ML19220C550

Forwards Commissioner Gilinskys mark-up of Chairman Hendries Testimony Before Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation on 790410

ML19220C550
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/08/1979
From:	Hodgdon A NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE)
References
NUDOCS 7905110212
Download: ML19220C550 (14)

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I PRAFT 4-7-79 TESTDiCNY OF CHAIRMAN HENDRIE BEFCRE THE SUBCC.':MITTEi ON NUCLEAR REGULATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC 'JORKS TUESDAY APRIL 10, 1979 1:00 P.M.

M-Chairmen, as you and I discussed in arranging this hearing we are here to present a preliminary account of what we believe happ?ned at Three Mile Island and some initial conclusicns in order to put on record at an early time what we presently know I am veryM.%=J-appreciative cf your understanding, d h W T.> 2 O rt.c T 'PJ' Senator Hart, that wa co g nat ar.d-shau.ld nct divert any appreciable staff

. resources frcm the operations at Three Mi)e Island c-from the support groups 2.,

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,3P3ethesda to.n_**b = 'm e5ftensive record for this hearing.

J, There will, of course, be additional investigations and we look forward to further hearings in wnich a more detailed accounting can be made.

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F i es+,-by vte 95 general cc=e,QDia_nj;,,,,t_c _c; ; -. _., 7 :at persorrat cUncern

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..a r + b a t_ o.f_Jy_co_U eague s-on -the-C-c=i s simr-and-a l memb e r s -o f o u r-s t a f f--t ha t-d thiuccidant_at Three-MHe--Istand-Unit--2 has-happened.--It-is a shocking..and-tctaliyaacceo.t.able_e. vent to-have-happened -in-a-civH i an-e1ectrical power C-: eg. e T7'~'pg prc9c.ce--Qich-QaEe : belie.ved_ presented very-low-risks. M ' J R-ere p903 s

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9 _ :"; S _.J-i--.L,--as-I,am-s ure yott-e'J ' af e:r-.c-ilizans-ar 3,.-that.the-roddet.bn-.axposure-levelLtathe publ.iLin the-area-of-ihree tile Ts'llnd ~hZie'

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beur relat-ively-lov. Our team at the site, our staff here'at headquarters, the utility personnel at Thren ilila Island, and the large nur. lear industry support group that has gathered at the site are all working hard,to make %re 97 017

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_2-that' the expcsure levels do not become-a5'y larger. That effort is being further m

supported by groups'from other Federal agencies at the site, by $ tate and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania, and by many government and industry scientists and engineers all over the country.

But in spite of the

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low exposure levels to the public experienced thus far, it is clear that the

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patential for substantially larger exposurles of the publfc/ existed d'uring the

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V course of this act_ident.

Un rarcat._ha te an-accep t-attle-nuclear pcwer program ^in this country if-tnere-is any_2.cceec-i-eb4e7Ts'gf even-ts.-of-the-Three--Mile Island kind occurring at.

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nuclearMar-p-Ients. J?he tidclear Regulatory Commissior, must immediately

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L carry out a searching review and evaluation of the regulations and standards for these plants, the training md licensing standards for reactor cperators, and the inspection and enforcement activities for operating plants. We must c..

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find cut where our design standards, cur reviews of possible transient and i

accident situations, and cur inspection and enforc,ement of safety-related,- -

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operating requirements.hw&

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khecident ;, Ma My haxeau.t thaseHemenn~cf-the-staf.f thaLag e

imd ateMaroWdif Tri ch mg w nn tne situation at ThreeTITe~I3Tahir'To wc'.i._on-th h esseatt @~tinC'ifaJ'o PefTo'r C 6, ;!. -. <.. ; l.

