ML19211A607
| ML19211A607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/06/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7912200227 | |
| Download: ML19211A607 (74) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-MAKING ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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Place -
Washington, D. C.
Date -
Thursday, 6 December 1979 Pages 1 - 73 r
1633 172 O
(202)347-3700 m.~.:
/
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReponen 4M North Capitol Street 7 M22 00 El7 Washingten. D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE - DAILY
7' 1
CR8674 DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Thursday, 6 December 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N.
W., Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record df decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
e i633 173 A
2
.8674 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
PUBLIC MEETING 4
DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-5 MAKING ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE l
6 7
8 Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.
9 Washington, D.
C.
10 Thursday, 6 December 1979 11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9 :35 a.m.
12 BEFORE :
13 DR. JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 14 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 15 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 16 ALSO PRESENT:
17 Messrs. Shapar, Gossick, Hoyle, Hanrahan, Kenneke, and Bickwit.
l 18 I
l 19 1
1633 174 20 1
21 l
1 22 l
1 23 24 i
%wW Reorwn, lm.
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1 P E g g g g gsI,E g g CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Could we come to order?
The 8674 2
I Commission meets this morning to actually continue its s-1 3
discussion of the role of the Commission itself in emergency 4
5 response.
We had the last meeting on this subject in mid-October.
The first thing I have to ask you to do is to join 6
me in voting to hold this meeting on less than one week's 7
n tice.
8 Those in favor?
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Aye.
10 11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Aye.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
- Aye, 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE :
So ordered.
14 The OPE you will remember came around widh an 15,
outline of a Commission response for the mid-October meeting.
j i
i 16 There was discussion there.
Af ter that meeting OPE was directed'i 1
i 17 ;
to try to define as best they could what the collective 4
1 18 '
comments of the commissioners might mean in terms of a revised j
l 19 Proposal.
They produced same dated the 30th of October and i
i 20 that proposal has in my view two elements.
One of them thatc.the; l
21 Incident Response Organization would operate on a preplant 22 basis to the maximum extent possible.
And there is discussion 23 about how we have a set of plans including detailed descriptions 24 of all the procedures, criteria, guidelines, and so on.
The Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 aim to be -- being to set up what is referred to as a generally 1633 175
4 l
1 i
automatic response based on a comprehensive set of Commission approved plans.
Under this scheme the EDO would be delegated l
l authority, the Commission's authority to issue orders and so on.
4 The other part of the October 30th proposal is that the Commission would stand essentially in a consultant role.
The Chairman to be present at the Incident Response Center and 7
to be, in effect, the observer on behalf of the Commission and to then keep the Commission informed,about what is going on.
9 I sent you a memorandum dated the 26th of November 10 on which I commented that it seemed to me that OPE's proposition jj had the considerable merit, that I thought they had in fact 12 hit somewhere close to the center of gravity of the Commissioner;'s 13 remarks id mid-October that indeed we ought to do as good a jg j b of pre-event planning as we can.
ButImustsaythat5have 15 limited confidence that we are going to lay down a sufficiently l g
comprehensive set of guidelines so that the response on the j7 Part of the staff emergency managers can be largely automatic.
18 I
l Ijustdon'tthinkaccidentsaregoingtohappenthatj j9 t
way and each one is-going to have its unique requirements for 20 evaluation and judgment.
21 Secondly, the EDO should be delegated authority in 22 my view and issue orders to licensees.
I think I would propose 23 24 to do that even apart from emergency situations.
Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 And finally I continue to believe that the Chairman 1633 176
5 l
i 1s-3 or the Acting Chairman or the specified commissioner perhaps j
should in fact cit with the emergency management team and 2
3 participate in its discussions.
And when decisions are made, i
particularly the mean ones, which have to do with off-site 4
5 actions, that that commissioner assume responsibility for those decisions on behalf of the Commission rather than leaving it 6
to staff offices to make those toughies while the commissioners 7
sit back so they can kibbitz later on and say well, I wouldn't 8
have done that if I had been there or s'omething like that.
9 10 So, that is how the land lies.
11 I propose to you -- well, I propose to hear what 12 views are up and down the table.
I propose to keep pushing 13 for an emergency response role of the Commission in which the i
14 President's appointees in fact assume the responsibility for 15 f which I believe we were nominated to come here and take.
l 16 l There is one other matter that relates to these 17 '
things and that has to do with this peculiar quirk in the 18,
s ta tute.
I refer to it that way at any rate.
Thatthecounsell l
19 had identified, which is that we apparently can't delegate l
l I
20 '
to one of us the Commission's powers to issue orders.
It means '
f i
f 21 that if a commissioner is part of the emergency management I
s 22 team until the statute is straightened out, that the staff 23 officers who are on the team are going to be the issuers of j
1 24 orders no matter who is in charge of the team, commissioner or ;
Federal Reportsrs, Inc.
25 not.
It has been commented on in congressional hearings as you 1633 177
6 i
i I
ls-4 know, in the press and it's my view that we ought to go forward !
j with a request for rectification of the oddity reasonably 2
3 promptly for the reasons that I have outlined in my memorandum I
4 to you.
And, in fact to do that -- and I think there is a very I
5 good basis to do that whichever way the Commission comes down 6
with regard to the specific role of the Commissioner or 7
Commissioners in an emergency response.
Although the Commission i
ought to stay in a consultant role, all the Commissioners in a 8
consultant role, or whether the Chairman or one of us should 9
10 in fact sit on the emergency management team and in effect lead 11 it.
12 Now, since I have summarized an OPE memorandum among 13 other things why don't I ask if there is a comment there by way 14 of --
15 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me interject at this i
16 !
point under any formulation it seems to me the Commission is i
17 ;! ultimately responsible for the decisions that get made, and I 18 guess I take a little hombrage at least at the phrase, sitting l
l 19 l back and kibbitzing.
I am not sure what it refers to, but I l
l l
20 j don' t think it adds to the evacuation decisions made during l
l 21 the last accident that that has been a phenomenon.
l l
~
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It certainly wasn't --
1 i
23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
We may have kibbitzed I
24 each other, but I don't think we kibbitzed the staff, i
e nsi n n a tus,ine.
25 (Laughter.)
jg l7 i
7 I i i s-5 1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Now, I think in fact Three Mile 2 in the -- when things got hot from Friday morning 'from about l l 3 9:00 o' clock on, in fact ran pretty much as I am suggesting here!. 4 And after all, since I differ with the OPE October 30th thrust 5 you have to allow me a certain amount of what should I call it, 6 enthusiastic elaboration of my side of the proposition; okay? 7 But I think it is a distinct difference. 8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You are saying that you are 9 envisioning prospective rather than retrospective? 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, because I think in fact 11 Three Mile in the critical period there on Friday ran about the 12 way I would see things running, You know, after a certain 13 amount of bouncing back and forth, why the decision to the 14 Governor of Pennsylvania, I made it; okay? The first one. And 15 i by the time we talked to him the second time we had sufficient i i 16 chance for Commissicner interactions so that the recommendation 17 lwe made to him at that point, while we hadn't taken any formal 18 ' votes or anything, there had been sufficient discussions so I 19 that I regarded that as a cooly judgment. i 20 You know, where it's reasonable get the kids and l i 21 pregnant women out of the place. And subsequently, we didn't 22 have occasion to make other formal recommendations. But you 1 23 know if it had come so fast that you didn' t have time to talk, 24 well they would have done it in Bethesda or they'd have done Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 it here, or if there had been time we would have talked about 1633 179
8 l 0 1 1 1"'-6 1 it. That's the way I see the pattern going. l 2 Well, do you want to make a comment on it? l You did a good job in summarizing the ' 3 MR. HANRAHAN: 4 OPE paper and your memorandum and I think that really does 5 represent the dichotomy, although I think it's more apparent 6 than real. I think the arguments you present in your memorandum 7 about the Commission bearing responsibility and certainly the 8 public looking to the Commission for that, and their decision 9 is very cogent and bears heavily on what happened. But does 10 that imply, therefore, that a Commissioner, the Chairman or the 11 Commission itself act as the head of the emergency management 12 team? I think maybe that's where the distinctions might be. 13 Or would attendants' presence providing guidance and affirming 14 decisions, particularly the tough ones, the public decisions, 15. would that be the distinction that we really ought to think 16 [ about rather than who is in complete charge. I 17 I think like the management of the agency that the 18 Commission affirns decisions, but there are others who will i l l 19 l take operating decisions and issue orders and so forth i 20 l continually. I think i f you look to the real -- to the I i 21 reality of the situation that you described at Three Mile 22 Island, would not the Commission want to be involved and i 23 aught to be involved in those most difficult decisions, 24 specifically things like evacuation. I think there is no way Fedcent Reporms, Inc. 25 around that. I don' t think there is any one of you that wouldn' t 1633 180
9 '.s-7 1 want to be involved in that, nor would any of us in the 2 public not expect you to be involved in that decision. 3 So, I really don' t see that in the long run you can 4 avoid -- I don' t see that you are attempting to avoid either s 5 one, but I think you may be discussing around the point in a 6 more academic fashion than in reality. 7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That may be right, but it 8 depends for instance if one adopts a Commission posture along 9 the lines of the October 30th memorandum, the consultant 10 posture hears the Commission close by, the Chairman is the 11 information carrier going back and forth from the room the 12 Commission is from the Emergency Response Center. The 13 Chairman's role or other Commissioner has delegated rolc 14 within the Emergency Response Center is to know what is going 15 on so that he can report to the Commission. 16 MR. HANRAHAN: I don't think that goes far enough. 17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay. Now -- let me just use the 18 word " commissioner" and understand it's the Chairman or the 19 Acting Chairman or whoever has the duty for the moment. 20 If the Commissioner in the Response Center is solely 21 there to keep quiet, to get information and to go tell the 22 Commission; okay? You don' t think that is good enough. I 23 certainly don't think it is good enough. If the Commissioner 24 who is in the Response Center in fact is discussing -- is both twW Amerwrt, lm. 25 keeping the Commission informed and is discussing things that 1633 18i
