ML19220A497
| ML19220A497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1978 |
| From: | Herbein J Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220A498 | List: |
| References | |
| GQL-0854, GQL-854, NUDOCS 7904230028 | |
| Download: ML19220A497 (3) | |
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Directer of :Tuclear Reactor Regulatien a
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Attn:
S. A. 7arga, Chief "a
Light Water Reacters t-
- 1' '70. k U. S. '!uclear Regulatory Cc=rissicn Washingten, D. C.
20555
Dear Sir:
""--aa \\" ' a 'sland :iuclear Station, Unit 2 (OC-2)
Cperating license !!c. DFR-73 Oceket :Ic. 50-320 Small 3reak 1CCA Enclesed please find the results of Babecek and Wilecx's (3&W) = cst recent calculations ccncerning a *
3reak LCCA at CE, ( Analysis of 91'1 3re@.s in the Reseter Ccolan' S n Discharre Finin: fer the 3W levered leen 17' FA Plants, May 1, 1973) as well as the analysis presented to the :73C staff by B&W at a meeting en April 25, 1978 (Analysis of E=all 3reaks in the Peactcr Ccclant 3"--
N scharse Fininr for the SW levered icon 17~ FA Plants). Met-Ed and G?JSC have reviewed the enciesed analyses and concur vith the 3&W finding that fall ec=pliance with 10 CFR 50.h6 and Appendix x to 10 CFR 50 is clearly demonstrated for cperation at pcVer levels belov 2568 Ite(t) (approximately 925 pcVer for CE-2).
Recent conversations vith 3&W have indicated that results of ad:litional calculations for pcVer levels up to 2772 :ta(t) vill be available to the :TRC by approximately June 1, 1978. It is believed that these results vill scre clearly ierenstrate ec=plete cc=pliance with 10 CFR SC.k6 and 10 CFR 50 Appen-dix : at power levels up to 2~72 'es('t).
Maintenance operations at 2E-2 are pregressing vell, and Mcde 2 entry (criticality) is expected to be made en May lk, 1978.
It is then expected that the pcVer level vill be gradually increased; hcVever, 2568 ?te(~t) (925 of Pall pcVer fcr CC-2) fcr which ccepliance with 10 CFR 50.h6 has been demenstrated is not te be achieved prior to June 3,1979.
Met-Ed, therefore, prepcses to submit (prior to exceeding the 2568 :ta(t) power level) correspendence which, based on the B&W calculations ncv being performed, demonstrates cc=pliance with 10 CFR 50.h6 and 10 CFR 50 Ap-pendix K for pcver levels up to 2772 Ita(t ) (1005 CE-2 full pover).
Met-El has revised the appropriate CC-2 precedures (Emergency Orcea"-a w o-13, less Of Reactor Ccolant/Reacter Occlant oressure and Operating Procedure 21Ch-l.2, Makeup and Purification Cecineralizatien) as follevs:
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Mr. 3. A. Varga May 5, 1978 pet G, v ) "
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Energency recedure 2202-1.3 - revised to detail the cperater respcnse (see belcv).
2.
Cperating Procedure 210 -2.2 - revised to permit cperations with one of the sakeup pump discharge cross-cennect valves open and the other ene closed.
There vill be two (2) cperators designated to respend to u s=all break LCCA, (1) Centrol Ecc= LOCA Cperator, stationed in the centrol rec = and trained to recognice the sympters and respend to a small break LCCA and (2) Auxiliar-/
Suilding LCCA Cperator, statiened en the pri=ary side of the plant, and trained to respcnd to a s-=
break LCCA. The Ocntrol Ecc= LOCA Cperator vill, within two (2) minutes after the event, analyce his indications and determine if there is a loss of Offsite cover concurrent with a diesel or
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takeup pu=p failure and a s-a break LCCA.
In the event of'that occurrence, by time T = 2 minutes, the Contrcl Ecc= LCCA Cperater vill direct the Auxiliary Building LCCA Cperator to proceed to the takeup pu=p discharSe cross connect v117e and open it.
