ML19220A824
| ML19220A824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1979 |
| From: | Ahearne J, Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904250009 | |
| Download: ML19220A824 (30) | |
Text
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1 f
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
3 4
DISCUSSION OF THREE-MILE ISLAND INCIDENT o
(Closed to Public Attendance) o 7
Chairman's Conference Room 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
2 April 2, 1979 lu, 11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice at 12:20 a.m.
12 Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
13 PRESENT:
1,,
Chairman Hendrie f
15 Co=missioner Gilinsky Cc=missioner Kennedv
, o-Cc=missioner Bradford Ccmmissioner Ahearne 3/
n' ' : O D. 'r =.c =".."..
,,.o S. Chilk 19.:
L.
Bickwit I
W.
Dorie 20 [
A.
Kenneke 1
21 22 (Note:
This transcript is constructed frem a 22 tape recording.)
70-0E8
--22 7904250069
~
s BACKGROUND INFORMATION As the Three Mile Island situation developed beginning on Wednesday, March 28, the Commissioners met to discuss the nature of the event and scheduled a staff briefing held on March 29 at 9:50 a.m.
The emergency nature of this situation at Three Mile Island led the Ccmmission to go into " continuous" session for the duration of the event beginning on the morning of March 30.
This meant that whenever a quorum was present, it was part of the continuous session. Because of the nature of these sessions, particularly on Friday, March 30, Saturday, March 31, and Sunday, April 1, most of the Ccanission meetings were held outside the Chairman's Conference Rocm which is equipped with magnetic tape recorders.
Part of Saturday's and Sunday's meetings, for example, were at the Incident Response Center at Bethe:da.
The nature of these meetings was informal and of ten interrupted.
Commissioners and staff members came and went as conditions arose.
During many of the sessions, multiple conference telephone calls and twoway telephone calls were made and received that were difficult to record and to transcribe.
These continuous meetings were for the most part recorded by several portable tape recordert using mini cassettes and regular cassettes.
Nonetheless, in the fast moving events connected with this incident, there may have been times when Commissioners discussed matters which were not recorded.
The transcripts of the tapes of these continuous sessiens, particularly where the meetings were held outside the regular meeting room, are a composite of several tapes. For all of the reesons above, these tran-scripts do not represent formal or official Ccanission statements on the matters discussed therein, nor have they been reviewed or edited by the Commi ssion.
\\
';0- 089
2 A
1 PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's call the meeting to order.
3 This, at the moment, continues to be one of the 4
closed session in connection with the -three-mile thing.
5 I should tell you that I have got to go over and
.i see Jack Watson at 1:00 o'cicek, so I may have to go off 6
7
[ and leave you discussing things.
I.
Let me give you a brief rundown.
I have been talkin 8
i 9
to Harold this morning at the center and so on.
Harold went 10 on -- a little af ter 11:00 o' clock -- for a press briefing 11 in which he discussed -- and there is a tape of that en 12 the way down to you, so you can hear the full briefing right a
13 off the tape.
14 MR. CHILK:
There is also a transcript coming down.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, there will be a transcript 16 coming.
17 Now, what Harold did was to explain in some detail 18 at this briefing, the various pressure -- the various 19 ;:! measurements which have been made, the bubble volume and s
20 j the fact that those have been trending down.
He discussed
'21 ;' the nature of the measurement, the substantial error band i.li 22, en it is about plus or minus 200 cubic feet. So, you knew, 23 we started cut aroun$d 1,000 and then there were Eeasurements 24 at 850 and then 600 or 700, and then yesterday af terncen l
25 350 and 200.
One late last night around -- the last one I 70-090
3 l'
saw, I guess, about 1:00 a.m. or something like that was 2
about -- just below 200.
The last measurement Harold had 3
,. this morning, he called me just before he went into the 4
briefing, was 25 cubic feet plus or minus 200.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Does he believe the numbers 6
are now -- because the constant trend, he got some ---
i 55 7
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, the terms in which he 8
discussed it was that clearly in spite of the very substantial 9
error that the bubble volume is coming down ---
10 CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Where is it going, though?
1' 1 CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:
Well, let me discuss that in a
~
12, minute.
But let me tell you what he said so that you know 13 what sort of a consensus view of the organization is and the 14, people on site.
15 But it is coming down and is either now gone or s
16 very -- or much smaller, and that, you know, vedy encouraged 17 by that.
We have the customary regulatory conservatism 18 ' about proudly announcing that it is all gone, because there h
19 'l is a substantial error, but it is clear that even with the i
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20 ji substantial crror that is
-moving rapidly in the right F.
21 direction and the concerns then, over the hydrogen bubble t
l-22 and its possible effects on this system is -- that concern i;
23 is very considerably mitigated now and on its way to not 24 being of concern much longer.
25 Secondly, the discussion about the evolution of
'iG- 091
e i.
