ML19211C192
| ML19211C192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/27/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19211C191 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8001110045 | |
| Download: ML19211C192 (19) | |
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/ NUCLEAR REGULATORY C.OMMISSION DISCUSSION OF NFS-ERWIN (Closed to Public Attendance)
Thursday, September 27, 1979 1738 217 Pages 1 - 13 Prepared by:
C. H. Brown Office of the Secretary 8001110 O V.5
I i,l 1
i I
it 1
f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ii' 2
f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION il 3
,i 4
l DISCUSSION OF NFS-ERWIN i
(Closed to Public Attendance) 5 6
!i 7
Commissioner's Conference Room
!i 1717 H Street, N.W.
8 Washington, D. C.
9 Thursday, September 27, 1979 li 10 11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 12 3:45 p.m., Victor Gilinsky, Acting Chairman of the 13 Commission, presiding.
p 14 t'
COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
15 t'
l Commissioner Gilinsky 16 i
Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford l7 b 2f8 17 Commissioner Ahearne 18 ALSO PRESENT:
i; 19
[
V.
Stello W. Dircks 20 i
L. Gossick j
M. Howard R. Burnett 21 p!
L. Bickwit l
S. Chilk 22 j
23 j,
24 r
25 h
a,.
i b
2 c
3 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Very well, Lee?
3 MR. GOSSICK:
Well, I will ask Bill and Victor 4
l, to go ahead and tell you where we are now, in the matter of I
5 the Erwin MUF.
Go ahead, Bill.
- \\
6 i
MR. DIRCKS:
Well, the assignment that you gave 7
us, after the last meeting on the subject, after we talked 8
to the FBI was to go back and see if any developments had
'i 9
occurred or expected to occur that might bring some new 10 light on this matter before the start of the actual 11 taking of the inventory.
12 As you recall, the FBI said that if nothing 13 developed prior to the start of the inventory they most 14 likely would enter this case to pursue that other ---
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I thought it was also that 15 somewhere Tuesday or Wednesday that that was the decision 16 time, and you would -- if you called them, they would then 17 start.
18 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes, it was mid-week, so to speak, 19 that they want to come back in.
20 l.
We have been talking to them right up until the
,1 4
Point this morning, I guess.
So the up-shot is nothing 22 has developed, we have resumed the various aerial flights, 23 we nave looked into everything that can be looked in prior to the starting of the inventory, and there is essentially 5
1738 219 i
l l
l 3
1 f
nothing to report.
The inventory must be taken, and that's p!
2 ii the thing ---
I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: So then you are going to l
ask them?
4 5
MR. DIRCKS: That's the intent, yes.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What is it that they are f
i I
7 l
going to do, now?
8 MR. DIRCKS: They are going to pursue the one 9
remaining area that we haven't, namely, to answer the 10 i
question:
Has the material been taken off site?
Has it 11 been stolen?
We have not really gotten into that.
12 We have concentrated on the normal approach that 13 we take to these MUFs.
We go back and we survey the entire 14 plant, we check the records ---
15 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But we haven't done that?
16 j
MR. DIRCKS: We haven't pursued the so-called 17 l;
violation part of the Atomic Energy Act. We have no grounds 18 ll to believe that a violation has occurred, we have got no i
19 indication that ---
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But it might be prudent 21 l
at this point, certainly to ---
l 22 MR. DIRCKS:
At this time, rather than waiting c
23 il four weeks to go ahead and have ---
i 11 24 n
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.
4 h
MR. DIRCKS:
That's essentially where we are 25 i.
ll 1738 220 t
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today ---
ii 2
d COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And the FBI is prepared to t,
1 do that?
l 3
l 4
MR. DIRCKS:
Last week they were prepared.
In JAA' y {) -
5 fact, it was judgment too, that ---
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
They were prepared if l
l we had asked last week, weren't they?
7 h;
l 8
l; MR. DIRCKS:
They were prepared.
If we were i
i i
I, willing to say last week that we had an indication of a 9
n 10 violation here, they would have come in right away.
