ML19220B429

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Conduit Failure Analysis Suppl & Loss of Cable Room Suppl to Fire Hazards Analysis
ML19220B429
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/01/1978
From: Herbein J
Metropolitan Edison Co
To: Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GQL-0804, GQL-804, NUDOCS 7904260028
Download: ML19220B429 (2)


Text

==

/ Y 2Li, jw j A4*de PC# **CGAf53 METHOPOLil AN EDISON COMPANY PCST CFFICE 3CX 542 READING. PENNSYLVANI A 196C3 TELEPwCNE t15.aS 9-:601

.v.

.c, ~ c a

n

,s se G;; C30h Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

~.

Attention:

Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief r

c, Light Water Reactors 3 ranch, Nc. 4 u

3 C. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (TMI-2)

Docket No. 50-320 Operating License No. DPR-73 Additional Infor ation Concerning Fire Protectica

Enclosures:

(1) Conduit Failure Analysis Supple ent to Fire Hazards Analysis (2) Loss of Cable Roo= Supplement to Fire Hazards Analysis The following infor=ation is submitted for your review as required by Operating License Conditions C(3).l.3 and C(3).l.4 C(3).l.3 (as odified by A=end:ent 42):

" Revise the fire hazards analysis to exclude the assu=ption that cables inside conduits will not be damaged by a design basis fire and propose any required codifications. Define spray protection

.seasures required to protect redundant divisions cf safe shutdown equipment due to the application of =anual firewater."

Rescense:

Enclosure (1) is the Conduit Failure Analysis Supple:ent to the fire hazards analysis previously sub=itted.

This analysis con-cludes that there are portions of four fire areas within the plant which will require auditional protection to fully =eet the acceptance criteria established. We propose to =cdify these areas to provide additional protection by either providing fire barriers, increased spatial separation or additional fire suppression as the conditions warrant.

The specific details for cdifications in

~

each area are presently being engineered and will be submitted f or :: cur review by June 30, 1973.

I plementation will be cc=pleted 5()OO$

q%I2 N OG3 7004260 0215!

}S

t w

Ma, ic73 GQL cSCL Mr. S. Varga no later than the end of the first regularly scheduled refueling outage.

As the details of the designs are worked cut, consideration will be given to the effect on redundant safe shutdcwn equipment from the application of =anual firewater. Protection, if and where required, will be provided by the following =ethods as dee=ed suitable:

1.

Ad=inistrative control in the for: of training instructions to fire brigade to lessen the possibility of wetting down unaffected equipment, 2.

fixed barriers or per=anent spray shields, 3.

te=porary spray shields such as fire retardant, water repellent tarpaulins.

C(3).l.4:

"Cc=plete an analysis demonstrating the capability of safely shutting down the plant independent of cabling and equipment in the cable spreading roc = and propose any required =odifications."

Rescense:

Enclosure (2) is one copy of the Loss of Cable Roc = Supplement to the fire hazards analysis. The report indicates those functions required for safe shutdown which would be lost due to the complete loss of the Cable Roc = due to a Design Basis Fire.

'Je propose to make plant =odi-f' tions as necessary to re-establish safe shutdown capability i_c pendent of the Cable Roo=.

Such modifications will result in a

' cal control station, possibly in one of the DC Switchgear roo=s located in the Control Building, elevation 280'6" So=e shutdown operations will require operator actions locally at the safe shutdown equipment. The operating procedure to be develcped will identify those actions and locations. Plant =odifications will include, if necessary, ce==unication and lighting systa=s to assure adequate coordination ability and access. Specific details for required =odifications are presently being engineered and will be submitted for your review by June 30, 1973 and will be Laple=ented prior to the end of the first regularly scheduled refueling outage.

Very truly ycurs,

/

/

,/

J. G. Herbein

/

Vice President f

vsa:onz:2,,5 Inclesure 9