ML19220D046
| ML19220D046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1979 |
| From: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905160259 | |
| Download: ML19220D046 (12) | |
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I AUTHORED BY COMM. J. AHEARNE J'J t. --
April 5,1979 i:RC ACCIDEtiT REVIEW l
The Three Mile Island reactor is being brought undar control, the.
President is about to announce a review, and Congressional inquiries are starting.
The fRC IaE end flRR reviews heve begun.
It is time (almost past time) for the MRC to announce:
(1) it is going to have a detailed review (2) how the review uill be structured (at least an outline)
(3) the basic procedures for the review I have talked with fiASA, the l'avy, the FAA, and Steve Hanauer. The attachments cover some major points.
Based on his experience with Browns Ferry, Steve Hanauer recommends these functions be performed:
(1) A technical review of what happened.
(2)
Determine what changes should be made.
(3) A formal inquiry to determine what, if any, blama should be assigned.
I see three pitfalls to avoid:
(1) We could easily overstructure such a revieu.
(2) Me must try to combine getting at the problems with assuring public confidence.
(Although with the Presi-dential Commission and Congressional inquiries, perhaps the public confidence aspect will be assured.)
(3) Me must give the effort high priority - so that our people are full-time and do not also have to keep programs running while serving.
(Hanauerbelievesnot doing that overly extended the Browns Ferry review.)
The advisory committee act may lead to some potential problems, particularly in the pace of the proceedings. There are other problems with regard to holding on-the-record hearir :s, tape recorded interviews, and note and review interviews. There are questions with respect to 7005160959 119 27,oo
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i what, if any, waivers of liability (immunitie:) ought to be sought or
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given.
There are questions with respect to how much and what kind of public in'.'c!vement. And there are questions as to who should lead 3
various levels of review.
Some names that have been suggested: Alan i
Rosenthal, George Low, Rocco Petrone, Hal Lewis.
There are questions as i
to what senior f4RC officials ought to be included (Cornell, !4f nogue,
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Denton, Commissioner (s)).
And finally, there is a major question regarding the. relationship to the President's review.
We need to decide among three approaches. As strawmen, the fol-lowing are pc sibilities:
A.
Three separate reviews:
1.
A fact finding group - headed by an individual with a group of primarily technical people.
Responsible for. developing a detailed analysis of what happened, both in the accident and following.
2.
A group to provide conclusions and recommendations as to what changes should be cade.
3.
An inqairy board to assess blame.
B.
A single board, similar to a special Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, which would develop the record, and analysis of what happened, assess blame, and make recommendations. All would be on the record, possibly a mixed APA approach.
C.
A single task force chaired by a technical individual, with sub-stantial tiRC technical representation, that would analyze what happened and make recommendations as to needed changes.
I believe we should choose:
(1) What approach.
(2)
If'possible, the type of individual who, rill head (maybe several).
(3) Uhat to say in a press releas9.
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Attachments 1.
Options 2.
Summary of NASA Apollo investigations, 3
NTSB, FAA.
(to coma)
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I&E and NRR current investigation of TMI
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Legal powers A
5.
Hanauer reflections on Browns Ferry (to come) 1 6.
[d Bradford diagram (already distributed) 7.
My previous memo, Apr 3,1979 (already distributed) n O
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l April 5,1979 i
ti STRUCTURE 9
4 OPTIONS n
s 1.
Solely internal to t!RC:
=ij (a)
Follow manual chapter. This was Brcuns Terry organization.
j Note the chairman is to be the E00's Technical Advisor, a f.
vacant position.
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(b) NRR and I&E reviews, pulled together by some third group j
(OPE, PMA, ad hoc group).
(c) A new structure, headed by Minogue or a Commissioner.
All of these approaches have advantage of retaining complete control over the review, prcbably making it. ore efficient. They all have three weaknesses:
(1) Are too low an effort for seriousness of eveat (although (c) might nct).