It_i_S_ alr(eady-Meae--to-methab-aFeng the areas where., improvements sho i

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I made, we should f M diiYt'iMt'sTsubstEntial'upgM3'ing of reactor operator -' - n -m:~**I a

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training with respect to plant transients anc off-normal conditions. Second,

~we must make our staff reviews and safety r.egulations place as much emphasis

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. on safety measures,to deal with plant transients originatin'g in the secondary 1

.m or steam-producing side of nuclear power plants as we have placed on accidents

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in.the primary system such 'as loss-of-coolant accidents. Third, we must care-fully re-examine the sensitivity of a 1 plant designs to these transient situations and to, the autcmatic safety s.ystems that deal with them.

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.we must make certain that our licensing review and our i,nspection procedures

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are capab1e,of preventing /'Mhe.as-of--t he -t-ype--t hat-we cc_c.ata t. Thr-se.

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'n We-hiTe'_a lot to learn from the Three Mile Island accident.i The experience s '-s p

can'be used to improve the safety of all nuclear power plants.

I would'like toemphasizeherethatI'mnotjustthinkingofimprovedhardware,foolphcof r

procedures or other technical fixes.

I'm thinking of the regulatory framework itself -- has the_ accident revealed deficiencies _in the way NRC regulates?

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' don't see '.he Three ?.iile -Irlan~TRritdent_and its implications as matters that should be add [essed exclusively on' a technical pla'6eQore is invo N

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. sand a colleaguas will discuss--these with yc'1 th.is af terncon-2.

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N Cafore describing the current situation at Three Mile Island'I sho ld Tike to

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/cc.r ent on ' President Carter's role.

ln Frcm the outset we have kep\\t the

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iPresident fully informed concerm.ig the accident.

He has'been most helpful i,n providing us with his personal views and suggestions and in making avaiTable to the fiRC.a cc ;aunications network.

Moreover,hisvis~ittothe.siteonAoril/

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grateful for these jctions.

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m' l-In his recent energy address, the Pres ident e. pressed'cencern about -the e_,-...,..'

acc4de rt and-64rected-that an independent Presidential Commission be ests-s lished to investigate the causes of the accident and to make recc=endaticas

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on how the safety af nuclear power plants can be improved.. The fluclear n

Regulatory Commission will cooperate fully with the Presidential Commission.

In addition the Commission is planning to conduct its own ccmprehens,ive untf~

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' W investigation. AI.theugn se are now working out details of the

% t ;> w ; a structure,of this investigation, wa canvet-reaMrget'it tnde6'Tay~uiit'IPGe

'N Thee?_lile 4s4and crrirt-ts-fn-^a~ GIT sRutdcWn"conditica~and our staff. deter-m i n es -that-t h ere-ir rrr res-i d ca l~ri s k't o-t be-pubTit.

I should like now to give you a brief summary of what we now ur.cerstand ta have been the sequence of events at Three Mile Island, A mre detailed chronology will be provided by the staff.

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. Initial Events A loss of feedwater flow in the external heat transfer loop increased reactor coolant pressure leading to cpening of the pressurizer relief valve and

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scramming of the reactor.

Heat-up of the primary system was augmented when the auxiliary feed vater pump (which came on automatically) was unable to Doi. e.Me wh ~. 1.t. -

delivar water because the outlets had been valved off.

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(,,_l.>.a <..:c.: c' g%'r'eiuirenent~s"T ~TWincreased heating combined w wm M., v of lice'n'see dT6Tition j

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continued depressurization of the primary system through the stuck-cpen pressurizer relief valve, resulted in automatic actuation of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) as the pressure dropped.

The operator, however, manually terminated ECC) injection evidently upon indication of high level in

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the pressurizer. All this happened within the first qucrter hour after the A

loss of feedwater flou.

For reasons we do not yet fully understand, all reactor ccolant pumps were subsequently turned off manually, eliminating (et one hour and 40 minutes) all forced-flow cooling through the core.

At 13-1/2 y k,a 2, rr-/,'S a P.M. en_.kJr d,<.

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hours reactcr coolant pumps were turned on again restoring forced flow. 'le

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believe that during this period of 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />syhe core wa

everely damaged and 71.~l non-condensible hydrogen gasgthat eventually formed a bubble persisting for wG5 several dhys, M i t ' created.