10 3-4 1 are going on with the senior people there, the emergency 2 management team, and they are saying I think we ought to do this ~ ' 3 and he is saying well, let's do that. That is, he is concurring 4 in the decisions; okay? 5 So that the staff officers on the team have a right 6 to feel that they have Commission concurrence in these 7 decisions; okay? Then I think we are kidding ourselves it's 8 not a consultant role. In fact, he's a member of the team and 9 I think it's a lousy perception from the outside to have it 10 labled, no the Commissioner is not a member of the team, he 11 just consults when in fact he is doing precisely what -- or 12 just a step away from what we ought to be doing, what the 13 Commissioner ought to be doing. And the., additional step that 14 I think we ought to take is if the Commissioner is there he 15 has got to be the ranking individual in the team, and he ought 16 to be recognized as the head of the team and bear the formal -- 17 and have that formal recognition. 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Where does the word consulan? 19 come in? Is that in the OPE letter? 20 MR. HANRAHAN: Policy making -- 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The Chairman of the Commission 22 would be present at the Incident Response Center and would be 23 consulted on major IRO decisions, particularly those off-site, 24 et cetera, et cetera. During the emergency the Chairman would Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 keep the Commissioners informed, consult with them on basic 1633 182
11 .s-9 1 issues the implication being where there is time, which has 2 been a part of every one of these things; okay? I t-L 3 4 1 s.i 1633 183 6 7 I Y t 9 10 i
- 1. I 12 13 l is ll i 3 'l i
16 ' 17'l 11 18 i 19 ' 20 21 22 23 24 Pednt Reponen, Inc. 25
12 R#8674 1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And then the list of summary 3 hd-l
- 2 2
of the things will provide for EDO consulting consultation 3 with the Chairman on major emergency responses and decisions. 4 I think in fact that that is a real function, and if the 5 Chairman or the delegated Commissioner is there, participating 6 i:n decisions, saying "Yes" or "No," if the decision is "No," 7 and so on, I think that's the right direction, certainly. 8 But I think the posture of the whole situation is 9 enormously improved if one recognizes that indeed the 10 Commissioner is in there, is concurring, and is bearing 11 responsibility, and whether a delegated Commissioner, you know, 12 is formally the head on the books, duly recognized as such, 13 which is the way I think it.ought to be, or has this consultive 14 sort of role -- you know, if somebody eventually lines up the 15 four or five people who compose the emergency man zgement team 16 at the time a decision was taken, and they're looking for some-17 body to shoot for responsibility, you know the barrels are 18 going to come down on the senior nian present, and it's going 19 to be the delegated Commissioner or the Chairman, and I think 20 that's inevitable and I think it's proper. 21 And I think, you know, we just ought to say " Good; 22 that's who the head is. " 23 MR. HANRAHAN: I think in terms of a major emer-24 gency, there is going to be a lot of things for other wws: Rosenm, Inc. 25 Commissioners to do. In a sense, you have groups that want to 1633 184
13 ad-2 1 deal -- you know, Governors, et cetera, you have a President, 2 you have a Congress, who want to deal with those who are in 3 charge, and who want to deal with Commissioners and not with 4 staff people. 5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: There's no question about it. 6 MR. HANRAHAN: And I think it provides an import-7 ant liaison for the whole Commission, for one to be in the 8 operation and the others to be dealing with those who are 9 affected and who are a part of it, so that they bring the 10 whole Commission, that has among themselves the full -- 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But Ed, whatever system is 12 set up, there has to be a mechanism that whoever is performing 13 a liaison function is current to what is going on. 14 Because one of the difficulties that can very well 15 arise is that, as you say, the Congress, the States, will want 16 to deal with the Commissioner rather than the staff person, 17 but you still have to make sure; you have to have a process 18 by which the Commissioners who are performing the liaison 19 function is kept very much abreast of what's happening. 20 Otherwise the appearance of getting good information 21 isn't going to be accurate. 22 MR. HANRAHAN: Does that suggest then that the 23 Commission as a whole should be adjacent to the emergency 24 response center, and not some distance away? 'esoral Reportm, Ine. 25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I suppose if you stock up 1633 185
14 vbd-3 1 a lot of NoDoz pills and such, m aybe that can be done. 2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm convinced that if another 3 one like Three Mile goes, then we ought to center our opera-4 tions out there closer to the response cen ter, so the 5 Commissioners are close, and I think one of the elements in 6 our planning -- 7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I don't think it necessarily 8 follows that collecting more and more people, particularly on 9 the high end of the management spectrum n7cessarily guarantees 10 a better result. And it may not even guarantee a better appear-11 ance, as a practical matter, because appearances ultimately 12 will be measured by results. 13 We are having a theological discussion here, it seems 14 to me, using my colleague's words, that doesn't get to the heart 15 of the question. 16 The heart of the question, it seems to me, is: what 17 needs to be done? First you need to decide what it is we're 18 ' going to do -- what the responsibility really is, to what 19 it extends, and what comprises that we can arrange the things 20 that are involved in that responsibility? 21 Once you say that,,then you say: okay, who is it 22 in this agency and in this organization, and what organizational 23 entity is it that is most capable of dealing with that particu-24 lar set of circumstances? Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 Once you do that, you know the answer to all the 1633 186
15 hck -4 1 other questions. But if you start approaching it from the 2 other end, which is -- you krew, ..what's my role?" well, 3 when you come right down here, anything you want, but you 4 may not be dealing with the problem. You may be dealing only 5 with role-playing, and I think that's sort of the theology 6 that I am hearing. 7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: So what is your solution? 8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Just what I said: start 9 defining what the problem is. What it is you're trying to 10 deal with. And we haven't got that; I don't see it. 11 Youj for example, John, correctly pointed out that 12 the Kemeny Commission itself said it must be recognized that 13 the utility is responsible _ for dealing with this matter. Id Now, that is the beginning of wisdom. And I 15 think from there we ask ourselves: "Okay, what is it that 16 we are responsible for? Specifically,.what do we do about 17 l that? " And then we find out who it is that's best capable 18 of doing that, and if we're going at it the wrong way, we're l 19 going at it from the other end. 20 MR. GOSSICK: Can I comment? 21 It seems to me that -- I agree with both the thrust 22 of your memo, Commissioner -- Chairman Hendrie, and also I 23 think the point that Commissioner Kennedy is making. 24 But having been through a few of these, the most Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 crucial part of the whole operation is in the first few minutes 1633 187
16 16 - 5 1 or hours, in the case of Three Mile Island -- it stretched 2 into literally days -- is the assessment of what's going on, 3 and whether or not things at the site are being handled in a 4 proper way, as we would expect them.to be handled. 5 I think the point made earlier about the matter of 6 evacuation on Friday morning, in the case of Three Mile 7 Island, is not really where the Commission got into trouble 8 on Three Mile Island. It was in the events that took place 9 Wednesday and on Thursday, and our ability to assess and the 10 way we went about assessing what was really going on, and the 11 knowledge diat we had with respect to the true condition of 12 that plant. 13 It seems to me that that is the most important first la thing to address, and I agree completely that the Chairman 15 or Acting Chairman, or whoever represents the Commission, the 16 senior person available, has to be on-site to know -- 17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: By " site" you mean the plant? 18 MR. GOSSICK: No, I'm sorry; I meant in the IRC. 19 Now, back on the other matter of the role of the 20 other Commissioners, it seems to me that we are set up in the 21 center partly through the experience that we learned at Three 22 Mile Island, and through the Redwing operation and some other 23 work that we have done, that there is a source set up for a 24 person who is currently kept abreast of everything that is Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 known and can relate that to those people who need that kind of 1633 188
17 d-6 1 technical detail. 2 There will be some people at a high level who want 3 only that -- they only want to know exactly what the technical 4 detail is, and in fact, at Three Mile Island, Senator Hart 5 and others were calling indirectly and wanted to be briefed 6 by the executive management team, which obviously took some 7 of our tise, and we learned this process, having Dudley Thompson 8 and Ed Jordan, and others who were serving this role, to carry 9 out thatfunction. 10 It seems to me that the liaison necessary, or that 11 could be done or should be done by the other Commissioners is 12 on a level of detail that does not require down to the last 13 minute of the technical status of the plant, but more, what is 14 the status of the Commission reaction to the thing? What's 15 going on, what is the Chairman, if he is out there -- what is 16 being done in be center? 17 People want to be assured of that. I think other 18 Government agencies need only to know -- I'm talking now at 19 the Secretary level or at the head of agency level; they're 20 not interested in -- I wouldn't think need to be interested 21 in the gory details of what's going on. 22 But again, I would like to come back to the point 23 that the most important function to be done by the IRC andi the 24 Commission, then.-- the Chairman, is to assure ourselves that Federal Repc rters, Inc. 25 we are fully knowledgeable of what's going on and what's being 1633 189
18 id.7 1 done and whether or not that's adequate, and whether or not 2 some additional direction is necessary, and of course, also 3 decide the nature of the forces that we have sent out there 4 to be on site, like in the case of Harold Denton, or whatever, 5 to be on the scene to assist in that evaluation process, depend-6 ing on the timing and the event. 7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Could I add one word to that? 8 It seems to me that you just pointed to the need for 9 defining what it is that we are talking about; there are some 10 things which clearly the Commission Chairman or someone repre-II senting the Commission, needs to decide. 12 As I was reading,