't, 11
]
Also, it was their view last week that it 1
12 wouldn't be prudent for them to wait four weeks until after this actual inventory.
It is going to be a dead 13 a
i spot, so to speak, from now until the beginning of November, 14 15 j
and the general consensus is why waste more time.
ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Right.
And there was some 16 sentiment here that they ought to be brought in anyway.
17 MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
But there was also sentiment 18 19 1
n their side that they didn't see a need for it right l
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20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Right, but if we asked 21
'l they would.
22 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What was the sentiment 2a, d
here that --
4
,1 4
b COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The sentiment here was 25 s;i
[
1738 221
5 1
simply that when that large amount is unaccounted for in I
l whatever way, that it might be prudent to ask the FBI to 2
i d
3 come in and start looking to see whether that area, under 4
their responsibility was reasonable, rather than assuming 5
that that case hadn't happened.
l 6
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I'm just getting caught 7
l up.
8 MR. DIRCKS: That's about where we are today.
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: So that's where we are?
10 MR. DIRCKS:
That's where we are.
lil COMMISSIONEE BRADFORD: So all of the overflights 11 l
hl and whatever they detected came to nothing?
12 MR. DIRCKS: Came to nothing.
The overflights 13 t
14 l
detected some hot spots out there, I think whatever 15 information we have now, looked like it was material that had been there since '69,
'67 ---
16 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Have we taken samples?
17 Do you have any idea of how much is there?
18 MR. DIRCKS: We have taken samples in there.
19 l
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do we have any idea 20 how much material is there?
21 MR. HOWARD:
No.
2 ')
li COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Any estimate at all?
23 Can we identify it, since it's ---
n z
b COKdISSIONER KENNEDY: Is it kilograms or ounces 2a.
lj or ---
1738 222 Ii
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6 h
I.
1 MR. HOWARD:
Kilograms.
L 2
0 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Kilograms.
It is kilograms.
- l 3
MR. BURNETT:
It is not highly enriched, though.
4 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Of not highly enriched I
5 material?
6 d
MR. BURNETT:
Not highly enriched.
0' 7
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What kind of material?
8 MR. DURNETT:
Between 4 and 7 percent 1:
9
]
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Did Erwin process 10 low enriched material?
11 MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
They have a scrap 13 recovery operation and have had one for years.
MR. DIRCKS: And this material has been out there, 13 14 it seems, for a number of years.
MR. BURNETT:
And the signature on it dates it 15 earlier than '69.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What is the size of our 17 force there, now, roughly?
18 MR. HOWARD:
My estimate is about 7 or 8 people 19
- 9 20 I
.i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And that's how many will 41 g
J stay throughout the physical inventory?
22 h
MR. HOWARD:
Yes, sir.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Roughly?
24
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'*5' Sir-25 1738 223 i
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1 1
MR. BURNETT: Actually, it goes up from that point.
2 k
It goes up to about 15 by next week.
1 l
3 MR. HOWARD: Right.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So the next step for you 5
to take would be to call the FBI, and who would you be 6
calling?
MR. DIRCKS:
Well, I'd call Mr. Sitkowski, who 7
8 knows that we are supposed to be calling him.
i 9
MR. STELLO:
I think it is maybe important to 10
- i make a point.
Il 11
- l My view hasn't changed, personally.
But when 12 l
we were here talking about it the last time, I felt that li 13 j
there was a staff view, that also went to the direction, il l
and I think that since that time I have sensed a staff 14 h
15 ij view that has maybe a " wait and see" attitude.
And I I
lil think you need to know that.
16 17 My recommendation to bring in the FBI has not i
18 changed.
As a matter of f act ---
\\\\
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That we should?
20 MR. STELLO:
That we should.
-- has not changed.
21 I might add, I feel, af ter thinking about it since the last time we talked, even more so, that there is a need, 22 but I have asked Morris also to sit here, I told them 23 V
24 that I would point to and try to express what I sense 25 l
is a different view than when I was here the last time, d
1 1738 224
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o" 8
- i s
1 and I also sense from Bob what I think is a different 2
view.
And I think you need to hear that.
