ML19220C728
| ML19220C728 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1979 |
| From: | Thornburgh D PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0087, ACRS-SM-87, NUDOCS 7905140092 | |
| Download: ML19220C728 (9) | |
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l STATEME!;'
OF DICK THCR iBURCI!
GC'/ER:;0R OF PE::::SYL'tA::! A U.S.
SE:A!L SLEG:011TTEE CN :.UCLEAR REC'JLATIO:;
9:30 A.M.
AFRIL 23, 1979 WASI!! :GTC!.,
D.C.
790514009 7__
105 321
STATEMENT BY COVERSOR DICK THOR::BUFCH g
U.S. SENATE SUECCSITTEE C:. ?.TCI. EAR REGUI.ATION "Mr. Chairman and members of the su com=ittee:
b "I want tc thank ye2 for the opportunity to comment on something that 'can't happen here,' but almost did.
"I'm sure you join ce in praying that the events on Three Mile Island are never repeated - not at anytime, nor at any place on this Earth.
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" Sat as the Lord does, indeed, help those who would help themselves, we must do all within cur means to understand this thing called nuclear power, to use and control it if we can.
and to forsake it if we must "I understand that the purpose of these hearings is to answer the question of control This is as it should be, and I will attempt to help in anv way I can.
"Let me begin with som. cbservations on what went wrong dur!"g cur ten davs of tension in Pennsylvania; what went rig t,
and why.
"The gatFering, evaluation and cennunication of facts are indispensable to decision-makers in any situatian -- be uhey Little League coaches or five-star generals
":n the case of Three Mile Island, this task, and 50w it was handled,could easily have meant the difference between life and death.
Th i s is why I must point first to the information prcblem -- perhaps the tcugnest we faced in a very tough situation.
"There are
- hose who assured, when I first mentioned this problem, that I was talking about the po.er cc pany, and about self-appointed ex,erts of various persuasiens -- and they were quite right.
"There are those who assured I was talking about t!.e news media, the SRC, and various officials, both elected and appointed -- and they were partly right.
"The media, t!<e political establishment and the bureaucracy never 'ahave as firely uned instruments, in perfect harmony and centrol -- and certs msc in a crisis of such sagnituce.
"These institutions were sending a kaleidoscope of signals to my office, i
many of tho' helpf ul, many of the: troublescTe, and a 'ev of them quite disturbins.
Althcugh there were exc e r t ict.s. the signals we received from sources.ho e
were closest rc the plant site were f ar mort reifable than those that came from elsewhere "There were indeed, scne erroneuus,,ome alarming and some irrespcnsible reports carried by the media.
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Page 2. Senate Testimony - Til l
l "There were also, on the other hana, many moments wnen res>~ters did 4
- ar joo af putting events into perspective than did the afficials wno wer+ shapins those events.
If some press accounts were an occasional threat to those who mi St pinic, most were a continuing check on those who might deceive.
Their place in this emergency was indispensable.
"In Jealing with other institutiens, I came to appreciate the problems news i
re >rters were facing. The nuclear trade jargon, the clam 2r of competing experts, I
and the garble gap between Harrisburg and Washington all made it gaite easy ta understand how five different stories could come cut of a sin /le press conference, through no fault of the reporters involved.
"My own staff people spent a gr.at deal of their ti e acting as i nve s t i g i t i v-reporters to me, and I felt they did well ut. der the circ matances.
"Throughout th-risis, I felt I was gettirg the be>*
info-matian avail.ol_
from the widest rarge of sources, and I still believe that.
But this was only the beginning of our task.
"The real problem saa sifting fact from fiction, hyperbole from analysis, cant from carder, and guesswork from solid reporting.
"The cocpany issued =tatements in the early days that proved to be scmething less 'han accurate, and its credibility as a reliable scurce of informatia erefed rather quicki affice continued, thrcughcut she crisis, ta monitor what ccmpaly officials were saying, but we legan to look elsewhere to determine what really was bappenin; "I sent our own state experts in radiation and nuclear engineering to the site --
to give is a continuing technical assessment of the danger posed by the crippled reactor.
