ML19221B056
| ML19221B056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.4.2, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.4.2, SRP-09.04.02, SRP-9.04.02, NUDOCS 7907120326 | |
| Download: ML19221B056 (7) | |
Text
NU REG-75/087 f p REag%
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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SECTION 9.4.2 SPENT FUEL POOL AREA VEf4TILATION SYSTEM REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) l 1
Seccndary - Mechanical Ergineerir.g Branch (MEB)
Materials Ennineering Branch (MTEB)
Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)
Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (TCSB)
Power Systems Brar.ch (PSB)
AREAS OF PEVIEW The f unction of thc spent fuel pool ar vent 11ation system (SFPAVS) is to maintain ventilation in the spent fuel pool equipment areas, to permit personnel access, and to control airbornc radioactivity in the area during normal operation, anticipated opera-tional transiants, and following postulated fuel handling accidents.
The ASB reviews the SFPAV5 from air intake to the point of disciarge where the system connects to tra gaseous cleanup and treatrcent systeai or the station wents ta assure conformance ith the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4 and S.
The review includes components such as air intakes, ducts, air conditioning units, filters, blowers, isolation dampers, and exhaust fans.
The review of the SFPAVS covers all areas containing or adjacent to the spent fuel pool, including the spent fuel cooling pump room.
1.
ihe ASB reviews the SFPAV5 to determine the afety significance of the system.
l Based on this determination, the safety related part of the system is reviewed with respect to furctional performance requirements during normal operation, during adverse environmental occurrences, and subsequent to penulated accidents including the loss of offsite power.
The ASB reviees safety related portions of l
the system to assure that:
a.
A single active failure cannot result in loss of the system functional performance capability.
b.
Components and pip N or ducting have sufficient physical separation or b",iera to protetL essential portions of the system from missiles, pipe whip, and fires.
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aperate nucteer power plante These docwnente ese made eveaseble to the public et part of the Commission a p3fecy to inform the nuclear industry and the general pube6c of reguletory procedured and poitries Stenderd review p6 ens are not substatutes for regulatory guides or the Commreoron e regulettone end co'npatence with them le re 1 required The egenh'd rev*ew paen sectione are keyed to Revision 2 of the Stenderd Format and Cor' tent of Safety Analysio Reporte for huckoor Power Plante Not eH sectione nf tfse %tederd Fermet have e correspondmg review plan Pubhehed etendard review p6ene wLil be rede*t per*odiceHy, as appropriate. to accommodate comments and to reflect new 6nformation and esperience Coenments and suggaet ene for ims.nvernent mi'. "e cone.dered and should be sent to the U S Nuclear Regulatory Commweson.Offwe of Nucleet Rmtor 6
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f ailures of non seismic Category I equipment or components will not af fect c.
the SFPAVS.
2.
The ASB also reviews safety-related portions of the SFPAkS with respect to the l
following:
The capability to direct ventilation air from areas of low radioactivity to a.
areas of potentially higher radioactivity.
D.
The capability to detect the need for isolation and to isolate portions of the system in tne event of failures or malfunctions.
The capability to actuate components not normally operating that are required c.
to operate during accident conditions, and to prnvide necessary isolation.
d.
To determine that the quality group and seismic design requirements are met for the system.
3.
The Effluent Treatment Systems Branch (ETSB) evaiuates the effectiveness of the SFPAVS filters to remove airborne contaminants prior to discharge to the environ-ment in SRP Section 6.5.1.
4.
The Accident Analysis Branch (AAB' eval ~te the radiological consequences o.
airborne contaminants resultina from a postulited fuel handling accident in SRP Section 15.7.4.
5.
The Radiological Assessm.ot Branch (RAB) reviews and evaluates the capability of the SFPAVS to detect and.ontrol leakage of radioactive contamination from the system, as well as r-bati protection criteria described in SRP Section 12.3.
6.
The applicant's propos M 'achnical specifications are reviewed for operating license applications they relate tn areas covered in this SRP section.
l Secondary reviews are performed by other branches and the results used by the ASB to i
complete the overall evaluation of the system. The SEB determines the acceptability of I
the design analyses, procedures, and criteria used to establish the ability of seismic Category I structures housing or supporting the system to withstand the effects of natu-ral phenomena such as the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the probable maximum flood (PMF), and tornado missiles. The MEB will, upon request, review the seismic qualifica-tion of components and confirm that the components, piping, and st uctures are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The MTEB verifies that inservice g
inspection requirements are met for system components and, upon request, will verify the compatibility of the materials of construction with service conditions. The ICSB a-d I-6 l determine the adequacy of the Cesign, installation, inspection, and testing of all essen tial electrical componena (s nsing, control and power) required for proper operation.