3 My recommendation, I would like you to understand, il didn't change and doesn't change.
In fact, I think it is ---
4 I
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What is it based on?
5 l
6 MR. STELLO:
The thinking that I have done has 7
led we to conclude that if there were a blackboard and I were trying to draw a curve,15 8
l
[
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
_]
I do not believe, 18 in light of our mission to assure that the health and 19 safety, to properly protect the security of the country, 20 warrants waiting.
I want to have much higher confidence that this 21 g
L 22 l
material has not been diverted, and the more I think about i
23 it, the more I think, as they move out in that curve and 24 if we had the time, and we knew how to do it, maybe we 25 j.
ought to even try to quantifiy that at what point do you make t-F i738 225 l
e
9 that decision in terms of levels of confidence versus 1
l' the amount of material.
[
2 3
] and I just don't see, based on the 4
judgments that are made, that there is sufficient 5
confidence that we know that material on site.
It is a 6
safety issue, as I see it, that is causing me to move more and more that there is a possible path for this 7
Lt 8
[
material to fall in, that I think needs to be looked at, l
9 aside from the question of finding and prosecuting people, 10 just the safety issue by itself.
II 11 j
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, what you seem to be 12 saying is that we don't know that it is offsite, but
- l 13 4j we don't know that it is onsite either.
k 14 ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And the magnitude of it.
4 MR. STELLO: And the magnitude.
And the judgm9nts 15
[
that people could say, what confidence do they think it is 16 i
17 going to be found onsite.
?l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:'Yes.
18 j;
II
'l MR. DIRCK5:
Well, just one point.
19 I think that's very true.
There's absolutely no 20 l
ll feeling one way or the other.
I think if we had to go by 21 past experience, we would say it is part of the nature of 22 h
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the beast that that stuff is in that plant, stuck or lost 23 in processing areas or something.
J. *t n
l The other point that we have to realize is that 25 i
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1738 226 c
1 1
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D inventory period started back in June, at least this run, n
2 tj and I think there were problems back when the previous 3
inventory was taken, because that is when they were half
,I on a strike and half not on a strike.
I 5
In other words, the hourly wage people were 6
i taking the inventory, and then mid-way in the inventory il 7
they lef t on strike and turned the rest of the inventory 8
i taking over to the so-called salaried personnel.
9 The third point that I think you have to realize i
i 10 is that these numbers are so imprecise, it is basing --
---11 I can understand Vick's desire to graph this thing out 12 in precise engineering terms, but the problem is the numbers 13 going into such calculations are so foggy.
. m saying all Il 14 of that, and I'n probably going to agree that it is 15 prudent to call them in, just because you want that extra 16 feeling of security.
But on the other hand, as I think 17 one of the FBI people said, this looks like a large MUF, ii 18 but what makes it so different from your past MUFs.
bl 19 Nothing but the largeness of it ---
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But some of those are 21 l
unexplained.
I 22 MR. DIRCKS:
Some of those are unexplained.
23
[.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are Moe or Bob going to --
II 24 j
C,OMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
i MR. HOWARD:
I have been talking to the staff and 25 l
4 1738 227 L
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my own conclusion too is we looked at the records that 2
"l we could, we looked at the physical security for the l
3 P
I, entire period and found only once, a very, very small 4
anomaly.
And that was certainly backed up and protected.
I 5
We looked at every record that they had down 6
there and we found no mistakes -- identifiable mistakes i
7
[
in the records.
We looked at every discrete item on the ll 8
i staff, and we are right now in the process of gamma f
9 scanning every container on the site, and that will be 10 h
comoleted this Sunday afternoon.
We have found nothing
'l 11 wrong.
12 We have taken the survey instrument and we have 13 looked at every square inch on that site, either by truck 14 or by hand, and then again, on the flyovers.
15 The way the staff looks at it, and the people 16 who are working there, I guess they come up with the --
17 the agreement reads that we should have some indication 18 to provide the FBI with a cause for an investigation, and 19 we just dcn't have it yet.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, you are saying I
21 something beyond the discrepancy in the records themselves?