"I askei Lt. Cav. Scranton -- as my cnief adviser on emergency management operatiens -- to go into the plant,ind bring back what was to become the first authentic layman's report on what it was like in there.
I "I wanted to know if the Met El technicians themselves were in a panic, and I
his description af the workers as calm and cool was reassuring, to say the least.
"We als) receivej advice and Stiefings, during the early davs of.re crisis, from Pennsvivania-hased NFC inspectors, who were wcrkicz t t!.e site.
"It was reporteJ to us on a Thursday nig,: that the dang?r appeared ta te over.
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Page 3.
Lenate Testimony - tNI "I felt,at the time, that I had a fairly accurate picture of the ha :a rd Pennsylvania was facing and the pr(cautions we needed to consider.
I wts hopeful that the crisis was,indeed, passing us by.
"But then case t'e morning of Fridav, March 30.
An 'unplannea' borst of ral10 active steam had 5een released into LLe air, i
"The Thursday report had been overly opt.'.mta.fc.
The crisis escalated d amatically, and so did the clamor of off-site experts and second-guessers f rca around the world.
"Our problems at the site were cc= pounded by lecse talk of a ' massive' evacuation, confasien over how many hydrogen bubbles were in the reactor, and, eventually, that celebrated bulletin on an i=minent ' explosion' -- all of which seemed to originate from sources who had yet to set foot ir Pennsylvania, to say nathing of the plant itself.
"These sources -- toth af ficial and self-appointed -- sim,aly could nor appreciate the co rplexity of what we were f acing up there.
"They may have meant well, but they were a burden.
"As you knew, it has been widely reported that even HaraIJ Den.cn and Dr.
Rczer Mattson suggested evacuation early in the crisis -- althrugh neither af them sa de such a proposal to me ar my staff.
"4 hat has nct been widely reported is that both men were saying the e things before they left the Wasbington area, and that both changed the ir =inds af ter arriving t the plant site.
c :.r. Centon left us last week, he told the presa, and I q. ore:
'I gues
've learned that emergencies can only be ma.a;ed by pent le at the site.
They c n't be managed back in Washington. I would not recommend that we attes;t ta manage accidents in the futu;; from back in Beth2sdc.'
"Although Mr. Denton i< more thin capable of speaking fcr hi self, I bel' eve his terark a> plied not mly to the f act-finding needs of decision-makers, but to the technical operatians at the plant as well.
"I feel that thi' puint was, indeed, one of the most important lessons ta be leacnad frc7 the incident r e c cmi.e n d that it be cons dered in :r.y revistons to be uade la our federa: emergen y respoase procadares.
"This cas shy I mied ?res dent Carter t' send us sorerne o f :-:r. Dentsn's cali,re in tae first p l a-; e. We needed tv ser2a Tarapr ent and techni;TI expertice
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Page 4 Senate Testimony - TMI with en-site experience. The President responded quickly to this requeet, and Mr. Dent:n's arrival represented a turning point in the crisis.
"We acw were better able to offset an avalanche of mis-statements and secend-guessing f rom virtually everyone wha had an cpinion.
We dis this with regular, daily briefings frc= a qualtiied perscn in the i
best pcsiticn to kncw the truth -- Harold Denten.
"For my part, I did centinue to cross-check Mr. Jenton's cbservations against these of my ovn people.
' We became convinced that he was a credible sour:2, and ue depended on him heavily in the final days of danger.
"We also relied cn the cocperation, advice and assistance of the White Hcase.
A three-way 'hetline' telephone was installed to connect te and
-v staff ith the President and his staff, and with Mr *ventan at the plant That was put to gcod and frequent use.
"There is, of course, no Republican er Democratic say ta deal with a crisfr of this type and =agnitude.
My first and only concern was for the health and safety of the perple in the area, and partisan politics had to be put aside as we 9
attempted to meet this = cst basic of all public trusts "I was gratified thet the White Hcuse responded in <ind.
The President's
- erscnal visit to the site -- announced at one cf the hiehest peints ri te1sien in the crisis -- did =uch to cala and reassure our people.