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II.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the SFPAVS design, as described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), is based on specific general design criteria and regulatory guides.
The design of safety related portions of the SFPAVS is acceptable if the integrated design of the system is in accordance with the following criteria:
1.
General Design Criterion 2, as related to structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of with:,tanding the ef f ects of natural phenomena such ds earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and ffoods.
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General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures housing the system and the system itself t+ing capable of withstanding the ef fects of external missiles and internally ry ited missile 3, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe br.
i 1.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and components irrportant to safety.
4.
Requiatory Guide 1.13, as related to the system capability to lim't releases of radioactive contaminants to the environment.
5.
Regulatory Guido 1.26, as related to the ouality grcup classification of systems and components.
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related to the seismic design classification of system ccmponents.
7.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components important to safety from the effects of tnrnado missiles.
8.
Branch fechnical Position ASB 9.5-1, as related to capabili ty of t he system to remove smoke.
9.
Branch Technical Positiens A5B 3-1 and MEB 3-1, ac related to breaks in high and moderite energy piping systems outside centainment.
For those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the re< pons:bility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methods of applica-tion are contained in the SRP sections c orresponding to those branches.
II! RLVIEW PROCEDbRES The procedures below are used dering the construction permit (CD) pgyjJW to determile that the design criteria and baus and the preliminary design as set forth in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Neport meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II l
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for the review of operating license (OL) applications, the procedures are used to verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report.
The procedures for OL reviews include a determination that the content and intent of the technical specifications prepared by the applicaat are in agreement with the requirements for system testing, minimum performance, and surveillance developed as a result of t*le staff's review.
Upon rtquest from the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such inputs as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
I As a result of various SFPAVS designs proposed by applicants, there will be variations in system requirements. for the purpose of this SRP section, a typical system is I
assumed which has fully redundant subsystems, each having an identical essential (safety features) portion. For cases where there are variations from this typical arrangement, the reviewer would adjust the review procedures given below.
Howaver, the system design would be required to meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
The reviewer will select and emphasize material f rom this 5'lP section as may be appro-priate for a particular case.
1.
The SAR is reviewed to verify that the system description section ind piping and instrumentation diagrams (P& ids) show the SFPAVS equipment used fc r normal opera-tion and the ambient temperature limits for the area serviced. The sys am perform-ance requirements section is reviewed to determine that it describes allowable component operational degradation ('
loss of cooling function, damper leakage) and describes the procedures that will be followed to detect and correct these cond.tions.
The reviewer, using results from failure modes ar.d effects analyses as appropriate, determines that the safety related portion of the system is capable of functioning in spite of the loss of any active component.
2.
The system P& ids, layout drawings, and ccmponent descriptions and characteristics are then reviewed to determine that:
a.
Essential portions of the SFPAVS are correctly identified and are isolable from non essential portions of the system. The P& ids are reviewed to verify that they clearly indicate the physical divisions between such portions and indicate design classification changes. System drawir js are also reviewed to verify that they show the means for accomplishing isolation and the system cescription is reviewed to identify minimum performance requirements for the isolation dampers. For the typical systr.n, the drawings and description are reviewed to verify that two automatically perated isolation dampers in series separate non essential portions and components from the essential portions.
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9.4.2-4
b.
Essential portions of the SFPAVS, including the isclation dampers separating essential from non-essential portions, are classified Quality Group C and l
9' seismic Category I.
Component and system descriptions in the SAR that iden-tify mechanical and performance characteristics are reviewed to verify that the above classifications have been included, and that the P&lDs indicate any points of change in design classification.
Design provisions have been made that permit appropriate inservice inspettion c.
and functional testing of system components important to safet).
It is acceptable if the SAR inform. ion delineates a testing and inspection program and if the system drawings show the necessary test recirculation loops around fans or isolation dampers that would be required by this program.
3.
The reviewer verifies that the system has been designed so that system function will be maintained as required in the event of adverse environmental phenomena or in the event of certain pipe breaus or loss of offsite power.
The revie-er eval-uates the system, using enginesring judgment cr.d f ailure modes and ef fects analyses, to determine that:
a.