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. Emargency Rescon g At 7 a.a. the ',icensee notified the State of Pennsylvania. At 7:45, the licensee reached the flRC ar' within half an hour the flRC./ ncident Response I

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T'.* 9 Center was operating, -in an hour a direct linelotheplantcontrolroomhad been established.

The 1lhite House wa'. alerted at 9:15 a.m. and by 10:05 a.m.

an ?'RC Response Team was on the site.

At 10:15 a.m. the Commission was briefed by the Director of Office of Inspection and Enforcement.

From _ Wednesday morning on there were continuing releases of radioactive gas evolving from the reactor cooling sater which had been pumped from the sealed containment building to the non-leak-tight auxiliary buildinc.

Despite efforts to halt these releases, they increased on Friday morning. This situation led to a decision by Goyernor Thor ~nburgh -- on the Commission's reco mendation --

,.6f a rt *,:wQ to adv'ise.ciifl'dren and pregnant women h leave the 5-mile zone nearest the

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reactor.

i;RC increased the level'of its on-site team and Harold Denton, the Director of Reactor Regulation, was placed in charge.

Communications and transportation support were supplied at !!hite House direction.

Other Federal agencies provided additional assistance.

i;RC received the full cooperation of Pennsylvania State government officials

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as well as other Federal' agencies.

flowhere was this cooperation more apparent than in the vitally important area of radiological monitoring.

For instance, within a few hours, the Depar...:ent of Energy's Aerial o

Radiological f:anitoring Survey (ARMS) airplane was on statica over the site.

Also, personnel from the Pennsylvania State Bureau of Radiological Health were making measurements from Thursday afternoon onward.

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Contingency Planning re ! :.d.i-d u.t i.lu (m hs o.'.um CT' i

On Friday it was recognized that the early core damage had fcn-ed a sizable quantity of hydrogen gas which had collected in the reactor pressure vessel above the core.

One concern was that the hydrogen bubble might grow and interfere with the flow of cooling water to the core.

Another was that oxygen generated by radiolysis of water might accumulate -- with potential for an explosion.

The Commission considered reco=ending additional evacuation beyond that recomended by Governor Thornburgh -- which I indicatu in my our l,. u..', T'c.. :

press conference on Saturday afternoon -- but decided that increasg'd prof.c.w wCO k.

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tective action was not warrantedg c_# C.cT../ v.m. ;..,

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On Sunday it appeared that efforts to manage and reduce the hydrogen /olume were meeting with some success.

Further analysis also indicated that the 1

oxygen levol was considerably less than originally estimated.

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1. ef f.e-s @ is passed and the reactor cool-down process could De @ d #

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proceed without the hydrogen' bubble k::M--

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8-p tions to Preclude Generic Problems (a the ba;is of available information, the i;RC has taken trio specific 5

actions for plants having Babcock and Wilcox pressurized wa ter reactors.

First, an t1RC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin was transmitted on April 1, directing licensees operating S&W react:rs to perform a series of specific reviews and actions.

The licensees must respond by tomorrow.

Our on-site inspectors will monitor compliance with this bulletin. The ilRC headquarters staff will review the responses promptly and act on them accordingly.

This.

Eulletin was supplemented by another on April 5 that provided additional speciiic cperating instructions based on our augmented u.1derstanding of the events at Three ftile Island.

(Copies of these Bulletins are attached for the record.)

Second,,in inspector was assigned full-tine at each operating plant having a

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SLW reactor.by hpril 2.

In addition to assuring that tn.e Bulletins are fully understood and f ollowed, the full-time inspector -- with additional assistance from t.he I;RC regional offices -- will assure that some inspection activities will occur during each shift and that each shift will have a clear understanding fD of the. guidance. Regional and headquarters staffs will stay in c4ssi touch ! 1 %',1

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with the on-site 11RC inspectors to be sure that our, instructions to the

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licensees are being carried out.4 Furt-herre,%;ne Com. mission has sent a C.a. '

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telegram to each of the licensees with B&W reactors to underscore the seriousness t

with which the Commissinn views this situation.

