ML19220C230

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Forwards Branch Positions Re Low Grid Voltage & Class IE Equipment Qualification Outside Containment
ML19220C230
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1977
From: Tedesco R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Vassallo D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7904300081
Download: ML19220C230 (17)
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMiss!CN f

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MEMORANCLM FOR:

D. '/assalle, Assistant Direct:r fcr Light '4ater Reac ers, :PM FRCM:

Rcber L. Tedesco, Assis:an: Direc::r for Plant Sy::ams, CSS

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Plan: Name:

Three '411e Island L'ni: Num er 2 Cccke: No:

50-32C Licensing Stage:

Cperating License Miles:One No:

N/A Res:cnsible Branch: LWR-a and Project Manager:

H. Silver Requested C:: le:icn Cate:

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The enclosed pcsitions were prepared by CSS:PS:

Power Systems 3 ranch.

These ;csitions were informally given :

the a:plicant at the July 21, 1977 meeting. presents cur :csition witn regarc :: sustained degradec grid voltage conditicns anc ? ssible interaction te: ween the Offsite and cnsi:e

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(Encicsure 2 rovides at;iicable mccel Tecnni-amergency ;cwer syst, ems.

cal s. cec 1 ica:1cns',j.

...in1s :cs1:1cn is essentially iden-ica,i :: -he

csiticn new being acciied
ocerating :lants.

Encicsure 3 ; resents ne s sf' csiti:n en envir emental ;ualifica-icn of Class lE equipmen unicn is located cu: site :ne c:ntain en: building.

Wita regard : the f:ur acti:ns of Encl:sure 1, we wculd #inc :he foll:w-ing resolutien acce: able f r Three Mile Islanc Uni: 2, anc rec:mmend :na:

the applican-be so acvised.

1) a ccmmitment anc scnecule by ne a:clicano f:r imclementa:icn :f

?csition i, 2 and 2 prior :: ::

letion of firs refueling.

(!=clemen:2:icn of these :csi:icns is being backfi: On ali ::erating clants wi n ::moletien generally being scnecuisd by nex refueling.)

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AUG 3 0. Vassaile full i clementaticn of ?csiticn : by the acclicant price to initial a involves verifica:icn of transformer 2)

(Pcsition

cwer c;eration.

tap setting by actual voltage measurement anc dec :entaticn; noThis p plant =cdifica:icns are involyec.

implemented en all operating plants.)

In cur judgement, because of the icw pecbacility of cccurrence cf degraded grid or bus voltage ccnditions required tc prcduce ccmcen

cde failure cf redundant electrical ecuicment, the accve resolution of the ci:ed cesiticns wculd prcride adequate assurance fcr ;uclic health and safety.

li-With recard :c the cesition of Enclosure 3, a ccamitment by the ac?

cant to'ccmolete ne installation cf :he recuired envircreental refueling teccerature menitcring sys:aa prior :c ccmoletion of firs:

ld be wculd be acceptacie; hewever, the dccunentaticn recuirements shou In our judgament, fcr :ne met price :.' initial ;cwer operation.

time pericd invcived, ne ;rceability of occurrence of an event wnich would require safety actico coincid relativaly shcr:

and the health and safe:y of the public is adequately prctec:ed.

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Rccer: L. Tedesco, Assis:in: Cirec:cr for Plan: Systems Civisicn of Systems Safety Encicsure:

As sta ed cc:

S. Hanauer R. Mat: son R. Scyd F. Rcsa S. Yarga H. Silver W. McCcnald J. Glynn F. Asne fs q M

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FCR SUSTAINED CEGRACEJ GRID VCLT GE C NDIT'CNS THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT NC. 2 We have c:maleted cur evalua-icn of :ne responses :: cur request for additicnal infcrmaticn regarcing tne suscentacility of ycur d'esign with regard to:

(2) Sustained degraced voi age conditicns at :ne Offsite ?cwer scurce; and (b)

Interacticn of ne Offsite and cnsi e smergency ;cwer ;ystems.

In this regard, we have deveicced :ne folicwing staff Ocsi-icns f0r use in the review Of plants ir tne CP and CL stage of review.