- Joe, your very powerful memoran-13 dum,.on page 3, you generalized from what it seemed to me is Id a
class,but not total range of issues. 15 It is correct; Commission staff has to be put on 16 things like: is Harold Denton and the team of 40 going to I7 Three Mile Island? Or is it going to be John Jones and 18 two secretaries? It is correct that if it is possible to do so, and 20 the question of evacuation arises, that is a matter certainly 21 for the highest authorities in the agency, because it is that 22 kind of a decision. If it is possible to do that. If there's 23 time. 24 There's another question altogether, however, whether s eni mecomn, Inc. e 25 that highest authority of the agency should involve itself in 1633 190
19 .d-8 1 the myriad of decisions which are being taken constantly by 2 that emergency management team in the way of advice, counsel, 3 question, approach to the event itself. On-going event. And 4 the licensee's response to_ it. 5 And there 'are a host of those things constantly 6 going on, and every one of those involves decision. And one 7 has to decide where does the decision point rest? And it seems 8 to me that's what I was trying to say: one has to define 9 which kinds of decisions one is talking about, what issues 10 one is talking about, and then you can decide who it is who 11 is best able to deal with that. And say: that's the way 12 it is. 13 Then you are in the way of establishing a sort of Id procedural framework for dealing with things, and how various 15 entities of the organization interrelate. Until you do that, 16 I don't think you can. That's not a big job, it seems to me, 17 but it hasn't yet been done. 18 The Chairman began to do that, John added some more I9 thoughts to that, and it seems to me that's where a little .d T#2 20 attention ought to be paid. 2' 1633 191 22 23 24 ederal Reporters, Inc. 25
CR 86'74 j 20 MM:jwb i
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MR. GOSSICK: My thought had been that 2 questions that came to the Emergency Team level for solution, 3i the delegated Commissioner as head of the team be part of that 4 decision-making process. Details below the EMT level then 5 wouldn ' t: reach that level. 6 Decisions would flow on past that level to the 7 Commission, then, on a time-available and seriousness basis. 8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: There are two types of 9 decisions getting made. The EMT sort of fixed the reactor 10 decision, should they try to repressurize, go on to RHR on 11 the one hand, and public protection measures on the other. 12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: There's a third class 13 which are below the more major question that you identified, 14 "should they depressurize and go on RHR. " There are a number 15 of lesser technical questions that, for example on Three 16 Mile Island there was a lot of discussion between Stello 17 and Moseley and people on the site which never even rose to i 18 the EMT. l 19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Right. l 20 MR. GOSSICK: Let me back it up. Even before you I 21 get to those kinds of questions, the first thing when you 22 arrive there is: Do we really have a problem or don't we? 23 Do we alert the White House? Do we call the IREP guys out 24 of Brookhaven? Do we get the ARM's airplane on its way? It Focus neponen. Inc. 25 may be a lot further to go than Harrisburg the next time, if 1633 192
3-2'jwb j 21 I I 1 there is one. ~ 2 There are these things, from the standpoint of 3 deciding what to do, assuming the worst is going to happen -- 4 or at least assuming it's serious enough that you can 't 5 presume it's going to clear up and be all right -- that are 6 made almost routinely. I mean, they're made early on by 7 the EMT and carried out by the IREP. And the role of EMT is 8 to follow it to see did they get over -- did they get 9 launched? Are they being notified? 10 But there is another level. And once this word 11 gets over to, say, HEW's Emergency Center and somebody calls 12 the Secretary, the Secretary is going to want to talk to the 13 . Chairman, or somebody at that level, if for no other reason 14 than to say, "Yes, I talked to the Chairman; I know what's 15 going on." i i 16 But early on like that, that's something that 17 could be handled perhaps by one of the other Commissioners j i 18 who've been informed as to the status of the IRC. When you i 19 get down to some of the more gutty decisions about, you 20 know, hey, it looks like we may have a realy problem off-site; ; 21 it's time to call the Governor. And maybe the Governor is 22 calling in. He's going to want to talk to the guy in charge, 23 and that man ought to be the Chairman, or the Acting 24 Chairman. Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's that further 1633 193 l
3-3 jwb 22 i 4 1, definition I'm talking about. When one begins to break it s I i 2 down that way, it isn't all that hard to develop a matrix of l 3l the kinds of things we ' re talking about. And that 's fairly I I 4l easy to discern what the interrelationship is. 5 Otherwise, it would be very fuzzy. 6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What I was groping towards 7 is to fix the reactor type. That class of decisions I would 8 guess probably could get made at the -- by those members of the 9 EMT with the specific backgrounds in that area. Vic Stello 10 or Harold Denton. And conceivably a Commissioner with 11 expertise in that area would be consulted in some way. 12 But in fact, the Commission as a whole is not going 13 to have an institutionalized role in fixing the reactor. - l' So. 14 whatever basis for Commission participation there is lies 15, almost entirely in the public protection decision on making I 16 them and confirming them. I 17 ' Now if in fact FEMA is involved in emergencies; i 18 somewhere in the Response Center from now on, and their role 19 is upgraded, what is that going to mean? Will FEMA be in a l 20 position then of making recommendations to the Commission? 21 or will they be forming a separate assessment? 22 Will~they become the agency transmitting the 23 federal recommendations to the State of Pennsylvaniai 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The latter is more likely to Fedwal Reporters, Inc. 25 be the case than the former. That.is, at.least for the 1633 194 l
3-4 jwb 23 l 1 foreseeable future, it seems almost certain to me that NRC's 2l communication channels and familiarity with the individual l 3! facilities will be far greater than FEMA's, and that they I 4 will have to depend very heavily in terms of what they -- 5 what their response is, what they do, what they recommend on 6 what we think ought to be done. Simply because the informa-7 tion will be flowing primarily to NRC and through us to the 8 FEMA people. 9 With regard to who gets out and calls the Governor, 10 and so on, putting aside governors calling up here, for 11 instance, which I think is highly likely in the circumstances, 12 but looking at it, at the communication flowing the other 13 way, we might indeed in the course of working out with FEMA 14 the details of the federal response, decide that we talk to 15 them and they would call the governor and alert the Civil l i 16 Defense organizations, et cetera, with whom they have a direct ' 17 linkage. But that's not worked out at present. I 18 And I would think that until it is, why we would i I 19 feel a responsibility to make those communications ourselves. 20 And I don't know, maybe even after FEMA is in the primary l 21 role, to stand ready to consult further, directing the state PeoP e, or whatever they may want. l 22 23 Certainly if they call up, why we're not going to 24 tell them, "No, we won.'t talk-to you. Call the following Fede,al Reporters, Inc. 25 number and talk to John Macy. " 1633 195 1
3-5 jwb 24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What you're suggesting is j basically our deliberation would have about the same focus 2l 3l they had during Three Mile Island, but the le ation would I 4 just be physically changed and you would be part of the EMT part of the time, part of the Commission part of the time. 5l CCMMISSIONER AHEARNE: My sense of what Joe was 6 suggesting was, as far as evacuation, it was similar to what 7 we did. 8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: That's right. 9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But the significant dif-10 11 ference was that he would be the head of El"T. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes. 12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And I would guess that 13 14 would mean that if it were long-running, that either he or 15 the next senior person would be -- I 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, if we get into a situation 17 where it extends for some hours, why we will have to arrange 18 a duty roster sort of situation for coverage. 19 My reason for thinking that it would be desirable for us to be out there, rather than down here, just has to 20 do with the additional communication linkage of Bethesda to 21 here. In the tight periods back at Three Mile, as I look 72 back, it's very clear that, just as there was difficulty 23 24 between the site and Bethesda, there is just a further f deral Remrters, Inc. e 25 attenuation coming over the telephone lines down here. It's 1633 196
3-6 jwb 25, i i 1, just inevitable. You can't spend your whole life on the i telephone just listening -- although it seemed to me for a 2 3 couple of days, that's the way we ran. i 4j And if we were out there, why then people would l 5I all be close at hand out there, closer to the place. The o inf?rmation is better. As Ed says, there are going to be 7 communication liaison functions with other agencies, and the 8 Congress, and so on, that people are just going to want to 9 talk to commissioners. 10 We did that in part in Three Mile. You and Vic 11 handled that HEW-EPA initiative, and I think you took care I 12 of the oversight Chairman, didn't you? ~ 13 (Laughter. ) 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let me put that more positively. 15 You did take care of the Oversight Chairman. 16 (Laughter. ) 17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: So I think it's hardly a case i 18 of Commissioners having to sit around and, you know, just i l 19 read novels while they wait for something to come up. 20 There would be lots to do. 21 And then certainly the general principle would 22 operate that, where there was time -- you know, where there 23 are major decisions, hot points coming along, and there is 24 time to reflect on them, why they come through to the Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 Commission just as they did before. 1633 197
3-7 jwb l 26 1 On the other hand, if there isn't time, you know, you' re just going to have to cut and go at whatever the 2 3 cognizant level is in the chain, or maybe back at the site i 4j with the shift supervisor. 5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Lee,, forgetting as best 6l you can who the particular individuals on the Commission are -- 7 (Laughter.) 8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: -- what might we be 9 overlooking in terms of the pluses or the minuses of having 10 a Commissioner being head of the EMT, instead of having the and #3 11 EDO head of the EMT? 12 13 1633 198 14 15 l l 16 l 17 ! i 18 I 19. l i 20 l 21 22 23 24l
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27 8674 i MR. GOSSICK: I don't really see anything that is 1 s-2 being overlooked. I agree with the Chairman that with the 3 benefit of experience the public, the Congress, the President, 4 is going to expect the senior agency person available to be 5 in charge of something that's of this kind of importance. 6 Now, this is not to say that we probably may not have things 7 like the Redwing affair where it never really reached a point 8 that it was necessary to bring the Chairman out.
