ML19220A698
| ML19220A698 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1975 |
| From: | Schweiker R SENATE |
| To: | Anders W NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904240137 | |
| Download: ML19220A698 (2) | |
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t Mr. William Anders, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission washington, D.C.
20545 1
Dear Mr. Anders:
I anderstand you have been notified of a statement delivered on June 4 in a Washington news conference by two former security guards at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant located on the Susquehanna ?,iver near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
These two gentlemen, Mr. John Darcy and Mr.
Joseph Shapiro, visited my office after their news conference and spoke with a member-of my staff.
They left, for my review, a copy of their statement, and elaborated upon it in their discussion.
The former guards' statement contains several charges, alleging in sum that security for the Three Mile Island plant is extremely lax, and concluding that, based upon personal experience, it is their opinion that an intruder or saboteur could con-t ceivably enter the plant and cause serious damage l
with little opposition.
The Three Mile Island plant, as you know, is located in a highly populated section of Pennsylvania.
More than a million Pennsylvanians live within a 50-mile radius of the plant, including residents of such population centers as Lancaster, Lebanon, York, i
i Harrisburg, and Carlisle.
Moreover, Three Mile Island lies only 80 miles from downtown Philadelphia.
As a United States Senator from Pennsylvania, I am very concerned over the possibility that this nuclear reactor may be improperly protected from intrusion.
Accordingly, I enclose a copy of the N;n)q g g,)_
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Mr. William Anders June 6,
1975 Page Two statement by Messrs. Darcy and Shapiro, with a request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission fully investigate I
the alleged security problem at Three Mile Island.
Please advise me of further developaents in this matter, and whether !!RC regulations are being adhered to in the plant's security system.
l Your consideration of this gatter will be appreciated.
Sin /
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, m Ricnard S.
Schweixer United States Senator RSS:rmt ga a.
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STATE:'EN'.
iY JOHil DARCY M!D JOSEPH
'.PIRO ON SECURITY PRECAUTIOilS AT THREE 11ILE ISLAi!D ilUCLZAR PLA:JT IN DAUPHIH COUHTY, PEMISYL'/l,NIA This joint statement is made by tuo men who were formerly employec as security guards at the Three Iille Island (TMI) nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
Ue make this statement because we regard ou ?alves en professional security men and we are concerned about the lax secsrity standards we have observed at the L' hen we voiced our concerns to compcny manacement, TMI.
company seemed more interested in sweeping things under the rug than in inproving security, For this reason we have taken our story to outside sources.
'1e make this statenant uith.no preconceived nuclear pouer plants.
But we do believe that opinicns about security at nuclear power plants should be performed in a professional l
and conscientious manner.
Specific itens which we regard as exanples of nonprofessionalism follow:
1.
In February 1975, personnel employed by one security company removed a gate from its hinges, which was supposed to be i
locked.
That gate.as the respcasibility of a cecond security There are two cecurity ccmpaaies at TiiI, and there is company.
if our c mpany can show competition between the companies, because that the other company is incompetent, cur company might cet the contract for the entire reactor station.
The gate was removed by personnel of our company to embarrass the other co npany.
i One of us making this statccent Nes asked to help recove the gate, but declined on the grcunds that such action 1as inappropriate
'Then we went to our company and might be considered sabotage.
management to tell them the true facts about the gate " incident",
j we were told that management had their story about the incident and did not want to change it.
'zThen we persisted in voicing our concern about this and other incidents, we both were laid off.
2.
Records are falsified.
Fecords show that guapd sergeants made pcst checks ': hen in fact the sergeants did not make the checks at the times recorded.
Records show that certain automobiles
- hen those vehicles in fact were not inspected.
i were inspected Guards nerely wrote down the license plate number on the inspection
- form wi;hout inspecting the vehicle.
In at least one case, a The worker left the site with three unauthorized toolboxes.
should have been confiscated, but the sergeant and toolboxe.n assistant security supervisor on duty ignored them.
3 There is insufficient screening of personnel on the guard force.
As long as a person is a : arm body, the ccmpany will hire him with a minimum of a check into his backcround.
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l There is insufficient and inprcper training of guards.
If 4
a guard did not pa.s his firearms qualification, a supervisor would shoot into the guard's target until the target had a high enough score to qualify.
The training of guards on general kno.tledge of radiation is insufficient.
On paper, the training covers the nun.ber of hours required.
But the actual training in knouledge is very little.
5 The electrcnic security systems do not work properly.
The l
main gate to the opcrational reactor (there are two reactors on the Island-one cperating and one under constructicn) is electronically operated and had never really uorked properly.
After the ccmpany had repaired the -3te and thought they had it fixed, a child rode by on his minibike and caused th3 Eate to trip open.
At the time we were laid off, the gate had not been repaired.
At the time i
the cate did cperate, it could be opened by a metal trash can placed on the sensor plate.
TV cameras uhich are supposed to monitor the site fence did not function all the time when it was dark or when there were large clouds of dust or fog.
Guards frequently turned them off because they are not ': orth monitoring.
The fence monitoring system is faulty because th-:re 1re many false alarms.
The w'nd and raboits can cause an alarm.
Bes'use of this, guards stoppad taking alarms seriously and often di~
- t bother to investigate.
6.
Unauthoric a keys had been distributed.
Cne of us found that a delivery truck driver had been given a key to a locked gate because guards apparently.:ere too lazy to unlock and lock the gate, 8
as required, for cach delivery.
Ue have been told that as r iny as 300 keys had been rade for the gate and these could not all be accounted for.
7 Security at entrance gates is lax.
At the construction (south bridge ) gate, in the morning there is a free period uhen everyone is let in without a check.
Anyone walking up to the constructicn access gates uculd be let through if he just called out a (badge) number.
The same is true for cars driving in acrcss the south bridge.
8.
Security is supposed to tighten before a reactor sces operational and nuclear material is brcucht in.
Individuals are logged into and cut of the reacter vessel building.
One of us uas on duty logr,ing persons in and cut when he noticed some persons were logging in twice without logging out.
It turned out that an entrance on the ctner side of the building was cpan and unguarded and perscns were entcring and leaving frem there.
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'; ten we complained about this poor security at Till to our supervisors, they seemed more concerned about covering up the information than taking corrective action.
'Then we refused to withdraw our complaints at the suggestion of management, we were laid off.
Our statement today is not just a result of the lay-off.
He have copies of the statements we made to management before we were laid off.
Rather our statemant today is a step we believe l
necessary to air the truth about security at Tr1I and other plants.
l He certainly do not regard our experiences at TfII as an 4
l isola.ted problem.
If lax security exists at TiiI, it probably exists at other plants.
Ue hope that some agency, government or j
otherwise, will as a result of our statement conduct a detailed i
investigation at all nuclear pcuer plants.
He think that security regulations on paper are only as good as the competence and. concern of the men who serve as guards.
He would like to see strict security enforced at nuclear plants.
t Ue are not publicity seekers, our main concern is to encourage professionalism in the F.uard forces r ound nuclear power plants.
i If called upon to testify for a gover.
2nt inspection or i
investigation ue will do so readily.
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