These ;csi-tiens are essenticily identical :: the tesitions taken in tne evaluation of :: era:ing plants in : Mis regard. The ;csitions are based en staff evaluation Of :ne res;cnses to generic informati:n recuests 'r:m iicensees of c:erating ciants anc otner related informaticn, and On the acclicable General Design Criteria, as discussed in subsecuen: caragra:ns and in Issue No. 10 of NUREC-Cl28.

We require :na; ycur design meet :nese ;csiticns.

Cescribe ycur design and hcw i: meets :nese ;csi ti:ns; crevide a::recriate tecnnical a~nalyses to su::cr: any ncn-c:nf:rmance.

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-3 The voltage sens:rs snall aut:ma:ically initiate :ne disc:nnection d) offsi:e pcwer sources unenever ne voltage set :cin: anc time c#

delay limit: have been exceeded; The voltage :ensors shall be designed to satisfy the appJicacie a) requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971, " Criteria for ?rctection Systems for Nuclear Pcwer Generating Stations"; and see -nclosure 2 for mode,i tecnnica,i ine iscnnical 2:ectrica:,icns i

S:ecifications) snali include limiting : nditicn for Opera-icn, surveillance recuirements, trip se: ;cints with minimum and maximum 1*=i s, and alicwaole values for the sec:nd-level val: ace ;rc ec-tien sensers and associated time delay devices.

General Cesign Criterien 17 (GCC 17} " Electric ?:wer S/ stems, cf Accendix A, " General Cesign Criteria for Nuclear ?cwer ?lants," cf IC CFR Part 5C (a) eso ;nysically inde:enden circuits from :ne Offsite trans-requires:

mission ne:wcrk (al ncugn one of inese circui s may be a delayec access circuit, One circui mus: :e aut:matically availacle wi nin a few sec:rcs fclicwing a less-of-c clan: accident),(b) redundan :nsite 4. ~. :cw e r supplies; and (c) recundan C.C. ?cwer supclies.

GCC-17 furtner recuires tha: ne safety ';nc:icn of each a.:. system provide (assuming the c:ner system is no-func:icningl snall be ::

sufficient ca:acity and capacility o assure -hat:

(al s:eci fed acceptable fuel desicn '.imits and tne design c:rci:icns for :ne reactor resul of antici;a:ac

alan: pressure :cuncary are not exceedec as o

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9 ccerational ec:urrances; an

(:) :he c:re is cocied anc con air.en integrity and otner vitai functicns are maintained curing any Of ne

cstulatad accidents.

Existing underveltage mnit:rs aut:natically ;erf:rm the rectired func-4 n

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5 bability for ne a:cve ::nciti:ns :: cc:ur.

Mcwever. si"ce decradati:n of an effsite cwer svstam ina: c:uld lea: :: Or :ause the fai?:re of redundan safe:y-reia:ed electrical ecui: en: 1s unac:e::a:it, <e recuire the addi icnal safe:y targins ass: cia:ac *i 3 i :lementaticn Of :ne protecti ve. measures detailed 3:cve.

2)

Fasitien 2:

Interaction of Cnsite Pcwer Scurces with Leed Shed Feature We require that the current systa= designs aut::atically preven:

Joad snedding Of the erargency buses ence the ensite sources are supplying power to all sequenced leads en the emergency buses.

The design shall also include the capability Of the load shedding feature to be aut: atica!'y reinstated if the ensita scur:e supply breakers are tripped.

The aut::atic bypass and reinstatement feature shall be verified during :ne periodic esting identified in Fcsitien 3.

In the event an adecuata basis can be provided f:r retaining the lead shed fcature

  • hen leads are energi:ed by -he :nsite ;;wer systam, we will requi.e :na-the se ;cint value in the Technical Specificaticns, which is curre.itly specified as "... equal to er greater than..." be amended t: specify a value having taximum and minimum li 1:s.

The licensees' bases for the set;cints and limits selected must be 30cumentad.

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-c-GCC 17 requires that previsiens be included : minimi:e the prcba'cility of losing electric pcwer frem any of the remaining su;; lies as a result of or c: incident wi-h the less cf ;cwer genera ad by the nu'elear pcwer unit, tne less cf pcwer frca the transmissien netwc-k, er ine less Of pcwer fr:m the ensita electric ;cwer su;;1ies.

