ML19210D103
| ML19210D103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1979 |
| From: | Early P POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911200540 | |
| Download: ML19210D103 (27) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK to Cot.UMaus CIRCLE NEW YORK. N. Y.1o019 (212) 397 6200 Trustees agongg7,,gn,y JOHN S.DYSON '"'*'0,8,",',*',",',",#, ChAIAMAN s s'cu swa v CE GEORGE L. ING ALLS " *
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RICH AR D M. FLYNN JOSEPH R. SCHMIEDER EsDENT& MIEP ROBERT 1. MILLONZl rREoERien R. cuRx November 14, 1979 ,,,,,y ,, ,,,ce,,, JPN-79-72 ;",";,", v,'g , '," ='"' orrican osmao yc PatelOENT
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Director Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Operating Reactors
Subject:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Fire Protection System
Dear Sir:
We are enclosing additional information in response to various NRC staff concerns on '.he JAF Fire Hazards Analysis. These responses are consistent with your request in the JAF Safety Evaluation Report supporting Amendment No. 47 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 dated August 1, 1979. The enclosure relates to the following:
- 1. SER Paragraph 3.1.1 Interior Fire Hose Stations (PF-9, PF-20)
- 2. SER Paragraph 3.1.8 Ventilation System-Safety Related Pump Rooms (PF-24)
- 3. SER Paragraph 3.1.19 Exposed Structural Steel (PF-22)
- 4. SER Paragraph 3.2.2 Pipe Penetrations (PF-33)
- 5. SER Paragraph 3.3.3 Fire Water Piping Systems (PF-36) -
2
- 6. SER Paragraph 3.2.5 Fire Door Supervision (PF-8) 1367 252 AoD 7 9g200 N 5
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We are also attaching updated Table 3.1 and 3.2 with appropriate references to various Authority letters for the convenience of staff review. If you need any further assistance please do not hesitate to call us. Very truly yours, hafAl. dY Yt. Paul J. Early Assistant Chief Engineer-Projects
, 1367 253
~.
TABLE 3.1 , Page 1 of 2 IMPLEMENTATION DATES FOR LICENSEE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
~
AND bTAFF REQUIREMENTS PREVIOUSLY LISTED ITEM DATE REFERENCE LETTER AS ITEM NO. SEE NOTE 3.1.1 Interior Fire Hose Stations (PF-9,20) October 1980 JPN-79-44(7/27/79) C 3.1.2 Valve Supervision Implemented JPN-79-12 (3/7/79) C 3.1.3 Manual Fire Fighting Equipment (PF-28) Implemented JPN-79-12 (3/7/79) C 3.1.4 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus December 1979 JPN-79-40(7/2/79) C 3.1.5 Administrative Controls January 1980 JPN-79-40(7/2/79) C 3.1.6 Emergency Lighting (PF-25) January 1980 JPN-79-40(7/2/79) C 3.1.7 Fire Doors (PF-35) Implemented 'JPN-79-44 (7/27/79) C JPN-79-55(9/5/79) 3.1.8 Ventilation System-Safety Related Pump Rooms * (PF-24) Spring 1980 JPN-79-12(3/7/79)** C 3.1.9 Alternate Shutdown Capability-Relay Room
- October 1980 JP,N-79-12 (3/7/79) I 3.1.10 Exterior Hydrant Hose Houses (PF-12) Implemented JPN-79-55(9/5/79) C 3.1.11 Post-Indicator Valve Wrenches (PF-14) Implemented JPN-79-40(7/2/79) C 3.1.12 Post-Indicator Valve Labeling .