"The President's expressions of concern for our needa, beth during the crisis, and daring the long struggle to cc=e, w-re vesccme words for a Ccmmonwealth that has =uch rebuilding to do.
"I've taken this =uch ti=e to describe the ccmmunicatiens aystem we eventually developed because it had two very importan t functions in this crisis.
"First, it was the key to cur atterst to give the people a source of infar-
-ation in which they could have some conridence.
We regarded the public c. edibility of the Caverner's Office as essential to our efforts to avoid a panic, as well as our efforts to imple ent, if necessarv, an orderly evacuatian.
'Sec ndly, the fa:ts, net supposir: cts er assumptiens, hai to be the basis for every =rve we made in :nis cr sis.
'I had to make deci.icns no other Ccvernor has ever f aced bef ore, de:1:icns which I pray that na one wi.1 over face again.
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Senate Testi=cny - TMI "I'm well aware that each of the choices I made along the way is fair game fer those who now will say we did too mu-5, those who now will say we didn't do encugh, and those who now will say we e rred ir. both direc tions.
"I realize that this
.s inevitable. Frankly, I've initiated my own s:atf review of the entire course of the crisis, to catermine how this kind of an incident i
might be handled in the future.
"While that review is still in progress, I would like to give you an acccunt of some of the more significant actions we took in this matter.
"The mo=ent I learned of the accident. I ordered the acct'7tation of an appraisal we had begun on the emergency preparedness system developed by the previous,frinistration in Pennsylvania.
"It was 1 workable system, but we did find weak, esses -- which we moved as quickly as possible to correct "I also ordered our civil defense and Naticnal Gaard units to assume an alert status, taking care, however, to avoid a show of helmets and sirens which might, in themselves, have caused a panic.
"The March 30 decision to advise people living near the plant to stay indoors was based on a reco mendation from the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatorv Co==issicn.
The decisica to rescind that advisory at t dnight was also based on the chairman's
- :ne n da t ion s.
"My March 30 decision to advise preg ant women and preschool children to leave the area within five riles of the plant wa-prompted by an overnight escalation in the potential dangers the accident posed for them.
"The chairman agreed, at that time, that this would be a ' prudent' step to take as a ' precautionary' move.
"My decision to suggest that schools within that sa=e area be closed for the day was a logistical one.
It recogniced the potential need far a general evaccaticn of the area, as well as the natural desire of families to keep their children together, regardless of age.
"The decision ' call on the best available health authorities -- both public and private -- to supplement the rest of P.y technical and professional advice, was another precautienary move which, in the end, helped us to keep thinas in perspective.
"The toughest decisien sf all however, was the cne that ! had to make 24 hoars a day throughout this crisis.
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Senate Testimeny - IMI "That was, of course, the decision net to order an evacuation that would i
have been unprecedented in its nature -- as well as its patential f or harm.
"I must tell you that the thought of evacuation first occurred to me at 7:30 a.m. the morning of March 8, and that it never lef t my mind for ten entire days.
"I had to weigh the potential risks cf Three Mile Island against the proven hazards of meving people under panic conditions.
'No matter Scw well they are olanned, massive evacuations can kill and injure people -- especially the aged and the infirm, infants in incubators, other hospital patien s, and even the able-codied man -- who like the usner in a burning theater -- happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
"I would not have hesitated to evacuate the entire area had it ev.
appeared to be the safast course.
"I cculd not in good conscience. have ordered such a step with the facts at my disposal.
" Finally, the decisten to tell a very brave and tired group of women and children that they could, at last, go hcme again.
s one to. I wn i treasure for the rest of my life.
"For I believe it ended that period w'.en the worat fear of mcdera man almost came to pass in Central Pennsylvania.
'I have since made other decisiens and f orme d new epiniens, of course, abcut the future of Pennsylvania, the saf ety of nuclear power, the adequacy of regulatien.
and our need for alternative caergy sources.
"I have asked the White House, and it has agreed, to provide our state with all the appropriate assistance to address the problems we face in putting ourselves an the read to recovery.