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under the current ground rules any time they activate the 10 Center instructions are to notify the Chairman. He will be 11 there. 12 But hopefully most of them will be like that. It 13 would be an unnecessary trip, but by the time the Chairman gets 14 out there it's probably in bed. But I don't really see a 15 downslide. In fact, I think it's really the way it should be 16 and should have been. 17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Would you during the half 1 18 hour it might take the Chairman out there have any hesitation l 19 in ordering or in recommending an evacuation ' f things were to 20 be breaking that fast? l 21 MR. GOSSICK: None whatsoever. If things -- 22 circumstances again as best as we can ascertain them through 23 less than perfect ability to assess what's going on there we 24 are going to be relying on one, the resident inspector, and .i nepo, ten,inc. 25 then two, the senior official that's available that is 1633 199
28 2 knowledgeable as to the f acts. And if those things -- if that j inf rmation seems to warrant a decision like that, one, we 2 w uld certainly expect it to be their decision and us be in a 3 position of saying yes, that's right we agree. Or, if we 4 reach the other decision that everything points to us it's a 5 very severe kind of thing that they're not properly assessing, 6 I would think we would certainly feel compelled to go ahead 7 and so advise. 8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes. The real crunchers in 9 terms o'f decisions are apt to be a situation where the plant 10 11 operators are taking a more cheerful view than the considered 12 opinion of the staff. And you then may find yourself with a staff recommendation either to require some action in the 13 plant which the operator doesn't think is necessary, i.e., a-14 fix-the-reactor type decision or a protective action off the 15 16 site, a decision which again the plant operator doesn't think is I 17 necessary. If the plant operator calls in and says whoops, the! 18 alarms just went over there, I am calling general emergency 19 and the sheriff and pulling the trigger on evacuation, why I l doubt very much that any of us from the duty officer in the l 20 21 Response Center to the Collegial Commission is going to say I I 22 wait, wait, you know, stop where you are and let's think about 23 that. It's clear if the plant operator thinks it has got to 24 go, well, you know, that's the way it's going to go. uus neconm. snc. 25 But supposing we see a situation developing and 1633 200 j
29 i there's some time to analyze it and the plant operator says .s-3 i no, no, I'll have it by 5:00 o' clock, I'll have it all wrapped 2 3 up, take it easy, don't lose your cool, and we are getting worried about things, that's going to be the time -- that's the 4 5 place where you " earns your pay" situation. And that's where I think as I said in the memo, I'm inclined to think it's going 6 to be as much a judgment call as it's going to be an exercise y 8 of technical analysis and expertise. 9 And I think, you know, Commissioners by definition 10 are good at that sort of thing. 11 (Laughter.) 12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Lee, you said something in 13 response to Peter that that's the way it should have been 14 and commenting on Joe's scheme. Joe, in outlining, said it 15 was basically a description of what happened, the way things I just wondered if the two of you could get together. 16 ran. I 17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I meant "ran", Vic, in the 18 sense that it does seem to me that the final evacuation recommendation or lack thereof that went to Governor Thornburgh! 19 l 20 on the first communication we had with him on Friday morning, l \\ r 21 I eventually made that decision af ter hearing what I could 22 hear before the call came through, and then later on about a j i 23 couple of hours later we talked to the Governor again, and by 24 that time the Commission had -- we had our collective 6, al Reporters, Inc. 25 discussions and had a chance to work. And what I told him on 1633 201
30 ils-4 the second call reflected that discussion. It was in that j m 2 sense, you know, if you have got to do it fast, why you do it._ 3 And when there's a chance to talk, why you talk. And the 4 collegial body decides. It was in that sense that I was saying 5 that that's the way it ought to work. And also in the sensc that I think I ended up in that first call making a unilateral 6 7 -- making on behalf of the Agency a decision. What Lee is saying, and what I have also said in 8 the memo is that we had better off if I had gone out there to 9 10 the Response Center first thing. I'd have been much better 11 informed and in a much better position to -- 12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I would have liked to have 13 known some things about what happened on that day then, too. 14 Is that what you're saying, Lee? 15 MR. GOSSICK: I was speaking to the early hours. 16 You know, 8:15 on on Wednesday. 17 And the questions that we had and the way it turned ! l l 18 out, the underassessment, if you will, of the seriousness of j 19 the situation. 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Are you talking about the 21 physical presence of commissioners? 22 MR. GOSSICK: Yes. The Chairman, whoever the Acting 23 Chairman -- 24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Let me ask you what would ust Reporters, Inc. 25 have -- 1633 202
31 s-5 MR. GOSSICK: I don't know, but I think some of the j questions that have been raised about the adequacy of the 2 EMT's assessment of the situation at least -- 3 s CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: (Continuing) Perhaps as valid 4 but at least redirected. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think they've been 6 directed pretty well. I mean, at the Commissioners. I don't 7 think there's any question about that. 8 MR. GOSSICK: All I suggest is that if there was a 9 resource, and I am speaking in terms of the responsible agency 10 officials who had been on the scene and who have questioned 11 things that we either did or did not do, and cause the EMT to 12 have gone further or to have assessed the facts or the informa-l 13 tion, such as it was, that we had differently. It was, I think, 14 a preferable way to have handled it. 15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You think they would have 16 second guessed earlier? 37 MR. GOSSICK: Very possibly. 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Could I ask a couple of 19 questions -- 20 MR. GOSSICK: Let me just go ahead and make one 21 other comment. 22 The way that happened, we were in the EMT so very 23 24 occupied in passing on to each office down here what little we %.ral Reporters, Inc. 25 knew or what we did knew about the situation, but I must say 1633 203
32 s-6 that it couldn't have helped but to have detracted from our s ability to focus on the questions that should have been asked 2 and perhaps were not asked. And that's the one thing that we 3 learned again during Redwing and we had Dudley Thompson 4 passing on what we knew and the EMT did not pick up a phone 5 to call anybody within that respect. 6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I am not sure that I under-7 stand your Redwing comment. 8 Are you saying that you had learned it, so that in 9 10 Redwing you did it better? 11 MR. GOSSICK: I think so. We were not detracted by 12 individually my having to call -- CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: In Redwing Dudley was delegated 13 j4 to just keep people informed. EMT members didn't feel a 15 requirement that they do it. 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I am just saying, are you 17 saying that it was better? l 1 18 MR. GOSSICK: It was definitely better, j i 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Was this better for us? 20 MR. GOSSICK: I think so. l i gj COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It was a better accident. I 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: As accidents go I prefer Redwing 23 to Three Mile any day. 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: May I ask a question? E.,. Recomri, inc. 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, sir, please. 1633 204
33 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Len, could you clarify for ls-7 i w me you had. pointed out previously that this difficulty of having 2 the Commission delegate to one of the Commissioners -- we could 3 4 do that. Mr. Udall raised a point of order against Lou Hahn's amendment so that that didn' t go into the authorization. So, 5 it's clearly not going to be there this time around. 6 To what extent can the Chairman, Acting Chairman, 7 delegate a Commissioner, whoever he is, running the EMT -- to 8 what extent can they give directives to the EDO or any of the 9 other officials if that directive ends up being to have that 10 11 official give an order? 12 MR. BICKWIT: I don' t think they can. I think 13 that's a circumvention of the prohibition in the statute. 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I see. 15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, you can call me the great 16 circumventor. 17 (Laughter.) 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: -- but that's -- f I 19 MR. BICKWIT: Let me add a qualification. l l 20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: What you are saying is that if ~ 21 the delegated Commissioner or the Chairman I asserted that I 22 had the power to orderly supposedly delegated him to issue an ; i 23 order which the law would not permit the Commission to delegate 24 me the power to order, what you are saying is that's a cute L at Reporters, Inc. way of circumventing the clear reading of the statute, and 25 1633 205
34 ts-8 i that is not the way the game is run. But I guess you would 2 have no argument with the proposition that if I were down there 3 or part of the team, the head of the team, we have discussed some things set up, we had better pull the trigger, and the 4 licensee doesn't want to make this adjustment to the plant and 5 6 we have been arguing about it and say, damn it, we are going 7 to have to do it. Tell you what, let's call him up and tell 8 him we're issuing an order. Lee, would you stand by to issue 9 the order? You know, you aren' t saying that Lee can' t say no, 10 I can't take that, I can't agrae with that. 11 MR. BICKWIT: It's obvious that if you state your 12 preferences then Lee can voluntarily decide to go along with 13 them. 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: By George, I knew we'd have a 15 solution to this, problem. 16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Can we do that on intervenor 17 from the operator? 18 (Laughter.) I 1633 206 d t-4 19 I f 20 1 I 21 l' i 22 23 24 .al Reporters, Inc. 25
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Len, one of the things that 2 Joe had raised is the delegation to the EDO to issue orders. 3l If we, at least a majority of us, were to agree with that, s l 4; what is the step that is necessary? i i S MR. BICKWIT: I think you have delegations by ~ 6 manual chapter, and you have delegations by rule. This 7 delegation I think is of sufficient importance that you ought 8 to do it by rule. 9 MR. SHAPAR: The rules merely reflect in summary 10 f ashion what the actual delegations are. The actual delega-11 tion is the actual delegation. The rules simply, as a general 12 matter, summarize what's in the delegation from the Commission. ~ 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I expect i.f we wanted to do it -- 14 and I must say, I think that's an important thing to do, 15 whichever of these final decision ways we come about it -- i i l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It seems to me, no matter 16 l 17 how we come about it -- <l 18 ' CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's right. What it does is i 19 to provide the Executive Director with the same powers most i' 20 of the other officers on the EMT have, and just make sure 21 there's a redundancy of personnel with the order-issuing 22 power. 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Mr. Gilinsky had a broader 24 view of that, which it seemed to me had merit and ought to be Federal Reporters, Inc j 25 I at least discussed, on the delegation question. 1633 207