(PF-31) Implemented JPN-79-12 (3/7/79) C 3.1.13 Fire Bridage Leader Training (PF-30) Implemented JPN-79-12 (3/7/79) C 3.1.14 Control of Combustibles (PF-29) December 1979 JPN-79-40(7/2/79) --- C 3.1.15 Alternate Shutdown Capability-Cable Spreading Room
- October 1980 JPN 12 (3/7/79) 3.3.17 h___) I 3.1.16 Fire Alarm Annunication in the [Eyg)
Control Room Implemented JPN-79-12(3/7/79) 3.3.3 C 3.1.17 Total Flooding CO2 Suppression Q__;3 System-Ventilation Systems Interlocks * (PF-18) Spring 1980 JPN-79-12(3/7/79) 3.3.7 i , I 3.1.18 Fire Detection and Signaling Systems * (PF-19) {gy-p October 1980 JPN-79-55(9/5/79) 3.3.8 r C 3.1.19__ Exposed Structural Steel * (PF-22) October 1980 JPN-79-12 (3/7/79) *
- 3.3.9 C 7R5hy 3.1.20 g Electrical Cable Penetration Cgggg cys Qualification * (PF-27) October 1980 JPN-79-44(7/27/79) 3.3.12 I 3.1.21 sa Ventilation Duct Penetrations July 1980 JPN-79-12(3/7/79) 3.3.13 b'~~ C e ss LJ7 .
$g $=60
TABLE 3.1 (CONTINUSD) Page 2 of 2 NOTES: *The design details for these modifications will be subject to further staff review prior to implementation.
** Additional Information on these items is sent by JPN-79-72 (Nov. 14 , 1979)
C - No additional information to be provided by the Authority prior to implementation. I - Additional information will be provided by the Authority prior to implementation. Os N S N) W LJ1 s e 6 64
TABLE 3.2 . COMPLETION DATES FOR INCOMPLETE ITEMS , PREVIOUSLY LISTED ITEM DATE REFERENCE LETTER AS ITEM NO. SEE NOTE 3.2.1 Fire Hazard Analysis (PF-ll) November 1979 JPN-79-12 (3/7/79) I
- 3. 2. 2
- Pipe Penetrations (PF-33) February 1980 JPN-79-25(5/7/79) 3.3.14 C JPN-79-12(3/7/79)
- 3. 2. 3
- Fire Water Piping System (PF-36) November 1979 JPN-79-25(5/7/79) 3.3.6 C JPN-79-12(3/7/79) 3.2.4 Diesel Fire Pump Room Sprinkler August 1979 JPN-79-55(9/5/79) C Head Spacing (PF-32) JPN-79-40(7/2/79)
JPN-79-25(5/7/79)
- 3. 2. 5
- Fire Door Supervision (PF-8) November 1979 JPN-79-12(3/7/79)** C 3.2.6 Signaling Circuits Supervision August 1979 JPN-79-55(9/5/79) 3.3.2 C (PF-19)
JPN-79-44(7/27/79) 3.2.7 Fire Pump Performance August 1979 JPN-79-55 (9/5/79) 3.3.4 C 3.2.8 Fire Pump Capacity August 1979 JPN-79-55(9/5/79) 3.3.5 C 3.2.9 Testing of CO2 Fire Suppression Systems (PF-18) January 1980 JPN-79-41(7/27/79) 3.3.15 AI 3.2.10 Crescent Area Fire Protection (PF-23) August 1979 JPN-79-55(9/5/79) 3.3.11 . . C 3.2.11 Cable Flame Tests August 1979 JPN-79-55(9/5/79) 3.3.16 C JPN-79-44(9/27/79) JPN-79-40(7/2/79) NOTE: C- Item Complete, no additional information to be provided by the Authority AI - Additional Information will be provided by the Authority
- Additional Information on these items is sent by JPN-79-72 (Nov. 14 , 1979)
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9 JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NITI. EAR POWER PLANT FIRE HAZARDS ANA JSIS SUPPLEMENTAL DOCKET NO. 50-333_
REFERENCE:
NRC Letter of September 22, 1978, Enclosure No. 2 Response to NRC Concern PF-20: Interior Fire Hose Stations NRC Staff Concern: Interior fire hose stations have been located within or adjacent to most safety related areas of the plant. Additional lengths of hose (stored on reels) have been provided to extend hose coverage in several areas. It is the staff's concern that (1) Water leakage past the hose outlet valves will cause deterioration of fire hose; (2) " Electrically safe" fire hose nozzles have not been provided in areas containing high voltage equipment; (3) the 1" hose couplings and long lengths of hose provided may cause friction losses such that sufficient pressure will not be available at the nozzle; (4) hose lengths in excess of 100 f t. will be difficult to maneuver to effectively fight fires; (5) access to some interior hose stations in the plant are blocked by laydown and storage areas; (6) linen hose, which is not suitable for industrial fire fighting, has been provided to protect several safety related areas of the plant. NRC Staff Position
- 1. Provide drip valves on all interior hose standpipes downstream of the hose outlet valve.
