ML19220B115

Responds to NRC Requesting Addl Info Re Prevention of Unacceptable Boron Concentration

ML19220B115
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	06/25/1976
From:	Arnold R Metropolitan Edison Co
To:	Kniel K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GQL-0924, GQL-924, NUDOCS 7904250451
Download: ML19220B115 (7)

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([ mg &g# J-Director of ?Iuclear 3eacter Eernlat.en e

Attn:

Mr. Karl Kniel, Chief 9~/

3 ranch !ic. 2-2 U.S. "uclear Pegulatcry Cc -.i. wen j

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--'isshington, DC 20555 A

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L Ycur letter of July 'L.

' '7 c requested additicnal informatien which might be needed to shcv ccnfo. mnce te ?.C CFR 50.46.

In cu-letter of February 26, 1976 ve respenled to ycur request for infc mation abcut (1) an updated ECCS single failure analysis, (2) analysis of the effect of sub-merged valves, and (3) calculations of mini== backpressure. Since that time, the 2C-2 ?SAR has been revised to shev ccnformance to 10 CFD 50, Appendix by referencing tcpical reports 3A'4-lC103 and 3A*4-101CL.

The remaining request for infer =atic.: concerned the ability of the CC-2 design and operating prccedures to prevent unacceptable beren con-centratica. Attachment 1 entitlad " Operating Methods tc Eliminate Any Fatential for Unacceptably High Scric Acid Ccncentraticns" supplements tcpical re;crt 3AJ-10103 vith 2C-2 plant-specific informatien en oper1 ting procedures and single failures. A te=perature detectcr vill be added tc the decay heat drop line to prcvide indicatien of flev in this line.

No cther =cdificaticns were required in the plant.

'"his information ec=pletes cur respcnse to ycur lecter of July 2L,19~5.

'Je are unaware cf any cther correspcndence requesting additional infer aticn concerning the ECCS evaluation of CC-2 vith relation to 10 CFR SC, Appendix ':.

ve.y : 17 ycurs, 79042504f1

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~'he nethods cf cperation to be used in icng tern eccling to eliminat e any pctential for unacceptably high beric acid concentrations in the ccre regicn are listed telev:

Path A Open the "E drop line to the '.FI string to establish g-avity draining frc: the hot leg to the reactor building emergency s=p.

"'his vill pull injecticn flev through the core at a rate equal to the drain ficv rate.

path 3 Cpen the auxiliary spray to the pressurizer. This vill route dilute injecticn to the area above the core. Figures 1, 2, and 2 show the fiev paths for nocal injection e.nd both dilution paths.

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'"he tvc paths available proviie bcron dilutien ass =in~ the verst e

single failure. Table 1 identifies the = cst damaging single failures, and the path which would be affecced. :Tc single failure disables both paths. In all cases, the =cs* damaging single failure is in the onsite electrical system. In eitL;.r case, however, the failure of any of the individual cc=penents listed could result in a less of that

=cde if the failure can not be corrected by operating persennel in a suitable time fra=e.

~'he valves required for operaticn of each path are not submerged as a result of post-LCCA flecding of the centai=ent (see Table II-l of letter frc R. C. Arnold dated Februa-y 26, 1976

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v All valves located within the reacter building (DH-V1, 7171 L 72, RC-71, V3, 71h9) that =ust te operated in either pa'" - electric

=ctor operated (E40) and located cutside of the secondary shield vall. All of the valve cperators are qualified fcr the LCCA environ-ment.

If pcver is not available to any of the valves required to implement either path, electrical jumper cables vill be used to connect power to the E'O controller.

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7 days after the accident. Injection ficv to the RC Systen vi. be maintained th cugh tvc nc=al ICCS paths (see Figure 1) while initiating both alternate flow paths.

"he two ncr:al safety injection ficv paths can be either the two LP injecticn lines or One LP injecticn line ec=bined with cne HPI string ('.?! pu=p acting as tccster pu=p fer H"! p=p ).

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Path A 0:en the EE drc; line to the RB sr=p:

i a.

Close DH drop line DiO valve DE-V3.

Maintain injection flew to reactor vessel through two injectica flev paths by any of the folleving:

(1) One LPI punp operating with LPI discharge cross connect open (valves DE-n93A and DE-n923) and the flov split between the two injection lines by throttling control valves DE-V126A & 3.

(2) One L?I string in " piggy back" with one EPI string (DE-VTA cr 3).

b.

Assu=e LPI pu=p A is shut down. Valves DE-V1 (or ;I'-nn), CE-72, and CE-VlCCA are open. Open DE-V-lC2A (interlocks between DE-VlC0 and 102 vill have to be defeated). Cpen su=p cutlet DIC valve DE-V6A.

The te=perature =easure=ent in the DE drop line vill be used to deter =ine whether the drop line is draining by gravity to the su=p or not, because it is possible that a valve in the flow path is not actua.lly open. The indicated te=perature should change if gravity draining exists. Note the DE drop line indicated te=perature and then cpen the drop line Dio valve DE-V3.

A change or a fluctuation in the indicated te=perature is an indication of flov. The initial tenperature indication vill be lov and gravity draining frc= the hot leg vill significantly increase the indicated te=perature.

c.

Maintain injection flow to reactor vessel thrcugh two injection ficv paths per ite (a) above.

Path 3 Oten auxiliary stray line to pressuri::er:

a.

This path vill be established %diately after Path A.

b.

Close =ain pressurizer spray line m0 valve EC-V3 cr V1, or beth.

c.

If LPI pu p A is not operattr;, it is asst =ed LPI cross connect valves DE-n93A and B are open. LPI pu=p flev is being split between the two LP injection lines by throttling control valves DE-V128A L 3.

Close LPI pu=p A sucticn valve DE-V102A as additional assurance against possible backflev thrcugh pu=p recirculation line.

d.

Open auxiliary spray line valve DE-V-167 Unlock cnd c1cse breaker for auxiliary sprsy line EMO valve; cpen valve EC-n k9 The spray flev path is ncy established. Opening and cicsing spray line D:C valve EC-V1k9 vill produce slight chr ges in the indicated LPI ficv rate and also in the indicated LPI pu=p discharge pressure to ecnfir that spray flev exists. This flev path vill result in k0 sp= injection into the hot leg.

e.

Muntain injectica flev to reactor vessel thrcugh two injection ficv paths per ite (a) of Mcde 2 above.

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TA3LE 1

SUMMARY

OF WCEST SL'IGLE FAILUFIS WEICE FISULT I3 U'iAVAILA3ILITY OF C'E oare EUI? EIT AFFECTED SINGLE FA2URE PATH A PATH E h160 V bus 2-IE(2-22)

LH-V3(2)*

Ncce 480 V MCC DH-Vl&V171 Ncne 2-1123 h80 V MCC None RC-71h9 2 h23 RC-V3 hSO V MCC RC-V1 2-323

• DH-V3 is outside centai=ent, while DH-72 is inside contai=ent.

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OH-U 933 DH-H 93A bX X

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DH-V7B Pu=ps 9 DH-V128L CH-V4E CH-V4; DH-V12SA T

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Euilding Valves Shom b No -.21 Post-LOCA Conaition i

'3 230 FIGURE 1 NCRMAL CIfW PATHS CF COOLING WATER INTO CORE

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PATH A: DRAIN HOT LET INTO i

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DH-V101B DH-V101A Dil-113B DH-113A f

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Valves Shown in Normal l

l Post-LOCA Condition 3

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FIGURE 3 PATH B: INJEC*!CN TPRCUGi AUXILIARY SPRAY LINE IV70 PRESSURIZER

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