36 5-2 jwb l l l 1l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think that was with regard to 2 l delegation to a Commissioner. l. 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I thought it went farther l than that. 4l 5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: The language he submitted l 6i went farther than that. But you already have the power to 1 7 delegate substantially to all staff members -- 8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Oh, that's right -- 9 MR. BICKWIT: The operative portion, the portion l 10 that extends your current authority relates only to 11 Commissioners. 12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, except that as I i 13 understand it, our authorit*; to delegate to staff is specifi-14 cally outlined. It isn't a general -- 15, MR. BICKWIT: It's outlined, with certain l 16 l exceptions -- 17 i (At 10:30 a.m. Commissioner Bradford leaves.) b 18 ' MR. BICKWIT: -- which certainly don't inhibit you. : 1 19 I have not seen any inhibition that matters. 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY : Okay. 21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But to get back to my 22 question, Len. If we were to go to the delegation to EDO, 23 what process do we follow? Does Joe sign a letter? You say 24, it should be in a rule. Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 MR. BICKWIT: I would prefer to see it in a rule. 1633 208
37 '5-3'jwb i i i 1 Howard is saying typically that's not done, that the rule 2l simply codifies delegations that are made by letter? How are l 3 the delegations made? 4! MR. SHAPAR: They are in the Manual Chapter. I 5 MR. BICKWIT: They are in the Manual Chapter. 6 MR. SHAPAR: Just summarized in the rule. 7 MR. BICKWIT: Either way. 8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: As a matter of fact, they 9 both can be done. 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Typically there is a memo that 11 says, you know, you are hereby delegated something or another, 12 and I sign it on behalf of the Commission. 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I'm trying to get to, what 14 is the actual next step? That seems to be one of the issues 15 that most of us seem to agree ought to be done. l 16 ! MR. KENNEKE: I think you ought to be unanimous in i 17 j the view that the EDO should have an authority. You should j l 18 ! vote now and get that done and clear the air and work on the i 19 mechanics later. If an accident happened now, EDO should have ' 20 that authority. 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The critical thing for the 22 Commission to do is for us to vote to delegate to the EDO 23 the Commission's powers to issue orders. I wouldn't confine 24 it to emergency situations, but if it would help the process
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38 5-4 jwb 9 1 MR. KENNEKE: I think you need more discussion 2 about the normal, but my impression is -- l 3l. l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I would certainly go for the i s i l I i I 4' emergency situation. 5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: By all means. 6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: (Nodding affirmatively.) 7 MR.,KENNEKE: I think Peter does, too. 8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I vote for it. 9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why don't you just wait 10 until he walks back into the room. 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Okay, give him a chance to get 12 a word in, because I think that is -- and then the specific i 13 mechanics -- l 14 MR. BICKWIT: I suggest we both change the manual 15 and the rules to so provide, and that the rulemaking be done l i 16 ll effective immediately. 17 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: A Solomonic approach. h i 18 ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I think what is important l 19 is to get it done as soon as possible. The initiator can be l 20 a memo from Joe saying the Commission has decided. And then 21 there are other actions that can follow. 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It will be a memo from the 23 Secretary. 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me understand. If Federal As, simrs, Inc. 25 the Executive Director isn't there, what happens? Is this 1633 210
39 ' 5-5'jwb l i ~. I not further delegable? Or is it? 2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, the next person on the I i 3 list, as I recall it, for a reactor problem is Harold Denton I 4l who has crder-issuing power. 5 ( At 10 :35 a.m. Commissioner Bradford returned.) 6' CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: After that, it's Vic Stello 7 who has order-issuing power. If it's a fuel-cycle facility, I 8I you pick up Dircks, who has order-issuing power, and again 9 Stello. 10 MR. SHAPAR: And some of that is predelegated. 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And turn them from there, if 12 l none of those people are there, if you go all the way down to 13 there, it gets to deputies of the offices, who in turn I 14 believe have -- 15 MR. SHAPAR: I think it's full authority, now, l 4 16 i except for the EEDO. That's the only question mark. The 17 cap is with the EDO, and not below him. l 18 g CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's right. Once you get O I 19 !! down into the officers, the order-issuing power just I 20 delegates down from the Director to the Deputy, to an Acting l 21 Director below that level, and so on. So it 's j ust the EDO 22 and the delegated Commissioner, if I can get one. 23 Peter -- Peter -- ) 24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I was briefed. 'ederal Reporters, Inc. l 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The Commissioner has been 1633 211
40 5-6 jwb l i i 1 I brie fed. Those in favor of the operation, so indicate. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Aye. f 2l i 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Aye. I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Aye. 4j COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Aye. 5l 6l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: So ordered, unanimous. I 7 MR. GOSSICK: Do I also have the authority to 8! define " emergency"? 9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, absolutely. Part of the 10 emergency power is the power to define when it's an emergen'cy 11 and put those things in place. It has to be. Otherwise, you 12 have a machine that can' t start without a starter on it, 13 which in some ways is a summary description of certain of our la operations, but not this one, I hope. I 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: May I ask a question? I I i 16 j Joe, in your proposal, what I see is, you have j 'l 17 the Commission meet and be in Bethesda. l l 18 ] CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm afraid so. Sorry about l! I 19. that. I I 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: With you in the EMT. Do i 21 you mean that the other four of us then do not go to the EMT? ~ 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I have to talk in less than a 23 " hearsay fully developed proposition" to lay it out for you. 24 Let me tell you my thoughts. Federal Reporters, Inc. l 25 One of the things we're going to have to do out 1633 212
41 5-7 jwb t I N 1 there with the response room is to push out and get a little ) 2 more room, one thing or another. And I would expect that an 3 early critical phase is, as Commissioners arrived, I wouldn't i l I 4j be a bit surprised to see them standing pretty close in. l 5 It will depend on whether there is somebody 6 available to brief them in a room next door. 7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Depending on how close in, 8 it would kind of become a Commission meeting? Is that what 9 you had in mind? 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, it can't become a Commission 11 meeting. If that is a problem -- you know, if several 12 Commissioners are standing there just looking and listening 13 to what's going on is a Commission meeting, then we will have 14 to separate them and put two on this side and two on that 15, side. 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Len, isn't it true that if i 17 ! three Commissioners are in EMT -- that's certainly the way it i 18 worked in Three Mile Island. Whenever three were there, it 19 l started being recorded and transcribed. I 20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's right. 21 CHAIRFaN HENDRIE: I think that's because we were 22 talking to each other. 23 (Laughte r. ) j 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And let me say, I don't think Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 it's a " meeting" under the Sunshine law if a group of staff 1633 213 4
42 5-8 jwb I officers are having a discussion over here, and there happen 2 to be three Commissioners just standing and listening to that 1 3i and not talking to each other. Can I get away with that? I I MR. BICKWIT: You can gcc away with that, but 4l l Si that's a hard condition to fill. I l 6' CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: As soon as the Commissioners 7 start talking to each other about agency business, why it's 8 a meeting. 9 MR. BICKWIT: That's right. 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But three Commissioners can go 11 to a movie, by George, I'm glad to say, without it being a 12 l Sunshine " meeting." 13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, let's move the Center 14 to an embassy, a foreign embassy, and call it " foreign soil." i 15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: By George, that 's right. l l l 16, (Laughter.) l i l l 17 q COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Then we'd be exempt from U t 18 ' the Sunshine law altogether. l 19 ; COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I knew there was an i 20 advantage to having a lawyer on the Commission. l I 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: There may be others. 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Let me ask two other s 23 questions, if I can. i l 24 First, in the way the OPE memo started out, that eoeral Reporters,Inc. l led me to respond in a memo which I sent My conclusion was, 25 1633 214
'5-9'jwb j 43 I i 1 I thought it would be necessary, although agreeing with Joe, 2l that obviously you can't lay out criteria'and guidelines that 3 cover everything, but I still think that some approved set of l 4 criteria and guidelines are important. And I wondered 5, whether there was any additional action on those, or whether 6l you had in mind any additional action? i 7 MR. KENNEKE: In the Action Plan being formulated 8 I hope you will see some evidence of that going on. There 1 l 9 is some evidence, at least to me, of a need for additional i 10 staff coordination. But all of those things are being 11 deklt with. 12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I was speaking specifically 13 in the beginning of your memo. You say it would be based on 14 a comprehensive set of Commission-approved plans -- include 15 l detailed descriptions of implementing procedures, guidelines, 16.i and making decisions, recommended protective actions would 1 17 j be spelled out. ll l 18 [ Are you saying that that is part of the action i i 19 plan? 20 MR. KENNEKE: This memo hasn't been approved by 21 all of you. Somehow we have to get that started, and you 22 have to get clear in the staff's mind, at least, what it is 23 each of you would like. Each of you have ideas on that. 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: What you're saying is-- !sceral Reporters, Inc. l 25 I MR. KENNEKE: One vehicle of that is the action 1633 215