- 2. Provide appropriate fire hose nozzles in areas containing electrical hazards.
- 3. Confirm by the results of tests and/or calculations that the (flowing) pressure at each fire hose nozzle is greater than or equal to 65 psig.
- 4. Provide additional interior hose stations as necessary to limit the lengths of hose required to not greater than 100 ft.
.5. Establish administrative controls to prevent access to manual fire fighting equipment frem being restricted by temporary .
storage of materials within the plant. -
- 6. Provide 300 psi test single jacket lined hose for those hose .
stations which are provided to protect safety related structures and systems. 136/ ./ lb
*
- 2.
Response
To comply with the NRC stnff position the following items will be adopted:
- 1. Drip valves will be provided on all interior hose standpipes downstream of the hose outlet valve.
- 2. Areas containing electrical hazards will be provided with fog nozzles on the Fire Hose Standpipes.
- 3. The Authority has provided in their submittal dated August 3,1978 the results of their calculations confirming that at least 65 psig pressure-exists at the highest elevation hose stations outlets La the plant. .
- 4. Thirty (30) new interior hose stations will be installed in various locations to provide backup fire suppression for all ss.fety-related and some other areas of the plant.
A schedule of all new hose stations is attached. Twenty-two of the new hose stations and the connecting piping in safety-related areas will require seismic supports to prevent damage to essential cables or equipment. These are indicated by the suffix "S" in the schedule and on the drawings.
- 5. Administrative controls have been established to prevent access to manual fire fighting equipment from being restricted by temporary storage of materials within the plant.
- 6. Each hose reel will be fitted with 100 ft of 300 psig test single jacket lined and coated 1 1/2 in. fire hose and nozzle as shown on the attached schedule of new hose stations. Canvas or similar covers will be provided for hose reels in potentially contaminated areas.
~.
i367 258 t
3. SCHEDULE OF NEW HOSE STATIONS-SHEET NO.1 Sta. (1) Nozzle (4) No. Zone (5) Type (2d Type 031S TW HR E 032S TE HR E 033 TP HR A 051S TW HR E 052S TE HR E 053S TW HR E 054S TE HR E 059 TB HR A 061S TW HR E 062S TE HR E 082 RW HR A 092 TP HR A 093R(3) HB HR - 094R(3) HB HR - 095 TP HR A 125S PC CHR A 132 LR CA A 135S SP HR ER 136S BR HR ER 153S SW HR ER 154S SE HR ER 161S ES HR ER 162S EN HR ER 193R(3) HB HR - 232S CN HR E 233S RR HR ER 281 RC CHR ER 325S MC HR A 326S MG HR A . 331 AD HR A : 333S CR HR A : 334S CR CHR ER 425S MG HR A Wall Hydrant (MG Roof) (Hose Rack) A 1367 259
4. SCHEDULE OF NEW HOSE STATIONS-SHEET NO.2 (1) ist Digit = Elev.; 2nd Digit = Bldg. No.; 3rd Digit = Sta. No. Suffix S denotes seismic supports Legend: Fire Hose Stations Numerical Designation Codes Elevations Buildings 6 El. 369 2 Reactor Building 5 344 3 Administration Building 4 326 4 Auxiliary Boiler Room 3 300 5 Turbine Building 2 284-292 6 Emergency Generator Building i 272 7 Screenwell House 0 242-260 8 Radwaste Building 00 below 242 9 Heater Bay (2) Type CA = Cabinet (surface mounted) HR = Hose Reel CHR Continuous Hose Reel (3) R = Existing hose Station relocated (4) Nozzle Type: E = Elect, Fog Only; A = Adjustable; R = Reduced Flow (5) Fire Zone Legend I367 260 6
a s . (5) Fire Zone Legend Code Zone AD Administration Building BR Battery Room (SR) CN Cable Run Room North (SR) CR Control Room (SR) EN Emergency Generator Switchgear North (SR) LS Emergency Generator Switchgear South (SR) HB Heater Bay LR Locker Room MG Motor Generator Room PC Primary Containment (SR) RC Radwaste Control RR Relay Room (SR) RW Radwaste Building SE Switchgear East SP Cable Spreading Room (SR) SW Switchgear West TB Turbine Building TE Cable Tunnel East (SR) TF Pipe Tunnel TW Cable Tunnel West (SR) (SR) = Safety Related Area 1367 261 - i
1 JAMES A. ?ITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENTAL DOCKET NO. 50-333
REFERENCE:
