ML19220C183
| ML19220C183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1977 |
| From: | Arnold R Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | O'Reilly J NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| References | |
| GQL 434, GQL-0434, NUDOCS 7904300031 | |
| Download: ML19220C183 (2) | |
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TELEPHONE 215 - 929-0501 POST CFFICE SOX 542 REAOING. PENh 2YLVAM A 196C3 Maren 31, 1977 GG ch3h Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc==ission Office of Inspection & Enforcenent Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (~2C-2)
Iicense No. CPPR-66 Docket No. 50-320 Energency Diesel Generators On March 4, 1977, Mr. L. Harrow of your office was verbally notified of a situation which Metropolitan Edisen Cc=pany considered to be reportable in accordance with the require:ents of ICCFR50.55(e). This letter constitutes the required thirty-day follow-up letter.
Descriction Fairbanks Wrsa Engine Division of Colt Industries, the nanufacturer of the T!C-2 Diesel Generators, advised us that, based on service reports cn similar units in operation, sene cenpenents are not providing the intended service life. Speci-fically:
1.
Vertical Drive Eubs - It is pessible that the hubs do not meet the =anu-facturer's appropriate material standard and should be replaced to pravent possible cracking failures.
2.
Fuel Header Crossover Connection - A new, heavy duty, high alloy pipe connector and cl2=p fer each side of the engine shculd be provided to prevent cracking failure of the connectors.
3.
Ca= Shaf: and Ca= Follewers - Inproved ca: roller d2 sign with radiused edges, depth hardening and cencentricity centrols sh:uld be installed to prevent C
' -er fractures and/or ca: distress en the can shaft in order to achieve nor:al part life.
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re. J. P. O'24 illy, Dirtetor 2
3/31/77 G0% CL3k 2
Analv31s of Safety Inclications Of the three ec:;cnent proble:s described., only the failed fuel header cross-over connection failure caused co:plete loss of diecel functions at another facility. The hub failure caused no loss of functions and the ca= folicwer failure caused slight less of power. The canufacturer has indicated that each incident occurred only once and that the probability of additienal failures (had the conponents not been corrected) is very low considering that sc:e 25 diescls of the same design have been in operation for 1 to 7 years.
In the unlik ly event that ene diesel was lost due to a ec:ponent failure at TMI-2, tha ra:ainin; 10C2 redundant diesel wculd take over vital functions.
For this reason, there would ha"e been no adverse effect on the health or safety of the public or the plant staff.
Corrective letten The following actions are being planned to correct these deff:lencies:
1.
Fairbanks Morse will perfora a cicroscopic examination of the vertical drive hubs. Those fcund to he sub-standard will be replaced.
2.
Fuel Header Crossovet Connections will be replaced by Fairbanks Morse vich the new heavy duty, high alloy pipe connector and cla:p on each side of each engine.
3 New impreved cn. follevers will be installed by Fairbanks Morse.
If inspectica shv.as evidence of ca: distress en the e2 shaft, it too will be replace /..
4.
A four-tcur load test will be perfor=ed on the diesels af ter repairs are
=ade anu a finci inspection will be conducted.
All corrective acticas will be cc pleted prier to fuel lead presently scheduled for 10/15/77. Inspection, repair and test documentation will be available at the site for review.
Very truly yours, ciped - R C. 3-aM R. C. Arnold Vice President cc: Dr.Ernst 7c1;enau Director Office of Inspeccion s Enforce:en:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C =nission
'Jashington, D. C. 20555 m
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