5-10 jwb 44 i I plan which they are formulating, and there's the beginnings of 2 that. There has to be a vehicle for each of you to get your 3! ideas as to what those details are to be. The staff needs to I 4 get a sense that you in fact want to see all the details and j I 5! you want to approve it. I 6 I think there is near-unanimity on that. l l 7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But I had asked you back -- 8 to draft a memorandum of the development of such -- i 9 MR. KENNEKE: I have not drafted a memo. I do I i. I 10 try to do a lot of things. That's been part of my thinking of 11 how best to do that. I i 12 l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I see. I 13 The other question was, I had also suggesting 14 drafting a letter to FEMA. I 15 MR. KENNEKE: That's underway. 16.i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I would have thought it 1 l 17 would have been sent long before this. l 18 ] CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Did I agree with that? I think l 19 ' I did, did I not? i 20 ' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: My files only show Peter's 21 agreemen t., 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Take a look, John. I think I 23 did. 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I'm not saying you didn't Federal Reporters, Inc. l ag ee 25 r 1633 216 l
'5-11 jwb, 45 I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I need to know -- I am curious, I 2g for my own information, John. end #5 3l ,i i i di 5, I i 6 i i i 7 8 1633 217 10 11 l 12 ; I i l 13 14 15 l 16,' 17 ' l 18 ;i 1 19 1 20 ' 21 22 23 i 24 ...,n,...., 25 I
74 06 01 46 gshMM4 i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: If we are in agreement, I 2 would say it definitely ought to ce drafted. 3 MR. KENNEKE: On the FEMA letter, that's being 4 drafted. 5 MR. HANRAHAN The FEMA letter I celieve you 6 should have. The check is in the mail. I MR. KENNEKE: It's that close. But it's not a obvious that each of you agree with everything you suggested. 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I understand that. But in 11 order to get a le tter out, it has to get, started. Those are 12 my o estions. u 13 'Ay other points, Joe, I agree with you. I think I would it agree that the concept in having that commission move out to 15 Bethesca, I would agr ee th-t whoever is the commissioner 16 oresent be in charge of the EMT, recognizing the 14 difficulties of the charge that has oeen laid out. IS And I definitely think that we need those criteria and 19 guidelines. 20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think that we ought to do the 21 cest wo possibly can on those. I wouldn't ce a bit 22 surprised but that that will take a while and a numoer of 23 iterations cac k and forth. 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Absolutely. Vic started 23 the first iteration on the subject you worked on. Rememoer 1633 218
'40602 47 gshMMM i the things that you had worked up during the accident? It's 2 something like that that would be much more valuaole to me 3 in place then a general basis beforehana, although in a very 4 specific accident, obviously, there are a lot of details a that refer to the accident. 6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Obviously, I think that that's the way that we ought to go. 3 Vic? ) COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's fine with me. 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I am le f t a little uneasy 11 a bout translating Chairman or Commissioner in charge to mean 12 head of emergency management team or executive management 13 team. 14 It seems to me that the commission is always in charge. 15 And to the extent that the Chairman is there or another 16 commissioner represents the commission, he's obviously tne il senior person. But then, to put him in ' direct charge of a 13 group which is supposed to be an emergency group which 19 exercises itself every now and then seems no t to be quite 2J rignt. 21 I am not sure that is in fact what you mean. It seems to 22 me tnat what you are introducing is another layer of 23 supervision aoove in having the Chairman there, or a senior 24 commi ssioner. 25 But to take over a group that you know has learned to 1633 219
74 66 03 48 gshMMM i f unction together, just sted in out of the cold, seams to os d not quite tne right thing. 3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: How would you prooose to 4 have the commissioner involvement? 5 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY: Suppose the re is a 3 suoma rine in troucie somewhere in the ocean. You don't have / the Secretary of the Navy taking over, or the Secretary of 3 defense or the President. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: If you have that example, 10 would you care to identify the head of the program, that 11 would answer a question of whether he'd be taking over? 12 My question, Vic, is how would you involve the 13 co mmi ssion ? Let's say there is an accident. An emergency 14 breaks out. The EMT is formed. And you are now not so much 13 focused on the early minutes because, clearly, there it's 15 whoever is the senior person who was availaole. Ii But going to several hours, there is time to form the 18 commission up in Bethesda. What is the role of the l> commission with respect to -- let's take specifically the 20 EDO, who is now in charge of the EMT. 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: /le l l, I gue ss I wouldn' t 22 disturb the existing system oy having the Chairman or 23 Commissioner take operational control. 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: ,1ould you have one of tae 25 commissioners sitting in the EMT? 1633 220
4 06 0'4 49 gsh MAN I C0'4MISS IONER GILINSKY: Sure, ceing there and 2 representing the commission and having important 3 decisions -- in making the important decisions, possibly, 4 depending on what they are. 5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Mha t di f f erence is that 6 than Joe's proposal? 4 CO MMISS IONER KENNEDY: I think it is. S COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Vic just said making the impor tant dacisions. 10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Depending on the il c ircu ms tance s. I'm just reac ting to the flavor of what I've 12 neard, and I'm not sure that there is a diff erence. 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think there turns out in the 14 event of a serious accident not really to be much diff erence 16 in ta rms of what people would do. 16 That oeing the case, I think it's very much pref erable to il have the formal designation as a team member for the la Chairman or the delegated commissioner, to have that person 19 then participate in the drills. 20 So that is a question of the -- 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: In order to do that, all of 22 them have got to participate because any one of them may ce 23 the one. 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You may be out of town. 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, there need to be drills 1633 221
'4 06 05 50 gshMW4 I in which other commissioners can come out and sit in, and 2 mayce on a drill we coth ought to go out, or something like 3 that. 4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Two at a time. a CH AIRMAN HENDRIE: Or two a t a time. 6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's 2-1/2 drills for e every drill, do it 2-1/2 times. 8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But it seems to me that kind of / preparation is certainly oetter than coming in effect cold 10 to a serious event. 11 And fur ^t ermore, I must say I think that there's going to 12 oe a lot of difficulty in explaining, for instance, to some 13 of the oversight commi ttee s -- I won't mention names, but 14 some are interested in some things and some are interested la in o the rs -- that the EDO is the head of the emergency 16 management team. 17 But the Chairman proposes to sit with the team and at 18 least concur in their decisions, particularly with regard to 19 protective actions, of f-site, command decisions aoaut the 20 reactor conuition, and so on, and represent the commission 21 there, and so on. 22 It's a very odd configuration for a person who is 23 supposed to represent the head of the agency. 24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: It would not be if one 25 started at the beginning and looked at the kinds of 1633 222
~4 06 06 51 gsh MW4 i questions that are going to have to ce answered and the 2 kinds of decisions that are going to have to be made and 3 then spelled out who will make them under wnat a c ircu mstance s. 6 It would not ce a strange configuration cecause, 6 presumaoly, the E4T, under the direction of the EDO or 4 somecody else, wo uld have been designated as the agency in d this activity to make those decisions. And in other 9 circumstancas, if time were available, the commission would 10 make the decision and the E4T would recommend to it. 11 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: My concern primarily is to 12 have this ce clear. 13 If you may recall, in previous times, I had thought it 14 was very clear in the manual chapter. I thought it was 16 clear the EJO was in charge of the emergency and the la commissioners were a policy-making organization, whose il prima ry role was to oe involved in estaolishing the general 18 policy. 19 But in the unfolding of any rapid emergency, they did not 20 hvas that kind of a role. 21 I think many of you disagreed with that and certainly, 22 the impression I have is that that was a disagreement ana 23 tnat there should be a greater involvement. I think hows ver 24 we come out, it has to be clear so that we aon't go into another emergency with a lack of clerity. 25 1633 223
52 /4 06 07 gshMMM i It it's the commission as a whole '- charge of the 2 EMT, then we can say that. I f i t i s the EDO is in charge 3 of tne EMT, we ought to say that. If it's a delegated 4 commissioner is in charge, we ought to say that. 5 But what is really necessary is some cleer statement. 5 COMMISSIONER GILI:lSKY: Are you saying that you do / not think tne commission ought to nave more ther what you 3 described as a policy-making role? / COMMISSIONER AHEAdNE: What I started to say, the IJ starting coint is it appeared to me to ce very clear from 11 reading the manual chapter and from the discussions that I 12 had had witn the staff prior to Three Mile Island, t"at the 13 role of the commission was not a direct lin% in the 14 unfolding of an accident. la CHAIRMAN HENDAIE: And that's what I would have la told you before Three Mile Island 2. An accident haopens li and there's a staff response organization that's on the 16 oooks that goes into action. The commissioners are kept 19 informed. 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's rignt. But if tnat 21 is no t a practical solution, then whatever solution we 22 arrive at ought to oe very : lear. And that's my point. I 23 think that I have confidence in the organization. I have 24 confidence in any one of us being aole to do it. I h a ve -- 25 I really don't have confidence in a collegial group 1633 224
/4 06 d8 53 gshM1U i managing an/ thing like a rapidly unfolding accident. 2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Nhat I hear Joe saying is 3 that he, or the designated commissioner, will go down to 4 replace the executive director. Tha t doe sn' t sound to me a like the right thing to be coing. a CHAIRMAN HENDR;E Not replace in tne sense of the / executive director then goes home and reads the paper. He 3 joins the emergency management team and then becomes -- oecause he then, as the senior person there, oecomes the IJ head of the team 11 I think the team would continue to operate, you know, 12 like all of our groups, commi ttees, teams and so on, a 13 discu ssion activity. 14 CO MMISSIONER GILI:ISKY: As a practical matter, 15 everyone there woula cease taki6g orders from the executive la director and woula start ta'cing orders f rom the Chairman or 14 the aesignated commissioner. IS CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: True. I/ COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Right. 2] COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I'm not sure that that's 21 the right way to do it, without disagreeing with your 22 starting point. 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The objective is clear, 24 and that is to estaolish a clear line, es Jonn suggests. 2a I agree with you, Vic. I'm not altogether clear that 1633 225
54 74 06 0'9 gshMMl4 I tha t's tne way to do it. 2 3 4 6 6 / 3 10 ii 1633 226 w 12 1 13 14 15 16 14 13 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