4 e
i hydrogen and the evolution of oxygen and Harold also discussed, and Roger Mattson, I guess, covered that detail 3, for him, the high early estimates of cxygen evolution rate 7
4 4 )thatgaverisetoconcern the fact that when recalculation 5
was done, taking into account the substantial hydrogen 6 ll overpressure in the system, that we got out to all the e
7 [ experts in the country and that numbers of people who are a
8 [.theverybestonthissubject, new are in full consensus, n
9 and the staff at Bethesda is now in full consensus, that in fa 10 ' with that much hydrogen over-pressure in the system there n
11,' has not been any substantial evolution of oxygen at anytime
,i l
12 ;; in the system. So that that concern is pretty well put to i:
13 l bed now, too.
?
14,
gi J.,. c" Where did the hydrogen go?
I don't -- he discussed s
15,
CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And how did it get there?
li 16,.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And how did it get'out, yes, d
6 17 y
-- He discussed the ways in which
'.t could ccme k
18 l! out in which one or another or the full cc=l ination are 0
19 l certainly the reasons, and they are briefly -- there are i
20 j! a couple of letdown -- in effect, letdcwn streams from the I!
21 '! primary system.
One is the pump seal leakage co:ing e
i 22 ' liquid cut of the system, and it comes out with some hydrogen i
23 j gas in it.
So that comes out of the system, comes in to
'i 24 - storage tanks, letdcwn and storage tanks, and then when il 25 :, it is pumped back into the system it doesn' t have that h
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1 hydrogen system in it, because it is out gas at the lower 7
pressure.
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l, You've got a letdown line, there's the 10 gpm t
4 2 or so going back into the system.
Probably the main place 5 l the hydrogen went -- I guess that has to be my speculation --
l 6
ll is this stream which we have been taking from the discharge I:
7 y of the main circulated pump, which runs up into the top of 8 l'ii the cressurizer and then that water is sprayed as a fine b
9 yspray,downthroughthepressurizer.
There's the norm for 10 operating stream, and that's a good physical chemistr'(
11 h; sort of gas stripping operation.
You then get -- in train,
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12 j (desolved ' gases come* out in that steam bubble in the pressuri e
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13 ',l and then they vent from that gas base just into the contain-a.
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14 3 ment.
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15 ]
Now, we are kind of surprised at the rate at which li 16 ii it has moved on out.
Your instincts for the rat'e at which I
17 gas would go into solution and then be stripped out by this --
18 ! it is only about 20-30 gpm flow -- ycur instincts would be i
19 ' that that wouldn't move that much hydrogen.
On the other 20 hand, we have to recognize that we don't have any way to
'21 know whether we've had one big bubble or maybe a big bubble b' in the veisel and a smaller one over in that --
one of those 22 i I
23 l or both of those top elbows in the heat exchange -- in the 24 ] steam generator inlet piping, er in fact, whether the hydrogen I
o 25 L whether there never has been any substantial large bubble, but h
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l ric -003 I.
6
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the hydrogen has been in very small bubbles that are sort of entrained in'the circulating water in the primary system.
3 So that maybe that 20 gpm is not carryirg just hydrogen that r
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4 is actually desolved in the liquid, but a lot of small bubbles 5 ) which would be a much more effective mass transfer -- transport F
ll mechanism.
7 Don Davis did a rough calculation late last night i
8 l trying to see whether that mechanism would be compatable with 9
', apparent rate of mass transport, and it is, at least, within 10 the ballpark.
3, So our situation at the moment is that the bubble 12 f is either' gone or about to go by mechanisms which are a good
.f 13 deal less uraumatic than we thought might have to be the case.
3,-'. And the oxygen -- the explosion capability is gone.
Out on the containment side, the containment hydroge:
3 r
16 ' measurements continue to run at about two percen't plus a
I.
17 ; little -- I don't know what the precision is on those, but h
18 !l they haven' t changed all that substantially over the last h
19 !, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and they are just about now -- either the i
20 l recombiner is now running or they are about to crank it up.
21 l There was debate about the pros and cons of running if you l
22
! don't need it urgently now.
On the other hand, why not 23 i go ahead ---
i.
24 COMMISSIONER AEIApr :
Did we get the other one on?
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2 5,.
CHAIRMAN EINDRIE: The other one is plumbed.
The tI y#(,* [u c
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I i
i y ! utility finished welding it in mid-afternoon yesterday and 2
is ready to go,.but Stello insisted that our recombiner man, 3
Vic Benaryo, spent all evening c=u22ng all over it, worrying i
4 i and testing and so on, great concern about the possibility because it is out in the 5 h.of leakage from that system, a
6 ljauxiliary building, and you know, that containment atmosphere i
!!' is murderously radioactive.
But they are about to crank it 7
c[ up, either that or it is running now, so that will pull down --
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CO.T.ISSIONER KENNEDY: Thev shielded them with those 9
n
' lead ---
10 i
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, with the lead brick.
11
. COMMISSIONER KCNNEDY:
-- brick?
12 CHAIR N HENDRIE: Call went out, they needed
.3 something like 50 tons and found about 400 of them.