22 MR. HOWAPS:
I share Vick's sentiments, that 23 yes, this is great backup and when I looked at the agreement 24 and what we have found so far.
25 h
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, it is not as if
!!r 1738 228
i, N
e y
12
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l.
we would be suggesting to the FBI that we have some other 2
information.
We are telling them exactly what we know and
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don't know, l!
4 1
MR. DIRCKS:
And they have been kept informed 5
all along.
I 6
i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And asking them to come in.
li COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
'I O
N COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Bob?
a 9
4
]
MR. BURNETT:
Well, I have spent a lot of time 10 there.
11 In '74, there was a 31 kilogram discrepancy.
In 12
'75 there was a 14, and you know, I have looked at many others.
There are some los and some lis. [
13 14
[]
We know that there were 15 salaried people running the plant.
16 I was down at the site with Moe, and I haven't 17 found an indication that would lead me to believe that 18 it has gone anywhere but inside that plant.
I thought, 19
.l as Vick says, that we haven't exercised that one last little f
20 option.
But having come from law enforcement, I guess I u
21 1
would recommend telling them what we have and let them 22 make a decision.
23 f,
Now, I know that's a slight difference.
It is 24 just not clear to me what we are going to tell them.
25
[
MR. HOWARD: If I might add something.
1738 229
13 l
f In going over the records, we do find that 1
2 l
management has done the same job that the workers do in i
l just a slightly different manner.
There were some 3
4 cross-overs and there is obvious ---
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, that would seem to 5
6 explain or at least make more plausible why there would I
t be errors.
At the same time, it cuts the other way in 7
l 8
that just that that time of confusion might be the time i
9 I
to make away with some material.
So I don't know that it I
i 10
- j cuts one way or the other.
b 11
[
MR. HOWARD:
I just thought I would point that out.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As far as I can see, if 12 U
13 i
the material hasn't been taken off the site, when we call 14 the FBI in, in addition to any imposition on their 15 resources, we look embarrased.
It is embarrassing to us 16 l
because we will have ginned up this big exercise, i
17
/
If it has been taken off the site and we don't N
18 call the FBI in, we may preclude the opportunity to avoid 19 i
it being taken out or further lost from out control.
So the balance that I see is that on the one hand our 20 embarrassment versus the other hand, the significant danger.
21 The reason it might be embarrassing is we would 22 i
23 l
have to, at some point recognize that the thing has been j
a very sloppily run operation for a long time, and 24 il i
[,
the numbers have been very bad.
25 l-f 1738 230 c
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.3 14 i
1 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me ask you, Moe, what 4
2 it would you say if we were gathered here now, six weeks later, i
3 and had gone through the entire inventory and nothing has 4
changed?
5 MR. HOWARD: Vick has already asked me that question 6
If we have to look a little bit harder it might 7
be embarrassing, but ---
0 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
No, no.
I'm not asking 9
you whether you would be embarrased or not, but what 10 could you counsel then about further NRC action?
11 MR. HOWARD:
Then I certainly think the FBI should
!i 12 be notified and' brought in.
'l 13 ji COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But then it would be six 14 0
weeks later.
l 15 i
MR. BURNETT:
If I could comment on that, I would 16 think that you would then have a reason.
I understand, l
17 John, what you are saying there.
You understand that we i
18 are at least 100 days into this possible diversion.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I know.
20 MR. BURNETT:
The reinventory gives us the most 21 total picture that we can get.
If it doesn't narrow it, then I think you have strong grounds that there was no 22 i;i 23
- j way to technically identify this problem.
i 24 l
C,OMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It's probably -- the i
25 ll reinventory in that sense, may or may not lead to -- as you i
l 1738 231 ll 1
t 15 1
know the problems with that.
h2 i
MR. BURNETT:
I guess in the as -aer we are Q
i 3
going to have to think about when we call in the FBI and 4
with what kind of a number.
As we know the license 5
condition was 9.
Would we do it if it was at 12, 16?
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I don't know.
As I did l
I reached the conclusion that at C we ought 7
last week, i
]
8 to ---
f 9
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, you know, we are 10 not asking for specific action on their part.
