ML19220B867
| ML19220B867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1976 |
| From: | Maccary R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Deyoung R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904270535 | |
| Download: ML19220B867 (2) | |
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R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Idrector for Light '.'ater Reactors Division of Project Manage =ent CONTA1::MCC VEC AND PURGE SYSTRI ISOL\\ tit'N 7ALVES Plant !!ane: Three Mile Island Unit 2 Licensing Stage:
L Docket No. : 0 -320, 0
Respor.sible PM Branch.snd Project Manager:
LWR-2, B. Silver Responding SS Branch and Technical Reviewer: ME3, R. J. Klessel Review Status: Awaiting Information Recent conversations between the Mechanient Engineering and Contain=ent Systems Branches have indicated that the containment purge systen isolation valve's are identified in Table 6.2-15 of the Finni Safety Analysis Report as containment isolation valves and receive automatic isolation signals. Therefore, should a loss of coolant accident occur while the valves are open they vill be called on to close while experianHng the LOCA pressure and temperature conditions within the containment. The attached request for additional infor=ation solicits verification that the valves are, in fact, capable of closing following the LOCA event.
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MECHANICAL ENGINEEUNG 3RA'iCH DIVISION OF SYSTE".S SAFETY THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 1
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Table 6.2-15 of the FSAR indicates that the containment purge system isolation valves are containment isolation valves and receive automatic isolation signals. Therefore, should a loss of coolant accident occur while these valves are open they will be called on to close while experiencing the LOCA pressure and te=perature within the containment.
It is the staff's position that the containment purze isolation valves are active valves. Therefore, describe the valve operability progras applicable to these valves. De=onstrate that this program is capable of p
verifying the ability of these valves to close when subjected to the pressure and tenperature profiles shown in Figures 6.'.4 and 6.2.5, respectively, of the F5AR. Your attentica is directed to Section II.2 of Standard Review Plan 3.9.3'for a description of an acceptable operability program.
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t wa,_. M JL", ; - ss R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Light 'a'ater Reactors Division of Project Managecent CONTAI'CCIT VEC A'O PIIRGE SYSTC{ ISOLATION 7ALVES Plant Name: Three Mile Island D11t 2 Licensing Stage:
L Decket No.: ( 0-320, Responsible PM' Branch and Project Manager:
L'J:1-2, H. Silver 2esponding SS Branch and Technical Reviewer: ME3, R. J. Kiessel Review Status: Avaiting Infor-.ation Recent conversations between the Mechanical Engineering and Containment Systess Branches have indicated enat the containnent purge systen isolation valves are identified in Table 6.2-15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report as containnent isolation valves and receive automatic isolation signals. Therefore, should a loss of coolant accident occur while the valves are open they will be called on to close while experiwhg the LOCA pressure and temperature conditions within the containment. The attached request for additf anal infor=ation solicits verification that the valves are, in fact, <.apable of closing follo. ring the LOCA event.
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>!ECHANICAL ENGINEE').ING 3RA'?CH DIVISION OF SYSTE'!S SAFETY THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFOIHATION Table 6.2-15 of the FSAR indicates that the containment purge system isolation valves are containment isolation valves and receive automatic isolation signals. Therefore, should a loss of coolant accident occur L
while these valves are open chev will be called on to close while experiencing the LOCA pressure and camperature within the contain=ent.
It is the staff's position that the contain=ent purge isolation valves are active valves. Therefore, describe the valve operability program applicable to these valves. De=onstrate that this program is capable of p
verifying the obility r f these valves to close when subj ected to :.a pressure and temperature profiles shown in Figures 6.2.4 and 6.2.5, respectively, of the FSAR. Your attentica is directed to Section II.2 of Standard Review Plan 3.9.3 for a description of an acceptable operability program.
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