A copy is attached for the record.

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j C. ( I n t e r nam.y,,.an NRC Task Force on Generic Review of Feedwater Transients in Cf.W i

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Reactors has been formed to examine the reactor and plant systens at these l

plants that provided protection against feedwater trar.sients.

The Task Force report is expected to be completed before the end of this to.ith. We will carefully i

review that information and take whatever further action may be apprcpriate.

1 Pending completion of our review of the responses to.the April 1 pulletin and w s r,. c.,,.,- -:

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_n --- w that cpeetoFerrons-played __an-impor. tant"FU?eMn rite"Ecc-reent, we believe " %Hib._

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easonable assurance that the plants can continue -W withqit'--

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l danger to the public health and safety.

Although Ccmaissioner Bradford agrees' i

fully that the aforemantioned spec,ific procedures are prudent and provide a considerably enhanced level of assurance, he would await the report of this Wa-Task Force before sharing fully in this conclusion.

Let me now give you a brief status report on the current situation at Three Mile Island.

I was at the site again on Sunday and have been in close contact M r, Cu ! h..

with Harold Denton and his team at the site since th" 1 ~W -t'~^"%ul 3

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Current Situation The reactor is continuing to cool down. As of _(time) the temperature is down to F and the pressure is at psi.

Our staff estimates that the cold shutdcwn condition -- reactor temperature below F and pressure at atrospheric pressure -- may be reached within days.

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r ft5[i Ct-release of Theentirecool-downisbeingccnductedinawaythatminimizesthyn

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radioactivity from the site) ' ThbyptaacA-4 _e-been-adepted -even -though,--from.

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t hi.pu,b_lj.c ' s. po i n t o f v i ew, it. pay _ seem..to prc.long-the-emergeney. I am convinced that it is the correct approach, particularly because ',te really c=n't be certain of the exact ccadition of the various systems and components that may be required to achieve a more rapid cool-down.

At the present time _(time)_ the estimated rate of leakage of radioactivity is curies of rare gases per day and

, curies of iodine-131 per day.

The total leakage of radioactivity up to (

time

) is estimated to be curies of rare gases and curies of iodine-131.

In addition we estimate leakage of radioactivity via water (Susquehanna River) is about 97 026

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. Conclusion There are core details that tN staff will provide, and :;hould you require information th_at_ we_ dan't have in hand here,Je will provide it for the

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record. I,Cen~' 3d n %-begicnic;; 1, :;.5 <~

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t, ah-he-acc-ident-at-Thrye Mile-Ls. land "d

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Even though no n

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,f-one was hur.( 1 a@s--? aran-wa-caMaterr.licap fhia.t.ime,. no one was exposed f to dangerpuls radiation levels, the accident 4-Me & M ees.

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neighboringccmmunitiesweredisruptedandmanyindividualsexp~elrienced

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personal Mrdships., And, of course, the economic consequences of the, accident

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are substantial.

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,SpeakinJ for-tfie CommissiorcI ca/. m h

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n'onTy say that7e will continue to exerbthe l

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mximum, effort to caet our statutory. goal '- to protect',_the public nealth and h

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f safety.

We are dedicated tc,'_t3at gd.il. 4-hsM;r,--Ch&::ar['d.

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r2 < ' :'., M-our--respcase-.tc the.-Three-MH e~f 51 and acc ident.w.i1.1._rew.a.1-tha e

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_HRC.dec_ision to dispatch H. Dcntan to sita

_F_M 12:03 NP.C Chaircan reccenends to FA Governor to evacuata pregnant women and pre-school children in 5-mi!.1 t.s 1:25 NRC Chairman ceats with President; HSC convanEs afterward 2:C0 Danton and 12 staff arrive at sita by helicopter; confers with President.

