ML19221A032
| ML19221A032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1976 |
| From: | Israel S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Deyoung R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905160509 | |
| Download: ML19221A032 (3) | |
Text
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Locket No. 50-320 yay i g 1975 Docket Filed NRR Reading
" r RS3 Reading Richard C. DeYoung, Jr., Assistant Director for L'A's, DFM THRU: Thomas M. Novak, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, DSS TEREE MILZ ISLAND UNIT 2 QUESTIONS REIATIVE TO OU~ STANDING ISSUES Plant Name: Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Docket No.:
50-320 Milestone No.:
24-21 Licensing Stage: OL Responsibla Branch & Project Leader:
L'a-2, H. Silver Technical Retiew Branch Involved: Recctor Systems 3rsach Description of Review: Review of FSAR Amend =ent 40 (4-20-76)
Requested Completion Date: Nove=ber 19, 1975 Review Status: Awaiting Infor=ation A May 13, 1976 meeting was held with TMI-2 representatives to identify Reactor Systems Branch open issues relative to the SER.
In some cases he was not aware his recent responses were inadequate.
In others, he desired forul notification to back up previous verbal discussions.
The attached comments provide the for=al notification required.
Onginal signed by:
Sanford Isrsel, Section Leader Reactor Sys:e6s Branch Division of Systems Safety Znclosure:
Comments cc:
S. h,muer R. Hein man D. Boss H. Silver K. Kniel T. Novak ng.
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S. Israel J. Watt
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x 21.52 Figure 6.3-1 indicates a single pressure relief and a single (6.3) vacuum breaking valve installed on the borated water supply tank.
Failure of the vacuum break valve would fail the Emergency Care Cooling System following a loss of coolant accident.
The staff reco== ends that these valves be replaced with a si=ple vent line containing no valves. Failure = odes apply equally to the Sodium Hydroxide Storage Tank.
21.53 Preoperational Tests. The applicant has taken exceptien to (14.0) performing two of the preoperational tests. They are required to provide alternative programs to cdequately de=onstrate syste=
coerability. The applicant has not satisfied these require =ents.
With regard to recirculation tests, the applicant is atte=pting to de=onstrate operability in two steps. The first step weuld be a scaled su=p codel test to de=enstrate vortex control. The r*'ff has agreed to consider a proposal for a scaled test when
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sub=ite d.
The second step is a de=onstration of adequate pump NPSH. The applicant has atte=pted to show that through a conservative piping design no test was necessary, but the staff does not concur in this conclusion. The applicant must deconstrate adequate NPSH under all possible operating modes.
Relative to the core flooding tank test, the applicant has sub=itted experimental and analytical information fro: Oconee tests.
The sub=ittal does not provide a coherent technical basis for not performing preoperational tests on
'a core flooding tanks and associated piping at Three Mile Island Unit 2.
The applicant is required to demonstrate that the "as built" piping and co=ponents will perfor= as designed. This =ay be done by a valid test or ti.e staff has agreed to consider an argument based on inspection of the "as built" system and co=parison with the design drawings and component require =ents.
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%h 21.54 Manual Actions. The a=end=ent 39 response to questien 22.5 outlines sequences for operator actions in response to various loss of coolant ac :ident situatiens.
Provide a sequence of events including all operator determinations and actions for each of the following postulated breaks:
a)' 8.55 ft',DEC2 b) 14.44 ft' DEHL c) 3 ft2 CL d)
.5 ft2 CL e) 44 ft2 Core flooding line Provide the bases for operator action (instrument reading, alara, written instructions, etc).
List the time for operator response, actions, delay time, number of attempts, etc.
Identify competing non-ECCS actions and ti=e related thereto required of the operator. Take the sequence from the break through the transi tion into recirculation code.
Perform each assuming:
a) offsite power available b) Loss of offsite power c) Loss of offsite power and cne diesel Provide a chrcaology of BWST level and the flewrate and NPSH available for all injection and spray pumps.
Identify when information acquisition or actions vould require the operator to leave his nor=al station.
Identify time away from station.
In preparing the above response, the applicant should be aware of the following criteria. Limited operator actions to opti=1:e systems following a LOCA may be per=itted provided they cannot jecpardire attaining long term cooling. Specific and precise actions required to avoid failure of the ECCS are not acceptable. The systems should be so designed as to not require them.
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