We are asking ;
i 11 them to do whatever they think is reasonable under the h
12 circumstances.
And I don't know what they will do.
pl 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, that's not unlike what '
14 Bob is suggesting.
MR. BURNETT:
I'm not saying that's wrong, l
l 15 I
l because their view might be to sit back and wait for 16 17 b
reinventory.
p 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I'm further than that, 19 because I think that if you go to them and you say, here's 20 what we know now, and they will turn around, I would expect, 21 and say, well, what does that mean?
And if we say we 22 won't really know until we go through the inventory
_.. 2 3 in six weeks, and then in addition, if we say, and even 0
after we finish the inventory we still may not know, because 24 25 of all these other problems about the data base, I think that' il l
1738 232
0 s
?
16 1
at that stage they will ask, then what ar~. you asking us 2
to do?
As I was last week, I'm still at cae point, I would t
3 like them to ccr.e in and begin doing a review of th:
9 4
l operation on the basis that this stuff might have been i!
S f
taken out.
i 6
MR. BURNETT:
One point that I might make, if we 7
are going to question the data base, we have to question 8
from what level.
Once you open the door, then you have 9
to question it down to zero.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I understand that.
11 COMMISSIONER GlLINSKY:
Yes, but we are not 12 going to be telling them precisely what to do.
We are 13 not in a position to tell them how to conduct the 14 investigation.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: No, we aren't, but I think 16 or at least my belief is that we ought to be asking them 17 to go down there and do at least some type of a review.
18 I think that if you just take what we have to them 19 and say, well, here's our file, and if you guys think 20 h
there is anything worth coming down to look at, do so.
21 If you don't, don't.
I would go farther than that.
MR. DIRCKS:
I think we should stress, though, 22 when we left them last week, it was their view that if 23 we came up with no other leadr, than we have right now, 24 they would initiate their ---
25 1738 233
s*
17 l
ll 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And I feel that we ought 2
E d
to be asking them to do that, that's right.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You know, if they are I
4 prepared to go ahead and do it, I would say, by all means 5
do it.
MR. DIRCKS:
I wouldn't say they are enthusiastic i
i 7
about jumping into this thing, I think they are well
'[I 8
aware of -- making it an exception of laying back a couple I
9
[
of weeks.
10 l
MR. CUMMINGS:
I don't understand why we are so 11 reluctant to ask the FBI for a commitment in manpower to
- l 12
- l help us with this job.
o 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Depends on which job it is.
c 14 MR. CUMMINGS:
You know, to come in and investigate 15
'I this for us, from the theft and diversion view point.
h
]
That is basically what we are asking them for.
I just 16 il 17 don't see why that is such an onerous thing to ask the b
18 Bureau to do in light of the significance of the 19 unaccounted for material.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Nor do I.
21 l
MR. GOSSICK:
I just think there is one other h
point.
It could well be that we are going to finish our 22 h
23 l,
inventory and still come out with some number that leaves n
24 us to the questions.
It is very possible that the Bureau h
25
[
is going to go in there and turn that place upside down 4
1738 234 lI
i 1
18
'l
- i 0;'
1 l'
and come out with, they can't find anything.
We certainly y
haven't lost anything.
If we haven't done that, though, 2
il 3
!i it seems to me that there is a step that hasn't been taken, q
that at least answers the question:
Well have you done 4
5 everything you can?
I certainly would agree with 6
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: We have the responsibility b
7 to do it.
i; 8
0 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So you think we should go l'
9 l
forward.
10 MR. GOSSICK: I think so.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It is a responsibility we 12 have.
We really should be asking them to help us.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Very well.
14 MR. GOSSICK: And they have agreed to do it.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think the Commission 15 is clearly on the side of asking the Bureau to involve 16 itself in this case.
17 MR. STELLO:
We just need to make the phone call 18 af ter this meeting and then I think that will happen.
19 h
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Very good.
Thank you.
20 ll
.i (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded and the 21 ll Commission moved on to other business.
4:05 p.m.)
22
[
23 1738 235 24 25 h
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