2:30 NRR Operations Center naar site:

notifications to President and Governor 3:30 83 NRC personnel on site.

AM SATURDAY. MARCH 31 9:20 Phone contact with NY Radiation Maalth Bureau 12:00 Phone contact v.eh F0A re supplies of potassium iodine.

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(q wtak 10:45 NRC inforced of planned sabotage attempt.

f.H SUNDAY, A?RIL 1 11:10 97 NRC personne' on sita 2

S NRC establisheA 37 rad monitors at distances 1 to gl2'ailesfrcaplant All licensees with B&W reactor $ centacted; in:pectors

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dispatched 2:15 -27 Prc:ident Carter on-site Unit 2 Control Rocs f

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~12:15 PR #79-55 Press Release 1:00 SP Log SP notifies Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and roads press release.

2:CO SP Log SP telephones PA Emergen:rf Manage.:ent Agency, raads prass release

$ 2:10 SP Leg SP tries to telephone Haalta Center for Disaasi Car trol (Atlanta) (PA radiological Health says they will try again in corning).

8:30 SP Log SP calls H. Calley, EPA, to 9

read press release and suggete he call Gerusky and offar

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assistance

.r w g M :+1eu zA de/d d c5 9:00 Reg I A(6 people) dispatched ta site 9:30 SP Lcg Food and Drug Administration calls and offers to have Balttmore Field Office provide assistanca in looking at food pathways 10:25 PH-79-67A '-::::5 559

• 2 11:00 SP Leg SP tries to contact NY Bu.asu of Radiological Health (call completed at 12:17 pn) 11:05 SP Log SP calls NJ Dept. of Health. 3

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{O*. %.s brief members of Subccmittae en Energy and Enviro,vant, other Members of Congress, and Congressional staff on ::tatus of incident.

11:45 SP Log SP calls Delaware Rad-Hulth Dept.

==ynPMmm 12:05 SP Log SP returns call to Gov. Ray's (Washington) assistant.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMi%iCN G

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ADVISORY CO?. '.07 TEE O?! HE ACTO 3 S AFEGUiRD3 i : O '. [,$

v7,sma ray o. c. m33 g

v o.,.i Apri] 7, 1979 Henorable Joseph !!. Hendrie Chairnan U.S. Muclear Rcgulatory Co=.ission

\\l'shington, DC 20555 SU2 JECT:

11;TERIM REDORT CN RECE';T ACCICINT AT THE 19.EE IIILE ISUSD 1."JCLEAR ST/,TICN 12iIT 2 Dear Dr. Hendrie During its 223th caeting, April 5-7, 19~19, the Advisory Ccrmittee on Reactor Safoguards reviewed. the circumstances relating to the recent accident at the Tarea Mlle Island Nuclear Station Unit 2.

During this review, the Committee had the benefit of dis:ussions with the URO Staff.

Our study of the accident at Taree Mile Islared has chon that it is very difficult for a F.G plant operator to understand and properhr control the course of an accident involving a r. ell break in tM reactor cociant systea accompanied by other abnomal conditions.

Tne Committee recc= ends that further analyses be rade, es Econ as pos-sible, of transients and accidents in F;T.3 that invc1ve initia]ly, or at some time during their course, a small bren'<. in the primary systan.

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Tne co.mputer codes used for these an31y es should M capable of pt:-dict-ing the conditions observed during the accident at Tarce Mile Island, including thernal-hydraulic effects and clad and fuel tenparatures.

Tae range of break sices censidered should include the rallest that could be deemed significant, and should consider a rarge of break locc-tions.

Tne Co=ittee believes that the analysas rec:=enM abon.6il do non-strate, as has the accident at Tnree Mile Island, that additional information regarding the status of the systen will be neMed in order for the plant operator to follo'.i the course of an accident and thus be able to respond in an apptcpriate nanner. As a mini.ua, and in th2 interin, it would be predent to consider expeditiously the provf sien

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DUPLICATE DOCUMENT 97 030 Entire document previously entered into system under:

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