ML19221A235
| ML19221A235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1979 |
| From: | Brunner E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Beckman D, Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19221A228 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905210042 | |
| Download: ML19221A235 (7) | |
Text
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p hrn 1 1 J13 MEMCPJf; CUM FOR:
E. Greenman, Resident Inspector, PB 2/3
- 0. Beckman, Reactor Inspector, BV1 FRCM:
E. J. Scunner, Chief, 'iO5NS Branch, Regicn I
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLAll FOR OPERATING REACTORS IN PENN5YLVANIA The attached inspection plan, IP-1, " Inspection Requirements to
% view Licensee Actions Taken in Response to the Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island", is to be implemented imediately at all operating reactors in Pennsylvania (PB2, PS3 and BV1).
This plan was prepared by the Peactor Operations and Nuclear Support 3 ranch, NRC: Region I.
J. Grunner, Chief P acter Operations and Nuclear rSupport 3 ranch CC:
All Region I Resident Inspectors Regional Directors D. Beckman D. Haverkamp (For Information) 7905210047-141 118 3
IP-1 4/10//9 page 1 of 5 INSPECTION REQUIRE."ENIS TO REVIEW LICENSEE ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPCNSE TO THE NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND i
I.
Objective The cbjectives of this Inspection Plan are to review the actions taken by licensees of operating reactors in Pennsylvania in response to the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island (TMI); to verify ccm-pliance with facility Tochnical Seccificatione; and to vocify that factors centributing to the incident at TMI do not exist at other operating Pennsylvania reactors.
r II.
Eackground In cr ation IE Bulletin 79-OSA, " Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island" was issued on April 5,1979, to specify actions to be taken by C&W licensees as a result of the TMI incident.
TI 2595/2 war issued on April 6,1979, to specify IE inspection requiremants at B;W facilities to review licensee actions in response to IEB 79-05A.
The overall purpose of the Bulletin was to require S&W operating reactor licensees to conduct reviews of their facility (ies) and operations in light of the information describing the TMI incident.
The Sulletin and TI require formally structured reviews of system and component design, corresponding operational procedures and cperating events experienced to date which relate to those systems and pro-cedures involved in the TMI incident.
These reviews should culminate in a confirmation of the adecuacy of systems and procedures in each item addressed by the Bulletin.
This Inspecticn Plan extends the review require:nents identified in the Bulletin (to the extent practicable) to other operating power plants in Pennsylvania.
As such, the inspection requirements of TI 2595/2 have been appro-priately modified and incorporated in this Inscection Plan.
IE inspectors shculd reference IE Bulletins 79-05, 79-CSA and TI 2595/2 for further background information and guidance.
III.
Inscection Recuirements IE Inspectors will complete the following inspection requirecents at the designated facilities.
141 119
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IP-1 V 10/ 79 pige 2 of 5 A.
Cnsite Review of Goerator Trainino Verify the follcwing by review of training records and/or by discussions with at least two licensed operators en each shift.
(See Paragraph V and Enclosure 1 for additional infoma-tion) i 1.
That operators are aware of specific details of the THI-2 incident to the extent of available information and have received briefings on any procedural changes initiated as a result of licensse reviews of the TMI-2 event.
2.
TMt all operators have been instructed on the specific
- easures which provide assurance that engineered safety features would be available if required, in particular, measures for returning such systems to operable sta tus following maintenance cnd tccting.
3.
That all operators have been instructed on the specific and detailed c.easures to assure that automatic actuations of engineered safety features are not cverridden.
[The verification of the existence of procedures to assure operability of the SIS was required by TI 2515/14 and is reiterated - PWR Only].
4.
That all operators have re.iewed plant automatic actions initiated by reset of engineered safety features, that could affect the control of radioactive liquids and gases.
5.
That all plant operators and supervisory cersonnel have been instructed in the provisicns and directives for early NRC notification of serious events.
B.
Cnsite Inscection of Enaineered Safety Feitures 1.
Review valve / breaker / switch alignment procedures for all ESF systems against current P&ID's and single-line diagrams to verify adequacy of alignment procedures.
2.
Using licensee procedures, verify valve / breaker / switch alicnments(Eoth redundant ESF trains are to be inspected for all accessible comnenents in all FSF systems.
and verified as soon as possible but not later than April 13, 1979.)
k4
IP-1 4/10//9 p we 3 of 5 3.
Review the :urrent approved surveillance tests for systems selected under item B.2 above to verify that nhen it is cmpleted it will have returned the system to an CPFPABLE candition.
This action is to cover any changes to the procedure since the last surveillance test.
J 4.
Review the last surveillance test on each ESF system and I
verify that acceptance criteria bere net.
5.
Review for adequacy the administrative controls imposed by the licensee to assure proper " return to service" of ESF ccmponents following test and maintenance activities.
Also, review for adequacy the adminis;rative controls that assure ESF systems are returned to an operable s ta tus et the conclusion or an extended outage.
(Admin-is trative controls should, as a minimum, assure:
continuing compliance with the Technical Specifications when equipeent is taken out of service for any reason; and, a rechanism exists for plant operators to track the status, on a shif t basis, of equipment removed from service).
6.
De te rmine if the licensee utilizes " independent verifica-tion" of valve / breaker / switch alignments when perferning those alignments folicwing extended outages and aftee naintenance/ test activities.
(f:ot a requirement, gather in fo rma ticn) 7.
Verify that valves in the auxiliary feedwater system (or the system which provides the alterna te cooldcwn capability, for example, feedwa ter, RHR Service Water, condensate.