(2) Uculd lack public acceptance.
(3) May miss scme hard questions vhich outside involvement could raise.
2.
Mixed with both NRC and outside:
Two Options:
(a) A licensing board structure - with the panel composed of senior flRC officials and outside officials.
For example, panel could be chaired by Rosenthal, with Minogue, an ACRS member, Cornell, and perhaps a Commissioner from t!RC and several others from outside (perhaps from Presidential Com:nission).
(b) An administrative board.
This would be similar to the IIASA accident approach.
(In each of the two Apollo inves-tigations, a seven member board used an informal inquiry 119 231
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approach.) This could have someone from the outside as chairman - for axample, like George Lou (although he is not t
available except as a last resort).
The remainder of the
,j board could consist of a mixture of fiRC and outside people, aj Aporoach 00tions t
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Adjudicatory Board. Subpoena powers. Uitnesses would be advised to have counsel. Testimony would be sworn, on the record. Cross-examination would be allowed. Hearings would be open to the public.
t possible problems:
Tendency of technical members to ask leading questions.
1 Reluctance of witnesses to volunteer informaticn (the chilling effect of a court proceeding).
Slowness of review if only search for evidence is in hearing process.
Inability of non-technical panei to get at difficult, technical issues.
Advantages:
High public acceptance, because of formality and openness of procedures.
Establish defensible record if later wish to take action on basis of fiadings.
Provides legal protection to witnesses.
Cross-examination process may get at information which otherwise would not rise to surface.
2.
Task Force Grouo. Witnesses would be interviewed, perhaps by attorneys,withnotes07'tapesmade.
Summary of witnesses statements would be checked by witness for accuracy before submission. Board might split into subpanels to focus on separate issues.
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Possible Problems 1
t!ay focus too narrowly on technical issues, i
f Could be seen as predomir.ately t'RC-controlled review, not I
open to public concerns.
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May compromise possible actions.-
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!!ay not get adequate probing of occurrence.
i Advantages More efficient mechanisms to examine technical issues.
i Less formal approach may enable more rigt amination.
Easier to incorporate technical people from fiRC involved as part of review.
Similar to i'ASA reviews, which have shown ability to handle major accident reviews (although the Admiral disagrees).
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April 5, 1979 i
FACT FINDING PANEL I
j Chairman: Outside, tectnical individual such as Patrone or Lewis.
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Vice Chairman:
Lawyer i
Panel of: -
NRC technical people i
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i Public interest.
Not under advisory act.
Focused on what happened.
Prior to accident NRC review and inspection B&W design During accident Will use I&E and NRR reviews Report to everyone.
ADVISORY PANEL Under advisory act Uses Fact Finding Panel as input, but can go beyond Primarily outside people Probably include chairman and Vice Chairman of Fact Finding Panel, bat not as chairman.
R: port to everyone Inquiry board does not come under either.
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April 5,1979 Investigations Into the Cause of Civil Air Accidents flTSB v. FAA The itational Transportation Safety Board (flTS3) has the responsibility for determining the probable cause of civil aviation accidents.* The flTSB determination of probable cause involves first fact finding, and I
I then analysis.
Fact Finding Under the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, the Board may request the FAA to do the field investigations, although it remains responsible for the final determination of cause. There are approximately 4500 accidents per year. Many of the minor accidents are done by an FAA investigator alone.
For more important accidents, one or r.vo IITS.3 regional investigators become involved in the investigation. Major accidents have their own special orocedures which are discussed below.
Field Investigations for Major Accidents The tiTSB has "go teams" on standby to deal with major accido..u The "go team" is composed of about a dozen people including a Eoard member, a number of specialists who are experts in areas of concern, and a representative of the public affairs office. The flTSB designates additional people to participate in the investigation.
These include representatives of the FAA, people from the airlines, the manufacturer, the controllers union, etc. who have knowledge or expertise which would be helpful.