14 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:
Yes, I know.
13.1 a
!i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The Island, I understand is ---
3,O l
CEAIRMAN HENDRII: Settlinc.
17 a That's all right, I
listen, they are going to be shielding pieces of equipment
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'Ih in that auxiliary building and we a*e going to need it for 19 I
20 l months, and they are going to use every brick of that and jmaycallformore.
So I think that's just fine.
21 e ih Now, the next question immediately is:
Good, we 22 g hhavegottenridofthebubble.
Are we nLw ready o
23 4
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h decressurize and go down on to the rhr mode, the normal 1i decav cooline mode at a lower cressure and a lower temcerature 20 L
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y lit in the system.
I will recommend urgently that nobody make 2
a move nowhere Entil we know exactly hcw we are going to do il 3 [thatandalltheprosandcons.
4
[
"he utility side now has a functioning senior
.hadvisoryteamoutthereintheguardheadquartersat Olmstead
-3 6
Airbase.
They have pulled in canior reactor people from all a
7 over the country.
There are groups there from all over.
Il 8
4 COS1ISSIONER AHEARNE: So the technical comoetence 9
is now ur.
p 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The technical competence, on the j,
4 11 j utility side, people who have the experience, imagination and 1
12 ! the intellect, to think, very carefully through all of these il 13 0 options to balance then, is now in place and supplementing il u
14 [ very rapidly.
So that is very good, because instead of, in I
15 j effect, ou people being the plant engineering staff for I
16 these evclutions, are now -- you know -- they will now have 17 substantial technical strength on the utility side ---
18 l
COS1ISSIONER KENNEDY: Back into an agree mode.
I 19 CHAImiAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
20
-- we can now look at that and our people, ef
'21 course, will, you know, inevitably there will be arge mts 22
, about where the best balance is an& how to do this, a.d i
23]ouc of the concurrence that will come from those, why you n
il 24 1 get the best -- about as good as can be done.
lIl 25 i.
Since the system is new stable, we are not concerned c
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about the bubble and any explosion problems with it.
It is l
2 cooling nicely,'--
all the thermocouples, I believe, are 3
ne.,, "nder 400.
I.
4 The question is whether to move ahead aggressively 3 il to prepare for and make the transition to the decay heat o
6 E mode or whether to plan to stay here for a week or so and 7
let further decay cccur in the core.
One wants to look very i
8 L carefully at the event trees that flow from both of these 9
courses to see where your best option is, and that requires 10 some very careful examination and evaluation.
If you go 11 <; this way what are the possib'.e troubles you can get into and 12 l what are 'the relative' l keli?xds of those, and at each J
13 stage down either of these caths, where are vou lef t always 14 ' with the best standby and rsserve capabilities to dedl with 1
15 j the situation.
So I am telling people that we ought, by 16 ' no means, now to i= mediately plunge and start depressurizing, I
i 17 ij or even bringing the tempera ture down.
18 5 I talked at some length with Vic Stello last l':
19 night and we agreed that we.new need to be very carefu'.
20 i the baron concentrations in the system.
As I recall, t:
'i
'214 B&W clants, thev are more heavily redded -- contro' rodded
[I l
2 2,' than some of the others so that you have a smaller need for 23 " boron poison in the primary water as you come to cold shutdown F
24, that is, down maybe at 120 maybe or 150 degrees, but you n
25 [ still need baron in the system to come to cold shutdown,
. _ goer l
l i-
10 l'
negative temperature coefficients, reactivity increases as the temperature comes down.
ind we want to think a little 3
bit abcut whether that highly damaged core and fission 4
products in the water creates any sort of a chemical situation 5
or whether coolant temperatures, coupled with the chemistry, 6
would give you any proclivity for taking boron out of a solution that you wouldn' t have in a normal plant situation.
e 3
So I think we ought to stay right where we are until we 3
have thought through all of these things.
10 CO!Oi!SSICNER KENNEDY: They put a lot of boron in it 11
.Sout two or three day: ago.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, well the water that you 13 pump in is a borated solution.
14 CO!OiISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes, but my recollection, 15 didn't they dump a whole lot in for the same reason a couple 16 dav. s ac.e ?
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, it's a thing that you would 13 There is a horated water storage tank that hangs there ready 19 to put a strong solution in.
It is running at about -- it
,,20 seems to me 800-odd ppm boron.
That's plenty at 280 F.
21 I want to make sure that it's plenty at -- even at ambient 22 temperature, 70 degrees or whatever, and that there isn't 23 an inclination, in view of the accident chemistry situation.
24 CO!Oi!SSIONER AHEARNE: At one time they were worried 25 about a potentially high leak rate out of the RER pumps.
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1 CHAIRMAN ENDRIE:
That's -- that -- Yes.
