ML19221A844

For Comment Issue of Reg Guide 1.13,Revision 1, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis

ML19221A844
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/31/1975
From:	NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
To:
References
1697, REGGD-01.013, REGGD-1.013, NUDOCS 7907100079
Download: ML19221A844 (3)

Text

A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revision 1

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REGZATORY GEDDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEV3LOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE 1.13 SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY DESIGN BASIS A. INTRODUCTION

1. Loss of Water from Storage Pc,ol General Design Cnterion 61, " Fuel Storage and Unless protective measures aie taken, loss of water Handling Cnteria for Nuclear Power Plants!' of Appen-M a fM stov N cd a m@q d &

dix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power t fuel and resultant damage to luel ' dding integ-Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensmg of Production rity and could result in release of radioact matenals to and Utiluation Facihties," requires that fuel storage and the environment. Natural everu.s. subas ca%uakes or handling systems be designed to assure adequate safety lugh winds, could damage theido.,hither directly or under normal and postulated accident conQtions. It als by the generation of musfes. Eenhq$ihs or high mnds requires that these systems be designed with appropriate gg g

containment, confinement, and filtering systems and be pool. Designing A: faCy tp withstand these occur-designed to prevent sigmficant reduction in the ceolant d

M M w@ WW inventory of the storage facility under accident condi-tions. This guide descnbes a method acceptable to the would allerdtyhoc cacerns.

gy W NRC staff for implementing this enterion.

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DrgpA o eavy loads, such as a 100-ton fuel cask.

B. DISCUSSION 4, %u@ dDow probabihty, cannot be ruled out in plant anaMgiments where such loads are positioned or moved it is important that fuel handling and storage facM in'pr over the fuel pool. Possible solutions to this be designed to.

b I potential problem include (1) preventing preferably by 4*'> b

1. design rather than interlocks, heavy loads from being

a. Prevent loss of water from the %@tl pool W. hf ted over the pool (2) using a lughly re d

system designed to prevent dropping of heavy loads as a would uncover fuel.

bM result of any single failure; or (3) designing the pool to

b. Protect the fuel from mechanical damage.

withstand dropping of the load without significant leakage from the pool area in which fuelis stored.

c. Provide the capa(' y. limiti.ig the potential offsite exposures i the bgnificant release of

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Even if the measures desenbed above to prevent loss radioactivity fro of leax tight integnty are followed, small leaks may still b

If spe - uel - >rar cilities are not located within occur as a result of structural failure or other unforeseen provided with events. For example, equipment failures in systerns the pn. -.

as iontainment or adequate 1 l fective features, radioactive materials could connected to the pool could result in loss of water from be released the environs as a result of either loss of the pool if such loss is not prevented by design. A water from the storage pool or mechanical damage to permanent fuel-pool-coolant makeup system with a fuel within the pool.

moderate capabihty, and with suitable redundancy oi backup, could present the fuel from being uncovered if

• 12nes indicate substantive changes from previous tssue.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Commem ev d be seat to t*e secreter, of **e c omm..s.ca u s =vcieer i

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• _ epi een, if thev prov.de a bes.s f or the hadiage reo+s te to 3 Foots and M eieriais Fec.ht.es S Occupenoae8 Moe'th the essweac e ar c oat.auear e of a poe m t or hc ease by the C omm.os.on 4 (avironmental and $ emg 9 Anotrust Rev. eve imo ovement s.a imes e guides ere enc ou aged 5 Meteness sad Pient Protec t oa 10 Geae on Comment s ead suggest.oas vor et ent.mes and goJes..ote e se,s as g,p%p,,. e in e e ommodete c o,a Copies at pubbshed gu des ce, be obtemed by ention reevosi sad.cenag vae mears and s o,et et e e..on.

.ooa or..pe eas e N o...e. comments on

• *.s g u.d e is ei e.e d ma n.% ebout ' w ri m onth s et e is ssuaa< e ma' be per d.w.s or e dessed to the U S Nweios. Regu ator, Comm.ssion W eeh.ag oa OC r

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M such leds sh. aid occur. f arly detection of poelleakage sutably contrelled during refuehng operations. The and 1 0 dam y tould be pnmded by px ' water Ine!

des:gn of the sentdatwn and idtrauen system should be morators and radunen momtors dmaned to alarm both bned on the assumptwn that the claddmg of all of the loefly and m a contmuously manned 1

. I nnely fuel rods in one f uel bundle might be breacheJ. The assured mventery of radia ctne matenals avadable for leakage oneration of budding fdtratten sy sten s by actuatmg these sy stems by a sq..a n om local from the buddmg sheuld be based on the assumpnons radiaticn memtors given in Regulatory Guide 1.1 'Assumpnons Used for hvaluatmg the Potential Radmlogical Consequentes of a Wehanical Damagc to Fuel Fuel Hand:mg Acadent m the Fuel Handlmg and Sterage Iaahty for lleihng and Pressurized Water fi. rdcase el radmactae matenal trem tuel may a&rs"(Safety Gmde $

Jurm; the refuelmg process. and at other times. as

5. The spent fuel storap fauhh should hne at least m<

a result of tuckladdmg ladures er mechanaal damag.

