ML19220B623
| ML19220B623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane, Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1972 |
| From: | Bloch E US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Schweiker R SENATE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904270128 | |
| Download: ML19220B623 (4) | |
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Docket Nos. 50-289 /
HOV 2 - M 50-320 /
50-353 50-352 Honorable Richard J. Schweikar United States Senats
Dear Sena;:
or Schweiker:
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Your letter of September 26, 1972, to Dr. Schlesinger con-carning the qualifications of Mr. Carl Houston as a witness in the public hearing on the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant and concerning the status and construction problems of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Plant has been referred to me for response.
Ihe subject of quality assurance, including that of assurance of proper welding practices, is of importance in the Cocraission's evaluation of the adequacy of designs of nuclear reactor facili-ties proposed for ccustruction.
In this respect, information provided by Mr. Houston in connection with the Surry f acilities of the Virginia Electric and Power Company was carefully investigated by the regulatory staff before authorizing opera-tion of the Surry Unit 1 facility.
In addition, Mr. Houston testified before the Aconic Safety and Licensing Board which the Commission established to consider the issuance of the operating licenne for that f acil.ity.
In connection with the Limerick proceeding, Mr. Houston was offered as a witness on behalf of certain intervenors on July 14, 1972. Such a proceeding is an adjudicatory proceeding, held in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the requirements of the Adminis-trative Procedure Act.
There were objections by the applicant in the proceeding to the offer of Mr. Hous ton's testimony on the grounds that intervenors had not properly raised cuch quality assurance issues, and on the grounds that euch of Mr. Ucuston's prepared testimcny was beyond the scope of his stated qualifications in the field of welding. However, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ? residing in the Limerick proceeding did not rule on these objecticos, indicating that it desired to review the record to deter =ine whether applicant's
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Honorable Richard S. Schweiker i At that tfme, the Board denied the offer of Mr. Houston's tastimony cn the basis of the form of its preparation explaining that it found difficulty in understanding it and indicating to the attorneys that they should assist witnesses in preparing to testify by helping the witness to separate irrelavant =aterial from proffered testimony.
Le Board stated that it would reconsider that matter if a new statement on behalf of Mr. Houston vera offered.
At a reconvened session of the hearing on October 16, 1972 Mr. Houston was again offered as a witness for the intervenors, having prepared a revised statement. he Board again rejected the proffered testimony, without ruling on Mr. Houston's quali-ficaticns, stating that " portions of the proffered statement are so intertwined with those phases which the Board believes are not pertinent to this proceeding, that it would take end-less detail to take each cf the sentences and separate them from experiences which the witness believes are pertinent." he Board indicated that it felt that the main thrust of the testimony was a si=ple statement or paraphrase of the provisions of the ASME Code.
Since the Code requirements have been incorporated in the applicatica by referenca and are a part of the Co= mission's requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a, the proposed testimony "does; not seem to present a relevant or material mat-ter for consideration." Enclosed for your information is a copy of the proffered testimUny. You may note that it in no way reveals any substantive deficiency in the application for the Li=erick f acilities.
lith referance to the tree Mile Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 the following updated summary of the status for this, plant is providad. We construction of Unit 1 is nearing comp *.etion.
We expect to complete our Safety Evaluation on the application for an operating license for this unit in early 1973. A notice of consideration of issuance of an operating license was published in the Federal Register en July 7,1972.
Petitions requesting a public hearing and for leave to intervene are presently being considered by the Commission, he construc-tion of Unit 2 is in progress and we expect the applicant to file an application for an operating license early next year.
he reported construction problems for the Bree Mile !aland Nuclear Generating Plant listed in your letter are at this time applic ble to tha construction of Unit 1 only and are addressed below.
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. i Honorablo Richard S. SchvciLr Honeyec-mine in Primary Ccatainment 1,
Ecacyco=bing of poured concretc and in particular voids ice in the concreta around reinforcing bars in the ring girder area, located at the junction of the cylindrical portica with the do=a of the primary containment, were detceted by the appliccat cs early as April 1971, cad reported to Uc have revicued tha cpplicant's repair the Cc=:iscica.
procedure c4d are continuing our cnalysis of this construc-O cion defect.
will be based on the requirement that the entire pri=ary contnf nmnt, as built cnd repaired, een witho tand oafely all the loads specified in the ori;1 cal design.
Core Cooling Systc= (ECCS)
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E=cr9ency Ec EOCS in a key engincerad safety feature en all currentLe Co=niacion i l
light water modcrated power reactors.
tuted a public rule =ching hearing on the catter of cctting acceptcaca criteria for perforncaca of the ECCS in Jcnuary Any licensos 1972, cad this hearing is still in progrecs.d 2 will be subject issued for Wrce Milo Icicad Units 1 ca to whatever ECCS accept nca criteria are finally promul-j Sated as a result of this rule taking hearing.