55 74 01 01 kap /M4 i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: de have a cureaucratic x 2 macnine in place, which is designea to aeal with certain 3 sorts of proolems, and it gets exercised periccically. 4 deople develop working relationships, and then out of tha 3 olue to put someone_else in -- COSMIsSIONER AHEARNE: At a previous time, I a / proao sed-that a list of control, which was 3 . fndiv idual-s pe c i f ic, not posi tion-spe cific, I proposed tnat 9 Joe ce the neaa of the emergency management team. If Joe IJ wasn't available, then Lee be the head of the emergancy 11 manag ement team. If Lee wasn't avail able, if it's e fuel 12 facility, Bill Dircksi if it was a reactor, Harold Denton. 13 If neither of them was available, then lic S tello. 14 Tnat's individual-specific, and that group could 15 always exerc ise. 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That, in fact, is the present is configuration. I have designatea that kind of -- 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You know, that would -- 19 what that would really say is there's only one commissioner 20 who would exercise over the emergency management team. 21 Tha t's Jo e, and if he isn't available, then assign a 22 commissioner at the head of the emergency management team. 23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Mind you, I'm not saying 24 that he oughtn't go out there, or that tougn decisions, that 25 he oughtn't to make them, if the situation calls for it. 1633 227
56 '4 07 02 kap /MM i Sut what I hearc aian't seem to limit it to that. 2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: No, it wasn't, cecause i t's my 3 view that you can't go out there and stand next to the team 4 and not ce in charge and assume responsibility. And John's a call for clarity is very pertinent here. a COMMISS IONER KENNEDY: Being in charge and assuming responsioility are not necessarily equated. It e 8 seems to me that responsibility rests with the five people 9 on this sid? of this table, no matter what. The 134 says 10 that. Il CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm sorry. 12 COMMISS IONER KENNEDY: Otay, if you don't want to 13 take responsioility, you don' t have to. I a ssume 14 responsioility for anything that this staff does, any time la it does it, because I don't think I have any option to do 16 otherwise. That's my personal view. II (At 10: 55, Commissioner Ahearne 1? f t the room.) 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Dic k, we hav e oeen down in the 19 last 28 months in more hearings than I can shake a stick 20 at, where that is not permitted to 0e the ground rule of the 21 discussion. 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY I don't follow you. I 23 don't understand what you're saying. 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Where people come after staff 25 or of ficers for this or that act of omission or 1633 228
74 07 03 S7 k ap/MM i c ommi ssion -- 2 C0 4MISSI0 DER KENNEDY: Joe, you have never heard 3 this commissioner ever take that posture, and he will not. 4 I' m s o rry. a CHAIRMAN dENDRIE: You are not going to be 5 permi tted to say, "I am re sponsible. Get your hands o ff I that sta f f of ficer." S COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I am permitted to say that 9 if I choose. Indeed, I will. 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They will just ignore it, ana li they have. 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: They can ignore it if they 13 want to. 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They can ignore it if they want ~ 15 to. If the EDO is the executive director over one of the 16 staff offic3rs -- it doesn't matter how many commissioners is are lined up here -- and makes a decision tnat people decide IS later that was the wrong decision, why, that's a 19 responsioility, it seems to be, that the commissioners ought 20 to be ar. Not the career officers or the staff. 21 CO MMISSIONER KENNEDY: I certainly agree with 22 that. And I do not have to have mace the decision myself to 23 agree with it. 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think we need one of us on 25 tha t team, as a formal member, recognized as such end than 1633 229
'4'07'04 58 kap /MM i inevitaoly the head because of the seniority question. And 2 I think any other configuretion will be viewed as the 4 3 Commission oeing unwilling to cear the heat. 4 (At 10:58, Commissioner Anearne entered tne room. ) a COMMISSIONER SRAD?ORD: Ina t may oe a pretty 3 important point. That is, if what the chain structure -- e looking at ihree Mile Island, what the chain structure would 3 clearly do would oe to shif t everyone's perception of who is 9 responsible for the EMT decision to the commissioner, rather 10 than -- thereby to the Commission. 11 It's not clear that it would change -- would have 12 changed the quality of the decisions themselves very muca, 13 because I think when you look at what went wrong, as Lee has 14 already saic, it has a lot more to do with the flow of ~ la information between the plant and the operators -- 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Peter, there is nothing in my 1/ proposition here that says, you know, the addition of myself 13 or any commissioner to the EMT is going to really upgrade 19 its performance very much. 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Peter, I tnink I can -- 21 COMMISSIONER BRAD?ORD: I was talking, if you and 22 I were both in the re sponse center on that Nednesday. 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The problem on Wednesday 24 was the flow of information. It wasn't there. 25 COMMISSIONER BR AD?ORD: Inat's what I'm saying, 1633 230
59 74 07 05 kap /MM i also. And it would ce a mistake to look on this proposal as 2 solving these proolems of tnat Wednes day. 3 CdAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's e xac tly right. 4 CO MMISSIONER BRADFORD: Granted we weren't the re a in the capacity of taking tne EMT over, but I can't -- a speaking for myself, I can't imagine if I haa been there in / that capacity it would have made things any better at all. 8 I can think of a number of ways it might have made it worse, 9 so that does sort of -- does that really say that the gain 10 in the change you are proposing, Joe, has a lot more to do li with conforming to t.5e public's perception of who's in 12 charge to wno's really in charge, than it does with changing 13 the substance of decisions that would be mada in that role? 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Certainly more the former, 15 because 1 haven't meant to imply, as I say, that the 13 addition of a commissioner to the EMT then equips the EMT 11 with, you know, great powers of discernment that it didn't IS ha e before. I don't think it will degrade them. v 19 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: The one qualification I 20 woula say, Peter. I think that Joe present might well have 21 made a difference, but that's not Joe as Chairman, a 22 commi sioner -- it's Joe with all his knowlege of reac tors. 23 That's the difference. 24 COMMISSIONER BRAD?ORD: The point is it's a 23 s ignificant one. 1633 231
4 07 0'6 60 kap / MM i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It's hard to tell, out that 2 would be the only possibla difference, out it certainly 3 would n' t -- 4 COMMISSIONER BRAD?ORD: Inere have historically a been times when lawyers were chairman. 5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: More often not. COMMISSIONER BRAD 50RD: It might not be a wise 3 princ iple simply to say that the chairman is automaticelly 9 in ch arge of the EXT. 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You will note that I have 11 always re fe rred to it by individual, not position. 12 CO MM ISS IONER BR AD.:0RD: Or profession? 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: My proposition has to ao both 14 with the perception of who, in fact, is in charge and 15 oearing responsibility and with the assumption of 16 responsioility on behalf of the Commission f or the il decisions. By being there, by being the head of the team -- 18 MR. HANRAHAN: I think you pointed out in your 19 memo that the decisions to which the designe ted commissioner 2J would be mostly involved are those judgmental ones, more in 21 puolic areas and not in sucn technical detail. So I think, 22 Commissioner Bradford, in this sense the Commission -- any 23 of the commissioners in this sense is aole to deal with what 24 goes on. 25 There is an adequate staff of tecnnical oeople 1633 232
74 07 07 61 kap / MM i there who can deal with those things. The translation of ] 2 that into tne judgmental, to the more puolic decisions, that 3 is the important -- 4 MR. KENNEKE: Commissioner Gilinsky's proolem, it a seems to me, is not with that aspect of it. The puolic 5 protective action kind of thing doesn't seem to be / underlying four concern, as I understand it -- correct me if 3 I am. wrong -- but more with the details of what goes on at 9 the plant, which may or may not immediately relate to a 10 decis ion aff ecting public protectiva actions, trying to 11 parse the problem of Commissioner Bradford earlier to 12 in plant decisions v.ersus things that directly affect public 13 decisions, protective actions. 14 Am I correct in this sense, that maybe that's 15 where your difficulty lies, and your concern about 16 Commi ssion involvement in dec ision-making? 1/ COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: No. It's more the 18 question of whether a commissioner steps in and takes 19 opera tional control of an existing emergency organization, 2J which is not to say that he shouldn't make some of the casic 21 decisions, whether it dea's with the plant or with public 22 protection, releases of radioactivity or wha tever. 23 CO MM ISS IONER AHEARNE: How do you do the one 24 without the other? How do you do the one, that is, keep the 23 liaison with the commissioner there, without going to Joe's 1633 233
62 ' 7 08 74 0 kap /VN 1 point, once the commissioner is there, particularly if it is 2 the chairman or the acting chairman -- ~ 3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It depends how he acts. 4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: dell, if he is just going to 5 observe and then report to othe: commissioners in the next 6 room, it seems to me all the proposols have been for more a participation than that. It seems to me that_that's a level S of withdrawal which none of us have really contemplated. / Once you go past that, ana this individual, the 10 designated commissioners, are now in there arguing with EMT 11 memoe rs, sa/ing, Okay, you have convinced me you've got to 12 do this, let's do it -- that is participating in the 13 decisions, concurring in them, approving of them -- whatever 14 words you want to use, or " making" them, if you want to use 15 that word -- then I find it very hard to have that la individual recognized as the head of the team. 1/ CO MMISSIONER GILINSKY: I'll tell you, the thing 18 that's wrong with that is he's going to get suc'<ed down a ll 19 the little rabbit holes, and the Commission will cease to 20 function. 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY That's rignt. 22 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY: The que stion it really 23 comes down to ist which decisions need to oe made at which 24 level? And if, in fact, the Commission is in the next room 25 -- and I would presume we are all pre tty well informed and ~ 1633 234
63 74 '07 09 kap /MM i can all deal with matters that need to be brought to the 2 Commi ssion -- s ) 3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Is is correct you would 4 p erci eve -- 3 CO MMISSIONER GILINSKY: The Chairman is the 6 chairman of the Commission; obviously, the spokesman. 4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Would you perceive, then, 8 the appropriate way to have the EMT s tructure to func tion in ? its emergency response operational role with EDO as the 10 chairman, as the head of it, running i t, with the Commission 11 a djac e nt, at least a majority of the Commission adjacent for 12 the public judgment issues that there is time to take, and 13 either a commissioner sitting with the EDO or some other 14 individual to serve as a continuous link? Is that what you ^ 15 had in mind? 15 CO MMISSIONER GILINSKY: If you are in the next il room, I don' t think you have to have the commissioner 13 s itting witn EDO. The EDO is the EDO anc he is perfectly 19 capaole of s itting oy himself, I assume. 20 I am just addressing the situation where the ?.1 Chairman is there and decisions need to ce made. 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Is your suggestion, then, 23 that there not be a commissioner sitting in the EMT on a 24 regular casis? 23 COMMISSIONER GILIN;KY: You mean sitting down and 1633 235