NRC Letter of September 22, 1978, Enclosure No. 2 Response to NRC Concern PF-24: Safety Related Pump Rooms - Ventilation Air Intakes NRC Staff Concern The safety related pump rooms SP1 and SP2 contain cables and equipment required for shutdown and cooldown of the plant. It is the staff's concern that a fire in the screenwell area would be drawn into the rooms through unprotected ventilation openings by the rooms ventilation systems. NRC Staff Position Provide physically separated supply ventilation systems, with automatically actuated 3 hour fire rated dampers, for Safety Related Pump Rooms SP1 and SP2.
Response
To comply with the NRC staff position of providing separate sources of ventilation air for the Safety Related Pump Rooms SP1 and SP2 the following solution is proposed. A separate source of ventilation air will be provided from the east cable tunnel via the existing access doorways. The access door between the pump rooms and the door to the east cable tunnel will be held open with fusible links and electric releases. The four existing ventilation openings to the pump rooms will be fitted with 3 hr rated fire dampers equipped with standard 160 F fusible links and electric releases. With this configuration, air can be drawn from either the screenwell building or the cable tunnel to supply makeup air removed by the exhaust fans. Both doorways will be fitted with new heavy gauge steel wire mesh doors for security purposes and equipped with electronic supervision. The attached sketch shows the locations of. the proposed fire dampers and the wire mesh doors. The electric releases for the two doors and the four dampers will be actuated automatically by heat or smoke detectors or remote manually - from a local control panel. The fusible links will serve as back-up - for the electric releases. 1367 262
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- JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE HAZTJtD ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENTAL DOCKET NO. 50-333
Reference:
Commission 's Letter of September 22, 1978, Enclosure No. 3 RESPONSE TO NRC CONCERN PF-22 EXPOSED STRUCTURAL STEEL NRC Staff Concern: In August 3, 1978 respcase to Staff Request No. 20, the licensee identified several plart areas where exposed structural steels exist, and provided general statements of the licensee's conclusion in regard to the safe shutdown consequences of fire damage to structural steel members in these areas. The responses, however, did not provide any information which could enable the staff to evaluate the validity of such conclusion, During the site visit, the staff observed that there are many more plant areas; e.g., control building, switchgear rooms, diesel generator building, MG set area, etc., which are housed by unprotected steel structures but were not identified in the licensee's response. Apparently, neither the direct impact of the structural scecl failure in these areas, nor its effect on safety-related structure, components, and systems in the neighboring areas has been investigated. Therefore, the staff does not have reasonable assurance that redundant equipment / cabling required for safe shutdown may not be damaged by a structural failure due co fire. NRC Staff Position Exposed structural steels should be protected against the , fire damage unless it can be demonstrated that the failure of such steels would not jeopardize safe shutdown capability of the plant.
. Response Those structures, equipment, or components whose failure could cause significant release of radioactivity (a release of .
radioactivity with radiological dose consequences potentially - exceeding 10CFR100 guidelines) or which are vital to a safe shutdown of the plant and the removal of decay and sensible heat, . are Class I structures as listed in Section 12.2.2 and as defined in Section 12.2.1 of the FSAR for JAFNPP. A list of Class I structures follows: D D j 1367 264
. 1. Drywell, Vent Pipes, Suppression Chamber, and Penetrations -
- 2. Reactor Building
- 3. Control Room (including external access)
- 4. Main Stack
- 5. Emergency Diesel Generator Building and Associated Switchgear Roans
- 6. Radioactive Waste Building
- 7. Battery Rooms
- 8. Screenwell-Pump House (substructure)
- 9. Emergency Service Watcr Pump House
- 10. Electrical Bays ,
Each of these items has been examined ~for the following:
- 1. Vital to Safe Shutdown
- 2. Existence of Exposed Structural Steel 9 D '3'T h ub #
- 3. Presence of Possible Fire Qv us .