2 One of the aspects of going to decay coo. ling is 3
that you come off a mode in which the primary circulation is within the containment and the hea t removal is within 5 :
the containment and what is ccming -- what carries the energy
[isthat second day's steam from ---
6 7
COMMISSIONER AHIARNE:
Right.
i 8
~
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- the steam generator going 9
over and condensing in the condensor hotwell on the turbine 10 generator set.
L got to a mode in which you are piping 11 the primary water -- coolant water, out into the auxiliary 12 building"through a heat exchanger set of pumps and back in --
f 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But you still have the ---
14 CHAIRMAN ENDRIE:
-- and it's you know, that water 15 is hot as all hell.
And any leakage at pump seals, valve 16 bonnets, is going to be murderously hot.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Can they do it?
13 CHAIRMAN ENDRII:
Test the system?
19 '-
COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
Yes.
l-N CHAIRMAN ENDRIE:
I'm not sure ---
20 t
ii
'21 L COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: That or just the pumps.
i-22 CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
There ---
i 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It said the specs were no 24 more than 3 gpm leak rate.
25 CEAIRMAN ENDR~E:
Yeah ---
70 GS9
12 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's a pretty high leak 7
rate, isn' t it for water that's hot.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
4 And you always have to be ready for something like 5
blowing a shaft seal, in which case the leakage rate will go 6
up substantially.
7 Now, even if just the normal minimal valve bonnet I.
3 leakage and that little leak that you get around the pump 9
seal, it's not like a normal operating shutdown where those 10 pu=ps are down in the pit and the exchangers over here and 11 ' it is sort of open and so on.
You know, it is a fairly clean system.
'What we need to do is to get covers over those pits 12 a
a 13 ' so that the radioactivity, which will evolve from that leakage 1*,
is not just free to wonder around the auxiliarv building.
15 'It would chase up completely out of the building and the i:
16 " won' t be able to service anything else.
And all of these W
17 arrangements need to be well in place before me make a 1
n in any event.
3o transition,.
19 'i COMMISSIONER AREARNE: Are they pumping gas from I
il 20 h the waste tank back into the container or is that still an i.
21.' option that's not ---
22 CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:
I t. ' ? set to go, and I 23 '; don' t know whether they are doing it yet.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But they are not puffing, 25 burping much?
'70 100
13 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Harold says, no -- through late 2
last night and down through this morninc, the sort of -- the w
3 stuff -- the helicopters reporting tenths of a millir per 4
hour. There was a time earlier yesterday when there was 5
a little more stuff burping from that waste gas header, and 6
it was showing, oh, 4 or 5 millirem up in -- per hour up in 7
the plume.
So that, at the moment, is well down.
O COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
What with the bubble gone f
9 or diminishing, what do they worry most about now?
What are 10 the worst things that conld happen now?
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, the worry now -- you 12 remember,'we sort of had two worries -- well, we had several 13 worries before, but one of them is still with us, although 1 4 modestly diminishing, and that is that we get a change in the 15 system, lose off-site power, so you lose that pump or the 16 shaft bearings go.
You get a failure of the pum'p, you then l'/ 6 have to start one of the other circu_ating main pumps in 18 order t? keep that circulation up. Another pessible source of tr=dit U
19 d would ce losing the condenser over on the turbine generator 20 [ sets, so you don't have good capability to condense the steam 21 frcm the steam generator.
There are probably other possible ii 22 malfunctions that could occur, which would then leave you 23 where you were going to have to go -- the first thing you 24 would do would be to go into high pressure safety injection, 25 to keep the core covered, and you would have to relieve the 70 101
F t!f
'4 I
l' energy by periodic venting from the primary system to the i.
2 containment.
3 Well, you know, we have always had that set of hl: possibilities as a possibility that would lead us into -- back into saying:
Gee, maybe we'd better get people away for 5
fjsomedistance.
As time goes on, you get -- that situation is 6
I;i helped, at least modestly, by the fact that the after-heat 7
li 8
l' is going down a little bit all the time, and secondly, that h,
1 9
d as time coes on and the operating crews get more chance to f
10 !, work, why the maintenance of the operating equipment gets 11 j better and, you knew, you are feeling that you have a better u
12 h. control o'n keec. ino. it oceratin9 as it improves a little bit.
i P
13 j The off-site power situation is still a bit of a h
li : headache.
They had located -- early yesterday -- a set of
.,l i
13 gas turbines at about 2 megawatts capacity apiece and they 1
I 16 ~ were seeing whether they could get those on to the site.
It 17 would require, I think, it would require paralleling four 18 h of them and they were looking to see what the paralleling Il 19 and synchronization problems were, whether if they brought 20 them in they could get in the situation, but we are depending 21 in order to keep that circulation going at the present time, 22 i on the availability of off-site power.
l 23 Now, the utility sv. stem has done everytning it can fIJ to assure that supply.
Three-Mile Island is now a dedicated 24 i
l 2 5 '. mode of the GPU syster, and within their capability the I
l 7C 102 i
l U,
15 t
switch gear is all lined up now so that it is the last thing that drops if anyuhing,happens.
They have got the 3
{ breakers locked in and there will be power on those lines c,.