This is independent of and distinct from licensing / regulatory type responsibility, which remains with the FAA.
For each accident the FAA determines whether certification of the airplane or pilot was at fault aad whether there was a violation of FAA regulations.
The Administrator of the FAA then decides whether enforcement type action is necessary.
When a certificate is modified, suspended or revoked, the Administrator's decision may be appealed to the f1TSB.
The appeal is heard first by an ALJ and then by the Board itself.
This procedure is entirely distinct from the procedures for determining probable cause.
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2 The participants are organized into specialty teams.
An NTSB staff member heads each team.
The Board member functions as the on-site spokesman for the hfSB.
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The field investigation may involve four or five dozen people and last a f
I week to two weeks for a big accident.
There are nightly report meetings I
of the teams to discuss developments.
Their meetings are not open to the public, although there is a daily briefing which includes discussion of the progress in fact-gathering (specifically avoiding analysis or speculation on cause).
Each specialty team prepares a factual report (called a Group Chairman's Factual Report) after it has completed its investigation.
This report is a ccmpilation of everyone's views.
Fact-finding Hearings To complete the fact-finding portion of the investigation, the Board may decide to hold a hearing. This is purely discretional.
There used to be written standard; for this determination (catastrophic accident, recurring nature, etc).
However, now a decision is based more upon the totality of the circumstances.
There is a public hearing in most of the "go team" cases.
This hearing is not an adjudicatory / adversary / Administrative procedure Act "on the record" type hearing.
The objective is to gather all facts and assure a complete review of the accident.
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An inquiry board is assigned to run the proceeding.
This board includes a member of the f!TS Coard (who presides), a representative of the legal office, the head or depty of the accident investigation bureau, and a hearing officer.
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The chairman of the board of inquiry designates parties to the proceeding.
l The parties are chrsen because they have knowledge or expertise which would contribute to a complete record.
Usually parties in the investigation are included as parties in the proceeding.
There is no general public f
right to participate.
The flTSB has specifically refused to allow potential plaintiffs and insue.nce companies to participate.*
It is unclear to what extent "public interest" groups are allowed to participate.
ACAP has been allcwed to participate in two or three proceedings.
I do not know if other groups have asked to participate and been turned down.
For each proceeding a technical panel composed of f;TSB staff members is appointed.
This panel functions essentially like a party to the proceeding.
It includes members with relevant expertise and a member who is responsible for leading each witness through his or her story.
Prior to the hearing each party is provided a list of exhibits, witnesses and areas of inquiry and is given an opportunity to coment on it.
The inquiry board then holds a prehearing conference at which it establishes a list of witnesses, the areas they will be called upon to address, aad the exhibits to which they will be referred.
The inquiry board cay subpoena witnesses,and testimony is taken under oath in a public proceeding.
In at least one case a pla..ciff took the f TSS to court in an attempt to force it to allow the plaintiff to participate.
The caurt ruled in favor of the flTSB.
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4 Usually the proceeding starts with the chief investigator summarising his or her findings.
The technical panel usually begins the questioning, followed by the parties, the inquiry board, and any follow-up questions.
This is not formal cross-examination; the proceeding is not adversary; and it is not governed by the rules of evidence, although the presiding
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officer has the autharity to exclude evidence whi '. is not certinent or is merely cumulative.
Af ter the record is complete, the parties may submit proposed fir. dings, analyses or conclusions based on the testimony and exhibits.
The parties do not comment on each other's proposed findings.
Analysis and Report on Probable Cause for the Accident Af ter all the facts are gathered, the analytical stage begins.
The NTSB staff is responsible for putting everything together and preparing a draft finding of probable cause.
This draft is concurred in by the legal office and the investigative and technical bureats, then forwarded to the NTS Board for consideration at an open " sunshine" meeting.
The Board may request modification or further andl.vsis.
When the Board approves, a final report is issued which sets forth the NTSB conclusions concerning the probable cause of the accident.