one of the follow mg prouuom with respect to the cauwd by 9 droppmg of fuel eiements er the droppmg hand mg of heavy loads, mcluJmg the ref uehng cask of ob'm ts onto fuel elements.

a. Cranes capaHe of cany n. heavy leads sheuld N iuesented. picit ubly hv d; en rather than by

.id m e s, ' eu <cd by a-s mL m mo a a i

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n.terl.s ks. fra o mm mg into th-,n nity of the pool; or gtenna, cause of meo, anm al t m g m t ri Dev '

i the f uel stour tacdny

'o pmat uh ussdes hon

b. Cranes sh mid be des a cd to pmvide strale-centx tmg the fuel w oulj ehmum t t!n ion tadure-proof har:Jhaf of heny 1.uds, so that a single Mme w d not re W t in hm d capaNay of the A relanvety <mau anaum of methanhal Jamap to the fuel nught sause sigmficant of fute J ses if no dme tune handhng o.ste ; t o pa t :. > its utety funchom or reduenon f eatures are pr ouded. Use of a t ontro!!ed leakage budding surroand.ny t'- tuel sto age p ot. with T he t uel pd A ' 'd be d s gned to withstand, assoaa.2d carabihts to lim:t re!ca:es of ra hontne "nhout leaige that au!d mcmer the fuel, the impact "t the heasiest load to be canted by the crane from the matenal resuiting tn m a ref uehnc acs.ident a; pears feasible and would da mu.h to chrndate this uncern.

nuximum Wht to w huh it tan be htted. If this I

a p. aach is used. design prousmns should be made to C. REGULATOR Y POSITION prevent the crane, when carrymg heavy loads, from monng in the uanny of stored fuel 1.The spent feel stoup la St, nucluim its structures and equtpment except as noted m paraguph 6

6. D: ams. permanent ly,. o n n e c t e d mechanical or beluw) should be designed to Categ r i.sennue require-hydrau' c sy sterns and other features that by malopeta-u me nts.

tion m f adure cou'd cause loss of coolant that wou!c un u,cr fuel should not be mstalled or mduded m the

2. The facday shuuld be de' ed (al te keep tor.

design. Systems for m.un t a u ma w ater quality and nadic wmds and missues generated by these wmds from quantuy should be designed so that any nuloperation or causmg sigmficant loss of watertyht mtegnty of the fuel failure of such systems (mcluding fadures resulting from storap rool and t b) to keep m < des. neuted by the Safe Shutdown Earthquake) will not cause fuel to bel l tomade wmds from centacta e fuel wnhm the poh urnovered. Then systems need not otherwise meet Categery I ser me.. :qauements.

3. Interlocks should be provided to present cranes frem passmg over stored fuel (or near stored fuel in a

7. Rehable and frequently tested monitoring equip-manner such that if a crane faded, the load could up ment should be provided to alarm both locauy and m a continuously manned locanon if the water level in the over un stored fuel) when fue! handhrg is not m progress. Dunng tuel handhng operations. the mterlocks fuel storage pool falls below a predetermmed level or if may be bypassed and adnumsuanve control used to lugh local-radation Inels are expenenced. The high-prevent the crane from carrym3 loads that are not r.idaton lesel mstrumentation should also actuate the necessary for fuel handimg over the stored fuel or other fihunon system pmhibited areas. Tbc fas dit y should be designed to nummi/e the need for bypassme such mterlouks.

8. A seismic Category I makeup system should be provided to add coolant to the poel Appiopnate

4. A controtted icakap buddmg should enclose the redundancy or a backup sy stem f or filling the pool from fuel pool. The buddmy <hould be eqmpred with an a rehable source. such as a lake, nyer, or onsite seismic appropriate ventdation and iunanun system to hmit the Category I w ater-stooge facdity, should be provided. If po:ential release of udnastne ioJme anJ other uN a backup system is used. it netd not be a permanently acuve matenals. The buddmg m ed not be des:gntd to instJ!ed system. The capaaty of the makeup systems withstand extremely hyh wmds. but leak : should be should be sumh that water can be supplied at a rate 125 0%

im

.A determined by consideration of the leakage rate that D. IMPLEMENTATION

• v would be expected as the result of damage to the fual storage pool from the dropping of loads, from earth-Any of the alternatives in Regulatory Position C.5 of 6

quakes, or from missiles origmating in high winds.'

Revision I may be applied at the option of applicants for construction permits and operating licenses for all

• The :taff is considerms the development of add 2tional guidana plants,regardless of the date of application.

conceming protection against missdes that might be generated by plant fadures such as tuzbme failures. For the present, the protection of the fuel pool against such missdes will be evaluated on a ease-by-case basis.

L 125 047 1.13 3

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uwen o srAtas NUCLEAR R E O U LA TO R Y COMMISSION Posvasa ano pass raso

' W ASHINGTON. D. C. 20558 M'

U R MUCLE AR MSGULATOMY c om u,,,3 on O& P ICI AL SUSINESS u ttsAJL PEN ALTY POR Mlv ATE U$f.,$300 L

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