7he functional safety requirement of the 1 css-of-offsite ;cwer senscrs" detect -he less of voltage en tne offsi a (; referred) :cwer system is ::

and to initiate the necessary actions required :

ransfer ne safety-related buses

ne ensita system.

The lead sheccing feature, anich is required func:icn prior :: connecting the :nsite ;cwer scurces ::

Oneir respective buses can adversely in:aract with the cnsi e ;cwer sources if the Icad shedding feature is not bypassed after it har, performec its required function.

The icad shed feature shculc aisc be reinstated :: allcw it t: ;erf:rm its function if the ensite sources are interruptad and are sucsequently required : be reconnected their respec:1ve buses.

3)

Oositien 3: Cnsi a ;;wer $curce Testinc tas recui rement We require :ra the Tecnnical Scecifica:icns incluce 1 demens rata :ne full functional operabili y and indecencence f ne The ensi e pcwer scurces at least cnce :er 13 centns during shutdcwn.

Tecnnical Scecifica:icns snali incluce a.ecuiremen for es:s :

(1) simulating icss of offsite ;cWer; (2) simulating icss of offsita cwer in conjuncti:n wi n a safe y feature actua-icn signa!', and rec:nnec-icn of cnsi a :cwer (3) simulating in:arru :icn and sucsecuen:

scur:es 0 :neir res:ective buses.

3rc er ::eration snall be ce.arminec ty:

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3) Verifying nat en loss of offsite pcwer tne emergency buses nave been de-energi:ed anc :na the leads have been saec fr m the emergency buses in ac:Ordance witn design requirements, b) Verifying that en loss of offsite pcwer the diesai genera: Ors start en the aut start signal, the emergency buses are energi:ed with permanently c:nnected leads, :ne auto-c:nnected shu:dcwn leacs are energi:ed through tne Icac secuencer, and One systam operates for five minutes while the genera: Ors are leaded wi n the snutdown loads.

c)

,/er1 ylng that en sarety features actuaticn signal talthcu less at.

offsite power) the diesel genera: Ors start on the au: star: signal and ccerate en standby for five minutes.

d),/er1 y'ng 09a: cn icss or.

. s1 e pcwer in cenJunc:1:n w1:n a sare:y features actuation signal the diesel genera: Ors star :n ne aut: star:

signal, ne emergency buses are energi:ed wi a permar.en-1/ connected icads, One aut:-cennec ad emergancy (acciden-) loads are energi:ed througn :ne lead secuencer and tr.e system cpera es f:r #ive minutes wnile ne generat:rs are Icaced ui-n -he amergency 1:acs.

ei 7eri fying tha On in errupticn of tne :nsite scurces ne icads are sned from ne emergency buses in ac:Orcance si:n design recuire-ments and :nat subsequent 1: acing cf ne ensite sources is :nrcugn

ne lead secuencer.

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GCC 17 requires that provisicns be inclucec Oc minimize ne peccacility of losir.g elec. ic pcwer frcm any cne of the remaining supplies as a result of or coincident with the less of scwer generated by the nuclear pcwer unit, the loss of scwer frem the transmission ner.icrk,'cr the loss of pauer frcm the ensite electric ;cwer supplies.

The testing requirements identified in ?:si-icn 3 will demcnstra a ne

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ca: ability of the ensite ;cwer system to perform its required func-icn.

The tests will also identify undesirable interaction between :ne Offsi a and cnsite emergency ;cuer systems.

4)

?csiticn 4: 0;timi:ation of Transformers Tap Settings The voltage levels 2: the safety-relatec buses should be optimized for

ne full icad and minimum lead conditions that are expected :nrcucncu:

the anticipa ed range of voltage varia:icns of :ne offiste ;cwer scur:e by aparepriate adjustment of :ne voltage tao settings Of the in ervening trans formers.

We recuire inat ne adecuacy of :ne design in this regard be verifiec Oy actual measurement, and by c rreia-icn af measurec values with analysis results.

Provide a descriction of the me-hed for making this verifica icn; before initial reac:Or ;cwer 0:eraticn, provice ne documenta:icn recuired :: establish -ha: his verifica-icn nas been ace:mciisned.