4
' as long as the grid has any capability to supply it in the 5
. line to there.
k l[
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What kinds of warning times 6
it 7
would go with a failure, at this point?
h CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think, a number of hours, 8
l}
9 Nbecause the kind of f ailures that occur now, with the bubble
.I e
10 gone and so you don' t have to worry about that range of 1
11] concerns, if a pump fails, you i=nediately try to bring on 12 b one of th'e others.
If that -- or a condenser vacuum goes, a
131 if any of that sequence goes you have got a number of hours --
14 ]
Well, a number of hours, like 10 or something like a
- 4 13 ;. that at least, on high pressure injection.
Then what you 4
16 !j would have to do is to let the pressure ccme down so that l'
17 'l the low pressure injection could pick up.
You could still 18 j! keep water in.
It just looks to me like the degraded i
19 sequences down these chains don' t have the f ast-moving i
20 a character that they would have had if you had a hydrogen i
s 21,l bubble in there that might expand down into the core and P
22 / void the fuel and leave an adiobatic heat-up situation and 23 ll'
~
so on.
i, I;
24 COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD:
What has the Governor li 22 said?
Is the pregnant women and small children advisory p'
4
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16 I
still ---
2 CHAIFS.AN HZ CRIE:
It is still in place.
He 3
reaffirmed it yesterday afternoon.
I went up to Harrisburg 4
late last night with Harold and we had a long talk with the 5
Governor and his staff.
Harold is being very frank with the 6
Governor, who is -- you know -- really shown a very sensible 7
and capable leadership capability trying to keep the balance, i-3 i and he is very much aware, and his s+'s very much aware of 9
the possibilities.
So Harold has felt free to be quite frank 10 with him.
11 I was able, last night, to discuss with them the
,i 12 r decision paper, and I have got a couple of things I want to r
13 say about that, af ter the discussions with them.
I think 14 I will also hear sometime today some results from a meeting 15 that the state people were having with Federa1 ' Preparedness
.a. " Agency ceoole and so on, this morning, late this morning, i:
17 abcut it at which that would be available.
And I left some 18 copies with them.
The decision -- Why don't I just talk about that 19 l
20 l for a minute, because I want -- in case I have to go --
i 21 on that report.
The decision sequence, they think, is a good l-reascnable thing to do.
In looking at our charts, one of 3,..
their --
i=nediate comments was that the evacua _on
,3 o
scenario is not a good fit.
It is not a total misfit, but 2,,
it is not all that good a fit with their capability.
And 2a-n, g 4 (.Q 9
4 17 1
I think we should recognize that, probably, and a fairly rapid modification of the thing.
We can halk to Grimes, 3
you know, and that kind of crowd and see if it is reasonable.
4 But what the Governcr and his people point out is 5
that they have an evacuation machine, think of it as a large 1
6 complex machine.
It can perform certain functions and is 7
prepared -- ycu knew -- you press the red button you get the i.
8 A Plan, the blue button, the yellow button and so on.
They 9
can't change that easily.
Their capability is evacuation on 10 a one-mile circle around the plant, a five-mile circle, a 11 ten-mile circle.
They are not able -- they don' t have a 12 quadrant' capability in that they don't have a two-mile 13 capability.
So I think the immediate realistic situation 14 with regard to evacuation scenario, if it is going to fit 15 well with them, I think our scenarios, what you do in certain 16 cases, need to fit their machine.
O therwise, yo'u present 17, them with a recommendation which they can ' t ---
e 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Execute.
4 I
1 9 ;l COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: That certainly --
20 h CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:
Which they can' t execute with
'l
.21j: precision.
They just have to take the next approximation in a
11 22 their machine.
U 23 "
COMMISSIGNER AEEARNE:
How hard would it be for 24 them en a longer run, let's say you conclude a week fron now 25 that, all right, here 's the way to get it down, but you
)
18 Y
conclude there still is a chance of pump seal leakage or
~
whatever, disc rupturing, that there cou1d be a large release.
~
3 Is it that hard for them to get a sector capability in, becaus 4
' you are talking substantial numbers of people is what you 5
are tal%ing about.
6 ['
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Their emergency side people are--
I CO!OiISSIONER AHEARNE:
I guess ---
8 very concerned about t::'fing CHAIRMAN HINDRIE:
9 to reconfigure the evacuation machinery with all the people 10 d
an
=
-e links in it and so on in order to do something 11, like that.
12 ;
it is certainly true that in pointing that
- Now, le 13 ' out, they were thinking in terms of ---
14 COffiISSIONER AHEARNE:
Immediate response.
15 '
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
a fairly short-term response.
16 CC"MISSIONER AHEARNE:
Or perhaps a planned 17. approach they could handle.
e 18;'
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But -- so -- and since it seemed r
19 i to me that we are -- you know -- that we are not by any 20 0 means anchored in concrete here and we are very anxious that ll 21 ji we fit well with them, that -- We just didn't get in to u
i 42, mucn discussion or what you might do if 10 c.ays trom r
zu, now you cecace, as a precautionary measure and before you 24 start a maneuver that you would like to do something.