4, Effect of Steel Failure on Safety-related Equipment
- 5. Consequences of Loss of Safety-related Equipment on Safe Shutdown capability Where it can not be demonstrated that safe shutdown capability is not jeopardized, action is recommended to modify the existing structure so that safe shutdown capability is assured.
Summary of Recommended Actions The evaluation of the current plant configuration has identified three areas where steel failure could jeopcrdize safe shutdown capability of the plant. These areas are: control room area, diesel generator building, and the electrical bays. The electrical bays and the diesel generator building do not : currently have sufficient fire resistant construction for } redundant modules. The control room structure does not have sufficient fire resistant support steel construction to prevent
- the collapse of steel in the event of a major fire in this structure.
As a result of this evaluation, the barriers in the electrical bays and the diesel generator building will be modified to obtain 1367 26,5
h{ a three hour fire resistant rating. These actions will be in accordance with designs tested and approved in accordance with , test methods as specified by, ASTM E119 or .UL263. Refer to conceptual drawings 11825-FIG hF22-1, 2, and 3 for delineation of the areas where modifications.are recommended. Protection against a major fire in tha control room structure will be provided by assuring the capability to shut down the plant independently of the control room. Further details of this method of shut down are provided in Appendix C to the response to NRC concern PF-11. Emergency Diesel Generator Ruildina and Associated Switchaear Rooms This structure is vital to safe shutdown. The emergency diesel generator building houses two modules each consisting of tuo emergency diesel generators and the switchgear associated uith these two generators. The building is a one-story reinforced concrete structure with a structural steel supported roof. The steel roof framing is not independent and is not fire protected.
Conclusion:
The roof support beams will be fire protected for a 3 hr fire resistance rating. This protection will sustain the roof slab and the fire barriers between modules so that a fire in one module will not damage the other module. Refer to 11825-FIG-PF22-2 for a delineation of the steel requiring fire protection. Electrical Bays This structure is vital to safe shutdown. It is a reinforced concrete structure with a concrete roof supported on structural
. steel framing. Below El 272 ft, the safety-related cabling is protected by reinforced concrete. Above El 272 ft, the safety-related switchgear equipment is located between column lines 13 to 19 and A3/4 to B. The redundant switchgear modules are separated by a north-south concrete block wall. The Class I equipment is protected by poured concrete valls at the A3/4, B, and 13 lines and by a concrete wall at the 19 line. There are exposed structural steel beams above the internal walls and column flanges in the block walls which are not fire protected.
The foam room is located at El 272 ft to the north of the switchgear areas. This area houses fire protection subsystems i used to protect Class I equipment. The concern for the foam room - is not fire damage to steel within the room as there is a fire loading of 0 Btu /sq f t as shown in the Fire Hazards Analysis
- Summary, Attachment 1, but rather that a fire in an adjacent area could result in damage to exposed structural steel leading to impairment of the foam room 's integrity. The foam room is bounded by the outside to the west and above. The north and east sides are adjacent to the turbine building track bay. The south 1367 266
side is adjacent to the generator lead housing area. The oil storage room on the south side was originally: designed to confine a fire. The cable tunnels balow the foam room do not contain exposed structural steel. The northeast corner of the foma room is supported by structural- steel over the closed loop cooling water system heat exchangers and pumps. Exposed structural stocl exists on the north, east, and south boundaries in the form of partially e:: posed columns and roof support beams as they penetrate the walls. The beams suppor. ting the northeast portion of tlfe slab at El 272 ft are also exposed structural steel.