RCIC systens) identified by the liccnsee as requiring locking or similar positive position control are actually locked or controlled.
Verify that any additional ranual valves or manually cperated matcr-driven valves which could defeat or compecaise the ficw of auxiliary cooling water are subjected to positive position control.
8.
Verify that plant procedures assure adequate instru-cent / service air supply to engineered sa fety features equipment.
Verify by procedural or independent review that moisture free air system operation is assured; that procedures to switch to alternate (backup) air systems are available; and that plant operators are aware of the impnefanco nf.iir syctome fo r propar.quipcant croration 141 121 i
s
IP-1 a./10/70 page 4 of 5 9.
Verify procedures exist which assure that two independent steam generator auxiliary feedwatcr,ficw paths, each with 100% finw ra,narity, are n,nerable at any time when heat removal frcm the pri.r.ary system is through the stcam generators.
When two ind= pendent 100% capacity ficw 1
paths are not available, the capacity shall be restored j
within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant shall be placed in a cooling mode which does not depend upon the steam genera tors for cooling within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
When at least one 100%
capacity ficw path is not available, the reactor sSall be made subcritical within one hour and the facility placed in a shutdown cooling node which does not rely on the steam generators for cooling within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
(PWRs only) 10.
Verify by review of cperating rodes and procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive cases and liquids out of primary containment, that undesired pumping of radioactive liquids and gases will not occur inadvertently.
Ensure that such an occurrence would not be caused by the resetting of engineered safety featuras instrumentation.
C.
Onsite Assessment of Operating prqcedu_r_es_
l.
Cetermine if the licensee requires partial actuation
("one train") of S.I. to assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine operation 11 events which induce pressurizer level transients.
(Not a requirement, gather information ) - PWR only.
2.
Determine the operating conditiens and/or precautions when operators are instr uctud to secure reactor coolant pumps (or recirculation pumps) to assure item 4c, " Actions to be taken by licensee", in Bulletin 79-05A are met.
3.
Verify by discussions with reactor operators (a sample of not less than 4) that they are a,;are of the criteria for operation of reactor coolant pumps - PWR Only.
4.
Ascertain whether the licensee has procedures for feeding dry steam generators and determine if operators are krowledgeable in these requirements.
(Not a requircrant, gather informa tion) - PWR Only.
141 122 4
IP-1 4/10/19
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Page 5 of 5 5.
Ascertain whether tagging practices on contrcl panels provide potential for obscuring sta tus indicators, such as, valve or switch position, neter indicators and alarms.
D.
Completion of Inscection Recuirerents I
It is recognized that full cccpletion of the above inspection requirements is depcodent upon applicability to the facility under inspection, the operational mode of the facility during the period of the inspection and ccnsideration of personnel exposures.
The inspector should. exercise his cwn judgement regarding applicability and completica of each line requirement.
Every ef fort should be made to ccmplete these inspection requirements to the extent practicable.
For facilities presently in cold shutdown, the inspector's reviews should assure compli-ance with Tech Specs governing the existing plant conditions; and that adminis trative controls are adequa te to es sure compli-ance when the facility subsequently comes out of cold shutdown.
IV.
Recortinc Recui_renen_ts The results of inspection at F8 2 and 3 required by Section III above shall be included in a nonral inspection report and the pre _limi_ nary fir. dings shall be transmi tted tv Region I by CCS cn 4/13/79.
RV 1 is prosen tly in cold shutdown por the Commi c cion' c Shcw cauce Order of 3/13/79.
The inspection requirements of this Inspection Plan will be ccmpleted for SV 1 prior
'3 startuo from cold shutdown.
V.
Insoector Discussion With Licensed Operators The inspector should hold shif t crew discussions in accordance with to this Inspection Plan.
VI.
Regional Contact Questions regarding this IP should be addressed to D. Caphten (435-1765).
Manbours expondad on thic effort cheuld be recorded against MC 92704.
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ENCL 05URE 1 GUICANCE FCR CO.';CUCTING CPEPAiOR DISCUSSIONS In order to assure that the training provided by the licensee to all licensed operating personnel is meaningful, direct discussions with individual operato/s are being conducted.
j l
The following guidance will prcvide a basis for conducting these discussions in a minner that provides uniform assurance from shif t to shif t and site to site that the required topics listed in IE Sulletin 79-C5 anc 79-05A are beng adequately covered,
It is essential that the inspector is kncwledgeable about the details surrounding the event at TMI-2 IE Sulletins, FNs and tis provide the best scurce of information and will be supple. Tented and provided to the site inspectors as they are available.
During the initial discussions with licensed operators, ensure that as a minimu 1 the following specific topics are covered.
The depth of coverage shall be ccaparable to that provided to the Regional Of fices and site inspectors on April 6,1979, by NRR and I?,E.
1.
Six specific contributing factors as described en Page 1 and 2 of IE Sulletin 79-05A.
2.
Prelininary Chronology as provided by Enclosure I to IE Eulletin 79-05A.
3.
Seriousness and consecuences of the simultaneous hinciting of both aux 1!1ary feedwa ter trains.
S.
Need for prcmpt reporting of sericut events to NRC.
5.
Necessity to avoid premature resetting of ESF systems including core cooling systems, and containment isolation system.
6.
'eed to avoid premature tripping of Peactcr Coolant Pumps during tran sien t: requiring forced core ficw.
The inspector shall mintain a list of all licensed operators who have attended this briefing including the date and time.
The objective is
% ci i nc,.wo uger a tur3 ano iaay ce callea upon to perfcrm the duties of a licensed operator shall have received this briefing as saco as possible.
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