25 That's possible we could go back and discuss'it.
I thought
?
'ic 1Cli
19 I
I ought to report to you that their immediate response to 2
this was hel,ful and so on, but that those evacuation 3
' scer.arios that weren' t a good fit to their machinery.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If we are really looking 5 [ at possibly leaving this present situation in place for 6 i a week or more, presumably the Governcr is going to have to 7
revisit that reccc=endation as to pregnanc uomen and small 8
children.
9 CHAIRMA ' EENDRIE :
Pregnant wcmen and so on.
Yes.
10 COMMISSIC :ZR BRADFORD:
Is there any thought given 11 to -- of course that concern does primarily does mean a 12-question 'of the possibility of small releases.
That, of i,
13~ course, it is not the only concern in the situation and may 14 not even be a dcminant concern as quiet as it is now.
Two 15, if he relaxes that, at the same time saying something to n
16 the effect that if you don' t have to be close-in'to the 17,, plant until we get that under control, don' t be.
That is, i-18ilitisnot that the evacuation is over but it is just i
19 'j sc=ething that continues to caution people that things i
20 i aren't co=pletely back to normal.
'21 j!
CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:
I don't know whether he can i
f 22 e cut it that fine, Peter.
N 2 3
COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: But what I'm concerned 24 about is that obviously at the point where he drops tha:
i 25, adviscry, which he may feel he has to do if he foresees
+
70-107 i
l1
!i
I 20
~.
I the situation going on for a couple of weeks and we don't 2
anticipate even small releases, that that not at the same 3
time be a signal that the crisis is over. and you don' t have 4
to worry.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think whatever he says in 6
connection with a removal of his recommendation for i
7 pregnant women and pre-school children, you know, he strikes l-8 i me as a pretty sensible guy -- you know -- the things that 9
he has said have been very sensible in his regard, and I'm 10 sure that they will be couched in the terms which says that 11 you knew, we continue to have a situation at the plant that 12,i is not fr'ee of all c.otential c.roblems.
I think that kind i.
13 of background tone can be added to it, but I don't -- I o
14' kind of had the feeling last night that he would find it 15 : difficult to find scme intermediate cut between a recommen-i 16> datien -- not a mandatory, but a recommendation that c.rea.nant 17 ;. wcmen and preschool children stay away from within five i
18, miles of the plant, and to find an intermediate cut that n
19 hsays, well, if he removes that recommendation, on the other t.
20l hand, if you don't havg to come back don't.
I have just got 21 ' a notion that ---
b l'
29 i.
CCM'4ISSIONFR AHEARNE : That's too fine a distinction.
U 23 !
CHAI.V1AN HENDRIE:
that he will find himself
,. n then trapped unable to answer the question:
Governor are vo" 9
r 25, telling me to ask my wife to come back or not to come back?
'/C N i
l l
21
~
l Say yes or no.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, what's happened is 3
that he's rather substantially simplified the evacuation 4
situation for one set of reasons which may not continur_ to 5
be his concern, on the other hand, you want to still have 6
the -- it seems to me that assurance that ---
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I tell you, Middletown is --
8 I guess the population of Middleto in is at about 15 percent 9
of normal.
The other towns in the area ---
1C COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Fifteen?
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
12 -
There are a substantial number of people who have 13 lef t frcm as far away as Harrisburg and other places off in 1 4 the 20 to 30 mile range.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I have heard of seme pecole 16 who left Washington, too.
17 ;
(Laughter) t 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: What, after my somewhat equivocal 19 announcement at the press conference that I wasn' t concerned 20 ;! about Washington, which might be for other reasons than i:
'21 [ radioactive ---
i 22,
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: By the way, I wender if it is l-23 clear that pregnant wcmen are covered by this one -- the f'
24 dotted line in the Column B, projected doses of 1 rem otcle ocd.
25 cr 5 ran dan =id stay inside.
That basically covers a
"iG ' ' 09
,1 l.
i 22 I
children and pregnant women, and --
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But not others?
I ---
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, you are basically i'
throwing everybody into the same group.
In other words ---
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Don ' t separate them.
n l}
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- we are just saying that C
j'l
=
e you know, if you mapped out the doses and it is going to be n
li 8
[ over 5 and you say, get out of there, if it is going to be 9
over 1, you say, stay inside.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And that's the fine 11 tunning ---
12 j.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And that's the guideline l
13 for pregnant women.
i 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Oh.
15,
MR. KENNIKE:
Everybody is controlled by the 16 limiting group.
e 1 7 '!
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
All right.
ii 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's where the " stay 19
'I inside" guidelines come from.
t
.II 20 !.!
