moderate energy piping systems are close to essential portions of the ARAVS, or that protection from the effecis of failure will be provided.
The means of providing such protection will be given in Section 3.6 of the SAR and procedures for reviewing this information are given in SRP Section 3.6.
d.
Components and subsystems, necessary for preventing the release of rdio-active contaminants, cra functiol as required in the event of loss of offsite power.
The system design will be acceptablo if the ARAVS meets minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuming a failure of a single active component within the syste or in the auxiliary electric power source which supplies the system. The SAR is reviewed to see that for each ARAVS component or subsystem affected by the loss of offsite power, the resulting system flow capacity will not cause the loss of preferred direction of air ficw from areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of higher potential radioactivity. Statements ir. the SAR and the results of failure modes and effects analyses are considered in verifying -hat the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verificction of system functional reliahi'ity.
4.
The descriptive information, P& ids, AFAVS drawing,, and failure modes and effects analyses in the SAR are reviewed to assure th, essential portions of the system can function following design basis accidents assuming a concurrent single active failure.
The reviewer evaluates the analyses presented in the SAR to assure functioning of required components, traces the availability of these components on system drawings, and checks that the SAR contains ve. ific"ien that minimum system isolation or filtration requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans.
For each case the design will be acceptable if mininum system requirements are net.
IV.
EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer determines that sufficient information has been pro,ided and his review 9
supports conclusions of the following type, to be includad in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report:
14 8 M,,,3 9.4.3-5 POV-I
"The auxiliary and radwaste area ventilation system (ARAVS) includes all components and ductwork from air intake to the point of discharge where the system connects to the gaseous cleanup and treatment system or station vents. Based on the review of the applicant's proposed design criteria, design baces, and safety classifica-tion for the auxiliary and radwaste area ventilation system and the requirements for system performance to preclude an unacceptable release of contaminants to the environment during normal, abnormal, and accident cor.ditions, the staff concludes that the design of the auxiliary and radwaste area ventilation system and auxiliary supporting systems is in conformance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases,"
General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components," and meets the guidelines contain?d in Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifica-tions and Standards for Water, Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of tiuclear Power P' ants," Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification,"
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Cesign Classification," 3 ranch Technical Fosition ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," and Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
V.
REf t!RENCES 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protec-tion Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases."
3.
10 CFR Part 50, Append x A, General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, fystems, and Components."
l 4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water,
Steam, ar.d Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification."
7.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,"
attached to SRP Section 9.5.1.
8.
Branch Tech.:ical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping failures in Fluid Systems Ou+ side Containment," attached to SRP Section 3.6.1, and MEB 3-1,
" Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment,"
a+tached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
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