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ACTICN STATE 3ENT3 ACTICN A

- With the number cf CPERAELE channels one Tess than the Total Number of Channels operation may precaec provided both of the fellcwing conditiens are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped a.

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The Minimun Channels CPERA3LE requircent is me:; hcwever, one aedi.icnal channei may be bypassed for uc to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing ;er Specifica:icn (a.3.2.1.1).

ACTICN 3

- With the number cf CPERA5LE Channels one less than the Total Number of Cha.neis cceraticn may precaed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCYI NAL provided the ineperable channel is placed in the i:tripped conditien within I hcur.

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Or sh&1l be demonstrated CPERAELE:

J 3.1.1.X Each diesel genera:

At least once per 15 mcnths during shutdcwn by:

a.

Simulating a loss Of offsite ; wer by itself and in 1.

conjunction with a safety features actuation tas-signal, and witn a ncn-acciden scram signal, a) Veri fying -ha: On Icss of offsite ;cwer :ne emergency leads nave been sh 2d b,uses nave been de-energi:ed and tha:trem the emerge requiremen s.

Verifying :nat cn loss of offsita ;cwer in c:n-b) junc:icn with a ncn-accident scram signal the cn the aut star signal, diesel genera: Ors star the emergency Suses are energi:ed witn permanently connected leads, the auto-c nnected snutdcwn icads are energi:ed thr0ugn the Icad sequencer, and :ne system ccerates fer five minutes while the generators are leaded with the snu down leads.

On safety features ac uaticn signal Verifying :na:

c)

(witncut loss of offsite ;over) the diesel genera: rs signal and ccerate on stancby start en :ne aut: star:

for five minutas.

n Icss Of offsite ;cwer in : njuncticn Verifying tha witn a safety fea:ures actuation signal,:ne dieselen d) s ar:

buses are energi:ed wi n permanen ly :ennected leads,

genera rs

'ne auto-c:nnected emergency (accident) leacs are energi:ed -hrougn :ne lead secuencer, anc One system ccer a as f:r five minutes wnile the genera::cs are leaded with -he emergency 1: ads.

cn interructicn of :ne ensi:e scur es Verifying tna:

ne leacs are shed fr:m :ne energency tuses in ac::rcance e)

Icacing wi n design recuirements and tna; sucsecuen:

of :ne ensi e scurces is thrcugn the lead sequencer.

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ENCLOSURE 3 STATE 4E?iT CF STAFF FCSITICN CN THE ENVIRONME.4TAL CUALIFICATICN OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LCCATED CUTSIDE THE CCNTAINME?iT SUILDING Witn regard Oc all Class lE equipment located cu sice tne c;ntainment building we recuire dccumentation wnica states that all cf this equic-ment has been certified to satisfy the arpiicaole industry standards (e.g. NEMA and ANSI). ~

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Further, we require assurance tha: the envir:nmen a: :ne equi; ment lccation is maintained wi:nin the tamcerature range for wnien One equipment is cualified to ccerate.

In these loca:icns wnere the :am:erature cculd exceed :na fce whicn the Class lE equipment is qualified, the staff requires that the applican: provide a tem erature monit: ring system.

The system shculd at a minimum meet :ne folicwing requirements:

1) The centrol recm snculd receive an alarm wnen :ne tem erature rance has been exceeded.

This alarm should be pr vided by instrumentaticn Anica (a) is of a nign cuality, (b) is cnecked Oc verify its functicnal capacility by plant :acnnical speci fica icn recuirements, and (c) is scwered frcm a ::ntinuous pcwer source or is recuncant wi:n secarate channels and :cwer sources.

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2) The ccerator shculit have a methcd of maintaining a continuous record of the tem;(rature during One time tnat One temcera:ure range is exceeded.

Based on the =cnitoring system the applicant shall report :ne occurrence of ne tamcerature exceeding the ecui; ment qualifica:icn range and i s duratien as a license event rescr c the NRC.

In addition to this. One acplicant snali previce results of an analysis to cemenstrar.e tna: One excess tamcerature has nc: degraded :ne involved Class lE equipment belcw an accectable level for continued plant cceration.

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