3.
7culty Fuel Reds At the present tic.c there is no fuel at the site of the Le fuel propcced by the cppli-Erce Mile Island plant.
ccat for Unito 1 and '2 is slightly cariched uranius dioxide He fuel rods will l
pellets ccat:med in zircaloy clndding.In recent ::enths a
- be prcpreocuri cd with helit:2 gcs.
i densification of urcnium diorida pellets in operating recc-l tors hcs bcon cbserved to cause a decrense in pellet di=ca-As a result the Co==iccion is engaged in a detailad 3q %
of the fuel dcasification phenomenen cad its i=pli-sion.
GccN4hda-la-che"d [g6 revi:2 93 c.tions with regard to cafety.
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wi-1-1-prevido-the-basis. for-ope-raticn'1 lt + rre ermatlj Mins-cvaluaced.
f M y'M Ec pror.icity of the Erce Mile Islcnd Nuclear Generating Picat f,Mg with respect to the Harrisburg International Airport led to a specific "Aircraf t I= pact Design Bcsis," that wra catablished I
O during our revicw of the applicant's cpplicction for a construc-In accordence with this dcaign balls all struc-tures of the plant neccesary for a safe chutdcr.in are designed tion por=it.
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J NOV 2 - E Honorable Richard S. Schweikar 1.
Honeycombing in Primary Centainment Honeycombing of poured concrete and in particular voids in in'the concrete around reinforcing bars in the ring girder area,\\ located at the junction of the cylindrical portion with the doce of the primary containment, were detected by the applicant as early as April 1971, and reported to the Ccmission. We have reviewed tbs applicant's repair procedure and are continuing our analysis of this construc-tion defect. Our final approval of the repaired ring girder will be based on the require =ent that the entire primary containment, as built and repaired, can withstand safely all tha loads specified in the original design.
2.
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) he ECCS is a key engineered safety feature en all current light water mcderated power reactors. The Co= mission insti-tuted a public rule making hearing on the matter of setting accaptance criteria for performance of the ECCS in January 1772, and this hearing is still in progress. Any licenses issued for Three Mila Island Units 1 and 2 vill be subject to whatever ECCS acceptance criteria are finally pro =ul-gated as a result of this rule making hearing.
3.
Faulty Fuel Rods At the present time there is no fuel at the site of the Three Mile Island plant. The fuel proposed by the appli-cant for Units 1 and 2 is slightly enriched uranium dioxide pellets centained in zircaloy cladding.
The fuel rods will be prepressurized with helium gas.
In recent renths a densification of uranium dioxide pellets in operating reac-tors has been observed to cause a decrease in pellet dimen-sim. As a result the Comission is engaged in a detailed review of the fuel densification phenomenon and its impli-cations with regard to safaty.
Cocputational models that will provide the basis for operational and surveillance limits are currently being evaluated.
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The proximity of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Censrating Plant with respect to the Harrisburg International Airport led to a
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- fic. "Aircraf t Impact Design Basis," that was established during our review of the applicant's application for a construc-s tion permit.
In accordance with this desia;n basis all struc-i tures of the plant necessary for a safe shutdown are dasigned
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and constructed to withstacd the impact of an aircraf t weigh-ing 200,030 pounds at a velocity of 200 knots. We have con-sidered this load in particular with regard to the construc-tion f ault and repair of the ring girder deteribed abcve.
In additico we required and the applicant provid1d a special fire detection and protection system in the air intaka tunnel to the plant to suppress and extinguish a fire that could result from fuel spilled into the tunnal during the postulated aircraft inpact.
All safety related issues including the " construction faults" referred to in your letter are being reviewed by the regula-tory staff of the Comission and an operating license vill be issued only if our Safety Evaluation concludes that the Three itile Island Nuclear Generating Plant can be operated safely.
If you hava any further questions please let na know.
Sincerely, Driginar starM $
L.:. soch Edward J. Bloch Deputy Director of Regulation
Enclosure:
Testinouy of Carl Willard Houston
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DISTRIBUTION:
Courtesy Copy ESchierling g
Docket fila (4)
Mr. Hoffnan i
I,s DR Randing Mr. Shapar LReading Chaiman (2)
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RP Reading Comissioner Raney PWR-2 Reading Cotmissioner Larson 1Miuntzin -
Comissioner Doub RCDeYoung Comissioner Ray Attorney, OCC EJBloch OCR (2)
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