The failure of non essential portions of the system or of other systems not designed to seismic Category I standards and located close to essential portions of the system, or of non-seismic Category I structures that house, support or are close to essential portions of the SFPAVS, will not preclude operation of the essential portions of the SFPAVS. Reference to SAR sections describing site features and the general arrangement ar.1 layout drawings will be necessary, as well as the SAR tabulation of seismic design classifications for structures and systems.
b.
The essential portions of the SFPAV:
e protected from the effects of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, vi internally-and externally generated missiles.
Flood protection and missile protec'. ion criteria are discussed and evaluated in detail under Section 3 series of the SRP.
The location and the design of l
tho system, structures, and fan rooms (cubicles) are reviewed to determine that the degree of protection is adequate. A statement to the effect that the system is located in a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or t hat components of the system will be located in individual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both ficoding and missiles, is acceptable.
c.
The total system has the capability to detect and contr01 leakage of radio-active contaminaticn from the system It is acceptable if the following conditions are met:
(1) The capability for isolating ncn-eseential portions of the SFPA'!S by two automatically actuated dampers in series is shown in the P& ids.
9.4.2-5 Hev. I b
(2) The SFPAVS has provisions to filter radioactive contaminants f rom the spent fuel area by automatically isolating the normal ventilatinn system anc actuating the emergency exhaust system before the first contaminated airborne particles and gases reach the normal ventilation exhaust ducts.
A statement in the SAR that the technical specifications will require that the SFPAVS be operating whenever fuel handling operations are in progress is requircd.
d.
The essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of high and moderate energy line breaks.
Layout drawings are reviewed to assure that no high or moderate er,ergy piping systems are close to essential portions of the SFPAVS, or that protection from the effects of failure will be provided.
The means of providing such protection will be given in Section 3.6 of the SAR and procedures for reviewing this information are given in SRP Section 3.6.
e.
Components and subsystems necessary for preventing the release of radioactive contaminants can function as required in the event of loss of offsite power.
The system design will be acceptable if the SFPAVS meets minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuming a failure of a single active component, within the system itself or in the auxiliary electric power source which supplies the system. The SAR is reviewed to see that for each SFPAVS component or st.bsystem affected by the loss of offsite power, the resulting system flow capacity will not cause the loss of air flow from areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of higher potential radioactivity. State-rrents in the SAR and the results of f ailure modes and ef fects analyses are ccnsidered in verifying that the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verificai. ion of system functional reliability.
4.
The descriptive informat on, P&!Ds, SFPAVS drawings, and failure moces and effects i
analyses in the SAR are reviewed to assure that essential portions of the system can function following design basis accidents assuming a concurrent single active failure. The reviewer evaluates the analyses presented in the SAR to assure function of required components, traces the availability of these components on system drawings, and checks that the SAR contains verification that minimum system isolation or filtration requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans. For each case the design will be acceptable if minimum system requirements are met.
IV.
EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and his review supports c mclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's sorety evaluaticn rcport:
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"The spent f uel pool area ventilation system (SF PAVS) includes all components and doctwork from air intake to the point of discharge where the system connects to the giseous cleanup and treatment system or station vents. Based ca the review of the applicant's proposed design criteria, the design bases, and sifety classifica-tion for the spent fuel pool area ventilation system and the requirements for system perf ormance to present an unacceptable release of c.;ntaminants to the environment during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions, the staff concludes that the design of the spent fuel pool area ventilation system and supporting systems is in conformince with the Commission's regulations as set f orth in General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,"
General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components," and meets the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.13, " fuel Storage facility Design B isis," Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classif ications and Standirds for Water, 5 team, and Radioactije-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plints," Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Regulatory Guide 1.11/, " Tornado Design Clas ;ification," Branch Tecnnical Pos:tio ASB 9.5-1,
" Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," and Branch Technical fositions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
REffRENCf5 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protec-tion Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases."
3.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components "
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.13, " fuel Storage facility Design Basis."
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water,
Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
l 6.
Fegulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
l.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification."
8.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nucleir Power Plants,"
attached to SRP Section 9.5.i.
9.
Branch Technical Positions A5B 3-1, " Protection Agiinst Postulated Piping failures in fluid Systems Outside Containment," M tached to 5RP Section 3.6.1, and MEB 3-1,
" Postulated Break and leakaga locations in fluid System Piping Outside Containment,"
attached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
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