"As part of the process, I have asked for and received from the Small 3usiness Administration a declaraticn of an economic disaster in the area.
"I have also asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to inspect every reacrcr I
locate! within cur borders in Pennsylvania, and to assure r-if it can, that the
-cident on Three Mile Island shall ret be repeated.
" Chairman Hendrie pe rscnally as sured me that he would :rder these inspections to be conducted and conpleted *.irhcut delay
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Page 7 Senate Testiseny - TM1 "I have f ormed a cabinet leval group, 2nder the chairmanship of Lt. Cav. Scranton, to work closely with a f ederal team which has been sent to help us address the healt enviranmental, psychological and ecencmic impact this incident may have en our Commenwealth for many years to ec e.
"I have directed my staff to assess our need fer an active manitoring program i
of our own -- putting special emphasis on the training of state nuclear regulators l
and inspectors who could act as an independent backup to the feceral teams.
"Obviously, I see a need for better enfurcement of existing regulatory standards.
It appears that standards of eff1_.ency and expertise were too aften igncred or loesely-enf crced on Three Mile Island.
"I urge you to da all within your power to see that this never happens again.
"I urge you ta censider a revision af current standards to require the licensinz af utility cotpany executives, sa that the pre senc e of round-the-clock e:<pe rtise at avery nucleir power plant in the country might best be assured.
"Much criticism has been directed at the utility company, and perhaps rightly sa But that criticism implies something alcut our licensing process as well-
"I submit that no ecmpany should be authorized ta run a nuclear power plaat in this ccuntry unless i*s management staff -- alcng with its operation staff --
is certified as com,. tent to meet the ext rao r dina ry public responsibilitie s involv ed.
"It alsa is my hcpe that, in the future, our states 'ill te given a greater voice in decisi ns affecting the placement and expansien of nuclear power within their borders.
"As a carollary, I believe the states should have the clear authority to inspect the cperation of existing plants at any time, without prict notice.
"A few aights ago, I asked the engineering prafession in our Commonwealth to help us develcp safe and reliable alternative sources of energy for our citizens, with a special emphasis on coal, which we have in abundance in Pennsylvania.
"I now wc,Jer what might have happened, if just a fraction cf the billions we've spent on atcmi-p?wer had gane, instead, into the search ter lean and efficient ways in wnich to use the gif t, of coal and ot5er resources th2: laf beneath,above and around us all
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Page 3 Senate Testimony - TMI "As I've said before. I have doubts abort 'he future of nuclear power in ;ar.ociety, as well as the wid sly-held assumption that we can't r.eet our energy needs in other ways.
"The"'re the kinds of doubts that ycu, as a succommittee, will have to werk very hard to overceme, if you're assuming that nuclear pcwer not cnly is here r
to stay, but to expand, as well, into other communit ie s ac ros s America.
"Let me just say t: you, in closing, that this was a painful time for the recple of Central Pennsylvania.
"It wasn't easy for re to look into the face of a child-te aring voung wccan, who had fled frcm her heme, at my recommendation, to live on a stadium floor during the most anxious months of her life.
'Not all the confort in the world can erase that mecc y fr;m this woman's conscicusness -- nor perhaps even that of her unborn son er daughter.
"It wasn't easy to hear tne plight of a dairy f armer, who saw generations of good and honorable service to his community, start draining away before unthinking signs that read,'We don't sell Pennsylvania milk.'
"Not all the saf ety assurances in the world -- true as they were -- could erase the crisis of confidence thrown upon that man, through no f? ult of his own.
"And it wasn't easy to see a sra'.1 tewn -- struggling to survive the loss of its sons and daughters to the city -- saddenly find that those who still love it f ace a choice of living in Ioubt, or leaving.
"Not all the renewn in the world can erase the awareness of these g:cd people that something cut there is powerful and strange and not entirely under control.
"We must assure ourselves that it can, indeed, ce controlled, or risk losine it as a premising answer to our energy needs.
"There is no other choice.
"Thank you,Mr. Chairman."
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