ML19220D012
| ML19220D012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1979 |
| From: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905160177 | |
| Download: ML19220D012 (4) | |
Text
. ~ Ccd
,6 i 7 AUTHORED BY COMM. J. AHEARf1E yv i,
April 2,1979 Accident Review
' investigations 1.
Two types of reviews (1) What haopened?
(a) -
detailed examination of events
- design weakness in B&W?
procedural errors?
(Operator followed but procedures are wrong) operator error?
(b) Were there items f!RC should have detected but missed? -
detected and did nothing about?
(c) What changes to avoid a similar accident?
codify plants?
close down B&W plants?
close down all plants?
modify procedures?
improve operators?
change or expand flRC review?
(2) How was it handled?
(a) Detailed review of actions by Metropolitan Edisen by flRC by 5 tate by Federal Government, including White House Some overlap - to extent steps taken during, for example, first day aggravated the event, 'what happened' overlaps with 'how was it handl ed. '
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2 (b) Perceptions of events by each group, particularly contrasted with what was happening.
(c) What weaknesses?
NRC-licensee NRC-State NRC-White House White House-State (d) What changes?
include major surgery on NRC NRC authority over licensee in emergency Chairman (ED0?) take over in emergency.
2.
Two levels of review:
(1) Outside NRC:
Seriousness of accident and significance regarding other plants requires the primary review be outside NRC.
This can get as objective a review as possible -
draw on talents of world.
best chance of allowing a single group to examine in depth, and avoid multiple groups that could impede or even prevent developing as clear a picture as possible.
only way can be responsible to the public.
(2)
Possible methods of outside; NRC request.
President request.
Congress request.
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3 Best is for Fresident to set up.
Difficulty of getting Congress to set up an independent review and let operate.
Possibility: President ask fictional Academy of Engineering to set up such a review panel. This approach for "what happened."
President should set up two revi,ews - the NAE to review
'what happened,' the,
to review 'how was it handled.'
(Perhaps ask a set of individuals rather than an organization.)
Any such reviews should be done under one steering group.,
a Blue Ribbon panel, with chairmen to be acceptable to President and to Byrd and O'fleill.
(3) Hendrie should recommend (or request?) the President establish two such reviews, and provide all necessary funding. Each re-view probably should have a representative (probably staff -
but perhaps member) of House and Senate.
The hearir;s should be open unless the board closes with reason. The reports should be presented to both the Congress and the President.
(4)
Inside The flRC should also review the accident.
There are several immediate questions:
Are there immediate actions to be taken on the other B&'J plants?
On all plants?
Are there immediate modifications required in operator qualifications or inspector procedures?
Are there immediate changes that should be made in emergency procedures?
The answers would not be final.
Final actions would be based on the outside reviews. However, unless high confidence existed in formation and timely reporting of the outside groups, the flRC would have to act.
(5) Problems:
(a) How can we avoid obstructing the outside review but still get the informati<>n we need?
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4 (b)
If we do an internal review, will it add an intolerable time burden to the I&E and f1RR stat'fs - who will be stretched by responding to the outside review and handling Ti1I repairs, decommissioning, or caretaking?
(c)
If we rur. inside review, who would bandle it? The level will have two effects:
higher level will enhance problems (a) and (b) but improva the probability of timely answers.
Possibilities: (1) Hanauer - very competent and has had experience of reviewing Bfcwn's Ferry.
However, works for Denton and has been involved in handling the Ti1I problem.
(2) Minogue - has not been involved in Ti!I, but is a senior official.
(The only senior technical official not involved.)
May be some difficulty in reviewing the behavior of two peers.
(3) A Commissior.er -
would have to devote substantial, if not complete, attention to the review.
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