4 d 7 l'O 64 kap /MM i dicussing a matter with the - 2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes. ~ 3 4 3 8 1 3 10 11 i2 1633 236 13 14 15 16 1/ IS l9 20 21 22 23 24 23
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I guess I haven't thought hd-l 8' 2 it through completely. This is partly a half thought-out 3 proposal. 4 As Joe said, he didn't have his proposal. developed 5 fully; it may come down to a matter of style..~I would not 6 displace the head of that organization merely because a 7 Commissioner is present. I think the Chairman ought to be very 8 closely informed, and maybe the right thing is that he sits 9 right there with the group. 10 But, if I may use another analogy from an area with II which I am only slightly familiar, if the Admiral of the Fleet 12 is on one of the ships, and I understand the captain is still I3 the captain, or am I wrong? Id COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Only for the ship, not for 15 the functioning of the fleet. 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: He hardly ever is -- 17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It seems to me -- this is 18 something you know more about than I do, Lee, but have I got 19 that.one right? 20 MR. GOSSICK: The ahip also goes where the Admiral I wants.it to. (Laughter) COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's exactly right. 24 .Fberal Reportsrs, Inc. C MMISSIONER KENNEDY-Let me suggest, Vic, in line 25 with your point, another historical parallel perhaps, a former 1633 237
66 hd-2 1 President, now deceased, used to make a point of coming to the \\ 2 White House Situation Room and joining with his advisors', and 3 discussing at great length matters which they were constituted s 4 as a body to deal with. 5 And I think a careful reading of history would sug-6 gest that there was no noticeable improvement in the quality 7 of the decisions arising from that mode of operation, and those 8 decisions which were taken w'..an he sat in his office and made 9 them in the normal course. 10 Indeed, there is some historical suggestion that it 11 tended to muck the process up more than it improved it. 12 MR. KENNEKE: It seems to me there were several l 13 words perhaps we could focus on that might help to parse the 14 problen a little bit. The extremes see m to replace the 15 Chairman as the head of the EM L Then we use the word "he 16 would decide to ma km the decisions." He would decide. 17 The memo that we send, attempting to parse the i 18 decision is the word " consult." EDO word consult; that seems l I9 clearly not to suffice for what I sense to be the majority of 20 the Commission opinion. 21 There is some doubt about the extreme going all the ~ 22 wa' to the side; the Chairman used the term a bit ago, " concur 23 in decisions." It seems to me that's a useful direction to 24 talk about; you can participate in discussions, let the EMT Fe[eral Reporters, Inc. 25 make the decision, and the Chairman, with the advice and perhaps 1633 238
67 4hd-3 1 the consent of the other Commissioners, if possible, would 2 concur -- ratify the decision. 3 That would put the staff of the agency on the 4 decision, and yet, leave some distance between the two parties, 5 to try to keep a little bit of distance between the Commission 6 as such and the staff as such. 7 Is that helpful? Is that a helpful way of dealing 8 with your concern? 9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It's a possible place, but I 10 find it to be in fact, to be just the consultive role for the 11 designated Commissioner or the Chairman, which was elaborated 12 back in your October 30th memo, and with which I have simply 13 fundamental differences. 14 I continue to think that, in terms of what is expec-15 ted -- reasonably expected, I would think, from the heads of 16 the agency, in terms of public expectations, Congressional 17 expectations, what we ought to do in terms of our responsibil-18 ities, then we need -- ideally, the collegial Commission would 19 be the head of the EMT. 20 But it just is impractical to do those things by 21 committee, and I think there has to be a designated Commissioner 22 who is then the head of that enterprise. 23 MR. KENNEKE: It is clear that the public will look 24 to the Commission for some kind of reaction. Whether or not 'edws: Roonen, Inc. 25 the public would look to the Commission as having made a 1633 239
68 d.4, I decision dependscon whether the public perceives the Commission s 2 as having usefully participated in the decision process. 3 If you think about it as k rowing "what's going on, 4 and least not disagreeing with what the staff intends -- 5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Al, it is much more important 6 to have the correct decisions made. 7 I certainly would like the public to have a good 8 perception and feel confident, but our responsibility is to 9 set up a system where the right decisions are made. I think 10 that's really the important issue. Il MR. KENNEKE: And how those decisions can be.made, 12 I think Commissioner Gilinsky is dealing with a facet of that: 13 how will the Chairman's presence and role in the room affect 14 the thought process of the staff? 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I was just trying to shift 16 away the public perception is really secondary. 17 MR. KENNEKE: The public is looking for same 18 assurance. 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It has to be of secondary 20 importance; the principle importance has to be making sure 21 that decisions are being made. 22 MR. KENNEKE: Maybe I used the wrong term. I don't 23 mean it in the negative perjorative sense. I think it is how 24 the Commission will best affect the decisions. Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 Is it best effective by being a full participant 1633 240
69 ad-5 1 in it, at least a delegate, or is it best there as a check 2 aga' inst the way -- I think that's the difference between 3 the views.. I think it's a useful way to focus on it and see 4 how you raact to that. 5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Can I ask a related ques-6 tion? 7 What is the function of the regional office-in 8 all this? Is there an emergency center in the regional 9 of f ice? 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes. 11 MR. GOSSICK: There is, and in the past it was 12 always assumed that it would gear up to make sure the assets 13 and rasources of the region were properly used.. 14 I think it is being somewhat reconsidered in what 15 its role is in the light of our experience. 16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Are we striking the right 17 balance between Bethesda and the region? Should we be putting 18 more out there and putting more emphasis on -- 19 MHl.GOSSICK: I don't know that we can really 20 answer that without again recognizing that there was a charac-21 teristic of the Three Mile Island being close by as opposed 22 to, say, it's being in, you know, in California or somewhere 23 else, where we would undoubtedly have had to rely more on the 24 region for people and information, t ran perhaps we did in the 5 'ederal Regerters, IM. 25 case of Three Mile Island. 1633 241
70 hd-5 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Why would you have perhaps / 2 to rely more on the region for people? 3 MR. GOSSICK: From the standpoint of the time 4 involved, to get other people from either the headquarters or 5 other regions out there. 6 There is one other point that I hesitate to bring 7 up, but I think it gets, again, to the matter of the Chairman 8 or a Commissioner being there in whatever capacity you 9 finally decide. 10 When the Commissioner or Chairman arrives on the 11 scene, whether he is replacing the Director, the EDO as a 12 Director of the EbT, or not, as someone has pointed out, if 13 it's a reactor accident, the principal input is to the status 14 of the plant; the dangers that are perceived are going to 15 just naturally -- going to come from the most expert guy 16 the staff in that sort of business, and that will be on I7 either Harold Denton or Vic Stello. You've got two guys that 18 are equally qualified from a technical standpoint, to advise 19 and to try to perceive what the situation is. 20 Let's assume that it is Chairman Hendrie that is 2I there. He's also got that expertise, but let's assume that 22 Peter and I end up out there, or some EDO.who is a lawyer or 23 who is an expert in fuel-cycle stuff, but not reactors. 24 The question I raise is -- going back to your point Federal Recorters, Inc. 25 of people, specific, one can ask the question, I think, whether 1633 242
71 l-7, 1 you really want to have an EDO who may not be a reactor 2 expert, if it's a reactor accident, literally in charge of 3 the operation as opposed to having whoever that most expert 4 guy, as identified by the Commission, in its judgments with 5 the support of the EDO and other parts of the s taf f, as far 6 as making sure resources and whatnot, and wherever help and 7 advice 8 And for that matter, if it's someone other than 9 Doctor Hendrie, or someone with his qualfications or judgmenis 10 can be reached by the Commissioner, that is present. II I would come back to the point, though, that no 12 matter how you come out on that, that I think it still is 13 necessary, as Dr. Hendrie has pointed out, that the public Id understand at the highest levels, and all levels of Congress 15 and what else, that recognizes there is a Commissioner, or it 16 is "the" Commission, that's in charge of the event. And I I7 don't know how you can really get away from that-situation. 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The problem we are trying to I9 wrestle with, Lee, though, is how do you accomplish that while 20 at the same time enabling the emergency management group to 21 function effectively. 22 I don't think any of us disagree with either we 3 want the EMT to function effectively, or that ultimately 24 g, the Commission will be responsible for actions that are taken. 25 But the difficulty is trying to meld those. It seems to me 1633 243
72 .d-8 1 that -- 2 MR. GOSSICK: It seems to me that once you cross 3 the line and say: "No, we are not going to have the Commission 4 either stay here in Bethesda or sit somewhere else, either 5 here in Washington, or somewhere else in Bethesda, but not in 6 lhe EMT," the minute you have one of the Commissioners come into 7 da i. EMT, it is just naturally going to follow that the people 8 are going to be working directly with him as opposed to 9 through an EDO. 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It didn't work that way. II COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I don't think it's inevitably 12 They had -- at least --- 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: At least on Wedn esday, it Id didn't work through me; it worked through you. 15 MR. GOSSICK: T understood though that in that 16 situation you were there, and Peter, purely observing and I7 not taking over. 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You mean if they are there, l9 with an explicit role as a member. 20 MR. GOSSICK: Yes. Right. 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm not sure that we can go 22 much further on this this morning. I am 19 minutes late for 23 an appointment myself at this point. 2d I think we will have to continue this discussion redwei 8. pomes, ine, 25 again. 1633 244
73 .d-9 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Maybe Vic could try to flesh 2 out, put together a little bit his -- your proposed approach. 3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I was just saying to Peter, 4 in line with heading down this course, we're going to have 5 him arguing Supreme Court cases pretty soon. 6 (Laughter) 7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Very good. Thanks very much. nd T#8 8 (Whereupon, at 11:20 AM, the hearing was adjourned.) 'R#8674 9 10 11 1633 245 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 rEdei mooemn Ine, 25}}