Conclusion:
All column flanges and beams above the walls bounding the two switchgear areas and the f(am room, and the beams which support the northeast corner of the foam room floor slab, will be fire ,rrotected for a three hour fire recintance rating. "ith this action taken, a fire in one suitchgear area resulting in failure of exposed structural steel, vill not damage the redundant switchgear area and thus safe shutdown capability will not be jeopardized. The integrity of the foam room will not be endangered by failure of exposed structural steel in an adjacent area, and thus the foam room's function of providing fire protection subsystems for Class I equipment will not be impaired. Refer to 11825-Fig-PF22-3 for delineation of steel requiring fire protection. 10R ORh@M i367 207
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JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLAIE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS SUPPLDtEICAL DOCKET No. 50-333
REFERENCE:
NRC Letter of September 22, 1978, Enclosure No. 4 Response to NRC Concern PF-33: Unsealed Pipe Penetrations
'NRC Staff Concern:
In the August 3,1978 response to Staff Request #19, the licensee stated that several fire barriers in the plant contain unsealed pipe penetrations. The barriers containing unsealed penetrations were not identified. It is the staff's concern that unsealed pipe penetrations will allow a fire to propagate to adjacent fire areas. NRC Staff Position: Install fire rated seals in the pipe penetrations through fire barriers separating safety-related areas of the plant from other safety-related and non-safety related areas.
Response
To comply with the NRC staff position the location of all critical unsealed pipe penetrations as well as the design installation method for sealing each type of penetration will be identified. These seals will be designed to have a fire rating of at least 3 hours. In addition the existing sealed pipe penetrations will be investigated to see if they meet a fire resistance rating of at least 3 hours. The design of the seals will be based upon, in addition to fire integrity, pressure differential at: css the fire barrier. Each pipe penetration will also be analyzed to determine the affect of the fire seal on the pipe stress at that point. O e 1367 271
., s JAMES A. FITSPATRICK NUCLET.R FOUER PLANT FIRE IIA 7.;J1DS IdiALYSIS SUPPLI. MENTAL DOCKET NO. S0 -333
Reference:
NRC letter of September 22 W/3, Enclosure No. 3 RESPONSE TO NRC COMCERN PF-36 FIRE MATER PIPING SYSTEM co 4 3' g 9 . ou - # Imc Staf f Concern: The fire protection uater system consista of a fire main loop and several individual subsystems. Each subsystem supplies fire suppreccion water to fixed automatic wcter supression system and hose stations for the areas serviced by the subsystem. One subsystem supplies the fixed water supprersion system and backup hose stations in the Screenuell IIone and Turbine Building, and the fixed suppression nystc:aa in the Recctor Building. O ther subsystemn supply the Administrative Building and portions of the Reactor Building. Because of the pipe layout and valve crrangement in the fire water supply system, a single f ailure can i apnir the ability to supply fire suppression water to the automatic uater suppresnion systems and backup manual hose stations .i n some areas at the plant. NRC staU Ponif.lon A separate redundant connection should be provided from che underground fire main to each subsyntm unch that a single failure in the piping system uill. not cause a loss of all fire suppression water to any safety related fire zone. Respanno: Piping will be extended into an in ternal grid system Lith sectionalizing valves. Independent redundant fire water supplies
'(fired suppression or hose stations) are available to all rafety related areas and arranged such that a singte failure will not cause the loss of all suppression unter. The 12-inch internal ,
header will be considered an' extension cf the yard loop as allowed by paragraph 3 (a) of BT2 APCSB 9.5- 1 Appendix A. 3 One fire department connection similar to the one on the, warehouse will be provided outside the t.urbine building. If water is not available to the fire protection headers in the foam room trom the 12 inch internal header, tuo 2 1/2 inch hoses can
,- be run from hydrant No. 08 to the fire department connection to supply the headers from the yard loop.
1367 272
. 'As further protection against co:nplot e loss of fire protect. ion water, hydrant lio. 14, which i.s connected to the 8 inch city water main, uill be replaced with a mitnicipal type hydrant having a4 1/2 inch pumper nozzle. I.lso, the pre: ent check valve number 70 in the warehouse will. be removed. .In the event both fire pumps were out of nt.:vice, or if supplementary uater beyond the capacity of the puraps is required, a fire department pumper truck could take suction from the city water main and supply any part of the entire system.