(The Incependent Safety Board Act specifically instructs that the findingc of this report may not be used in civil liability cases.
It is also not used in the formal certifi-cation appeals mentioned in the footnote on page one.)
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Reconmenda tions In z.ddition, the Board may decide to make recommendations for corrective action on the basis of knowledge gained from the accident.
These recommenda-tiens are non-binding and can be made at any time (including before the investigation is complete).
Reapening Investications Accident investigations are >ver officially closed.
The Board will always entertain a petition for reconsideration.
Although the regulations refer to "new ano pertinent" evidence, apparently this standard is interpreted very loosely, and the threshold for reopening is not very stringent.
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UNITED STATES h
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t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlss10N I @+k 3 wAswracron. o. c. 2:sss April 4,1979 f
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Commissioner Ahearne FROM:
Kenneke
SUBJECT:
INVESTIGATIONS OF TMI ACCIDENT At your request, Bernie Snyder has checked on the scope, procedures, and current status of the NRR and IE investigations of the TMI accident.
NRR Investigation NRR has organized a task force to look into the response of B&W reactors to transients in the feed water system.
This is primarily directed to the generic question for all of the B&W reactors currently licensed to operate.
For your convenience these reactors are listed below along with the architect engineering firm, net power, and date of first commercial operation:
A/E Net Mbe Startuo TMI 1 Gilbert 792 9/74 TMI 2 Burns and Roe 880 12/78 Rancho Seco Bechtel 906 9/77 Davis 0 Besse 1 ?__.Duh power /Bechtel 871 7/73 Oconee 1 Duke Power /Bechtel 871 9/74 Oconee 2 Duke Power /Bechtel 871 12/74 Oconee 3 Bechtel 913 4/75 ANO 1 Bechtel 836 12/74 Basically this task force is reviewing the B&W design and transient analyses.
Some conversations are being held with B&W engineering staff, and these are exchanges are presumably recorded only by personal notes. A report will be prepared by NRR.
IE Investigation A limited investigation of the TMI accident is already underway by IE.
A team of about 6 has been formed of both Headquarters and Regional IE people, with Region II providing the leader.
Some interviews have already been conducted with licensee operating personnel. These CONTACT:
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Bernie Snyder (OPE)
DUPLICATE DOCUMENT 634-3276 Entire document previously entered into system under:
j ANO bb No. of pages: Q
~ +- 1; [ p arco 4, p UNITED STATES k 1 NUCLEAR..EGU LATORY COMMISSION j.plDi, y WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 l
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a %; *'- Qp 4 April 4, 1979 j Memorandum for: Commissioner Ahearne Carlton Stoiber From: Assistant General Counsel
Subject:
Legal Aspects of NRC Inquiry into the Three Mile Island Incident This morning Len Bickwit relayed your request that we take a quick look at some of the legal issues which are presented by the Commission's effort to structure an internal investigation into the Three Mile Island incident and related matters. The following is a preliminary look at some of the key questions. Complete analysis has not, of course, been possible in the short time available. This paper merely notes the major issues and suggests some possible approaches. A. Legal Authority to Establish an Internal Review The Commission possesses ample authority under Section 161 (c) to establish a suitable mechanism for examining the issues arising from Three Mile Island. The statute provides that: (I)n the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to--(c) make such studies. and investigations, obtain such information, and hold such meetings or hearings as the Commission may deem necessary or' proper to assist it in exercising any authority provided in this Act The' authority which the Commission would be exercising in this situation is found in numerous sections of the Atomic Energy Act, most particularly, Section 103 which provides that the Commission's licensing of utilization or production facilities is conditioned on its continued determination that issuance of the license would not be inimical to the health and safety of the =- DUPLICATE DOCUMENT B. Legal Authority which Review Body Entire document previously entered The general delegati into system L7 er: d d, tion 509 M /6 Act set fort n ANO No. of pages: [ T}}