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I guess somebody pointed that I
.21 l out to me and it just didn' t get it, i
22 i' No, I think, you know, de guidelines are 23 consistent with ---
L 24 !;
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I guess what isn't on here
!i 25 F is that the -- it refers to two EPA guidelines and it is not i:
O 70~110 l'
H l*.;
23
~
f
=ade clear that the one is for pregnant women.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
I tell you, I think these 3
are the EPA guidelines.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Oh, yes, they are, exactly, 5
because ---
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think it would be useful to 7
note that explicitly so that people aren' t in any doubt 8
whether this is the same as the thing they have seen before ---
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSK'I: Right.
This is exactly 10 following ---
11 MR. KENNIKE:
The numbers also appear in the statets
~
12 emergency plans.
13 CHAIPRAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I think it ought to ---
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Joe, are people being given 15 any kind of badges, at least the close-in people to sort
^
16 cf keep tracr, ((gd their ---
N U
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: There's a -- I don't think so, 18 because I ---
19 '
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You didn't notice then?
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, and we didn't have badges t
21 over there in the Command Center.
People who went in the 22 plant had badges, but there is a very substantially enhanced, 23 I guess DOE's pulled in a really heavy blanket area mcnitor 24 of the situation.
In fact, there was a report in the press 25 or the press implied that there wasn't anything up to that
>;0-111
r
[
24 i
I E time.
COFD1ISSIGNER AHEARNE:
Is it possible to get enough l,badgesto, at least, for this area?
3 f
4 CHAIRMAN ENDRIE:
For all the people in the area
r[ I don't know.
I would guess it would be possible.
What are 3
!i ld! we talking about, cnly a few thousand people, I would guess.
0 7
h CCFSiISSIONER KENNEDY:
A few thousand?
li 8
U CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, you are just talking about 9
maybe a couple of miles or ---
10,,
CCFS1ISSIONER KENEDY:
Yes.
Are you talking about
~
11 the general population or what?
12!!
- COFSiISSIONER AHE?_RNE: Yes, in that ---
4 13 "
COMMISSIOER BRADFORD:
Yes, it would be a good i:
14 ll idea to at least get a good sample, I think ---
_j 13 L
COFSiISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.
9 ll 16 ;'
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well ---
!i 17 l MR. THOMPSON:
I think HEW is doing something along li 18 !! those lines, I don't know precisely what they are, but I ---
e' l
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They may be badging people, 20 sort of on a sampling basis or something like that.
I i
21 i don't know, and I'm not sure ---
Il 22 ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Vic, you didn't have the l!
s' 23 i long term.
24 j
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I just put a line
.I 25 ij down there on the bottom of page 2, just so it won't be --
1.
1; 1
70-112 3
I h
5 1
25 I
I didn't fill it in, but it just flags it.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE-Yes.
Let's --
3 You can check and see what Harold thinzs.
I don't 4
know, maybe --
If we could --
Peg?
(Chairman Hendrie refers to his secretary.)
6 If we could get a squawk-box it would help so we 7
could get a quick rundown frem Harold once a day.
e r
8 i,
MR. DORIE:
iure.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In here?
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, some convenient place, 1,
and I think this would be a go'od room, because it allows us 12 to hold -- a convenient closed meeting or whatever else is 13 ' going on, and. see what they think down at the site is a good 14,- time.
I'm not sure.
My guess would be that maybe just 15 before, or maybe it would be better just after his morning 16 briefing or something like that, because he is just then 17 ;; pulled together and there have been a set of questions, he I:
18 f can tell us what he said and also indicate to us what some li 19 of the questioning line was and what he said.
Let us see s
20,! what we can do.
h
~ 21 "
Okay, I think I'm going to have to sprint off.
I 22.Now, there are a series or items that we cucht to becin to i
6 23 turn to.
I think there are sort of several areas, and I
?
24 ; think you began to discuss them yesterday.
25 l One of them is, could a couple of commissioners ---
l-i 97bg_.4j i
c
d L
26 1
Think about what we ought to say to Governor Brown's --
2 that is the other B&W plant situation.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We need to decide what it 4
is we are going to say generally to people about that, nou 5 j. just Governor Brown.
e r
CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
Yes. -
l 7
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We have a telegram from n
8 I Mr. Dodd and some other people ---
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Anyway, start to begin to think 10 about that so we can discuss it.
I don't know, Vic, would 11, you take lead on that and keep track of it. Did you already -
t i
12 [
' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Does this involve a field i:
13 ;' trio. ?
a 14 '
(Laughter)
~
15.
COMMISSICNER KENNEDY: We already got in touch with i
11 16 Governor Brown's office, b) provided him with a' copy of 1:
17 il the paper that was sent out to the Regions, and c) reminded b
12 '; him that there is an NRC person, a resident inspector ---
l 19 i
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, of course, we now have i
20 l a telegram from him saying that ---
l
'21 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Well, that was the telegram i
22 4 he sent yesterday.
He told us he was sending it.
h 2 3,,
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
Okay ---
24 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
He was sending it, you know, il 25 ' without regard to our answers to him.
'70- 114 e
i i
i.
I' t
27
~.