The Centrol Ecc= 1CCA Cperater will then preceed to the EP!
valves en the affected train. The Auxiliary Building LCCA Cperater vill take, at a :sximu=, 1.5 =inutes to arrive at the Orcss connect valve and at ti=e T =
3 5 minutes, be crening the cross cennect valve. Opening the cross connect valve vill ec==ence within 1.5 =inutes (T = 5.0 minutes) and at time T = 10.0 minutes, the crcss connect valve vill be fully Open.
As described above, when the Centrol Ecc= LOCA Operator has directed the Auxiliary Building LCCA Cperator to take the required acticn, he vill then prcceed to the EFI valves en the affected train, arriving in 2.5 ninutes.
I==ediately upcn ar-rival, at the E?I valves, time T = h.5 minutes, the Centrol Ecc= LOCA Cperator vill establish cct=unicatica on the head set with the Centrol Ecc= and begin to cpen the affected tra - = valves and will achieve minimum f'ev vithin 0.5 min-d utes (T = 5.0 minutes). The EFI valves vill be opened manually to cb+ain 125 sp:
flow per leg ccccurrent with balancing flew to 125 gp: in the unaffected leg electrically frc= the Centrol Ecc=.
This balancing evolutien vill take less than 5.0 =inutes and vill be ec=pleted by time T = 10 minutes. Pricr to the balancing evolution, the Control Ecc= CEO shall veriff that the normal akeup valve is closed. These precedure revisicns have been P2117 implemented.
Met-Ed review cc=nittees have reviewed these precad"-a -avisiens and have determined that (1) there is no increase in the probability of cecurrence er the ecnsequences of an accident or calfuncticn of equipment impcrtant to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report in that the precedure revi-siens sitigate the consequences of the accident previously analyced; (2) ne pc~s-sibility.for an accident er ralfuncticn of a different type that any evaluated in the safety a-='ysis report is created in that the major cencern, i.e., pump runcut, vill not cccur under the operator action specified above; and (3) the targin of safety as defined in the basis for any
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d al specification is not reduced in that 10 Cy2 50.k6 acceptar.ce criteria is not exceeded.
In addition, it hac been determined that utilication of these prccedures under any accident conditicn requiring operation cf the EFI pu=ps vill not lead to r t _- 4 r *
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degrada*ien of p=p perfc=ance dring any pa-t of the transient, perfc tance of these precedres provides assurs ce that the total H'3I fiev, whether thrcush tvc legs or four legs, vill not exceed 550 gps.
Frther assr ance that p=p
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Occur as long as the back pressure is g eater than the pressure eq.tivalent to 1500 ft. of water (approximately 650 psi). For the largest break analyced (0.17 ft2), RCS pressure reaches abeut 650 psia in about LC0 seconds, at which time the HPZ valves vculd already be into the balancing evclution. Ccnserva-tive calculaticas based on FSAR and Technical Specification data have been per-formed and indicate that adequate :iFSH exists fer at least 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> while taking sucticn frc= the L'ST.
Each maft was briefed en the ccnstraints of the license a-.d the senl' break LCCA p.ecedure requirements. An Operatiens Crder is being trittec to require each Cperaticns Depar* ent persen to signify understanding of the procedure changes and m - #ng requirements. Also, each Cperatiens Department persen is to physically locate all equipment required to be operated in acccrdance vith the procedure changes.
"'he Cperations Crier vill further require ene person en each shift (who is free to respond to the pestulated accident) to be statiened in the Centrcl Ecc: at all times, and cne persen en each shift to be stationed en the primary side of the plant at all times to car y cut the required action specified in the precedure changes. A sheet vill be attached to the Ocntrol Ecc Log Sheet shoving who are the two individua's assimed the responsibilities fcr 5
carrying cut the acticns indicated in the precedure changes.
Zach shift vill te rebriefed at least once per ncnth of the actions required in the precedures.
CC has performed drills to verify that the ass =ed cperator respense time is achievable and within the analysis ass =ptions.
All drills performed to date have shen adequate respense (to the point of unseating the Orcss-connect, and HPI discharge valves) in less than 5 =inutes.
Met-Id will submit a Technical Specificatica Change Request ccvering these precedures as scen as pcssible.
Met-Ed vill submit a preposal for a permanent solutien by August 5, 197c.
Shculd additional analyses be performed, Met-Ed vill =ake their results available to the :TEC, as seen after their ccepletion as possible.
f,,ine erely,
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J. G. Herbein
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