ML19211A795
| ML19211A795 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/23/1979 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912200697 | |
| Download: ML19211A795 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
[,,1 e c ' j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555.
o NOV 2 31979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
E. Jordan, Assistant Dintetor
- Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
CABLE SEPARATION VIOLATION As a result of our Licensee Event Report (LER) review, it has been brought to our attention that the General Electric Company has advised its customers of a potential cable separation problem. Specifically, both the ADS control wiring and the HPCI inboard isolation valve control wiring are routed in common cable trays. This violates both G.E. criteria and NRC requirements regarding the separation of redundant safety systems. This is a possible generic problem for all BWR 4's.
Earlier G.E. designs may also be affected.
We, therefore, recormend the issuance of the proposed IE Bulletin (enclosed) to all BWR licensees (except BWR 5's and BWR 6's) requesting information regarding the routing of the ADS control wiring, and isolation condenser, HPCI, and RCIC control wiring for the steamline isolation valves.
Please keep us informed of actions ken on this matter.
k Uatrell G.
- isenhut, ting Director Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated
Contact:
R. Kendall, X28218 cc w/ enclosure:
1631 091 D. Eisenhut B. Grimes G. Lainas R. Satterfield F. Rosa V. Thomas D. Tondi R. Scholl R. Kendall PSB Section A 22 00 M7
ENCLOSURE PROPOSED IE BULLETIN CABLE SCPARATION VIOLATION Description of Circumstances This Bulletin was prompted by Licensee Event Reports (LERs; see References) in which General Electric advised its customers of a potential cable separation problem. Specifically, both the ADS control wiring and the HPCI inb]ard isolation valve control wiring are routed in cormion cable trays. This violates both G.E. criteria and NRC requirements regarding the separation of redundant safety systems.
Actions to be Taken by Licensees For all BWR reactor facilities
- with a construction permit or an operating license:
1.
Evaluate the ADS control wiring and HPCI steamline isolation valve wiring configuration used at your facility; and:
a.
Detemine whether the situation described above exists at your facility.
b.
If so, describe how this configuration complies with the physical independence and electrical separation criteria for Class lE cables of redundant safety systems.
c.
Describe any proposed design modifications resulting from this evaluation.
2.
Where credit is taken for the RCIC system as a redundant system to the HPCI system in the operational analysis (e.g., for mitigating the consequences of a rod drop accident),
a.
Evaluate the control wiring of these redundant safety systems and detemine whether a cable separation problem (i.e, cables from redundant systems routed in conmon cable trays) exists at your facility.
b.
If so, describe how this configuration complies with the physical independence and electrical separation criteria for Class lE cables of redundant safety systems.
c.
Describe any proposed design modifications resulting from this evaluation.
- BWRs 5s and 65 may not be affected.
1631 092
f 3.
Where credit is taken for any other Engineered Safety Feature system (e.g., Isolation Condenser or any other high pressure system) in the operational or safety analyses as a redundant system to the ADS system:
a.
Evaluate the control wiring of these systems and determine whether a cable separation problem as described above exists at your facility.
b.
If so, describe how this configuration complies with the physical independence and electrical separation criteria for Class lE cables of redundant safety systems.
c.
Describe any proposed design modifications resulting from this evaluation.
References 1.
LERp79-056/01T-0, FitzPatrick 2.
LERd79-068/0lT-0, Brunswick 1 3.
LERd79-076/0lT-0, Hatch 1 4.
LER#79-098/0lT-0, Hatch 2 1631 093