1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And the other thing that I think you were beginning to discuss yesterday was, you know, 3
once the 4-ediate urgency of the operational situation dies 4
- ! down a little bit, why, there are going to be questions about 4
5 who ought to investigate whom, and it seems to me these are 6
going to come on several levels.
G 7 3:
We, the NRC, have clearly got a major post-mortem l'
8 6 effort that has to go on, so we understand what went on at 9
the plant and who did what to whom and why, and why they 10 thought was a good thing to do or not a good thing if they 11 '! didn' t do it, because we have significant questions to deal 12,, with about the plant, its design, operation and future actions 9
13
- instructions with regard to design and administrative 14 procedures and so on.
Clearly wa are willing to do that.
l o. a Chere is also going to have to be a major investi-16 gatcry affort, I'm sure, with regard to ---
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
How it all happened.
1.
18 CHAIEMAN EENDRIE:
Well, sort of in two stages.
I 19 How well organized was the government, notably, 20
. NRC with a system which -- you know -- in terms of with I
21,i review of this plant's design and inspection and review of i
22 its operation.
This and other plants, cenerallv, and I 2 3
'l, suppose somebody will want to know, did'we behave curselves a
24 Y in this particular incident.
1 2a [
nell, you know, I'd love to be in charge of those i.
(O t "b '
'lI, u
- I l
li n.
P, i:
b 28 l'
I l
1 investigations --
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And how not to ---
l.
3 i.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- but I doubt that option will llbeoffered.
We might think about what sort of recommendation 4
o 5
we might make.
The President has already said in Middletown ll yesterday that we will want to look very carefully into this
!,I 7
b event and understand what it was ---
I!
3 ll COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
John's point has been that
- l 9
in same reasure, we should request that kind of an analysis.
i.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, you know, recogni::ing that 11 !! it is inevitable, and also, quite proper, I think -- you i
12jknow, our' suggestions as to who and how, I think, are Il 13 j pertinent to having that decision made and things set up, I.
14 i
and John would you ---
15 '
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Fine.
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- and with the und'erstanding on 17 these things and others that it is an eff ort to try to help 18 get our thinking started, and that the Commission has to I
19 meet and discuss.
20 I'm going to have to sprint, and please go on, fImustsay,
~21 for about four days, I ha"= quit with the last i
22 word in the Response Center about 3:00 a.m.
thinking, okay, I.
23 j I think maybe we are beginning tc get our hands around it, Il 24 and by 7:00 o' clock in the morning when I'm back on the phone f
25 i
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: This morning's crisis hasn't h
,, - i g tu i
f k
p
P li l-29 i..-
t P' come up yet.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It hasn't happened. By George, 3
. that's right.
The 7:00 o' clock cris!s hasn't ---
?!
4 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE:
Right.
p' 3
CHAIR >AN HENDRIE:
I regard that as a favorable 9
6 h plan.
1 li 7
COMMI~SSIONER AHEARNE: 'Ihat scunds like a dam cscilaticn.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
In spite of the large errormade n
llinthemeasurement, I regard this as a favorable ---
9 10 l COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: But the last morning that P
11 happened was Thursday.
12,,
(Laughter)
Ii 13 !i (Chairman Hendrie departed the meeting. )
e 14 {i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm not sure, what with the i
15 li source of the informatier.
df.sappearing what else lI 16 ij we could sit around and discuss.
h 17 'l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: As far as fixing this 18 ;! thing is concerned, we can discuss a little bit more about 19 people's concerns are.
Well, I guess I understand it a 20 little ---
'21l CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, if they discu. 4 it ic 22 '}l and they tell you then don' t have any other options,
all 23 j you can do is --
ll 24 h COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I'm not altocether sure that i
25 that's the way it is.70-117 I
li
. ~ ~
- 30 t
i e
1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Particularly if the time-2 scale is becoming as big as it is.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, I know why ---
A (Simultaneous conversations ~amongst Commissioners.)
[.
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
-- they have taken in l'
6 [sectorslikethat---
1.
7
'[
CO.51ISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
8 L
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
-- and in order to be 9
prepared to do something, they put people all over, that 10 : means the resources have been distributed, you see.
i.
11 "
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes.
l' i.
12 [
~ COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Now, if they want to la 13, reallocate their resources, you don' t need these resources i
14 ll out here, but what you really need is these resources going 15 out there.
They do have a problem, but it means an augmental F
16. resource capability.
L 17 "
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, you don't want them 18 !! to move resources around, because another sector may have to i
19
' go at another time.
20 i
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's exactly the nature of
'21
' the problem.
That means considerably into this volume of l'
22 ' resources that are going to have to be mustered.
2 3 ;i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't see why,--
24 j (Simultaneous Commissioner conversations.)
2a_F CO:Ci!SSIONER SRADFORD:
We should probably break.
e ii
['
(Whereupon, the above-entitled meeting was adjourned I at 1:02 c.m.)
>~b3-4 4 o o
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