Figure PF 36-1 shows the system including the fire pitmps, the yard loop, the internal headers, all valve manifolds, all fire protection valves to fi::ed suppression systems and all hose stations. Every hydrant, valve, and hose station has been given an identification number to assist a fire brigrade. A hose stations coding system is explained on the drawings. D (
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1367 273 9 F e O I
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1367 274
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE DOOR SUPERVISION SUPPLEMENTAL DOCKET NO. 50-333
REFERENCE:
NRC Letter of September 22, 1978, Enclosure No. 3 Response to hRC Concern PF-8: Fire Door Supervision NRC Staff Concern: Fire doors protecting safety related areas of the plant are either locked closed; electrically supervised and alarmed in the control room; or are provided with automatic release mechanisms to ensure that they are closed to provide protection as a fire barrier. In the event of a fire an open door will allow the fire to propagate to adjacent areas. An open door can defeat the effectiveness of gas suppression systems for areas so equipped. NRC Staff Position: Fire doors in barriers that separate safety related areas of the plant from other safety related and non-safety related areas; and fire doors in barriers surrounding areas containing large amounts of combustibles should be closed and electrically supervised or locked closed. When such doors are blocked open or when locks and/or electrical supervision systems are inoperative appropriate precautions should be taken.
Response
There are presently 21 s'upervised fire doors in the FitzPatrick Plant. These
.
- doors are supervised by the plant security system.
To comply with the NRC Staff Position, the 20 additional fire doors listed in the attached Table PF-8-1 will be supervised by a new Class A monitoring system. 1367 275
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK UUCLEAR POWER PLANT TABLE PF-8-1 Listin'g of Additional Fire Doors to be Supervised Areas Connected Elevation Location
- 1. Cable Tunnel CT1 258'-0" North End of CTl to Cable Tunnel CT2
- 2. Safety-Related Pump 258'-0" Northwest Corner Room SP2 of SP2 to Cable Tunnel CT2
- 3. Safety-Related Pu=p 258'-0" East End of Wall Room SP2 Separating SP1 to from SP2 Safety-Related Pump Room SP1
- 4. Fire Pump Room FP1 258'-0" Northwest Corner of to Screenwell House Screen House SH1
- 5. Motor Generator Area M61 300'-0" Northwest Corner of to Reactor Building Reactor Building RB1 El 300
~
- 6. Entrance to Stairwell 300'-0" Middle Control Room in Control Room North Wall
- 7. Standby Gas Room S61 272'-0" Southwest Corner to of Standby Cast Room Reactor Building RB1
- 8. Battery Room BR1 272'-0" Middle of South Wall to of BR1 Corridor BR5
- 9. Battery Room BR2 272'-0" Middle of South Wall .
to of BR2 - Cerridor EP5 -
- 10. Battery Room BR3 272'-0" Middle of South Wall to of BR3 Corridor BR5 1367 276
. 2 Areas Connected Elevation Location
- 11. Battery Room BR4 272'-0" Middle of South Wall to ,
of BR4 Corridor BR5
- 12. Emergency Diesel 272'-0" West End of Wall Generator Room EG2 Separating EG2 to from EG3 Emergency Diesel .
Generator Room EG3
- 13. Emergency Diesel 272'-0" Middle of East Wall Generator Room EG1 in EGl to Switchgear Room EG5
. 14. Emergency Diesel 272'-0" Middle of East Wall Generator Room EG-2 of EG2 to Switchgear Room EGS *
- 15. Emergency Diesel 272'-0" Middle of East Wall Generator Room EG3 of EG3 to Switchgear Room EG6
- 16. Emergency Diesel 272'-0" '
Middle of East Wall Generator Room EG4 of EG4 to Switchgear Room EG6
- 17. Switchgear Room EGS 272'-0" East End of Wall to Between EGS and EG6 Switchgear Room EG6
- 18. Between Cable Tunnel 286'-0" South End of Separating Ventilation Rooms Walls
- 19. Relay Room RR1 286'-0" South End of West Wall to of Relay Room Cable Tunnel CT3
- 20. Relay Room RR1 286'-0" Middle of West Wall to of Relay Room .
Cable Tunnel CT4 -
/
1367 277}}